the white ensign would render the same service in the Atlantic. The east coast of the whole American continent would be made safe by the only European Power which has explicitly recognized the Monroe Doctrine, and it would be perfectly possible for the United States to economize on her coasts defenses in the Atlantic. The condition is, of course, that the British fleet on its waters should be kept up to a strength that precludes any possible danger of attack across the Atlantic.

The naval burden which, through such a division of labor, would fall on the British Empire is much heavier than that assumed by the United States. Furthermore, it must for many different reasons, which cannot be detailed here, be borne primarily by the United Kingdom. Its close proximity to the armed continent of Europe makes it even imperative for Great Britain to provide for a not inconsiderable home defense army in order to be able to repel a possible invader who, however great the naval armament may be, under specially unfavorable meteorological conditions, might manage to escape the British fleet. In view of these considerations, justice and equity make it seem appropriate that any contribution which the British Dominions may think it their duty to offer to the common work of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, be it in money or in ships, should be applied toward lightening the heavy burden of the British Empire.

In the opinion of the writer, much confusion of thought would be avoided if the appellation "British Empire" was reserved to that portion of the British realm over which the Imperial Parliament at Westminster has any real authority. It comprises the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with all the Crown colonies, India, Egypt, and all the other dependencies and protectorates. Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are de facto outside the proper sphere of any imperial authority, and must for practical reasons continue to be so, unless unsolvable questions of race and immigration shall unavoidably shatter the whole imperial fabric. But notwithstanding the lack of any central machinery for the co-ordination of the self-governing peoples who cluster round the symbol of the British crown, naval co-operation between the five Dominions and the United Kingdom appears more practical than, let us say, between Australia and the United States. A combination of the naval efforts of the British

peoples seems, so to speak, to be in the natural order of things. Their display in the Atlantic under one single supreme command has, besides, a very high ethical purpose to fulfill. There can be no doubt that the United Kingdom even to-day shows a much greater proportion of jingoes than either the United States or the British Dominions. It is of the highest importance for the success of the great pacifying task of the Anglo-Saxon combination, with which these lines are concerned, that this ugly blot on the character of the beloved motherland of self-government should be eradicated. It is a mission which can best be accomplished by those daughter-nations whose growth to full independence is of so recent date that the mother has not yet lost the habit of listening to their voices. Surely the old English spirit, which has created the wonderful domains of the Anglo-Saxon world by fostering the natural tendency to self-reliance and self-help inherent in every real man, is not yet dead among the inhabitants of those small islands in the North Sea which form the center of the greatest Empire that ever was. If such is the case, the mother will be proud of her daughters when they, as grownup sister-nations, tell her that their co-operation can only be had at the price of making the family policy worth while for all its members.

Now none of the Dominions have the slightest interest in the European entanglements of the United Kingdom. The overwhelming majority of the citizens of the Dominions are strongly and rightly opposed to lending their support to any policy which possibly might involve the employment of their direct or indirect contributions to a British navy for purposes quite outside their concern. If, therefore, the statesmen of Great Britain are sincere in their so oftenly expressed desires to curtail the heavy naval and military expenditures of the United Kingdom, the first thing they ought to do is to revert to that policy of splendid isolation from European political squabbles which in the past has so well served British interests.

As soon as the whole might of the British navy is exclusively reserved for keeping the peace of the Atlantic, none of the Dominions worthy of the name of Anglo-Saxon, which stands for fairness and justice between man and man, will stand aloof. Made secure in the Pacific by the American fleet, Australia and New Zealand can cease to squander millions on the maintenance of citizen armies, as unnecessary as they would be

inadequate if the American fleet did not control the Pacific. The navies of Australia and New Zealand would find their proper sphere in the Persian Gulf and for showing the British flag wherever the Australasian situation should require it. Their naval harbors would always be open to the American fleet. Canada, which has to thank the United States for the safety of her Pacific coast, would be fair both to its southern neighbor and to the motherland by assuming her part of the burden of the Atlantic. If she devoted the millions she now wastes on a militia as useless from a military point of view as it is superfluous from any political consideration to the upkeep of the British navy she would materially assist the United Kingdom and openly proclaim to all the world how firmly her interests are bound with those of the United States.

The idea that the Dominions should keep military forces which could be employed in India is one of those confusions of the British mind which sooner or later would wreck the British Empire. The Dominions can have no moral right to shut out Indians from their frontiers unless they keep outside the British Empire and leave the United Kingdom well alone in its complex task of looking after its many millions of different

races.

