least have enough sense to understand that the sending of a gunboat with a crew of a hundred men to Agadir could not possibly aim at anything else than to direct French public opinion on the necessity of fair play in Morocco, already endangered by the contradictory tactics of the three foreign ministers who succeeded one another in Paris in the space of less than four months: To the Germans at large the British outburst was incomprehensible. Yet the Kaiser ought to bear the full share of his responsibility. For years the wearer of the shining armor has been studiously nursing the warlike temper of a people which for generations has passed through the mill of universal military service.

The objection that a refusal to defend the neutrality of Belgium would ultimately involve serious dangers to Great Britain cannot be taken seriously. Germany could not afford to conquer and keep either Belgium or Holland. The modern world knows, or at least ought to know, that nationalities can no longer be absorbed and the German Government has already enough troubles of this kind on its hands. It has had large experience of what nationalist parties mean in its Danes, its Guelphs, its Alsatians, and its Poles. It is unthinkable that it should wish to weaken the dwindling monarchical majority by making it possible for a new Belgian or Dutch party to swell the ranks of its opponents. Nay, taken all round, considered from every possible point of view, the explicit and irrevocable withdrawal of Great Britain from European politics would be of incalculable service to the British Empire, to the Dominions, to the United States, to mankind as a whole. It is the primary condition for a successful combine of the Anglo-Saxon peoples on which the satisfactory solution of the problem of peace and disarmament hangs. Great Britain need feel no false shame in taking this essential step. It is by no means a confession of weakness! But to entirely counteract any possible misinterpretation of the courageous initiative, the strongest naval Power should accompany its voluntary withdrawal from the European card-table by a gift of singular magnanimity. Great Britain should withdraw its opposition to the expressed desire not only of the United States, but of Germany, AustriaHungary, and seventeen other countries, that private property should be immune from capture at sea as it already is on land. It is, of course, extremely doubtful whether the general acceptance of this principle

would in itself make for a decrease in the armaments of the world. The naval profession, the royal and imperial admirals, and the captains of industry who live on the money sunk in warships would at once bolster up the supposed and enticing needs of coast defense both at home and in the colonies. Yet at least the excuse for the barbarous conversion of merchantmen to cruisers on the high seas would be gone. And what is more, the moral position of Great Britain would be immeasurably enhanced if she made it perfectly evident that she had nothing up her sleeve.

Standing quite outside the orbits of the two groups in which the armed camp of Europe is divided, Great Britain's influence in the unharmonious concert would be far greater than when she endeavors to play the trombone herself. When it is no longer directly concerned with the balance of power, Downing Street can always raise its voice in favor of moderation and count upon that respectful hearing from both parties which is the reward of any honest broker in a disinterested mediation.

The opportunity for a withdrawal from any direct participation in the quarrels of the dynasties of Europe is at present particularly favorable. The recent increase in the Belgian defenses together with the outcome of the crisis in the Balkans, where Greece and Bulgaria balance each other, while Roumania and Servia may add their forces to those of the Dual Alliance in preparing for the fulfilment of legitimate national aspirations, and a sober Constantinople might be expected to concentrate its energies upon consolidating Asiatic Turkey, enable France and Russia to look with equanimity on any further increase of the military forces of the Triple Alliance. There is now a balance of power between the latter and the Dual Alliance unaided by Great Britain. Thus her withdrawal, not from her friendships, but from her European engagements, admitted or not openly avowed, though generally understood, becomes almost imperative. It would tranquillize one side without endangering the other.

Among all the severe criticism which has been heaped on the present policy of Great Britain, it should not be forgotten that the United Kingdom in one respect occupies a unique position which makes her singularly fitted to play a leading part in a planetary movement. Alone of all the great nations of the earth the United Kingdom is an adherent

of free trade. Products of all countries can pass her own borders and the borders of her vast empire and compete on equal terms with the results of the labors of her own citizens. It is a truly magnificent position for a preacher of universal peace and good-will, a logical outcome of that principle of self-government of which the ultimate aim is the greatest human liberty imaginable; the possibility to move unhindered all over the globe and to enjoy its infinite resources as far as the limits of time permit.

In order to emphasize the sincerity and unselfishness of their safeguarding of the highways of international commerce, both Great Britain and the United States should once for all make it clear that they would henceforth abstain from seeking any concessions for their private citizens. The diplomatic, military or naval pressure which a government is able to exert abroad is due to the sacrifices of all taxpayers, to the exertions of the whole nation. There is no valid reason why it should be exercised on behalf of any private interests, whether they are those of an individual merchant or financier or the big armament firms, which in more sense than one masquerade as a national asset. Neither should missionaries be supported. They have no more right to concern themselves in the affairs of other nations than those unscrupulous financiers who furnish funds to foreign countries to enable them to provide the armaments necessary for a devastating war, after which the money-lender can renew his loans at a higher interest.

