on the other hand, she has gained a number of safeguards for her neutral commerce, and a number of limitations of the alleged belligerent rights of other Powers. There is indeed a naval school which is bitterly hostile to the ratification of the Declaration, on the ground that by it England gives up certain national claims of long standing and concedes certain rights against which she has long struggled. But the claims we give up have not been effectively exercised by us, the rights we concede have regularly been practised against us.91 Perhaps the view of a person foreign to the controversy but versed in international affairs of the greatest pith and moment may be quoted, especially as he considers the Declaration, not merely by its provisions, which he considers both wise and just, but as a part of the large movement which is taking visible form and shape under our very eyes. In an address on the Declaration of London before the American Society of International Law, Mr. Root said: This review of the origin and nature of the Declaration of London and of the attendant conditions exhibits the true significance of the Declaration. It is not merely a code of useful rules. It is necessary to the existence of the International Prize Court and therefore to the existence of any Judicial Arbitral Court. It is the one indispensable forward step without which no practical progress can now be made in the further development of a system of peaceable settlement of international disputes. It is to be hoped that a fuller realization of its farreaching importance will soon lead to its acceptance. I cannot avoid the conviction that a broad-minded and statesmanlike treatment of this constructive measure for practical progress in international relations, is of greater value than merely benevolent but academic declarations in favor of peace which are to be found in general treaties of arbitration and in diplomatic correspondence and in public speeches. Indeed, the whole practice of making general treaties of arbitration cannot fail to be discredited by the failure, if there is to be a failure, of the Prize Court Convention, for the cynical are sure to question the sincerity of general treaties of arbitration covering the whole field of international relations between nations which refuse to assent to this convention covering but a small part of the same field." The subjects codified by the Declaration have bothered and perplexed foreign offices and text writers ever since international law has been a 91 Quoted from address of Hon. Elihu Root, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1912), pp. 11-12. 92 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1912), pp. 14–15. science. Differences of time and place, as well as the means of warfare, have resulted in a divergence of views and a difference of practice which seemed impossible of reconciliation or of compromise. National prejudice and bias and a supposed benefit resulting from the maintenance of a particular doctrine and its recognition by international law, have converted philosophic observers and writers of authority into advocates rather than scientific expounders of a reasonable and therefore acceptable system of international law; the uncertainty of the law and the lack of uniformity in its interpretation and application have confused a subject sufficiently complicated in itself, and have paralyzed industry and commerce, if they have not wholly crushed them. It may well be that the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence is more precise and logical in theory and more efficient in practice than Continental theory and practice, and that the interests of the belligerent would be better served by its universal acceptance. But the neutral desires certainty and uniformity rather than logical precision, and a uniform practice is to him a first necessity, for, as pointed out by Lord Mansfield, it is more important that a rule of law be established and known than that it be correct, for industry and commerce will accommodate themselves to the rule of law if known, and the embarrassments, risks and delays incident to a state of confusion will be obviated. The recent Naval Conference composed of specialists did not meet for an academic purpose. It was not their avowed object, although it has been the result of their labors, to produce at once a reasonable and a scientific code. Their purpose was eminently practical; namely, to reach an agreement upon certain fundamental doctrines of international law, so that the International Court of Prize established by the Second Hague Peace Conference should have for its guidance and interpretation a code of law truly international because accepted by the community of nations; for the nations were unwilling to entrust to the jurists composing the Court the codification of principles of law which they themselves had been unable to codify, and to permit the judges to harmonize divergences of practice which had baffled statesmen, diplomats, publicists, and judges for centuries. They were unwilling to take a "leap in the dark," to use a familiar expression, although willing to proceed from the known to the unknown. Leaving out the differences of doctrine and the divergences of practice, the Conference was confronted by a difficulty which has always existed and which must exist as long as war is a recognized means of settling international controversies, namely, the seemingly irreconcilable interests of the belligerent, on the one hand, and of the neutral on the other, for the purpose of the belligerent is to crush the enemy by a direct blow, if possible, or by the slower but not less sure method of impoverishment and starvation. If the enemy is forced to rely upon his immediate resources, he may soon be exhausted and the war come to an abrupt end; for our experience in the Civil War shows that the nation in the field cannot in times of storm and stress create supplies of arms and ammunition necessary for a prolonged contest. If the neutral be permitted to supply arms and ammunition, he strengthens the army of resistance, and, if in addition he furnish food and clothing and the necessities of life, he not only supports the army in the field, but he recruits it by withdrawing labor from the factory and field, thus permitting it to enter the army and remove pressure upon non-combatants to conclude peace. The Civil War was not won upon the battlefield, as the layman would have us believe. Lee's army did not surrender at Appomattox because it was wasted in numbers and lacked arms and ammunition. The South fell because its resources were exhausted, its industry found no outlet, and its ports were closed to the neutral. Its courage was undaunted, its soldiers, although reduced in number, were eager for the conflict; its leaders, trained in the field and enriched by four years of experience, were able and willing to continue the contest; but the armies were destitute, the supplies were exhausted, and the empty stomachs overcame the indomitable will, the strong arm and the unconquerable purpose. The blockade of the Southern ports left the South dependent upon itself, and it fell. As the purpose of war is to overcome resistance, it is selfevident that the belligerent will not willingly renounce a right or a practice which weakens the enemy, and he will not, if he can prevent it, permit the neutral to become a base of supplies for the enemy. He will, therefore, subject neutral trade and commerce to close supervision; he will seize and confiscate arms and ammunition destined for the enemy port; he will prevent, as far as neutrals permit, trade in objects susceptible of warlike use; he will blockade enemy ports and prevent the in gress of supplies to replace the losses of war; and he will prohibit the egress of merchandise with which the wasted resources may be repaired. He will blockade the ports and isolate his enemy, and the contest thus limited will be a trial of endurance between the belligerents. On the other hand, the neutral will insist, and properly, that his industry and commerce be not ruined because two nations have been minded to break the peace, and he will maintain that he be not made a party to the war and suffer its losses and privations, unless by his own consent. The belligerents and the neutrals are thus opposed in their interests, for the belligerent seeks to restrain the industry and commerce of the neutral and to bring the enemy to terms, whereas the neutral proclaims the untrammeled freedom of trade. Both views cannot prevail. The past belongs to the belligerent; the neutral claims the present and the future as his own. A balance must be struck. And it is no small tribute to the London Naval Conference that it considered the rights and duties of both parties and devised a code reasonably acceptable to both. JAMES BROWN SCOTT. BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CHANDLER P. ANDERSON, New York, N. Y. CHARLES NOBLE GREGORY, George Washington University. AMOS S. HERSHEY, Indiana University. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, Northwestern University. GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, Columbia University. ROBERT LANSING, Washington, D. C. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Columbia University. Editor in Chief JAMES BROWN SCOTT, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D. C. Secretary of the Board of Editors and Business Manager of the JOURNAL GEORGE A. FINCH, 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C. EDITORIAL COMMENT SECRETARY BRYAN'S PEACE PLAN As the JOURNAL has devoted two editorial comments to Secretary Bryan's peace plan-that is to say, the conventions negotiated by him as Secretary of State with foreign countries, providing for commissions of inquiry to pass upon international disputes which may arise between them-it is not necessary to restate the terms of the treaties or the advantages which are expected to flow from their ratification and application in practice. The JOURNAL, however, is pleased to print the following list of countries, chronologically arranged, which have indicated |