Seismology, 1903, state unit, with proxy (on constitutional questions), and expense quotas based on population; Brazilian project for Court of Arbitral Justice, 1907, one representative per state and equal expense quotas for contracting parties; Central American Bureau, 1907, one representative per state and equal expense quotas.

Those organizations selecting a voting-power basis are:

Panama Conference, 1826, state unit; Cape Spartel Lighthouse Commission, 1866, one representative; International Telegraphic Conference, 1875, state unit, with proxy; International Weights and Measures Conference, 1875, state unit, colonies being admitted; Literary and Artistic Property Conference, 1884 and 1885, state unit; Kongo Régime Commission, 1885, state unit, no allowance for proxy; Latin Monetary Union, 1885, assigned as flexible panel, emission of coins being based on population; Pan-American Conference, 1889, 1902, 1906, and 1910, state unit; Red Cross Conference, 1892, (semi-official) majority of delegates; Red Cross, Central Committee of Conference, 1892, state unit; Hague Conference, 1899, state unit without proxy; Commission for Exploration of the Sea, 1899, two delegates each, vote presumably by state unit; Pan-American Union Governing Board, 1902, 1906, 1910 (resolutions, and project of convention, 1910), state unit, no proxy; International Sugar Union Conference, 1902, state unit; international Egyptian Sanitary Commission, 1903, one representative; International Radiotelegraphic Conference, 1906, state unit, colonies being entitled to votes up to a limit of six; Geneva Conference, 1906, state unit; Hague Conference, 1907, state unit, no proxy; Hague Court of Arbitral Justice, final vote on 1907 project, flexible panel; International Prize Court, final vote on 1907 project, flexible panel; Central American Conference, 1907, one representative; International Conference on Expositions, 1912, state unit, colonies being entitled to separate votes.

Those organizations, generally of a character different from the foregoing, which have selected an expense basis of representation are:

Riverain Commission of the Rhine, 1814, (revisions in 1831 and 1868), equal expenses; Navigation of River Scheldt, 1839, expense units based on size, each state using the river paying a proportionate capitalized fund toward its maintenance as a waterway; International Telegraphic Bureau, 1868 (also acts under Radiotelegraphic Convention, 1906)

voluntary expense units; International Weights and Measures Bureau, 1875, expense units on size, proportions being based on population of contracting parties; International Literary and Artistic Property Bureau, 1884 (arrangement continued in 1885 and since), voluntary expense units; International Industrial Property Bureau, 1887, voluntary expense units; Pan-American Bureau, 1889, 1902, 1906, and 1910 (resolutions, and also project of convention, 1910), expense units on size; Bureau for Publication of Customs Tariffs, 1890, expense on size, the basis being annual commerce; Central Office of International Transports (European only), 1892, expense units on size, the basis being kilometers of railroads of each contracting party under the convention; Zanzibar Bureau for Repression of the Slave Trade, 1895, equal expenses; International Court for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 1899 and 1907, voluntary expense units; Hague Permanent Bureau, 1899 and 1907, voluntary expense units; International Institute of Agriculture, 1905, voluntary expense units, colonies being separate contracting parties; Pan-American Literary and Artistic Property Bureau, 1906, expense units based on size, the proportions being fixed according to population; Court of Arbitral Justice (Chinese proposal), 1907, court representation based on voluntary expense units; International Sanitary Office, 1907, voluntary expense units; International Sanitary Supervisory Board, 1907, expense units based on quota paid to account of International Office.

About the only evident conclusion from this presentation is that neither law nor custom has been followed, or can be deduced; and, in fact, the foregoing analysis, as well as the whole investigation, has been premised only on the hope of finding a tendency in practice, which this study may assist in hardening into a recognized system.

The facts as just given, however, show nothing so much as a disposition to meet any specific necessity by the application of any scheme that would, at the moment, secure the sanction of these concerned.

Thus it is seen that the dual arrangement of combining voting power and expense contribution can be traced back to 1864, that it appeared at intervals and was made the key to the Brazilian project for the Court of Arbitral Justice in 1907.

The voting-power basis, like the expense-quota a necessary foundation

for representation, naturally shows persistence, was traced back to 1826; and as the equality of states has been the undisputed theory until very recently, it would undoubtedly be found, in the form of one state one vote, in any earlier gatherings.

It is interesting to note that the first attempt found to base expense on an equitable rather than an equal basis was the régime of the river Scheldt in 1839, when the idea of the concert of Europe had taken some shape, and when the concert itself had been tackling the problem of neutralizing Belgium. The previous arrangement of a commission to control traffic on the Rhine, in 1814,-probably not altogether because it presented a simpler case,-settled the expense question by equal division, and the plan has been continued.