Yet whatever may be the relative position that each member of the Anglo-Saxon community occupies, every one of them has a splendid rôle to play in the glorious task which lies before them. Though it is a common work for the British peoples and the United States, it needs no higher authority than the full understanding of what self-government really implies. None of them need to exact anything from another that each would not be willing to grant. And one and all they are perfectly willing to let the peoples outside the Anglo-Saxon combine do as they please, provided nobody disturbs the peace on the great highways of international intercourse. Possessing no armies that can possibly compete with those of the great military powers, having abandoned the idea of interfering with private commerce, they have every right to be believed when they assert that their naval preparations only aim to

prevent war by making them powerful enough to destroy every fleet which leaves its own shores with aggressive purposes.

The United States, the British Empire, and the British Dominions need only show a little patience and consistency soon to see the inevitable result of a single-minded purpose. Before long peace will reign supreme on land as well as on sea, not because it is enforced, but because the strides which the Anglo-Saxon world will make under its shelter will be so great as to compel all other nations voluntarily to abandon their ruinous preparations for war.

The strategical distribution of the British and the American fleet will in itself be a most valuable geographical demonstration of the unshakable purpose of the Anglo-Saxon co-operation. From the moment the German people realizes that the British fleet under no circumstances whatever can be lured away into the Pacific or the Mediterranean, the preamble of the German Naval Bill will cease to have an appearance of reasonableness. It says that "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that even for the greatest naval Power, a war with her would involve such risks as to imperil its own supremacy." But if the superior British fleet is always concentrated in the Atlantic and seeks no supremacy elsewhere, the Germans would be no better off if they sacrificed their whole fleet in an effort to diminish the British than they were before. What was left of the British fleet would still control the Atlantic! Logically, therefore, the German people will soon be led to constrain the imperial government to curtail the heavy expenditure on a navy which evidently has no reasonable purpose to fulfil.

The Japanese would be in the same happy position. Knowing that nothing could entice the American fleet to leave the Pacific, they can well ask their Government for what purpose it burdens them with naval estimates when it is evident that Japan is both secure from oversea attack and unable to undertake any aggression across the water. From the actions of the United States in voluntarily abandoning the Boxer indemnity, in withdrawing its support to the Six Power Loan bankers, in announcing its intention gradually to give complete independence to the Philippines, the East has learned to trust to the purity of American desires and in the circumstance that the Great Republic practically shoulders the whole responsibility of her old British ally in the Pacific

Japan should see a special proof of the sincere disinterestedness of the Anglo-Saxon combine.

The Anglo-Saxon combine cannot fail to create a most profound impression on South America. The spectre of a European invasion would forever be gone. The fear of a misuse of the Monroe Doctrine would share the same fate, as it is evident that neither the United States nor Great Britain would consent to such a distribution of their fleets as has been here advocated, unless they both trusted each other to leave the republics of South America undisturbed. None of them would any longer resent a doctrine which in fact had become but a part of a greater whole: Pax Maritima. Neither can any legitimate objection be raised anywhere when it becomes evident that the coöperation of the British peoples and the United States does not aim at the protection of their own concession hunters, but on the contrary precludes any external pressure from being exercised in South America, where henceforth all investors would meet on equal terms. At the same time the British and American fleets are so immeasurably superior to the navies of the different South American States that it would be sheer folly for the republics to continue to squander money on ships which under no circumstances whatever would be permitted to fire a shot at each other.

Gradually the same sort of reasoning will be done everywhere. In Europe one may perhaps confidently expect that Norway and Holland with their intelligent populations will be the first to see the folly of wasting millions on doll navies when their coasts are amply protected by the British fleet. And the reduction of the British and American navies which will immediately follow any diminution of the naval forces. of Germany and Japan will hasten both this reasoning and the process of naval disarmament. Eventually the naval interests will become silent.

That this return to common sense will have a powerful influence on popular opinion even concerning purely military armaments needs scarcely to be demonstrated. It will be heightened by the illuminating spectacle of seeing the great naval Powers of to-day diverting hundreds of millions of dollars from ships to education. And lest the Continental Powers of Europe should be tempted to increase their land forces by devoting the money saved on the navy to the army, let them become