hand the reciprocal acknowledgment of the independence and sovereignty of the contracting states.

In this connection, there is no reason for the retention of the reservation of "constitutional precepts" as a special clause, because it is equally known that no state can bind itself in any way contrary to the provisions of its own constitution. State constitution is somewhat inherent in state sovereignty and independence.

The same observation might be made respecting the reservation of "the integrity of territory," provided, nevertheless, that under such a reservation are not to be included either differences arising out of the annexation or occupation of new lands, or over state boundaries, and the like. The latter subjects may be, and have already been, referred to arbitral settlement.

Also there exists no real ground for the restriction regarding "the rights of third parties," because, as it has already been wisely observed, if the third state assents thereto, there is not the slightest obstacle in the way of an arbitral settlement, and if the third state does not assent, the said clause becomes entirely superfluous by force of the well known rule Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.

4

Finally, it would be most desirable that the exception "questions of a legal nature only or relating to the interpretation of treaties," should disappear, as soon as possible, from arbitration treaties. Although such a clause is in accordance with the convention adopted on this subject by the Hague Conferences, yet the manifest trend of opinion of the present time requires the field of arbitration to be more and more enlarged, and not to be narrowed to questions of a purely legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties. It is obvious, that on account of this limitation a very great number of controversies otherwise susceptible of arbitration may be excluded from such a pacific solution.

In short, the most desirable formula seems to be this: "Controversies of whatsoever nature; provided, that they do not affect directly the independence of either of the contracting parties."

In addition to what has been said, I may be permitted to make on this occasion some other remarks upon the causes which, to my mind, con

4 This JOURNAL, Vol. 7, p. 307.

tinue to prevent more progressive steps in behalf of obligatory arbitration or at least the enlargement of the number of classes of cases referable to voluntary arbitration itself.

Indeed, the very great service which up to the present time the Hague Conferences have rendered has been to adopt arbitration, although not obligatory, and create the Hague Tribunal for settling international controversies.

Compulsory arbitration or a world treaty for the preservation of general peace, are things not yet to be expected, at least, so long as the socalled family of nations is based upon the principles of absolute sovereignty, which underlie it, not taking into consideration different and special circumstances which may at any and all times occur as a ready cause for war. We should not entertain any illusions in this regard. Certainly, no reasonable pacifist and no practical statesman has ever pretended or expected that war might be suppressed forthwith by the vote of nations, even although assembled in conferences of peace. In spite of our best hopes and wishes, war is and shall be for a yet indefinite time a sad condition inherent in the existence of the civilized nations of the world. What is desirable and really practicable at this time is to continue to work for a gradual elimination of war from as large a number of cases as possible in the ordinary relations of international life.

In the first place, the events of the last few months show, what was equally well known before, that the great world Powers, notwithstanding their frequent utterances in favor of general peace, remain in the same unchanged state of mind, that is to say, that they depend much more for the maintenance of their high place, rights, and interests in international relations upon their great military force than upon any other element be it of the highest moral relevancy or excellence. These, and other Powers, when assembled in the Hague Conferences, have, no doubt, recognized:

(a) That war, though yet inevitable, should be diminished as much as possible;

(b) That to that end all peaceful means for settling international disputes should be favored and fostered among nations;

(c) That, excessive armaments being prejudicial to social betterment,

it is a pressing problem to find some better way for averting war than by their maintenance.5

But, in spite of the manifestation of these high ideas and purposes of humanity, if one looks at the facts as they really are, he will see that such ideas and purposes have not been expressed except under the implied condition that they should not oblige the Powers concerned to impose any restraint upon their particular aims. Each of them has some ground for increasing its armaments and other means of making war, as, for instance, to enlarge its domain by annexing or occupying a new piece of land, to preserve its acquired position of great Power in the international community, to keep in position to interfere with the affairs of another Power when advisable or useful in its particular ambition or interests.

In the second place, it seems unnecessary to add that some of the great Powers have in view though not expressly advancing them, certain peculiar reasons for not admitting arbitration as an ordinary means of settling international differences in the present state of the world's affairs. For example, Germany would be unwilling to submit to arbitration any important case in which she is concerned, since she thinks she is able to thrash it out with her enormous military force and strong alliances with other Powers with better chance of success than by bringing the case before the judges of the Hague Tribunal. Furthermore, arbitration without reservation, once admitted as the means for settling all international differences, who can state that circumstances may not arise of so extraordinary a character that questions like those

'Beside the convention for the peaceful settlement of international differences through the practice of arbitration, of mediation and good offices, the First Hague Conference also voted unanimously the following Declaration: "The Conference is of the opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind."

