So far as the present question is concerned, the Act is not materially different from-certainly not less stringent than the Act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 1213, c. 1012). The Circuit Court of Appeals in the present case followed its own decision in Taylor v. United States, 152 Fed. Rep. 1, which was based upon the Act of 1903, and in which it was held that while the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 1084, c. 551) had been construed as restricted to "alien immigrants," the Act of 1903 had been so framed as to cover aliens whether immigrants or not. In behalf of the petitioner it is contended that the court erred in its judgment as to the purpose of Congress in modifying the language of previous Acts on adopting the revision of 1903, and that this Act and the Act of 1907, as well as those that preceded them, when properly construed, refer to "alien immigrants" exclusively.

The Acts of 1903 and 1907 being revisions or compilations (with some modifications) of previous Acts pertaining to the same general subject-matter, a reference list, in chronological order, is for convenience set forth in the margin.2

taken into custody and deported to the country whence he came at any time within three years after the date of his entry into the United States. 34 Stat. 904.

Sec. 21. That in case the Secretary of Commerce and Labor shall be satisfied that an alien has been found in the United States in violation of this Act, or that an alien is subject to deportation under the provisions of this Act or of any law of the United States, he shall cause such alien within the period of three years after landing or entry therein to be taken into custody and returned to the country whence he came, as provided by section twenty of this Act, . . 34 Stat. 905.

2 Immigration Acts: Rev. Stat. Title "Immigration," §§ 2158-2164.

"An Act supplementary to the Acts in relation to immigration," approved March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477, c. 141.

"An Act to regulate Immigration," approved August 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214, c. 376. "An Act to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia," approved February 26, 1885, 23 Stat. 332, c. 164.

"An Act to amend an Act to prohibit the importation and immigration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its Territories, and the District of Columbia," approved February 23, 1887, 24 Stat. 414, c. 220.

“An Act making appropriations to supply deficiencies," etc., approved October 19, 1888, containing clauses amending Acts of February 26, 1885, and of February 23, 1887, 25 Stat. 565, 566, 567, c. 1210.

"An Act in amendment to the various Acts relative to immigration and the importation of aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor," approved March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, c. 551.

In a number of cases in the Federal District and Circuit Courts, it was held that the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1891, and the Acts that preceded it, relating to the exclusion and deportation of persons arriving in the United States from foreign countries, were confined in their operation to "alien immigrants;" and that this term did not include aliens previously resident in this country, who had temporarily departed with the intention of returning. In re Panzara (1892), 51 Fed. Rep. 275; In re Martorelli (1894), 63 Fed. Rep. 437; In re Maiola (1895), 67 Fed. Rep. 114; In re Ota (1899), 96 Fed. Rep. 487. The same view was expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Moffitt v. United States (1904), 128 Fed. Rep. 375.

Upon the reasoning and authority of these cases, a similar construction was given to the Act of 1903 in United States v. Aultman Co. (1906), 143 Fed. Rep. 922 (affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 148 Fed. Rep. 1022), the attention of the court apparently not having been directed to the question whether any significant change had been made in the law by the revision of 1903.

But in Taylor v. United States (1907), 152 Fed. Rep. 1, which was a review by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of a judgment of conviction upon an indictment for a misdemeanor for permitting an alien sailor to land in New York, contrary to § 18 of the Act of 1903, which made it the duty of the owners, officers, and agents of any vessel bringing an alien to the United States to adopt due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien, etc., the court reviewed the changes made by Congress in the revision of 1903, "following decisions of the courts which tended to relax the provisions of earlier Acts," and, finding that § 18 of the Act of 1903 substantially reënacted a part of 8 of the Act of 1891, employing the term "alien" in the place of the term

"An Act to facilitate the enforcement of the immigration and contract-labor laws of the United States," approved March 3, 1893, 27 Stat. 569, c. 206.

"An Act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses," etc., approved August 18, 1894, containing clauses amending immigration laws 28 Stat. 372, 390, 391, c. 301.

"An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States," approved March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213, c. 1012.

"An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States," approved February 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898, c. 1134.

"An Act to amend an Act entitled 'An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States,' approved February twentieth, nineteen hundred and seven,” approved March 26, 1910, 36 Stat. 263, c. 128.

"alien immigrant," and that similar changes were made in other parts of the Act, came to the conclusion that the change evinced an intent of Congress to use the word "alien" in its ordinary and unqualified meaning. This decision was reviewed in this court, and the judgment was reversed, but upon the ground (207 U. S. 120, 124) that § 18 did not apply to the ordinary case of a sailor deserting while on shore leave.

Shortly after the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Taylor Case, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Rodgers v. United States, ex rel. Buchsbaum (1907), 152 Fed. Rep. 346, held that the provision of § 2 of the Act of 1903, enumerating the classes of aliens to be excluded from admission into the United States, and amongst them "persons afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease," and the provision of § 19, for the deportation of "aliens brought into this country in violation of law," could not be construed so as to extend to aliens domiciled in this country; affirming In re Buchsbaum, 141 Fed. Rep. 221. In United States v. Nakashima (1908), 160 Fed. Rep. 842, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the same view of the Act of 1903 expressed in the Aultman and Buchsbaum cases, rejecting that adopted by the Court of Appeals in Taylor v. United States.

