in the agreeable anticipations of the progress of free principles of government, of the intimate union and brilliant prospects of the states of our new world. I presumed, I said, it was not necessary to bring to his mind the high interest felt by the United States in their welfare-an interest in which I deeply participated, and desired, as much as he possibly could, the happiness of our Spanish American brethren. What would be the determination of the United States at the period of the commencement of Congress, it was impossible for me to foresee; whether they would consider it a seasonable moment for doing that which was so much desired, was a point I could not resolve.

Six months later a request came from the first Latin American minister ever received by the United States of America, Manuel Torres, of Colombia (see the article on the "Pan Americanism of Henry Clay" in the Bulletin of the Pan American Union, May, 1913), for the United States to announce the Monroe Doctrine:

The glory and the satisfaction of being the first to recognize the independence of a new republic in the south of this continent belongs, in all respect and considerations, to the Government of the United States. The present political state of New Spain requires the most earnest attention of the Government of the United States. There has occurred a project, long since formed, to establish a monarchy in Mexico, on purpose to favor the views of the Holy Alliance in the New World; this is a new reason which ought to determine the President of the United States no longer to delay a measure which will naturally establish an American Alliance, capable of counteracting the projects of the European Powers, and of protecting our republican institutions. My government has entire confidence in the prudence of the President, in his disposition to favor the cause of the liberty and of the independence of South America, and his great experience in the management of public business.-(17th Congress, 1st Session, No. 327-Manuel Torres to the Secretary of State, Philadelphia, Nov. 30th, 1821.)

It will be noted that this was written over two years before the Monroe Doctrine was actually declared on December 2, 1823.

The following extract from an instruction from Secretary of State John Quincy Adams to the first United States minister to Colombia, Richard C. Anderson, dated May 27, 1823, six months before the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, continues the trend of events:

The Colombian Government, at various times, have manifested a desire that the United States should take some further and active part

in obtaining the recognition of their independence by the European Governments, and particularly by Great Britain. This has been done even before it was solicited. All the Ministers of the United States in Europe have for many years been instructed to promote the cause, by any means consistent with propriety, and adapted to their end, at the respective places of their residence. The formal proposal of a concerted recognition was made to Great Britain before the Congress of Aix-laChapelle. At the request of Mr. Torres, on his dying bed [he died July 15, 1822, at Philadelphia], and signified to us after his decease, Mr. Rush was instructed to give every aid in his power, without offense to the British Government, to obtain the admission of Mr. Ravenga [see Mr. Brent's despatch regarding Mr. Ravenga, printed above]; of which instruction, we have recent assurances from Mr. Rush that he is constantly mindful. Our own recognition, undoubtedly, opened all the ports of Europe to the Colombian flag, and your mission to Colombia, as well as those to Buenos Aires and Chile, cannot fail to stimulate the cabinets of maritime Europe, if not by the liberal motives that influenced us, at least, by selfish impulses, to a direct, simple and unconditional recognition. We shall pursue this policy steadily through all the changes to be foreseen, of European affairs. There is every reason to believe that the preponderating tendency of the war in Spain, will be to promote the universal recognition of the South American Governments, and at all events, our course will be to promote it by whatever influence we may possess.

In this connection the following extract from a letter from Lafayette to Henry Clay, dated December 29, 1826, is interesting:

How do you find Mr. Canning's assertion in the British Parliament, that he, Mr. Canning, has called to existence the new Republics of the American Hemisphere? when it is known by what example, what declaration, and what feelings of jealousy the British Government has been dragged into a slow, gradual, and conditional recognition of that independence. (Vol. IV, page 154, Works of Clay, 1856 edition.)

From the foregoing it will be deduced that

(1) The South Americans asked for the Monroe Doctrine;

(2) Their doing so gave it, from its inception, a Pan American nature; (3) Their asking for it furnishes an additional argument for its purely American, as contrasted with its supposedly Americo-British, origin.

(4) Such early action on the part of Latin America should not be lost sight of in present day applications of the Monroe Doctrine.

The following quotation from a pamphlet published in 1902 by the

late William L. Scruggs, formerly United States minister to Colombia and Venezuela, supports the foregoing sentiments of Lafayette:

It has been said, and repeated often enough to gain some degree of credence, that the first suggestion of the Monroe Doctrine had an European origin. The claim is that the British Premier, Mr. Canning, suggested it to Mr. Rush, during their personal conference in September, 1823, relative to the designs of the so-called "Holy Alliance" upon the newly enfranchised Spanish-American republics.

The absurdity of this claim is too manifest for serious consideration. In the first place, the Canning-Rush conference did not take place until two months after the date of Mr. Adams' note to Mr. Rush nor until a month and a half after Mr. Adams' oral declarations to the Russian Minister. Hence the impossibility that the suggestion could have come from Mr. Canning and at the time and place indicated; and it has never been intimated, much less asserted, that it came from him at any time prior to that. In the second place, we have Mr. Canning's own words in refutation of the claim, which, in the absence of rebutting evidence, ought to be conclusive. In a letter addressed to the British Minister at Madrid, dated December 21, 1823 (see Stapleton's Canning and his Times, p. 395; Wharton's Digest, Sec. 57) he uses this language:

"Monarchy in Mexico and Brazil would cure the evils of universal democracy, and prevent the drawing of a demarcation which I most dread, America versus Europe."

