begun as soon as the remaining mandates have been approved. It seems not too sanguine to hope, therefore, that with the completed launching of the system we shall have passed beyond the possibility of repeating such scandals as those in the Belgian Congo, which so disturbed American opinion a few years ago, or such an atrocity as the Germans' massacre of the Herreros.

The success of the mandate system is still depending on many factors. Chief among them, it seems to me, is the will that it shall succeed. The formation of this will and its effective assertion, require in each country a body on informed and intelligent opinion which is ready and active as each issue arises. Such an opinion is much needed in the United States today. We have professed at various times an interest in seeing that justice is done to the minority peoples of Eastern Europe, and an interest in the well-being of the natives of Africa. It is not enough that this interest should find expression when a particularly flagrant outrage such as that in the Congo has excited popular passion. The constructive effort which conditions the success of the minority treaties and the mandate system requires more than a week of headlines for its building.

If such interest exists in America today, it seems to me that it should insist that the protection of minorities in the new states of Europe and of natives in the mandated territories should find a place in the newly formulated foreign policy of the United States. Our government has taken the position that the United States is "directly interested in the terms of the mandates," and both Secretaries Colby and Hughes have given forceful ex

pression to this interest in connection with their efforts to secure equality of commercial treatment for American citizens in mandated territories. It would be a flouting of the whole mandate idea if a mandatory should use its position to exploit for itself or its friends the natural resources of the mandated territory, and unless equal access to such resources is provided for all foreigners, little progress will have been made in removing the chief source of international friction before the war.

But the government of the United States should not confine its interest in the terms of the mandates to securing business opportunities for American citizens. We can not discharge the responsibilities which came to us from the war by basing our foreign policy merely on a dollar diplomacy. To the minorities in Eastern Europe the American people have an obligation which ought to be discharged by some kind of ratification of the treaties with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia and Roumania and Greece. If such ratification must await our final action on the peace treaties, it ought to be none the less assured when that time comes. To the natives in former German territories in Africa and the Pacific, we have an obligation which ought to be met by our participation in framing the mandates and in supervising their execution. The simple method of handling both of these responsibilities would seem to be to take our place in the councils of the League of Nations. But short of that, we should insist that a way be found for us to play our part in making good on the Allies' wartime professions, and to justify the confidence and hope with which so many peoples still look to us for protection and sympathy.

doubtedly proposed by Mr. Wilson with an altruistic end in view. It was adopted, however, by the European statesmen as a scheme to disguise under a cloak of virtuous self-abnegation the intentions of the conquerors of Germany to divide among themselves Germany's overseas possessions.

In his recent book, Mr. Lansing attempts to explain Mr. Wilson's infatuation on the mandate question by a disconcerting analysis of his former chief's mental processes. Mr. Lansing believes that "a sufficient and very practical reason" for the willingness of Clemenceau and Lloyd George to acquiesce in the mandatory plan was that in this way "Germany lost her territorial assets, which might have greatly reduced her financial debt to the Allies, while the latter obtained the German colonial possessions without the loss of any of their claims for indemnity."

An additional and equally compelling reason might have been adduced by Mr. Lansing had he been aware of the embarrassment and alarm of the French and British premiers over Italy's insistence upon the fulfillment of a clearly worded article in the secret treaty of 1915. One of the promises exacted by Italy as the price of her intervention in the war was "adequate territorial compensation" in case the war should bring "an increase in the colonial possessions of France and Great Britain in Africa." President Wilson was the deus ex machina. Togo, Kamerun, German East Africa, German Southwest Africa, belonged to the League of Nations. The Treaty of Versailles did not give them to France

could Italy argue that her Allies had increased their African possessions? The former German colonies were simply "a sacred trust."

The French and British Governments have never at any time, either before or after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, taken the mandate idea seriously. It is not difficult to prove this assertion. It is based upon hard, cold facts, of which the Wilson Administration did not seem to be aware until the end of the year 1920. The prophecy of Isaiah about "seeing ye shall see and shall not perceive," was certainly fulfilled at Paris, not only in regard to the former German colonies in Africa and the Pacific, but also in regard to the Ottoman races. the Ottoman races. The mandatory articles of the Covenant were being violated at the moment of drafting, and during the two months before the Treaty of Versailles was signed. Mr. Wilson should have been aware of the intents of his associates. As the mandatory question is now becoming an international issue, through the notes of Secretaries Colby and Hughes, it is important for the American people to realize that the American Government has no reason to be surprised at the attitude of the French and British and Japanese Governments.