There remains the attempt to solve the problem of finding a master system for basis of representation in international organizations. The very large question of politics that must be encountered by any body having to deal with the matter is not to be considered at all, for it involves above everything else the dignity of a state, which may or not feel affronted at an effort to place it exactly where it should be among its contemporaries. Only in the matter of expense do the states seem willing to derogate from their right of equality. In these cases, where it costs money to exert the prerogative of equality, they apparently are quite satisfied to vote according to their voluntary contributions.

A distinction must be clearly appreciated in the following discussion between the different types of international organizations, because, while everything that is said here, aims to have a bearing upon the problem of representation as it arose at The Hague in 1907 and as it will arise later, the condition of accepting a secondary rating in an administrative bureau is absolutely dissimilar from assent to the same rating in a diplomatic conference, and the question of whether the practice of a judicial organization should be assimilated to the practice in conference is, for the purposes of such a study, an open one. I have viewed the official types of organization as a whole, but have tried always to keep their character and the significance of their statutory schemes clearly indicated.

Most significant as a practical policy, perhaps, is the gradual entrance of the colonies into the international administrative organs on a par

with the sovereign state, although the latter does not in any fundamental sense forego its authority. From the point of view of representation, this admission of the subordinate divisions of a state to a full voice means that a state overcomes the equality principle and, for the reason that the colony's interest is likely to be identical with that of the mother country, the parent state is enabled to secure a power corresponding in some degree to its size and importance. This is the only practical trend which is deeply-rooted and which seems practicable of easy development along the line of admitting the dependencies of one state as parties to international agreements, and thereby, without violating the ancient principle of sovereign equality, giving the state whose sovereignty has virtually been peddled out to many subordinate parts a total voice and a total power in some degree commensurate both with its actual importance as a Power and with its economic and diplomatic stake in world affairs.

Eight official international organizations, all of which are administrative or technical rather than diplomatic in character, admit nonsovereign political entities to their membership. The status of a state's possessions, colonies, dependencies or other non-sovereign territories in these varies considerably, and it is well to examine how it happens that they are admitted to such bodies, the extent of their freedom from their sovereigns' dictation, and to indicate as clearly as possible what benefits have resulted from their membership in these organizations.

The organizations taking cognizance of non-sovereign members are the International Institute of Agriculture (1905), International Sanitary Office (1907), and the Bureaus of Publication of Customs Tariffs (1890), Weights and Measures (1875), Postal Union (1869), Telegraphic Union (1868) and the Radiotelegraphic Union (1906); and the International Conference on Expositions (1912).

The Radiotelegraphic Union not only admits colonies as supporters of its bureau, but at the third conference in 1912 they were entitled to send representatives, in accordance with the following provisions:

Art. 12. [Convention]. If a government adheres to the convention for its colonies, possessions or protectorates, subsequent conferences may determine that the whole or a part of these colonies, possessions or protectorates is to be regarded as forming a country for the

(This tabulation shows that 45 institutions have 50 methods of representation, one of the 45 giving no details on the subject and six detailing both voting power and expense division.)

It may be taken for granted that in every official conference, union, council, bureau or other organization a basis of representation satisfactory to the contracting parties has been evolved and that the principle of equality has been observed in a manner acceptable to them for the purpose they have in mind. Premising the conclusion upon this statement of the case, it is seen that, out of 44 organizations, net, concerning which details are given, 23 based their representation entirely upon voting power, 15 entirely upon expense quotas which are either voluntary or predetermined by specific facts, and 6 resorted to a combination of both systems to secure the result desired.

Here, then, is the extent to which the parliamentary necessities, so to speak, of organizations growing up under the aegis of international law have broken down the Grotian principle of sovereign equality, which he based on the law of nature. Speculation is uncertain, but it is very doubtful if any such diversity would have been found in such organizations a century or even fifty years ago, had conditions made international gatherings and quick communication possible then.

If this assertion stands, it is fair to say that equality of states is no longer the absolute thing the father of international law conceived it to be. Furthermore, it is evident that to those actions of individual states which disregard the strict principle and which writers cite as being in derogation of absolute equality, 11 there should now be added the more important fact that the states themselves have been, and are, meeting and organizing by methods which impose servitudes of considerable significance upon the principle of sovereign equality.

It also follows that the attempt at The Hague to establish Courts of Arbitral Justice and of Prize, notwithstanding that equality of state

"See title "equality" in any manual on international law. Inequalities in ceremonial matters, weight of influence, interference in political matters, etc., are numerous. The Near East is frequently subject to dictation from the "great Powers," although Turkey, Greece and the Balkan states are nominally sovereign. The United States frequently enforces its will on Central and South American states, despite their alleged equality. See Wilson & Tucker, 5th edition, 97; Bonfils, 5th edition, §§ 272-8; 1 Moore, Digest of International Law, §§ 62-3; etc.