And further on, in the same letter, speaking of his conference with Mr. Rush, he says: "While I was yet hesitating, in September last, what shape to give the proposed declaration and protest" (against the designs of the Holy Alliance) "I sounded Mr. Rush, the American Minister here, as to his powers and disposition to join in any step which we might take to prevent a hostile enterprise by European powers against Spanish America. He had no powers; but he would have taken upon himself to join us if we would have begun by recognizing the independence of the Spanish-American States. This we could not do, and so we went on without. But I have no doubt that his report to his Government of this sounding, which he probably represented as an overture, had something to do in hastening the explicit declaration of the President."

This letter, it will be observed, was written nineteen days after the date of Mr. Monroe's message to Congress.

The point is that Mr. Canning deliberately placed himself on record as opposed to the Doctrine enunciated in both the message and the note, and hence could not have inspired either.

CHARLES LYON CHANDLER.

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON OF FEBRUARY 26, 1909

PART II *

UNNEUTRAL SERVICE

Chapter 3, devoted to unneutral service, has only three articles; but they are important and were debated perhaps with more spirit than any other articles of the Declaration. The general subject is one which has been treated by Lord Stowell in a series of masterly judgments, and it is believed that an examination of two or three of them would form the best introduction to this chapter.

In the case of the Carolina (4 C. Robinson, 256), decided in 1802, a Swedish vessel captured at the taking of Alexandria and lost, while in the possession of the captors, by accident and stress of weather, before the validity of the capture was passed upon by the court, had served as a transport in the French expedition to Alexandria and, upon suit brought by its owners, Lord Stowell said:

If an act of force, exercised by one belligerent on a neutral ship or person, is to be deemed a sufficient justification for any act done by him, contrary to the known duties of the neutral character, there would be an end of any prohibition under the law of nations to carry contraband, or to engage in any other hostile act. If any loss is sustained in such service, the neutral yielding to such demands, must seek redress against the Government that has imposed the restraint upon him. He has no right to expect that the British Government should pay for the injustice of its public enemy. If this vessel had been taken in delicto, I should have felt no hesitation in saying, that she must have been subject to condemnation. Whether the troops were received on board voluntarily, or involuntarily, could make no difference.59

In the case of the Friendship (6 C. Robinson, 420), decided in 1807, an American ship was engaged as a transport in the military service of the enemy. In addition to a small cargo, there were ninety passengers,

*The first part of this article appeared in the April 1914 JOURNAL, pp. 274–329. 59 4 C. Robinson, 260.

of whom one was an American, five French merchants, and the rest French military officers and mariners. To the objection that the French passengers were not transported for a specific active service of the enemy, his lordship said:

The substance of the thing is this, whether they are vessels hired by the agents of the Government, for the purpose of conveying soldiers or stores in the service of the state? That is the substance; and it signified nothing whether the men so conveyed are to be put into action on an immediate expedition or not. The mere shifting of draughts in detachments, and the conveyance of stores from one place to another, is an ordinary employment of transport vessels, and it is a distinction totally unimportant, whether this or that case may be connected with the immediate active service of the enemy. In removing forces from distant settlements, there may be no intention of immediate action: but still the general importance of having troops conveyed to places, where it is convenient that they should be collected, either for present, or future. use, is what constitutes the object and employment of transport vessels.60 And in a later passage of the same judgment, his lordship says:

Under these circumstances, I am of opinion that this vessel is to be considered as a French transport. It would be a very different case if a vessel appeared to be carrying only a few individual invalided soldiers, or discharged sailors, taken on board by chance, and at their own charge. Looking at the description given of the men on board, I am satisfied that they are still as effective members of the French marine as any can be. Shall it be said then that this is an innoxious trade, or that it is an innocent occupation of the vessel? What are arms and ammunition in comparison with men, who may be going to be conveyed, perhaps, to renew their activity on our own shores? They are persons in a military capacity, who could not have made their escape in a vessel of their own country. Can it be allowed that neutral vessels shall be at liberty to step in and make themselves a vehicle for the liberation of such persons, whom the chance of war has made, in some measure, prisoners in a distant port of their own colonies in the West Indies? It is asked, will you lay down a principle that may be carried to the length of preventing a military officer, in the service of the enemy, from finding his way home in a neutral vessel from America to Europe? If he was going merely as an ordinary passenger, as other passengers do, and at his own expense, the question would present itself in a very different form. Neither this Court, nor any other British Tribunal has ever laid down the principle to that extent. This is a case differently composed. It is the case of a vessel letting herself out in a distinct manner, under a contract with the

60 6 C. Robinson, 426.