books as to whether a judgment is a contract. Passing such considerations, and regarding the policy of § 15 and its language, we are unable to concur with the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

This court said, in Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U. S. 613, 625, that the title to lands allotted to Indians was "retained by the United States for reasons of public policy, and in order to protect the Indians against their own improvidence." It was held, applying the principle, that a warranty deed made by Long Jim at a time when he did not have the power of alienation "was in the very teeth of the policy of the law, and could not operate as a conveyance, either by its primary force or by way of estoppel" after he had received a patent for the land.

The principle was applied again in Franklin v. Lynch, 233 U. S. 269, and its strict character enforced against the deed of a white woman who acquired title in an Indian right. It is true, in these cases the act of the Indian was voluntary or contractual, and, it is contended, a different effect can be ascribed to the wrongs done by an Indian and that in reparation or retribution of them the state law may subject his inalienable lands-inalienable by the National law-to alienation. The consequence of the contention repels its acceptance. Torts are of variable degree. In the present case that counted on reached, perhaps, the degree of a crime, but a tort may be a breach of a mere legal duty, a consequence of negligent conduct. The policy of the law is, as we have said, to protect the Indians against their improvidence, and improvidence may affect all of their acts, those of commission and omission, contracts and torts. And we think § 15 of the act of July 1, 1902, was purposely made broadly protective, broadly preclusive of alienation by any conduct of the Indian, and not only its policy but its language distinguishes it from the statute passed on in Brun v. Mann, 151 Fed. Rep. 145. Its language is that "lands allotted

shall not be affected or encumbered by any deed, debt or obligation of any character contracted prior to the time at which" the lands may be alienated, "nor shall said lands be sold except" as in the act provided. The prohibition then is that the lands shall not be "affected by any obligation of any character," and, as we have seen, an obligation may arise from a tort as well as from a contract, from a breach of duty or the violation of a right. Exchange Bank v. Ford, 7 Colorado, 314, 316. If this were not so, a prearranged tort and a judgment confessed would become an easy means of circumventing the policy of the law.

Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE DAY dissents.

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY OF AMERICA v. STATE OF MISSOURI.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 166. Argued April 29, 1914.-Decided June 8, 1914.

Although the state appellate court may not have referred to the constitutional questions in its opinion, this court cannot regard such silence as a condemnation of the time at, or manner in which, those questions were raised; and, if the record shows that they were raised in that court, this court has jurisdiction. The Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude the State from adopting a policy against all combinations of competing corporations and enforcing it even against combinations which have been induced by good intentions and from which benefit and not injury may have resulted.

The power of classification which may be exerted in the legislation of

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

234 U.S.

States has a very broad range; and a classification is not invalid under the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment because of simple inequality.

A state statute prohibiting combination is not unconstitutional as denying equal protection of the law because it embraces vendors of commodities and not vendors of labor and services. There is a reasonable basis for such a classification; and so held as to the Missouri anti-trust Laws of 1899 and 1909.

Questions of policy are for the legislature and not for this court to determine.

As classification must be accommodated to the problems of legislation; it may depend upon degree of evil so long as it is not unreasonable or arbitrary.

237 Missouri, 369, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of the Missouri Anti-trust Acts of 1899 and 1909, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Edgar A. Bancroft and Mr. W. M. Williams, with whom Mr. Selden P. Spencer and Mr. Victor A. Remy were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

A Federal question was raised and was decided by the Missouri Supreme Court adversely to plaintiff in error.

The Missouri anti-trust statute is unconstitutional because it exempts from its operation and penalties all "combinations of persons engaged in labor pursuits" and is limited "to persons and corporations dealing in commodities."

Combinations of laborers, skilled or unskilled, no less than combinations of manufacturers and merchants, may restrain trade.

Anti-trust laws aiming to protect the freedom of trade and resting on the police power must include all persons who are capable of restraining trade.

Although certain state decisions support the exemption of labor and services, they are based on inconsistent and fallacious grounds.

234 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

Anti-trust laws must be co-extensive with the evils to be prevented and remedied.

The Missouri anti-trust statute is unconstitutional, because, while it prohibits arrangements and combinations designed or tending to lessen competition in the manufacture or sale of commodities, or to increase market prices, it does not prohibit arrangements or combinations between purchasers of commodities designed or tending to lessen competition or to decrease market prices.

A combination of buyers may restrain trade to the same extent and with the same or greater injury as a combination of sellers.

The Missouri anti-trust statute, as construed and applied by the state Supreme Court in its judgment herein, is unconstitutional because it unreasonably and arbitrarily violates and restrains plaintiff in error's right and freedom of contract beyond the police power of the State, thus depriving it of property without due process of law.

In support of these contentions, see Adams v. Brenan, 177 Illinois, 194; Bailey v. Master Plumbers, 103 Tennessee, 99; Chaplin v. Brown, 83 Iowa, 156, 157; Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Nebraska, 252, 260; Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia St. Ry. Co., 172 U. S. 475, 487; Commonwealth v. Int. Harvester Co., 131 Kentucky, 551; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 556; Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. St. 420; Dier's Case (Year Book, 2 Hen. V, fol. 5, pl. 26); Downing v. Lewis, 56 Nebraska, 386, 389; Hunt v. Riverside Coöperative Club, 140 Michigan, 538; Ipswich Tailors' Case (11 Coke's Rep. 53a); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 301; Meyer v. Richmond, 172 U. S. 82, 91; M., K. & T. R. Co. v. Elliott, 184 U. S. 530; More v. Bennett, 140 Illinois, 69, 77; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Cornell, 110 Fed. Rep. 816, 825; Owen County Society v. Brumback, 128 Kentucky, 137; People v. Butler St. Foundry Co., 201 Illinois, 236, 257; Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa, 182, 190; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 127;

Opinion of the Court.

234 U.S.

Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U. S. 447, 454; St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265, 276; State v. Associated Press, 159 Missouri, 410, 456; State v. Croyle, 7 Okla. Cr. 50; State v. Duluth Board of Trade, 107 Minnesota, 506, 546; State v. Int. Harvester Co., 237 Missouri, 369; State v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Missouri, 1, 370; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 395; United States v. Workingmen's Council, 54 Fed. Rep. 994.

Mr. John T. Barker, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, with whom Mr. W. T. Rutherford, Mr. W. M. Fitch, Mr. Thomas J. Higgs and Mr. Paul P. Prosser were on the brief, for defendant in error:

There is no Federal question in this case and the judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court should be affirmed. Astor v. Merritt, 111 U. S. 401; Powell v. Supervisor, 150 U. S. 113; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 941; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 299; Lohmeyer v. Company, 214 Missouri, p. 688; Brown v. Railroad, 175 Missouri, p. 189; Ross v. Company, 241 Missouri, 299.

The Missouri anti-trust statutes are constitutional and have been so held many times. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 270; Missouri v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Missouri, p. 368; Missouri v. Tobacco Co., 177 Missouri, 37; Missouri v. Insurance Co., 251 Missouri, 278; Railroad v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 209; Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U. S. 31; Railroad Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; United States v. Association, 171 U. S. 505; Missouri v. Int. Harvester Co., 237 Missouri, 369.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the

court.

Information in the nature of quo warranto brought in the Supreme Court of the State to exclude plaintiff in error from the corporate rights, privileges and franchises exer