Pursuant to said provision, the President, on March 14, 1907, issued an order that such—

citizens of Japan or Korea, to wit, Japanese or Korean laborers, skilled and unskilled, who have received passports to go to Mexico, Canada, and Hawaii, and come therefrom, be refused permission to enter the continental territory of the United States.

The order further directs the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to take such measures and to make and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry the order into effect. Held, that neither such statute nor order applies to aliens who have no passports from their governments, nor does the order authorize the exclusion of Japanese or Korean laborers other than those having passports to go to Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii; that a rule, adopted by the commissioner, that if a Japanese or Korean laborer applies for admission and presents no passport it shall be presumed that he did possess a passport limited to Mexico, Canada, and Hawaii, is beyond any power conferred on him by either the act or the President's order, and affords no authority for excluding a Japanese or Korean laborer who presented no passport, the natural presumption in such case being that he had none, and there being no basis for the presumption stated in the rule.-(United States v. Hemet, 156 F., 285.)

[Cal., 1872.]

A State may exclude from its limits paupers, vagabonds, and 1 criminals, or sick, diseased, infirm, and disabled persons who are likely to become a public charge, or may admit them only on such terms as will prevent the State from being burdened with their support. (State v. The Constitution, 42 Cal., 578; 10 Am. Rep., 303.)

But the State can not, even in the absence of legislation of Congress upon the subject, exclude from its limits, or admit within its limits upon terms, persons in the full possession of their faculties, sound in body, and neither paupers, vagabonds, nor criminals, and in all respects competent to earn a livelihood.-(State v. The Constitution, 42 Cal., 578; 10 Am. Rep., 303.)

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STATUS OF EXCLUSION TREATIES AND LAWS.

[U. S., 1880.]

Act Pennsylvania, March 25, 1850, providing that, to protect the public health, every vessel arriving from a foreign port shall be visited by the port physician at Philadelphia for the purpose of examining the baggage of the passengers and crew, and that such physician "shall receive and pay over to the board of health the sum of fifty cents" for each person on board, is in violation of United States Constitution, Article I, section 8, as an interference with commerce.(American S. S. Co. v. Board of Health, 26 Int. Rev. Rec., 69.)

Under act Pennsylvania, March 25, 1850, providing that, to protect the public health, every vessel arriving from a foreign port shall be visited by the port physician at Philadelphia for the purpose of examining the baggage of the passengers and crew, and that such physician "shall receive and pay over to the board of health the sum of fifty cents" for each person on board, the fee can not be sustained as a port charge for services rendered, since the service is to the city and not to the vessel.-(American S. S. Co. v. Board of Health, 26 Int. Rev. Rec., 69.)

[U. S., 1875.]

A statute which imposes a burdensome and almost impossible condition on the shipmaster as a prerequisite to his landing his passengers, with an alternative payment of a small sum of money for each one of them, is a tax on the shipowner for the right to land such passengers, and in effect, on the passenger himself, since the shipmaster makes him pay it in advance as part of his fare. Such a statute of a State is a regulation of commerce, and, when applied to passengers from foreign countries, is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations. Legislation on the subject which it covers is confided exclusively to Congress by that clause of the Constitution which gives to that body the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations." It can not be defended as falling within the police power of the State, for legislation is prohibited to the State over all matters on which it is granted exclusively to Congress; nor is the constitutional objection to this tax on the passenger removed because the penalty for failure to pay does not accrue until twenty-four hours after he is landed. The penalty is incurred by the act of landing him without payment, and is, in fact, for the act of bringing him into the State. (Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U. S., 259; 23 L. Ed., 543.)

The statute of California which requires masters and owners of vessels to give bond for the future protection of the State against the support of criminal and infirm passengers is an unauthorized regulation of commerce. If the right of the States to pass statutes to protect themselves in regard to criminal or pauper and the diseased foreigner exists at all, it is limited to such laws as are absolutely necessary for that purpose, and these regulations can not extend so far as to prevent or obstruct other classes of persons from the right to hold personal

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and commercial intercourse with the people of the United States.(Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S., 275; 23 L. Ed., 550.)

Acts Louisiana 1842, No. 123, providing that no free negro shall come into the State on board any vessel as one of the crew or as a passenger, and declaring that any such negro thus coming in shall be imprisoned and detained until the vessel is again ready to proceed to sea when the master of the vessel shall be liable to all costs and expenses, is void, as an interference by the State with navigation in the United States.-(1844, The Cynosure, Fed. Cas. No. 3529 (1 Spr., 88); 1859, The William Jarvis, Fed. Cas. No. 17697 (1 Spr., 485).)

[U. S., 1874.]

