vestigation that unjust discrimination against localities exists under substantially similar conditions of transportation the Com- mission has power to correct it; and this notwithstanding the lim- itations contained in the proviso to § 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Ib.
8. Power to prevent unjust discrimination; prior action; effect of. The earlier action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was not of such controlling effect as to preclude the Commission from giving effect to the Act to Regulate Cominerce, and in this case having, after examination of the question of its authority, decided to make a remedial order to prevent unjust discrimination and the Com- merce Court having sustained that authority of the Commission this court should not reverse unless, as is not the case, the law has been misapplied. Ib.
9. Power to make order permitting lower rate for longer haul, etc. Under § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to make an order, such as that involved in these cases, permitting a lower rate for the longer haul but only on terms stated in the order, establishing zones for the intermediate points and relative per- centages upon which proportionate rates should be based. Inter- mountain Rate Cases, 476.
10. Review of orders of, by Commerce Court; what constitutes affirmative order.
An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, based on its finding that the service rendered by a connecting line is not a serv- ice of transportation by a common carrier railroad, but a plant service by a plant facility, to the effect that allowances and divi- sions of rates are unlawful and must be discontinued, is affirmative in its nature and subject to judicial review by the Commerce Court. Tap Line Cases, 1.
11. Review of orders of; what reviewable.
Where the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission directing discontinuance of divisions of rates with another railroad depends upon whether the latter is a common carrier or a plant facility, the determination of that question upon undisputed facts is a conclusion of law which is subject to judicial review. Ib.
12. Review of findings; what are conclusions of fact not subject to review. Findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the character
and use of industrial spur-tracks within the switching limits of a city are conclusions of fact and not subject to review. Los Angeles Switching Case, 294; Interstate Com. Comm. v. Southern Pacific Co., 315.
13. Review of findings; conclusions of fact not reviewable.
This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Interstate Commerce Commission upon matters of fact within the province of the Commission. Ib.
14. Findings of fact by; binding effect; limitation upon rule. The rule that a finding of fact made by the Interstate Commerce Com- mission concerning a matter within the scope of the authority dele- gated to it is binding and may not be reëxamined in the courts, does not apply where the finding was made without any evidence what- ever to support it; the consideration of such a question involves not an issue of fact, but one of law which it is the duty of the courts to examine and decide. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 167.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 5, 6, 8, 27, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38;
JURISDICTION, D;
STATUTES, A 8.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
See INDIANS, 6-11.
INTRASTATE COMMERCE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 4, 9.
1. Collateral attack; decision as to removability not subject to; mode of review.
When a Federal court decides that a case removable from a state court on independent grounds is not made otherwise by § 6 of the Em- ployers' Liability Act, the decision is a judicial act done in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by law, and, even if erroneous, is not open to collateral attack, but only subject to correction in an appropriate appellate proceeding. Ex parte Roe, 70.
2. Review; mode of, in case of decision as to removability of cause. The authorized mode of reviewing such a ruling in an action at law is by writ of error from the final judgment. Judicial Code, §§ 128, 238. Ib.
3. Validity of judgment in suit in rem; sufficiency of service of process. Where a State has jurisdiction over the res the judgment of the court to
which that jurisdiction is confided, in order to be binding with re- spect to the interest of a non-resident not served with process within the State, must be based upon constructive service by mail- ing, publication or otherwise in accordance with the law of the State. Grannis v. Ordean, 385.
4. Correction of determination of stockholder's liability under Minnesota law; collateral attack.
Whether a former stockholder is ratably or otherwise liable with present stockholders is not a question which goes to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota court making the order, but a question to be sub- mitted for correction, if any, to the court making the order and not to another court in a collateral attack. Selig v. Hamilton, 652. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13, 37, 38; INDIANS, 2, 3; JURISDICTION, A 17;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1.
See INJUNCTION;
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 2;
JUDICIAL SALE.
See INDIANS, 3.
JURISDICTION.