MANDATORY POLICY OF THE ALLIED PREMIERS

Concealment of mandatory intentions, and denial of the authority of the League of Nations have been the consistent policy of the Allied Premiers. Since April, 1919, the allotment of the mandates, the drawing of boundaries and the rules for governing man

dated territories have been matters of direct negotiation between the powers in actual possession of German and Ottoman territories at the time of the Armistice. These powers did not wait until the Council of the League was formed. The residuary trustee idea is a farce, since the Entente Powers are interested in the League of Nations only as a convenient instrument to use in furthering their own foreign policies. This is natural. Who can deny that the authority and activities of the League in all matters that count are under the direct control of the Allied Premiers, who think of the League simply as a Doctor Jekyl-a false front to shield their Mr. Hyde doings?

The mandates for the former German colonies and Ottoman Empire were decided upon before the Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted. The ownership of these territories had been a matter of secret negotiations among the Entente Powers during the war. Mr. Wilson's intervention at Paris changed nothing. Mr. Wilson was humored to the extent of being allowed to invent a new name. That was all. "What's in a name?"

The mandates for the former German colonies were allotted to those who held them by those who were holding them. On the day that the Treaty was handed to the German delegates Mr. Wilson agreed to recognize that a de facto system already existed. He seems to have remonstrated only on the question of Yap, and that reservation was not written into the minutes. France and Great Britain had already made an agreement to swap lands, when Belgium kicked about being frozen out. Her statesmen appealed to Great Britain as the owner of German East Africa and not through the League of Nations. King Albert flew to Paris and an agreement was reached without thought or reference to this residuary trustee.

The Anglo-Belgium agreement transferred an inland portion of German East Africa to Belgium, thus proving that the British and Belgian Governments did not believe either that the title of the conquered territory was vested in the League of Nations or in the five principal Allied or associated powers, or that a former German colony as a mandated territory should be preserved in its territorial integrity. The world, and this includes the United States Government, has never been told of the terms on which Great Britain agreed to divide the former German colonies in the Pacific with Japan and what other terms were reached concerning the German islands south of the equator and German Southwest Africa.

The Ottoman Empire had been similarly taken care of by secret understanding, concluded in 1915 and revised at the instance of Russia in 1916. The facts concerning the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between Great Britain and France, and concerning the British pledges to Zionists and Arabs, must have filtered through the press to the White House long before Mr. Wilson sailed for Paris. These agreements should have demonstrated to the American negotiator-I use the singularthe absurdity of Article XX of the Covenant, but if Mr. Wilson needed another warning of the intention of his colleagues to give him the shadow while they kept the substance, he had it in their failure to comply with the "wishes of the inhabitants"-I am quoting from the text of the Treaty of Versailles.

THE OTTOMAN MANDATE

It has been frequently asserted by apologists for the League and Mr. Wilson that the United States was excluded in a share in the Ottoman mandates of our own volition. This is not true. France and Great Britain never suggested, even indirectly, that

we participate in the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire in any other way than in relieving them of the burden of the barren and mountainous portion of Armenia, cut off from the sea and from the regions of Armenia that were rich in cotton, copper and oil; and in regard to this thing may I say that I myself have seen with my own eyes the report on this question of General Franchet d'Esperey to the French Foreign Office.

Article XX provides that "members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof."

In justification of Mr. Wilson one might advance the argument that he relied on this stipulation, to prevent secret understandings, from nullifying the stipulations of Article XX. We must give Mr. Wilson justice in this matter, and we can believe that he provided for it, but international diplomatic language must be specific. "Inconsistent with the terms thereof" means nothing, unless "the terms thereof" are explicit and comprehensive. While the spirit of Article XX is unmistakable, its language is in places vague and childish, undoubtedly intentionally so. Although it is declared that "The well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization," the open door is promised only to members of the League, and yet Article CXIX provides that, Germany renounces in favor of the principal Allied and associated powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions." Unless all five powers are members of the League, Articles XXII and CXIX contradict each other. Exactly this

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unprovided for contingency has arisen at the present time. The fault does not lie at the door of the Allied Premiers. The League of Nations was presumably an American conception, and the mandate scheme was a concession to the American President. The sponsor of the mandate idea did not know how to be its defender.

