of this country would be willing to face this additional burden, if they have before them a resolute and well-considered program formulated by the administration and intended to relieve the world as a whole from the spectre of further preparations for war and at the same time alleviate the situation in Europe. If the United States will take the lead and formulate such a program, laying it before the leading nations, our government may count upon having behind it the weight of popular approval, not only in this country but throughout all the little nations in the world, all of whose peoples are sadly depressed by the anxiety which they feel when they witness the demoralization of the great nations which, after all, control the prosperity of the world.

As I contemplate the necessity of resolution and the adoption of some plan rather than reliance upon a policy of drift, I am led to quote a remark by Lord Loreburn in his penetrating study entitled How the War Came (p. 175):

A strong prompt decision by each State as to the course it proposed to steer and an immediate announcement of that course, where an antagonist was about in ignorance to thwart it, or as a friend was about to commit some error which would run counter to it-these, surely, are necessary in the management of any kind of controversial business.

TWO ALTERNATIVES

As I see it, there are really two broad alternatives facing the world today; of course, I am speaking of general and philosophical tendencies rather than detailed and particular cases. The nations may continue to cultivate the theory of unlimited state sovereignty and encourage the further development of the means for its maintenance. They may continue to calculate on all

possible combinations, military and financial, with which any of them might at any time be confronted, and prepare to resist such combinations. They may emphasize still more strongly the nationalistic theory of self-sufficiency and economic independence, the control of strategic materials and needs of communication, and proceed to abrogate all economic laws in the superior interest of national sovereignty. They may elaborate an economic and military policy intended to disprove and defy the principles on which the material world seems to be constructed. For the United States in particular, this formula is an inviting one by reason of our immense resources, our geographical position and the relation we now bear to the rest of the civilized world. We can arm to the teeth and be prepared to meet any possible combination which might be formed against us, either by all our debtors or by any group of them; and meanwhile we can salvage such of their movable property as can be without too great difficulty attached and brought under our own physical control. We can then fold our arms and look on while they "stew in their own juice." Indeed, it is not so long since that a man remarked to me that he thought Europe ought to be let pay the penalty for the corruption of its civilization, and that we should offer no help, either by way of remission of debt or by extension of material assistance, but stand aside and permit decay to set in and nature to take its course.

But the trouble with this alternative is that it overlooks the fact that the entire world is more or less of a piece, and that what goes on in Europe or even in one or the other end of Europe, can not but have a repercussion in this country. It does not take account of our dependence upon the existence of general tranquillity in the world and a

state of confidence and assurance that a reasonable degree of public order will be maintained while private business is being transacted. Only the selfOnly the selfsufficient village community can live in such idea-tight bliss. At the very moment that such a policy were determined and the measures begun to give it effect, the signs of weakness would be discernible as a result of the effect on us of the economic breakdown and political chaos in Europe. That breakdown has come in some quarters, and is barely being held off in others. Unfortunately, this first alternative is the one more readily taken up in times like these, when idealistic hopes which took but little account perhaps of realities have been disappointed and reactions of cynicism and disillusionment set in. It is a period of impatience and ill-temper, when loose thinking is common, and resolute, steadfast courses unpopular.

Broadly speaking, the other alternative involves the adoption by the leading nations of a reasonable policy of coöperation, looking to gradual disarmament, and agreement on the fundamental principles.

Any plan laid before the other governments must involve economic elements, matters in the domain of international law and certain political and moral considerations, all of which are vital factors in the peace of the world. It must embrace a genuine cessation of military and naval preparation, not necessarily the scrapping of fleets, aircraft, or fortifications, but the declaration of what is commonly known as a "holiday" in construction of these means of offense and defense, and the immediate acquisition of all enterprises for the construction of armament and military munitions by the several states. The reasonably rapid reduction of military and naval personnel, no matter how the state has to

provide for the men released, is another indispensable element in any plan of restriction of the preparations for war. In the domain of international law there should be agreement in principle (to be carried out later in detailed conventions) as to the outlawry of the use of chemical warfare; the abandonment of reprisals in any and all circumstances; the acceptance of the inviolability of merchant craft; possibly, also, the automatic action of neutral governments to bring about an effective blockade of belligerency wherever it appears without dispute as to who is the aggressor. After all, the thing which needs to be quarantined is the state of belligerency.

OTHER SETTLEMENTS

There are certain other settlements which must be regarded as essential to the peace of the world, not only now, but for the future. For instance, a determined and patient effort on the part of our government would go far towards settling by international convention the question of protection of racial minorities wherever they exist, so far as this problem can be solved otherwise than by the exercise of real understanding and human charity.

I also feel that the extension of the good offices of the United States Government at the time that it were to initiate the other negotiations necessary to the successful carrying out of this plan of cancellation of war indebtedness on the basis of quid pro quo, would make it easy for the Government of England gracefully to recognize the right of those who reject her offer of partnership in empire, peacefully and unmolested to withdraw. England

would thus secure a friendly neighbor who would be willing undoubtedly to shoulder a just proportion of the British war debt if permitted to go in peace, and who would also be as willing to

renounce the ambitions and burdens of empire as all the other little nations have been willing to abandon them in order to win the precious spiritual treasure of self-direction. An inde

pendent Ireland would be as little concerned with the imperial projects of larger nations as either of the Low Countries after their emergence from centuries of attempted assimilation by their neighbors.

