the grant of the State and therefore had no power to contract in excess of that which was conferred upon them by the State; hence all acts done by them which were prohibited by the state law were ultra vires and void. But, as foreign insurance companies have no right to come into the State and there do business except as the result of a license from the State and as the State exacts as a condition of a license that all foreign insurance companies shall be subject to the laws of the State as if they were domestic corporations, it follows that the limitations of the state law resting upon domestic corporations also rest upon foreign companies and therefore deprive them of any power which a domestic company could not enjoy, thus rendering void or inoperative any provision of their charter or condition in policies issued by them or contracts made by them inconsistent with the Missouri law. But when this reasoning is analyzed we think it affords no ground whatever for taking this case out of the general rule and making the distinction relied upon. This is so as the proposition. cannot be maintained without holding that because a State has power to license a foreign insurance company to do business within its borders and the authority to regulate such business, therefore a State has power to regulate the business of such company outside its borders and which would otherwise be beyond the State's authority. A distinction which brings the contention right back to the primordial conception upon which alone it would be possible to sanction the doctrine contended for, that is, that because a State has power to regulate its domestic concerns, therefore it has the right to control the domestic concerns of other States. It is apparent therefore that to accept the doctrine it would have to be said that the distribution of powers and the limitations which arise from the existence of the Constitution are ephemeral and depend simply upon the willingness of any of the States to exact as a condition of a license granted to a foreign cor

Opinion of the Court.

234 U. S.

poration to do business within its borders that the Constitution shall be inapplicable and its limitations worth nothing. It would go further than this, since it would require it to be decided not only that the constitutional limitations on state powers could be set aside as the result of a license but that the granting of such license could be made the means of extending state power so as to cause it to embrace subjects wholly beyond its legitimate authority.

It is true it has been held that in view of the power of a State over insurance, it might, as the condition of a license given to a foreign insurance company to do business within its borders, impose a condition as to business within the State, which otherwise but for the complete power to exclude would be held repugnant to the Constitution. In other words that a company having otherwise no right whatever for any purpose to go in without a license would not be heard after accepting the same to complain of exactions upon which the license was conditioned as unconstitutional because of its voluntary submission to the same. But even if it be put out of view that this doctrine has been either expressly or by necessary implication overruled or at all events so restricted as to deprive it of all application to this case (see Harrison v. St. L. & San Francisco R. Co., 232 U. S. 318, 332, and authorities there cited,) it here can have no possible application since such doctrine at best but recognized the power of a State under the circumstances stated to impose conditions upon the right to do the business embraced by the license and therefore gives no support to the contention here presented which is that a State by a license may acquire the right to exert an authority beyond its borders which it cannot exercise consistently with the Constitution. But the Constitution and its limitations are the safeguards of all the States preventing any and all of them under the guise of license or otherwise from exercising powers not possessed.

As it follows from what we have said that the primary conception upon which the court below assumed this case might be taken out of the general rule and thereby the State of Missouri be endowed with authority which could not be exercised consistently with the Constitution, was erroneous, it results that the necessity for reversal is demonstrated without requiring us to consider other propositions. But before we come to direct the judgment of reversal, we briefly refer to another aspect of the subject, that is, the ruling of the court below as to the subsidiary nature of the loan agreement and its consequent control by the broader principle upon which its conclusion was really based. Of course under the view which we have taken of the case, that is, of the want of power of the State of Missouri because the contract of insurance was made within its jurisdiction to forever thereafter control by its laws all subsequent agreements made in other jurisdictions by persons not citizens of Missouri and lawful where made, that is, to stereotype, as it were, the will of the parties contracting in Missouri as of the date of the contract, it is unnecessary to consider whether the loan agreement was or was not subsidiary, but see on this subject Leonard v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 65 Connecticut, 529; Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 22 Ind. App. 332; S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Delaware Ins. Co., 105 Fed. Rep. 642; 2 Wharton Conflict of Laws, § 467g and cases cited; and see note 63 L. R. A. 833.

Reversed.

Opinion of the Court.

234 C. S.

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v.

HEAD.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 255. Argued March 10, 1914.- Decided June 8, 1914.

Decided on authority of the preceding case.

241 Missouri, 420, reversed.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. James H. McIntosh, with whom Mr. Gardiner Lathrop, Mr. Cyrus Crane, Mr. O. W. Pratt and Mr. S. W. Moore were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Buckner F. Deatherage, with whom Mr. Goodwin Creason, Mr. James S. Botsford, Mr. W. P. Borland and Mr. James A. Reed were on the brief, for defendant in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the

court.

This case is governed by the opinion in No. 254 just decided. The policy sued on was one of the two issued to Richard G. Head in Kansas City, Missouri, in favor of his minor son. It was delivered at Kansas City and the first premium paid there, as in the previous case, and the subsequent premiums were paid in New Mexico. There was borrowed upon the policy by authority of the proper probate court in New Mexico the sum of $2,270.00 under a loan agreement and pledge; there was a default and an adjustment of the policy as in the other case. The case was tried in the court of first instance with the other case, was embraced in the Supreme Court of Missouri by the

same opinion by which the other case was disposed of, and there thus being no distinction between the two cases, for reasons given in the other case, No. 254,

The judgment is reversed.

FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COMMERCE COURT.

No. 383. Argued January 15, 16, 1913. Decided June 8, 1914.

The rule that a finding of fact made by the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning a matter within the scope of the authority delegated to it is binding and may not be reëxamined in the courts, does not apply where the finding was made without any evidence whatever to support it; the consideration of such a question involves not an issue of fact, but one of law which it is the duty of the courts to examine and decide.

The record does not disclose any evidence justifying the order of the Commission directing a reduction of rates which had been held to be reasonable by a prior order of the Commission.

In a proceeding against several railroads, testimony as to the condition of traffic on certain railroads does not tend to establish conditions on another road in regard to which no testimony is given and where the record shows essential differences between it and those roads in regard to which the testimony was given.

200 Fed. Rep. 797, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission establishing rates on citrus fruits and vegetables from points of production in Florida to exterior points of consumption, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Frederick C. Bryan and Mr. Alex. St. Clair-Abrams for appellant.