courts and cannot form the basis for an equitable title in the complainant.

This argument, we think, disregards the explicit provision of the complainant's constitution as to voluntary withdrawal. It overlooks the distinction between civil and ecclesiastical rights and duties; between the Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey, a corporation of that State, and the monastic brotherhood subject to church authority; between the obligation imposed by the corporate organization and religious vows. As we have said, the question here is not one of canon law or ecclesiastical polity. The requirement of complainant's constitution must be read according to its terms and its validity must be thus determined. Granted that it is to be examined in the light of that to which it refers, still, obligations which are inconsistent with its express provisions cannot be imported into it. This constitution, as already stated, definitely provides: "Membership is lost at once:-2. By voluntarily leaving the Order for any purpose whatsoever." (Section XI.) This language cannot be taken to mean other than what it distinctly says. So far as the corporation, and the civil rights and obligations incident to membership therein, are concerned, it leaves no doubt that the member may voluntarily leave the Order at any time. His membership in the corporation, and the obligation he assumes, are subject to that condition. If he severs his connection with the corporation, it cannot be heard to claim any property he may subsequently acquire. His obligation runs with his membership and the latter may be terminated at will.

With this privilege of withdrawal expressly recognized, we are unable to say that the agreement-expressed in § XII of the complainant's constitution-that the gains and acquisitions of members shall belong to the corporation, must be condemned. These go to the corporation in exchange for the privileges of membership and

to further the common purpose to which the members are devoted. No constitutional right is invaded and no statutory restriction is transgressed. The legislature of New Jersey which, subject to constitutional inhibition is the arbiter of the public policy of that State, granted the charter by special act to the Benedictine Society of 'religious men living in community' and it cannot be said that the constitution adopted by the Order was repugnant to the charter provisions or exceeded the authority plainly intended to be conferred. It would seem to be clear that the obligation assumed instead of being opposed to the public policy of the State where it was created was directly sanctioned.

The validity of agreements providing for community ownership with renunciation of individual rights of property during the continuance of membership in the community, where there is freedom to withdraw, has repeatedly been affirmed. The case of Goesele v. Bimeler, 14 How. 589, related to a religious society called Separatists. By an agreement made in 1819, the members of the society agreed to unite in a 'communion of property.' They renounced 'all individual ownership of property, present or future, real or personal.' Amendatory articles of like import were signed in 1824. As to these agreements, the court said: "The articles of 1819 and 1824 are objected to as not constituting a contract which a court of equity would enforce. What is there in either of these articles that is contrary to good morals, or that is opposed to the policy of the laws? An association of individuals is formed under a religious influence, who are in a destitute condition, having little to rely on for their support but their industry; and they agree to labor in common for the good of the society, and a comfortable maintenance for each individual; and whatever shall be acquired beyond this shall go to the common stock. This contract provides for every member of the

Opinion of the Court.

234 U. S.

community, in sickness and in health, and under whatsoever misfortune may occur. -By disclaiming all individual ownership of the property acquired by their labor, for the benefits secured by the articles, the members give durability to the fund accumulated, and to the benevolent purposes to which it is applied. No legal objection is perceived to such a partnership." (Id., pp. 606, 607). In Schwartz v. Duss, 187 U. S. 8, the controversy related to the property of the Harmony Society, a community in Pennsylvania. It was said that the cardinal principle of the society was 'self-abnegation,' which was manifested 'not only by submission to a religious head, but by a community instead of individual ownership of property, and the dedication of their labor to the society.' It had been held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the agreements constituting the community were not offensive to the public policy of that State (Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts, 351), and, as to this, it was said by this court: "The Supreme Court observed that the point made against the articles as being against public policy was attended with no difficulty, and Chief Justice Gibson said for the court: 'An association for the purposes expressed is prohibited neither by statute nor the common law."" (Id. p. 26.) In Burt v. Oneida Community, 137 N. Y. 346, in describing the character of that society, the Court of Appeals of New York said that its main purpose was the 'propagandism of certain communistic views as to the acquisition and enjoyment of property' and 'the endeavor to put into practical operation an economic and industrial scheme which should embody and illustrate the doctrines which they held and inculcated.' Necessarily, said the court (p. 353), "the basic proposition of such a community was the absolute and complete surrender of the separate and individual rights of property of the persons entering it; the abandonment of all purely selfish pursuits, and the investiture of the title to their

property and the fruits of their industry in the common body, from which they could not afterwards be severed or withdrawn except by unanimous consent. It was fashioned according to the pentecostal ideal, that all who believed should be together and have all things common. It was intended to be in fact, as they frequently styled themselves, but a single family upon a large scale with only one purse, where self was to be abjured and the general good alone considered." The court, viewing it solely as a business undertaking, held that the organization 'was not prohibited by any statute or in contravention of any law regulating the possession, ownership or tenure of property.' See also Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377; Gasely v. Separatists, 13 Oh. St. 144; Waite v. Merrill, 4 Maine, 102; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana (Ky.), 170; State v. Amana Society, 132 Iowa, 304; 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 909, note; 11 Ann. Cas. 236, note.

It is said that in these cases, the contracts had been fully performed, and that the effort was made either to partition or distribute the property of the society, or to recover the value of property which had been actually conveyed or services which had been rendered to it. But the validity of the agreements there in question, against the objection based upon public policy, was distinctly recognized.

In the present case, there was no infringement of Father Wirth's liberty or right to property. He did not withdraw from the Order. He had agreed, by accepting membership under the complainant's constitution, that his individual earnings and acquisitions, like those of other members, should go into the common fund and, except as required for the maintenance of the members, should be used in carrying out the charitable objects of the Order. It is not unlikely that the copyrights upon his books derived their commercial value largely, if not altogether, from his membership. Certainly, the equitable ownership of these copyrights, by virtue of his obligation, vested in the com

plainant and the moneys in question when received became in equity its property and were subject to its disposition. As to both, Father Wirth stood in the position of a trustee.

The further objection that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations was held by the Circuit Court to be untenable and we agree with that view. The applicable limitation is six years (Revised Laws, Minnesota (1905), § 4076,) and the bill was filed within six years after Father Wirth's death. There is no such clear evidence of repudiation of the trust as would warrant the conclusion that the statute began to run at an earlier date. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

SELIG v. HAMILTON, RECEIVER OF EVANS, JOHNSON, SLOANE COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 361. Argued May 6, 1914.-Decided June 22, 1914.

The legislation of Minnesota with respect to the liability of stockholders, as construed by the courts of that State, has heretofore been reviewed and its constitutional validity upheld by this court in Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, and Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243.

A stockholder cannot, under the statutes of Minnesota, even by a bona fide transfer of his stock, escape liability for debts of the corporation theretofore incurred.

Bankruptcy proceedings against a Minnesota corporation do not stand

in the way of a resort to the statutory method of enforcing the liability of a stockholder which is not a corporate asset. Congress has not yet undertaken to provide that a discharge in bankruptcy of a corporation shall release the stockholders from liability.