The Colby notes of November 20, 1920, to Great Britain on Mesopotamia, and of February 21, 1921, to the League Council on the former German colonies are admirable documents, and present, with fidelity, the American point of view. This is proved by the fact that the Harding Administration has continued the same policy, and Secretary Hughes follows the same line of argument. But are we not crying over spilled milk? It is the statesmen's duty to care for the interests of his country at the moment the danger arises, or, better still, to foresee and provide against all possible attempts of others to take advantage of his country.

The "equal concern and inseparable interest with other principal powers in the overseas possessions of Germany, and concededly, an equal voice to the disposition," ought to have been claimed by the United States before hostilities ended, or, at the very latest, before the Peace Conference opened. Good statesmanship would have prompted a concise setting forth of our equal concern and inseparable interest in every material advantage to be gained by the Treaty as a preliminary participation in the negotiation of the Treaty. There is nothing more pathetic than the use of that word 'concededly" in a document which shows that "concededly" is not there.

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AMERICA'S MISTAKE

I know that some generous, high minded Americans are bitterly opposed to what I have said. They say that it

would have been beneath our dignity between our comrades in arms and ourselves had any such course been followed. The idea is beautiful but impractical. Just how impractical it is we know, for the simple reason that it has been tried. Americans, with their heads in the clouds and thinking of the war as holy and of our associates as angels, forget that Great Britain, France, Russia and Japan did not feel it improper to enter an understanding with one another as to what should be the share of each in case of victory. Italy held up her Allies twice for an increased share in Russia during critical periods of the war. Japan wrung from others the promise of Shantung when she saw that the United States was going to come in. Roumania and Greece bargained with the Allies-they began to inquire about the future of Africa as early as 1916. While the Battle of the Somme was on, Great Britain and France were dangerously near friction in a discussion about their respective shares of the Ottoman Empire. After the Armistice the storm broke. Frank statements of public opinion in their respective countries on a variety of questions were put through the Paris clearing house by the representatives of the victorious nations. Why was it not made clear to our associates that American disinterestedness was contingent upon their disinterestedness and that equality of opportunity and treatment for American commerce with the commerce of every other nation in all territories that changed hands as a result of the war we helped to win, would be insisted upon? Frequently Messrs. Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Mr. Wilson also, stated that British, Italian or French public opinion would not stand this or that solution of the problem. Why was American public opinion not taken into consideration? Why was it taken

for granted that the United States would ratify blindly whatever Treaties that were put over? It would have been fair to our associates, as well as ourselves, had we told the European statesmen that American ratification of the Treaties was contingent upon what the Treaties contained.

We are told that the League of Nations is our work, but that we have not entered it; that the mandate scheme is our plan, but that we want no mandate ourselves. The American President was not only father of the League but he was responsible for the adoption of the Smuts suggestions that the League of Nations be the trustee for the former German colonies and the liberated portions of the Ottoman Empire.

The new administration has a pitiful legacy of error and inconsistency to handicap it in upholding a constructive policy on the mandate question. But Mr. Wilson is not alone to blame for the failure of the United States to protect at Paris American interests in the former German colonies and the Ottoman Empire. American public opinion has always been hostile to the policy of economic imperialism, because such a policy would entail sending armies overseas. Was not the mandate idea a possible means of conserving America's interests in the conquests without offering to assume obligations of a character that Mr. Wilson knew the American people would repudiate? It is easy to make one man our scapegoat, and it is as dangerous as it is easy.

Two YEARS OF MANDATORY CONTROL

BY ENTENTE POWERS

There is much to wax indignant about and to denounce in the way of self-appointed mandatory powers allotting to themselves the mandates, and in the way they have exercised them during the first two years of the