CONCLUSIONS

Possibly no recapitulation is of any use after such a survey of the question as I have had to make, but I venture to point out the chief considerations that I have set down.

1. The European countries are unable at the present time to pay interest on their debts, or undertake the amortization of their debts; and it will be years before they can begin to pay the interest currently due, to say nothing of arrears of interest.

2. It would be hardly possible, or at any rate, exceedingly difficult, for those countries to make head against their other obligations if their indebtedness to the United States were cancelled; while these obligations to the United States stand, the European governments are forced to continue absorbing private credit, already dangerously near exhaustion, for public use.

3. Relief from the burden of these debts, whether payable on demand or after twenty years, would enable the European countries (1) to come nearer to balancing their ordinary budgets, (2) to stabilize their fiscal programs long enough to enable capital to be invested with some assurance, business to be set going, and industry to revive, and (3) to begin the long and tedious return journey to convertibility of their currencies.

4. Cancellation by the United States of the debts owed by European coun

tries on account of war credits or European relief would naturally be welcomed by the European peoples and governments; they would, of course, prefer that such cancellation be unconditional.

5. Finding that at present unconditional cancellation can hardly be secured, the European countries will decide that they must make the best of the situation, bring about as rapidly as possible the transformation of their demand notes held by the United States Government into 15-25 year bonds with funding of interest, and having been granted this respite, address themselves to (1), domestic adjustment and (2), the cultivation in the United States of a public sentiment friendly to unconditional cancellation.

6. So bad is the situation of the European countries, however, that they could not, and would not, refuse any reasonable conditions imposed by the United States upon the gradual cancellation of the debts; the instant relief to their fiscal maladies would be worth any bearable sacrifice.

7. All the more would the European countries be willing to accept conditional cancellation, if the conditions laid down by the government of the United States were clearly for their further relief from the burdens of war; while the national dignity in each case would be consoled with the argument that the process was world-wide.

8. This war has frightfully mortgaged the future. Are not signs everywhere discernible that people are going not merely to chafe under the burden, but to question the utility of our political, economic and social system, or even of our sacrosanct ideas of sovereignty itself? If this is to be the outcome, there is not going to be much of our foreign debt paid to us, unless we put a lien on everything our debtors possess, movable and immovable, and

DEALEY, JAMES QUAYLE. The State and Government. Pp. xiv, 409. Price, $3.00. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1921.

This is a book of principles and not a description of the governmental machinery of the state. The contents cover such matters as the social background, development of political government, taxation, police power, functions of government, classifi

cation of law, the electorate, citizenship, political parties, and the growth of democracy. It is not in any sense a contribution. It is solely what it purports to be an elementary introduction to political science. MCLAUGHLIN, ANDREW CUNNINGHAM.

Steps in the Development of American
Democracy. Pp. 210. Price, $1.50.
New York: The Abingdon Press.
1921.

This book puts into 210 pages of clear type a series of lectures given at Wesleyan University in the spring of 1919. There are eight chapters in the book the first seven of which deal with principles emerging from our colonial history, the theories of the Revolutionary period, the principles and ideas of the critical years following the Revolutionary period, in the Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, Civil War and post-war periods. The crux of the book is Chapter VIII on "The Implications and Responsibilities of Democracy Today." The analysis of democracy given in the last thirty pages is alone worth the price of the book many times over. It is not only a philosophical analysis of merit but it is a clear vision of the science of democracy and a call to action on the high plane of the true democratic calling. A finer statement has not been written in many, many years. HALL, G. STANLEY. Morale. The Supreme

Standard of Life and Conduct. Pp. ix, 378. Price, $3.00. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1920.

Morale is "to keep ourselves, body and soul, and our environment, physical, social,

industrial, etc., always at the very tip-top of condition." The developmental urge that leads us into this super-hygiene is the only "truly defined power that ever was or will be." Hence it follows that "morale thus conceived is the one and only true religion of the present and the future and its doctrines are the only true theology." "True morale is never motivated by the expectation of pay or pain in another world."

Such is the main thesis in this new book

by G. Stanley Hall. But few will agree

with this fundamental thesis. All however will profit from the illuminating discussion of such topics as the Morale of Fear, Death, Hate and Anger, War Aims and Knowledge, the Soldier Ideal and its Conservation in Peace, Morale and Rehabilitation of the Wounded, Morale and Education, and Morale and Religion.

BRISSENDEN, PAUL FREDERICK. The I.

W. W. A Study of American Syndicalism. Pp. 438. Price: Cloth cover $4.00, paper cover, $3.50. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., Agent. Columbia University. 1921. This is an inclusive history of the I. W. W. from its early revolutionary bodies to 1919. It is difficult for one to discuss with accuracy the work because the field is necessarily so broad. Footnote references are given to sources and extensive quotations are included, and all in all the book appears to be a thorough-going, authentic and worth while history of the I. W. W.'s in this country. Those who want not only the history but the philosophy of the I. W. W.

will find this book worth while.

The Appendix gives some of the songs from the I. W. W. song book and some of the statutes by states outlawing criminal syndicalism.

DEALEY, JAMES QUAYLE. The State and Government. Pp. xiv, 409. Price, $3.00. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1921.

This is a book of principles and not a description of the governmental machinery