doctrine was a reality in part at least because of British coöperation. For other illustrations of our participation in international matters not strictly American I need refer only to our share in the two Hague Conferences, to our beneficent services in the settlement of the Russo-Japanese war in the peace of Portsmouth, to the less-known incident of our participation in the Algerçiras settlement in 1906, and lastly to our share in the world war and the Peace Conference at Versailles.

In connection with the Hague Conferences it is a matter of considerable interest in this connection to recall that the American delegates were by general agreement permitted to annex to their signature to the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international disputes, that nothing therein contained should be so interpreted as to require the United States "to depart from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state," or to relinquish "its traditional attitude toward purely American questions." A reservation of similar import was attached to the general act of the Algerçiras Conference. The practice of our government therefore assumes that there is no basic inconsistency between a certain kind of participation in European affairs and a vigorous assertion of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. On the other hand there is always the danger that an over-aggressive policy in this direction may seriously compromise our position.

THE ALGERÇIRAS INCIDENT

In the opinion of some, the part played by President Roosevelt in connection with the Algerçiras Conference had in it many of the elements for such a development. The facts concerning

our share in the Moroccan question have not until recently been divulged and the people of this country have not had the slightest idea of the extraordinary and altogether dominating rôle played by our government in bringing about a settlement in 1906.

It is a diplomatic secret that President Roosevelt is entitled to the credit of arranging the important Algerçiras Conference of 1906 and dictating the terms on which war between France and Germany with the possible involvement of England as the Ally of France, was averted. . . . In the end the President fairly compelled the Kaiser to accept the terms upon which the final agreement was reached by the Convention.6

The truth of these remarkable statements, startling though they are, seems to be fully borne out by the secret documents, hitherto suppressed at Mr. Roosevelt's request even by the powers principally concerned. From the evidence in the case as furnished in Mr. Bishop's two chapters entitled "The Secret History of the Algerçiras Controversy" it appears that he was able to dictate terms largely because the Emperor had repeatedly urged him to bring about the conference, assuring him that Germany would accept the awards. The Emperor had in fact gone further, declaring that Germany had no desire for territory or influence, only the general peace and the open door.

Thus in the first Memorandum from the German government it is stated "that Germany asked for no gains in Morocco; she simply defended her interests and stood for equal rights to all nations there." In a letter of April 25, Sternburg wrote:

France had offered to come to a separate agreement and make concessions, but that he (the Emperor) had refused because he

6 Bishop, J. P.: Theodore Roosevelt and his Time. I, p. 467.

was disinterestedly championing the cause of the world at large. . . The Emperor states that his policy is absolutely clear and simple. In spite of special advantages offered to him he stands by the treaty rights granted to all. Only if he should discover that he should receive no support from the interested treaty powers in connection with the open door and the conference, he would be forced to think of Germany alone. Only then--and not before he would have to choose between the possibility of a war with France and the examining of those conditions which France may have to propose, so as to avoid a war."

Despite this, it soon became apparent after the conference assembled at Algerçiras that the Emperor was far from being so disinterested. What Germany really wanted was a sphere of influence in Morocco, or to quote Mr. Roosevelt:

Aiming in effect at the partition of Morocco... she first attempted to obtain a port for herself, and then a separate port, nominally for Holland or Switzerland, which we are convinced would, with the adjacent Hinterland become in effect German.

Convinced that France would not yield, Mr. Roosevelt submitted four propositions as a settlement of the deadlock. These assumed the policy of the open door, that is:

That all commercial nations are entitled to have the door of equal opportunity in Morocco kept open, and the corollary to that principle, that no one power ought to acquire such a control over the territory of Morocco as to justify the belief that she might ultimately come to regard and treat that territory as her own to the exclusion of others. (Root to Sternburg, March 17, 1914.)

The proposal, however, placed the

President used the "big stick." He says, in commenting on Germany's finally yielding:

I had previously informed Speck, in a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persevered in rejecting our proposals and a break-up ensued, I should be obliged to publish the entire correspondence and that I believed that our people would feel a grave suspicion of Germany's justice and good faith.

Now it is a grave question how far American executive action should go in such matters. It is not at all inconceivable that negotiations of so delicate a nature and on so important a problem might get us into war. It certainly is somewhat of a departure from the doctrines of the fathers. On the other hand there was nothing in the Algerçiras episode to compromise our position on the Monroe Doctrine with respect to America.

ARBITRATION TREATIES

A good deal has been made of the Bryan arbitration treaties in their effect on the Monroe Doctrine. More than two dozen such treaties were negotiated and signed by our government in the years immediately before and during the war. These treaties provided definitely that:

The high contracting parties agree that all disputes between them of every nature whatsoever, to the settlement of which previous arbitration treaties and agreements do not apply in their terms or are not applied in fact, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for international investigation and report to an international commission, [and] they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities

hands and to this Germany objected vigorously. It was then that the

7 Bishop, J. P.: Theodore Roosevelt and his Time. I, p. 470. p. 489.

8 Ibid.,

report is submitted.