The Second Hague Conference not only adopted a new convention for the peaceful settlement of international differences, but also another declaration recognizing the principle of obligatory arbitration, and further, that certain differences, namely, those concerning the interpretation and the application of treaty stipulations, are, without reservation, referable to obligatory arbitration. Also a new Declaration relating to the reduction of military charges, as voted by the First Conference, was reaffirmed by the Second Hague Conference.

of Alsace and Lorraine would not be called into question and demand made for their reference to arbitral decision?

* *

Reasons and motives of the same or similar kind also explain why Austria-Hungary, Italy, Great Britain and other Powers do not desire to go practically very far on behalf of arbitration.

Austria-Hungary has just transformed her occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ex vi the Treaty of Berlin, into an actual annexation of the two provinces.

Italy has no idea of a renunciation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, although the treaty of peace signed at Lausanne contains no express clause recognizing her sovereignty over those provinces.

England, though a sincere friend and champion of peace, will cast her vote for arbitration within certain limits only. She cannot, on her part, renounce the territories acquired in Africa and Asia at the expense of the small Powers existing in those parts of the world. Besides, she knows that the great influence she has and exercises among the other nations is mostly due to a supreme British navy, sufficient to countervail and neutralize their forces. Accordingly, she understands that the cnlargement of her navy is the best safeguard of humanity against a very great danger, even if it is an increase of the instruments of war.6

Furthermore, does any one pretend that the preponderance of influence of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente in Europe is based on principles of or reasons derived from international law and justice, or deny that it depends entirely upon the military strength of either side?

On the other hand, in the present state of international law, even relying entirely upon the impartiality of the Hague Tribunal, it is not yet assured that all the controversies of an international nature which may arise will be settled with a complete guarantee of justice to the parties concerned.

Lastly, it is to be borne in mind, that the so-called family of nations is not yet a reality, unless the mere juxtaposition and intercourse of the different nations, each guided in respect to its international relations by

6 These views concur with those expressed in the Review of Reviews for February, 1914, on the same subject. On this side of the Atlantic, Chile, since the First International American Conference, has steadily dissented from any proposition respecting compulsory arbitration, because, it is said, of her occupation of Tacna and Arica.

its own and peculiar interests and ambitions, be accepted as such. They still hold to the same absolute conception of sovereignty which prevailed according to medieval theory. A sovereign state is, no doubt, one free from external control and, as such, entirely free to issue any commands over the whole community existing within its territory. Sovereignty is certainly an inseparable attribute of every independent state. Out of this absolute conception of sovereignty, each state assumes to be the sole judge of its acts and obligations, and that, accordingly, no restraint or obligation may be imposed upon it, except with its own previous and voluntary consent thereto.

In a general way and in particular relation to internal affairs, no objection can be raised to those propositions. But, on the other hand, the state being considered a part of the family of nations, such an absolute conception of sovereignty should have some limitation in order that it may be adjusted to the principles of justice, comity and humanity, upon which international law among civilized nations must be based. In this day and generation nearly all important occurrences, though they take place entirely within the territory of a single civilized state, cannot fail, in view of the close and uninterrupted relations of every kind existing between all the states, to interest the outside world.

If it is unfortunately true, that sovereignty may sometimes amount to absolutism or even to despotism as concerns the internal affairs of a state, it should, however, keep within the reasonable limits of justice in respect to external relations. Undoubtedly, this limitation admits in theory of no dispute; but in practice the sad truth leads to the contrary, that is to say, the extent of sovereignty is really measured by the military strength of each state. Hence the uncertainty, perhaps the lack, of a firm basis upon which the principles and rules of justice and humanity regulating international life may be secured. In so saying, I do not intend to do more than to point out a state of things which unfortunately exists as an insurmountable obstacle to the realization of the ideal of the friends of peace and to the effective progress of international law.

At this point, I may say that I entirely concur in the opinion of Sir Harry H. Johnston, when he wrote that the peace of Europe and of the Old World (why not the same of the New World?) will never be established on a firm basis and the principles enunciated at The Hague will