CASES ADJUDGED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

THE TAP LINE CASES.1

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMERCE COURT.

Nos. 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836. Argued April 8, 9, 13, 1914.— Decided May 25, 1914.

An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, based on its finding that the service rendered by a connecting line is not a service of transportation by a common carrier railroad, but a plant service by a plant facility, to the effect that allowances and divisions of rates

1Docket titles of the Tap Line Cases are: No. 829. United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisiana & Pacific Railway Co.; No. 830. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Louisiana & Pacific Railway Co.; No. 831. United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Woodworth & Louisiana Central Railway Co.; No. 832. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Woodworth & Louisiana Central Railway Co.; No. 833. United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mansfield Railway & Transportation Co.; No. 834. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Mansfield Railway & Transportation Co.; No. 835. United States and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Victoria, Fisher & Western Railroad Co.; No. 836. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Victoria, Fisher & Western Railroad Co.

VOL. CCXXXIV-1

(1)

are unlawful and must be discontinued, is affirmative in its nature and subject to judicial review by the Commerce Court. Where the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission directing discontinuance of divisions of rates with another railroad depends upon whether the latter is a common carrier or a plant facility, the determination of that question upon undisputed facts is a conclusion of law which is subject to judicial review. Although a railroad may have originally been a mere plant facility, after it has been acquired by a common carrier duly organized under the law of the State and performing service as such and regulated and operated under competent authority, it is no longer a plant facility but a public institution, even though the owner of the industry of which it formerly was an appendage is the principal shipper of freight thereover.

The extent to which a railroad is in fact used does not determine whether it is or is not a common carrier, but the right of the public to demand service of it.

Railroads owned by corporations properly organized under the laws of the State in which they are and treated as common carriers by the State, authorized to exercise eminent domain, dealt with as common carriers by other railroad corporations, and engaged in carrying for hire goods of those who see fit to employ them, are common carriers for all purposes, and cannot be treated as such as to the general public and not as to those who have a proprietary interest in the corporations owning them.

Congress has expressly excepted the transportation of lumber from the operation of the commodities clause, and had power so to do. United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366.

Debates in Congress may be resorted to for the purpose of showing that which prompted the legislation.

This court will not, in interpreting the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission in regard to a particular traffic, ignore a declaration of public policy in regard to that traffic as shown by an enactment of Congress.

Congress, by the exemption of lumber from the operation of the commodities clause, shows that it regarded railroad tap lines for lumber, owned and operated by the owners of the timber, as essential for the development of the timber interests of the country.

It is beyond the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to order a tap line to cease a division of rates as to lumber owned by it or by those having proprietary interest therein, if it is allowed such division as to lumber shipments by others.