THE UNITED STATES IN

THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER I

THE OPENING OF THE WORLD WAR

JUNE 29, 1914, the newspapers in the United States made known to their readers that on the previous day the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, had been assassinated in Serajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia.

The event was no new occurrence in the House of Austria. Within forty-seven years the Emperor Francis Joseph had lost, by the assassin's hand, his brother, his son, his wife and now his nephew. During a day or two the murder was a matter of current conversation; but ere July was half spent the crime had been almost forgotten. Our trouble with Mexico, home rule for Ireland, the doings of the Ulster men, the Caillaux trial, the violence of the suffragettes in England held the attention of the public.

Great was the astonishment of our countrymen, therefore, when they read in the newspapers of July 24, that cable dispatches from London reported weakness in the stock markets of Europe caused by fear of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and the possible drawing into the conflict of other European powers. Newspapers of July 25 contained a dispatch from London setting forth that an ultimatum of unprecedented severity had been sent to Serbia by Austria-Hungary; that it sought to fasten on Serbia responsibility for the assassination

of the Archiluke and his wife, that compliance with the demands of the dual monarchy would be a confession of guilt, that forty-eight hours were allowed in which to reply, and that Russia was seeking extension of the time granted Serbia. Vienna dispatches announced that if Serbia did not reply before six o'clock on the evening of July 25 her minister would be handed his passports. From Berlin came reports that Germany had been consulted by Austria, that her action had been approved, that, should Russia take part with Serbia, Germany was prepared to draw the sword, and that serious developments were expected unless Serbia yielded. July 27, it was known that passports had been handed the Serbian minister and that Germany had notified the powers that she regarded the war as between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and that it must be localized.

When, some months later, the diplomatic correspondence between the powers was given to the world in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, the Serbian Blue Book, the Russian Orange Book, the German White Book, the French Yellow Book, the Belgian Gray Book, and the British White Paper, some faint glimmering of what took place was revealed.

It then came to light that during the interval between the twenty-eighth of June and the twenty-third of July, AustriaHungary had investigated the murders at Serajevo, and had reached the conclusion they had been prepared and abetted in Belgrade with the help of Serbian officials, had been perpetrated with arms taken from the Serbian State Arsenal, were directly connected with a movement long going on in Serbia to revolutionize, and finally tear away from Austria her southwestern provinces and join them to Serbia, and that in this policy Serbia believed herself to be heartily supported by Russia. Having reached this conclusion, Austria decided that the time had gone by when this agitation across her border could longer be endured; that having informed her ally, Germany, of this decision she was assured that any action taken would be approved, and that, bent on war, she presented to Serbia, on July 23, 1914, not a note but an ultimatum.

In this ultimatum the direct connection between the Serajevo murders and the pan-Serb movement was stated from the

Austrian point of view. Serbia was charged with fostering a "propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, .. whose aim it is to separate from the monarchy parts which belong to it," was required to publish "on the first page" of her "official organ of July 26, 1914," a humiliating apology in words dietated by Austria, bind herself to do ten humiliating things, and return her answer before six o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25. Copies of the note were delivered on July 24, to the Governments in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.

The demands on Serbia were:

1. Suppress any publication which incites hatred of the AustroHungarian Monarchy.

2. Dissolve at once the Narodna Odbrana and all other societies which carried on propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

3. Eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both from the teaching body and methods of instruction, everything which served to foment feeling against Austria-Hungary.

4. Remove from military and administrative service every officer guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

5. "Accept the collaboration in Serbia" of representatives of Austria-Hungary for the suppression of "subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

6. Take judicial proceedings against the accessories to the murder at Serajevo.

7. Arrest Major Voija Tankositch and Milan Ciganovitch, "compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo."

8. Stop the illicit traffic in arms across the frontier, dismiss and punish the frontier officials at Schabatz and Loznica "guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontiers."

9. Explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian officials at home and abroad who have not hesitated since the crime at Serajevo, to express hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government.

10. Notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the preceding demands.1

The whole world was taken by surprise. On the day the ultimatum was delivered Europe seemed to be in a state of perfect peace. It was vacation time. The Serbian Prime Minister was not in Belgrade; the Russian Ambassador had left Vienna; 'British White Paper, No. 4.

the President of the French Republic was far from Paris; the British and Russian Ambassadors were not in Berlin, and the Emperor of Germany, it may be to keep up appearances of peace, had gone northward on his yacht.

The day after the delivery of the ultimatum Germany warned the Entente Powers not to interfere.2 July 24 her Ambassador appeared before the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and read a note verbale. The publications of AustriaHungary concerning the Serajevo murders, Germany said, disclosed clearly the aims of the pan-Serb propaganda and the means used for its realization. Serb intrigue could be traced back through a series of years, and was especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only the self-restraint of Austria, and the energetic intercession of the powers prevented a conflict at that time. The assurances of good behavior then given by Serbia had not been kept. Under the very eyes of official Serbia the pan-Serb propaganda had grown in scope and intensity, and at its door was to be laid this latest crime the threads of which led to Belgrade. It was impossible for Austria to any longer look with indifference on the doings across the border. Her demands were justifiable. But the Serbian Government might decline to meet them, and "allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary." In that event nothing remained to Austria-Hungary but to press her demands, if need be, with military measures. But "in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia," and the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavor to restrict it to those two immediately concerned.

"The German Government desires urgently the localization of the dispute because every interference of another power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences."

The part taken by the powers began with a proposal from Russia that the time allowed Serbia be extended. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the Russian chargé at Vienna to telegraph London, Rome, Paris and Belgrade that to prevent the incalculable and fatal consequences of 2 German White Book, Exhibit 1.

"the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply should be extended. AustriaHungary having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them time to study them." 3

4

Sir Edward Grey at once bade the British Ambassador at Vienna "support in general terms the steps taken by your Russian colleague," and the French Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs telegraphed the French Ambassador at Vienna: "The Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia. . . I beg you to support the request of your colleague." 5 But Count Berchtold of Austria replied "we cannot consent to a prolongation of time limit. . . . Serbia, even after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly relations by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we should be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by Serbia of all costs and damages incurred by us through our military measures.'

Within the time allowed Serbia made her reply and yielded to all the demands with reasonable limitations. Austria declared it "insincere," "unsatisfactory," "evasive," as not fully complying with her demands, and July 25 her Minister broke off diplomatic relations and left Belgrade.

And now Sir Edward Grey came forward with a new proposition. He had said to the German Ambassador, just after the delivery of the German note on July 24, that "if the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia" he "had no concern with it," and re-. minded the Ambassador "that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose" Sir Edward "would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg." But in view of the stiff character of the note, the wide range of the demands of Serbia, Sir Edward did not believe any 'Russian Orange Book, No. 4.

'British Blue Paper, No. 26. French Yellow Book, No. 39.

Austrian Red Book, No. 20, July 25.