Now it is obvious that "disputes. of every nature whatsoever" would include disputes involving the Monroe Doctrine. Therefore this country def

initely pledged itself in the treaties to refer "matters involving the doctrine to an international commission for investigation and report." This does not mean, however, as Professor Wilson would have us believe, that we have abandoned the Monroe Doctrine. To agree to delay action and possible hostilities till the questions in dispute have been investigated and reported upon does not by any stretch of the imagination, waive, as he says, the "purely national and American character" of the doctrine.

MONROE DOCTRINE FOR THE WORLD?

Nor is there here any reason for the championing by this country of a Monroe Doctrine for the world. We received with acclaim President Wilson's

foreign to the historic background and conception of President Monroe's message. Indeed, it involves the abandonment of the doctrine as an American policy. Why then call it a Monroe Doctrine? Why retain the name if we get rid of the substance?

Apparently, however, the people of this country are not ready to abandon the substance if the last elections can be taken as voicing its judgment on that question. The verdict was decisive in favor of a retention of the nationalistic application of the ideas of the doctrine.

It was therefore in accord with the nation's mandate that President Harding at the unveiling of the Bolivar Statue in New York some time ago reasserted the doctrine declaring that

before we entered the war.

That no nation should attempt to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to develop its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

This is excellent as an expression of sentiment or even as an international creed. On the other hand there is no warrant for the assertion that this and similar expressions of lofty internationalism by President Wilson, or indeed our participation in the World War, have superseded the Monroe Doctrine and set up in its stead a Monroe Doctrine for the world. Such a doctrine would not be a Monroe Doctrine even if sponsored by this country. It precludes by its very nature certain basic features of that doctrine and is entirely

9"If thus for half of the states of the world the Monroe Doctrine may now be subjected to international standards of judgment, its purely national and American character may be said to have been waived." Professor G. G. Wilson, The Monroe Doctrine After the War.

if necessary to protect these continents and their sturdy young democracy from oppression and tyranny." Secretary Hughes' reply to the Poles that the

United States would not intervene in the Silesian dispute is along the same line.

DOCTRINE AS OBSTACLE TO WAR

This clear-cut enunciation of policy removes at one stroke all dangers of equivocation as to our attitude toward the doctrine. Our uncompromising stand on the doctrine and our manifest

determination to back it up by force, if need be, has repeatedly cleared up an ugly situation that might otherwise have led to war. The dangers of equivocation and weakness are evident. Clearly understood policies rarely lead

to war.

By asserting the principle of non-intervention in the face of Austria, Russia, Prussia and France, which powers had just decreed intervention to reëstablish the absolution of Ferdinand in Spain [says Professor Moore], the United States prevented the necessity of its own intervention by precluding the occasion for it.

would seek to overthrow the then infant republics in South America. In such an event this country would be confronted with the possibility that by gradual and imperceptible encroachment the European nations would implant the monarchical idea again among the nations of South and Central America. The doctrine was announced, therefore, not as an expression of an intention on the part of this country to establish a hegemony over the South American territory, but as a purely defensive policy. That is to say, it was inspired by the fear that gradually one country after another in South America would be invaded, its territorial limits impaired or its political independence interfered with until they should again fall under the dominion of the European nations and finally there should be established in South America a monarchical system which would be a menace to the United States of America.

IN RELATION TO FOREIGN
COUNTRIES

It has been suggested that the South American countries resent our assertion of the Monroe Doctrine upon the ground that it is an assumption on our part of a national superiority which, while it may be justified by the material facts, is offensive to proud and selfsustaining nations. President Carranza even refused to admit that it existed. It seems to me that that feeling is based upon a misconception of the character of the Monroe Doctrine. We assert no superiority over the South American countries. We wish to do nothing which would impair the friendly relations between those countries and ourselves. They are entitled as much as we are to their national independence and such international arrangements as they choose to make. We do not wish to interfere with them,

as the history of the United States, particularly in modern times, will abundantly show. Take as an example our extreme self-restraint in the matter of a Central American country, that is to say, Mexico.

Now one difficulty about the Monroe Doctrine is that it is not particularly well understood. Professor Moore has called attention to a very interesting explanation of its reciprocal character.2 That is to say, he has linked it with our policy in relation to European affairs. It undoubtedly has something to do with that, but that some confusion has arisen concerning the Monroe Doctrine is exemplified in the attempt in the new Article XXI in the League of Nations to describe it. Perhaps this confusion is not unnatural because our statesmen had not employed any uniform method of describing it. On the contrary, some of our ablest presidents and secretaries of state have given varying definitions of it, some of which, I am sure, would be at variance with the real meaning of the doctrine.

Generally speaking, presidents and the Senate have contented themselves with explaining the historical origin of the doctrine and have stated the immediate purpose of it, and, in a general way, how it has worked. But even the Senate in ratifying the Hague Convention of 1907 did not essay a definition of the doctrine. On the contrary, in seeking to preserve our rights, all they said was that it was not intended to imply any change in the traditional attitude towards purely American questions, thus leaving the question as to what that attitude was entirely to the interpretation of any publicist who was interested.

In the Venezuelan controversy, which took place in 1895, Secretary Olney said, "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this conti2 See page 31.