On the other hand, the latter decision has been followed in a number of cases arising under the Act of 1907, which in this respect does not materially differ from the Act of 1903. Ex parte Petterson (1908), 166 Fed. Rep. 536; United States v. Hook (1908), 166 Fed. Rep. 1007; United States v. Villet (1909), 173 Fed. Rep. 500; Ex parte Hoffman (1910), 179 Fed. Rep. 839 (being the case now under review); Sibray v. United States (1911), 185 Fed. Rep. 401; United States v. Williams (1911), 186 Fed. Rep. 354; United States v. Sprung (1910), 187 Fed. Rep. 903; Frick v. Lewis (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 693; Siniscalchi v. Thomas (1912), 195 Fed. Rep. 701. Contra, Redfern v. Halpert (1911), 186 Fed. Rep. 150; and see United States v. Rodgers (1911), 191 Fed. Rep. 970.

The authority of Congress over the general subject-matter is plenary; it may exclude aliens altogether, or prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come into or remain in this country. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 603; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547.

The question, therefore, is not the power of Congress, but its intent and purpose as expressed in legislation. The cases that have held the immigration Acts not to apply to domiciled aliens returning after a

temporary absence have been rested in part upon the use of the term "immigration" in the titles of the respective Acts, and in part upon the employment of that or similar terms in the enacting clauses.

As authority for a liberal interpretation of the Acts, two decisions of this court have at times been referred to, which have, however, little, if any, present pertinency. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, held that the Contract-Labor Law of February 26, 1885 (23 Stat. 332, c. 164), did not forbid a contract for employing a clergyman. The Act was construed according to its spirit rather than its letter, and in view of its title, the evil intended to be remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to Congress for legislation, and the reports of committees in each House, it was held to be the legislative purpose simply to stay the influx of cheap unskilled labor. Since this decision, an express exception has been made of "ministers of any religious denomination." In Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, this court held that the provision of the Chinese Restriction Act of May 6, 1882 (22 Stat. 58, c. 126, § 6) as amended by Act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat. 115, c. 220), requiring every Chinese merchant coming into this country to procure and produce a certificate from the Chinese Government, did not apply to Chinese merchants already domiciled in the United States, who, having left this country for some temporary purpose, sought to reënter it upon their return to their homes here. But this decision was based in part upon the language of the particular statute and in part upon the fact that our treaty with China gave to Chinese merchants domiciled in the United States the right of egress and ingress, and the other rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed in this country by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.

The legislative history of the Act of 1903 demonstrates that the elimination of the word "immigrant" and other equivalent qualifying phrases was done deliberately. The bill originated in the House of Representatives, where the committee report declared that its general purpose was "to bring together in one Act scattered legislation heretofore enacted in regard to the immigration of aliens into the United States to amend such portions thereof as have been found, either as the result of experience in administering the law or of judicial decision, to be inadequate to accomplish the purpose plainly intended thereby; and to add thereto such further provisions as seem to be demanded by the consensus of enlightened public opinion." H. Rept. 982, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. The report of the Senate committee likewise

explained the bill as being in the main a reënactment of existing laws on the subject of immigration, stating "The necessity for such reënactment is due in part to the fact that, as a result of judicial decisions, as well as of administrative experience, the efficiency of such laws to accomplish the evident purpose of their enactment has been shown to be materially less than appeared to be the case at the time of such enactment, and therefore a new expression of the legislative will upon the subject of immigration has become desirable." The Senate inserted the word "immigrant" in one place, but it was eliminated in conference. S. Rept. 2119, 57th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Doc. 62, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess.; Cong. Record, Vol. 36, p. 2949, 57th Cong., 2d Sess.

Counsel for petitioner cites the debates in Congress as indicating that the Act was not understood to refer to any others than immigrants. But the unreliability of such debates as a source from which to discover the meaning of the language employed in an Act of Congress has been frequently pointed out (United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 318, and cases cited), and we are not disposed to go beyond the reports of the committees. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 463; Binns v. United States, 194 U. S. 486, 495; Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S. 1, 19.

It is earnestly insisted that the omission of the word "immigrant" is of little consequence, because it does not apply at all to the excluding section. It is said that the words "alien immigrant" did not occur in the acts of 1875, 1882, 1885, or 1887, and did not occur in the excluding section of the Act of 1891, but only in its eighth section-that which related to manifesting. But in the Act of 1893, "To facilitate the enforcement," etc., each section was made to apply to "alien immigrants." The force of the argument pretty well disappears when we recall that it was in spite of the absence of the word "immigrant" in the excluding clause that courts had held that because the word occurred in the title and in other provisions of the pertinent Acts, the excluding clauses likewise were confined to immigrants, in the sense of aliens who had no domicile in this country. Of course, there were other considerations; the extreme hardship in individual cases where the aliens had long been resident in this country, and the practically uncontrolled authority of the executive officers of the government, being among them. But, whatever considerations may have combined to bring about the judicial interpretation of the Acts that preceded the revision of 1903, the committee reports already cited sufficiently show that the language of the