The State can not require the master of a ship to give bonds conditioned that immigrants coming on board the ship shall not become public charges.-(In re Ah Fong, Fed. Cas. No. 102, 3 Sawy., 144.)

[U. S., 1837.]

Act New York, 1824, requiring masters of vessels arriving at New York to make report of the names, etc., of foreign passengers, etc., is not an interference on the part of the State with commerce between the port of New York and foreign ports.-(City of New York v. Miln, 36 U. S. (11 Pet.), 102; 9 L. Ed., 648, affirming Fed. Cas. No. 9618 (2 Paine, 429).)

[U. S., 1849.]

The third section of the act of the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, of the 20th of April, 1837, entitled, "An act relating to alien passengers," providing that no alien passengers (except those likely to become paupers, who are prohibited in another section from being landed unless a bond is given to secure the city, town, or State against their support) shall be landed until the sum of $2 is paid to the boarding officer for each passenger so landing, is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States and therefore void.-(Norris v. City of Boston, 48 U. S. (7 How.), 283; 12 L. Ed., 702.)

[La., 1874.]

Section 2, of the immigration law, enacted March, 1869, and reenacted in Revised Statutes, 1870, section 1722, is not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, which gives to Congress the exclusive right to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian tribes. The law is simply a police regulation adopted by the State for the protection of its own citizens. (Immigration Com'rs v. Brandt, 26 La. Ann., 29.)

[U. S. C. C., N. Y., 1898.]

The Treasury Department may make rules and regulations to carry out the statutes and facilitate the exclusion and return of persons whose immigration Congress has forbidden, but no mere rule can operate to exclude a person not excluded by the statutes.-(In re Kornmehl, 87 F., 314.)

[U. S. C. C. A., N. Y., 1908.]

Immigration act March 3, 1903 (ch. 1012, sec. 20, 32 Stat., 1218), provides that any alien who shall be found a public charge in the United States from causes existing prior to landing shall be deported at any time within two years after arrival, at the expense, including one-half of the cost of inland transportation to the port of deporta

tion, of the person bringing the alien into the United States. Held, that the term "transportation," as so used, should be given its ordinary meaning, viz, carriage from one place to another, and that the phrase "cost of inland transportation" therefore only included the cost of carrying the alien from the inland place where he was found. to the port of deportation, and that the Government was therefore not entitled to recover under such section from the steamship company bringing the deported alien into the United States any part of the traveling expenses of an officer sent to bring the alien to the port of deportation.-(United States v. Hamburg American Line, 159 F., 104; 86 C. C. A., 294.)

[U. S. Sup., Wash., 1903.]

Aliens of the excluded class are not protected from deportation by the executive officers of the Government because they have effected an entry into the United States, in view of the power given the Secretary of the Treasury by act October 19, 1888, 25 Stat., 566, ch. 1210 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1294), if satisfied that an immigrant has been allowed to land contrary to law, to cause his deportation at any time within a year after landing, which power was again substantially conferred by the provisions of act March 3, 1891, sec. 11, 26 Stat., 1086, ch. 551 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1299), that an alien immigrant may be sent out of the country "as provided by law" at any time within a year after his illegal entry into the United States.--(Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 23 Sup. Ct., 611; 189 U. S., 86; 47 L. Ed., 721.)

[U. S. C. C. A., Wash., 1903.]

Under act March 3, 1891, ch. 551, secs. 10-11, 26 Stat., 1086 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p. 1299), providing that all aliens unlawfully coming into the country shall, if practicable, be immediately sent back on the vessel by which they were brought in, and that any alien unlawfully coming into the country may be returned as provided by law at any time within a year thereafter, where alien immigrants unlawfully came into the country from France, are then temporarily absent in British Columbia, and return within a year from their arrival from France, they are properly deported to France.-(Lavin v. Le Fevre, 125 F. 693; 60 C. C. A., 425.)

[U. S. D. C., Wash., 1899.]

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Neither the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., ch. 551), nor any prior 3 act of Congress confers authority on ministerial officers of the United States to arrest and deport an immigrant who has become domiciled in this country, on the ground that he has become a public charge from causes existing prior to his landing. Such person is within the protection of the fifth constitutional amendment, and can only be deprived of his liberty by judicial proceedings, of which the circuit and district courts are by such act given concurrent jurisdiction.-(In re Yamasaka, 95 F., 652.)

[U. S., 1893.]

The detention and disinfection of immigrants by order of a State board of health, with the purpose of preventing infectious disease, is not a regulation of foreign commerce by a State, within the meaning of the prohibition in Constitution United States, Article I, section 8.--(Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Milner (C. C.), 57 Fed.,

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