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ARTICLE 43 If a vessel is encountered at sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband which applies to her cargo, the contraband can not be condemned except on payment of compensation; the vessel herself and the remainder of the cargo are not liable to condemnation or to the costs and expenses referred to in Article 41. The same rule applies if the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, or of the declaration of contraband, has had no opportunity of discharging the contraband.

A vessel is deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war, or of a declaration of contraband, if she left a neutral port subsequently to the notification to the Power to which such port belongs of the outbreak of hostilities, or of the declaration of contraband, respectively, provided such notification was made in sufficient time. A vessel is also deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war if she left an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities.

Article 44 is in a sense the continuation and the necessary complement of the previous article and requires neither comment nor justification for present purposes, other than to say that the legitimacy of the seizure which the captor has the right to make in certain circumstances cannot be determined by him, but must be passed upon in a judicial proceeding.

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ARTICLE 44 A vessel which has been stopped on the ground that she is carrying contraband, and which is not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband on board, may, when the circumstances permit, be allowed to continue her voyage if the master is willing to hand over the contraband to the belligerent warship.

The delivery of the contraband must be entered by the captor on the log-book of the vessel stopped, and the master must give the captor duly certified copies of all relevant papers.

The captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband that has been handed over to him under these conditions.

It is believed that the chapter dealing with contraband is satisfactory, if it be taken and its provisions applied in the sense in which they are understood and interpreted in the official report, for doubts and difficulties which might arise from the examination of the text are met and overcome by the clear and precise language of the report and the illustrations which it contains. The explanation contained in the report concerning the radius within which vessels attempting to break blockade are subject to capture harmonizes in fact, if not in theory, Continental and Anglo-American practice, because a careful examination of adjudged cases shows that vessels attempting to enter or to escape from blockaded ports have invariably been captured within the sphere of hostilities, as defined by the Conference and stated in the report. 58 The concession made by Great Britain and the United States, therefore, appears to be rather one of theory than of fact. In the same way, an examination of adjudged cases of capture and confiscation, both of vessels and cargo, shows that the doctrine of continuous voyages, renounced in the case of conditional contraband, is likewise rather a concession of theory than of fact, and that the permission to remove contraband, while permitting the vessel to continue its course, meets what are considered the legitimate rights of the belligerent without too great a disturbance of neutral trade and activity. As in the case of blockade, so in contraband, the Declaration seems to be rather a reconciliation of divergent theories than a compromise of divergent practices, if substance be considered rather than form.

JAMES BROWN Scott. 58 Professor Holland, perhaps the stoutest opponent of the Declaration, seems to concede this in the following passage:

“In defence of the change, it is alleged that of the cases on blockade to be found in the Reports, not one relates to a capture made otherwise than in the neighbourhood of the blockading squadron. Even if this can be shown, it would not prove that no such captures had taken place, or that the mere existence of the rule had not checked blockade-running." (Proposed Changes in Naval Prize Law, 1911, p. 11, footnote.)

(To be concluded in the next number.]

BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

CHANDLER P. ANDERSON, New York, N. Y.
CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, George Washington University.
AMOS S. HERSHEY, Indiana University.
CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, Northwestern University.
GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, Columbia University.
ROBERT LANSING, Washington, D. C.
John BASSETT MOORE, Columbia University.
GEORGE G. WILSON, Harvard University.
THEODORE S. WOOLSEY, Yale University.

Editor in Chief JAMES BROWN Scott, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Washington, D. C.

Secretary of the Board and Business Manager
GEORGE A. Finch, 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

MR. BRYAN AND THE THIRD HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

The motives which led the Czar of Russia to invite the Powers represented at St. Petersburg to an international conference to consider the steps which could be taken to stop the increase of land and naval armaments, to reduce the expenditure which such armaments and their constant increase necessitate and to maintain peace between nations, lie hidden in the archives of the Russian Government, or are known only to the initiated who hitherto have not felt justified in disclosing them. The results of that Conference, which appropriately met at The Hague on May 18, 1899, the birthday of its illustrious and august initiator, are, however, well known and justified the Czar, however exalted, highminded or Utopian his motives may have been. It did not, and in the nature of things it could not, given conditions as they are not what they might be, secure an agreement of the Powers or of any of them to check the growth of armaments or to cut down military and naval budgets. It did, however, something greater. It showed that the nations of the world might meet in conference in times of profound peace to discuss questions of peace and the means by which it might be restored if broken, and maintained if it existed; and it rendered perhaps even a greater service than this by showing that the development of a system of international law, fitted to meet the needs of the nations and to regulate their conduct upon principles of law and justice, was possible.

As a matter of fact, but without going into details, it regulated the conduct of war which it could not abolish by a convention on the laws and customs of war on land. It adapted the Red Cross Convention, more accurately termed the Geneva Convention, for the care of sick and wounded to maritime warfare. It devised a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, providing for temporary tribunals with an easy method of selecting their personnel from a permanent panel of judges, and it supplied a course of arbitral procedure, which it was hoped would be of great service to the nations and which in practice has rendered the services expected. In view of these circumstances it is unnecessary to discuss the question whether the Conference idea and the Conference of 1899 were justified. The first Russian delegate, who was also president of the First Conference, believed that another would be called in the succeeding year and stated his belief to Mr. Andrew D. White, chairman of the American delegation to the Conference. Years slipped by without a call. Russia became engaged in a war with Japan, so that it could not properly take the initiative. In this state of affairs President Roosevelt, at the request of the Interparliamentary Union, which met at St. Louis in connection with the Exposition, sounded the Powers as to their willingness to participate in a Second Conference, in a note bearing the honored signature of John Hay as Secretary of State, and dated October 21, 1904. The replies were favorable, and the Powers were so informed by Mr. Hay in a second note, dated December 16, 1904. The termination of the Russo-Japanese War by the treaty of peace signed at Portsmouth on September 5, 1905, made it possible for the Czar and his advisers to turn their thoughts to peace. President Roosevelt generously relinquished his initiative, and Russia issued a call for a Second Conference.

The First Conference was international in the sense that it deliberated

BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

CHANDLER P. ANDERSON, New York, N. Y.
CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, George Washington University.
Amos S. HERSHEY, Indiana University.
CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, Northwestern University.
GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, Columbia University.
ROBERT LANSING, Washington, D. C.
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Columbia University.
GEORGE G. WILSON, Harvard University.
THEODORE S. WOOLSEY, Yale University.

Editor in Chief JAMES BROWN SCOTT, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Washington, D. C.

Secretary of the Board and Business Manager
GEORGE A. FINCH, 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

MR. BRYAN AND THE THIRD HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE

The motives which led the Czar of Russia to invite the Powers represented at St. Petersburg to an international conference to consider the steps which could be taken to stop the increase of land and naval armaments, to reduce the expenditure which such armaments and their constant increase necessitate and to maintain peace between nations, lie hidden in the archives of the Russian Government, or are known only to the initiated who hitherto have not felt justified in disclosing them. The results of that Conference, which appropriately met at The Hague on May 18, 1899, the birthday of its illustrious and august initiator, are, however, well known and justified the Czar, however exalted, highminded or Utopian his motives may have been. It did not, and in the

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