A. OF THIS COURT.
1. Of appeals from Circuit Courts of Appeals; when suit one arising under
A suit does not arise under the laws of the United States unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of some law of the United States upon the determination of which the case depends and so appears not by mere inference but by distinct averments according to rules of good pleading. Hull v. Burr, 712.
2. Of appeal from Circuit Court of Appeals; when suit one arising under law of United States.
In this case held that a suit to restrain trustees in bankruptcy from pros- ecuting an equity suit against complainants in the state court on the ground that the bankruptcy proceedings were a fraud and that
the appointment of the trustees was void was one arising under the laws of the United States within the meaning of § 24, Judicial Code, and the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is not final. Although there may be a general prayer for relief if no relief other than injunction against prosecution of a suit in the state court is brought to the attention of either the District Court or the Circuit Court of Appeals, the general prayer should be treated as aban- doned. Ib.
3. Of direct appeal from District Court under § 238, Judicial Code; in- volution of construction of treaties with Indians. Where complainant's entire case rests on the construction of treaties with Indians in regard to reservations and on the claim that cer- tain of such treaties have been repealed by the subsequent admis- sion of the Territory within which the reservations are situated, this court has jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the District Court under § 238, Judicial Code. Johnson v. Gearlds, 422.
4. On direct appeal from District Court under § 238, Judicial Code; scope of consideration.
On a direct appeal under § 238, Judicial Code, from a judgment of the District Court dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction on the ground that neither of the parties was a resident of that district and that the suit was one that could only be brought in a district in which one of the parties resided, this court is only concerned with the jurisdiction of the District Court as a Federal court; whether appellant is entitled to the relief sought is not a jurisdic- tional question in the sense of § 238. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 369.
5. On direct appeal from District Court under § 238, Judicial Code; ques- tion open.
When the matter in controversy is of the requisite value and diverse citizenship exists, the question is simply whether the case is cog- nizable in the particular District Court in which the case is brought. Ib.
6. Of direct appeal from District Court under § 238, Judicial Code; involu- tion of constitutional question.
A case otherwise within the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States and reviewable in the Circuit Court of Appeals is not a case which may come direct to this court under § 238, Judicial Code, merely because in the course of the case a question has arisen as to whether a change in decision of the state court as to the effect
and scope of a state statute amounts to an impairment of the ob- ligation of a contract. Moore-Mansfield Co. v. Electrical Co., 619.
7. To review judgment of state court; when judgment rested on non-Federal grounds sufficient to sustain it.
Denial of full faith and credit to the statutes of another State cannot be made the basis of review by this court where it appears that the court below reached the same result that plaintiff contended for on grounds wholly independent of the Federal question and sufficient to sustain its action. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 123.
8. To review judgment of state court involving question of extraterritoriality of its laws.
There is a clear distinction between questions concerning the operation
and effect of the law of a State within its borders and upon the con- duct of persons within its jurisdiction, and questions concerning the right of the State to extend its authority beyond its borders with the same effect; and a decision upon the former does not constitute a ground for refusing to entertain a writ of error to review the judg- ment of the state court involving the latter. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 149, 166.
9. To review judgment of state court in case transferred from territorial court.
Under §§ 32 and 33 of the Arizona Enabling Act of June 20, 1910, the judgment of the state court in a case transferred to it from the territorial court is not reviewable by this court simply because it was pending in the territorial court at the time of the Enabling Act; such a judgment can only be reviewed by this court where a Federal question exists to give jurisdiction as in the case of judg- ments from the courts of other States. Van Dyke v. Cordova Cop- per Co., 188.
10. To review judgment of state court; when Federal question sufficiently raised.
Although the state appellate court may not have referred to the con- stitutional questions in its opinion, this court cannot regard such silence as a condemnation of the time at, or manner in which, those questions were raised; and, if the record shows that they were raised in that court, this court has jurisdiction. International Har- vester Co. v. Missouri, 199.
11. To review judgment of state court; when Federal question raised too late. Attempts to inject Federal questions into the record by filing amended
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