The natural complement of the Anglo-Saxon policy of limiting any active interference to the keeping of the peace on the two great oceans is a British withdrawal from the Mediterranean. In reality it is already an accomplished fact. The few British warships which ply its unruly waters represent no serious strategic factor. An increase of their number to anything corresponding to the rival fleets of its riverain powers would mean so serious a financial responsibility for the people of Great Britain that it is not likely to take place in spite of all the talk of that section of the British public which is unable to see that the European situation has changed since Nelson's time. Yet an explicit declaration of withdrawal from the Mediterranean is necessary. The presence of any number of British warships there, in excess of the local requirements of the British possessions, is incompatible with the avowed intention of the British peoples not to interfere with European politics.

The Mediterranean is of no particular value to the Dominions, and even to the British Empire it is only of secondary importance. If the British fleet is unable to guarantee the safety of its blue waves, the route

round the Cape of Good Hope has to be sufficient for imperial purposes. But as the co-operation between the British peoples and the United States would guarantee both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the French possessions from oversea attack, the chances are that the shorter route to India always would be open. France would be able to concentrate her available naval resources in the Mediterranean, where she can count upon the co-operation of both Spain and Greece. The former has identical interests in always keeping open the communications with North Africa. The latter could never throw in her interests with both of the Mediterranean Powers of the Triple Alliance. To further facilitate France's task it would be in the true interest of the British Empire to accompany her withdrawal from the Mediterranean by removing its objection to the opening of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the Russian fleet. As long as militarism holds its sway over Europe, France and Russia must march together. France has now reached the climax of her expansion. There is nothing left which she can henceforth hope to lay her hands upon. Syria, upon which French chauvinists sometimes cast longing eyes, is perfectly capable and willing to take care of herself in case the Turkish Empire should fall asunder. It is therefore difficult to conceive of a repetition of the old French antagonism toward England. On the other hand, there would be no wheat-ships from Odessa if Russia became hostile. As long as France and Russia are allied they are bound to act in conjunction with regard to the bulk of those British foodsupplies which pass the Straits of Gibraltar. In this respect the possession of Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt is a valuable British contribution toward the safeguarding of those Mediterranean communications which really matter for the United Kingdom. Apart from adequate localized defenses these Mediterranean possessions of the British Empire are mainly secured by the inevitable interplay of rival European interests.

As for the pretended danger to India in case the Russian Black Sea fleet were able to enter the Mediterranean, the foregoing considerations have already given this side of the question its true importance. But as a general proposition, the present Viceroy of India, who possesses special qualifications for his judgment, having been both British Ambassador in St. Petersburg and head of the permanent service in Downing Street, was undoubtedly right when he publicly stated his conviction that a

Russian intention to attack India has never really existed. At any rate, there is no fear of such an aggression to-day. A Russian attack on India will always be impossible unless aided by the Indian peoples themselves. They are already to-day much further advanced toward self-government than the great mass of the Russian people. There is no likelihood whatever that they would prefer to exchange the gradually relaxing rule of the British Raj for the tyranny of the Czar.

In order to win the full and unstinted support of the Dominions, Great Britain ought also to release herself from those treaties which imply armed interference on the European continent. Such a step will, more than anything else, convince the outside world of the absolute rectitude and unselfishness of the Anglo-Saxon co-operation. It will give the distrusting peoples of Europe a tangible proof of the sincerity of the British intentions. The organization of the British army can be adapted to colonial purposes exclusively. Quite apart from these considerations, it is difficult to conceive how any serious political or military thinker could in our age have contemplated the employment of the expeditionary force on the battlefields of Belgium or France. The telegraph would send the news of its disembarkation on the European continent to every corner of the British Empire and so flame the spirit of unrest wherever it may be smoldering.

As a matter of fact, the openly avowed desires of the powerful military circles in Great Britain to interfere on the Continent are at the back of the latest increase of Europe's armaments. It may not be surprising that these desires should have found a warm welcome among the rank and file of the Tories who look to conscription as the best means to "discipline" the discontented working-men. Nor is it astonishing that their unscrupulous leaders saw a legitimate party weapon in the German scare. The disquieting feature of the situation is that the military caste has also succeeded in making the Liberals believe that England needs France more than France needs England. During the Moroccan crisis of 1911 it was the leading Liberals who pronounced those ridiculously exaggerated and grossly unfair speeches which are the main cause of the revival of French chauvinism and German popular hatred of England. Thus the latter really reaps what she has sown.

On the whole the German people may well be excused. They at