ized, and commenced the exercise of high political powers. This convention was called, not by the people of the States directly, but by their representatives, or the legislatures of the States; but the Constitution, prepared by the Convention, was adopted by delegates chosen by the people in each State; and is justly to be considered the act and will of the majority of the people (in the States respectively) as declared in the preamble, "We, the people," &c. The amendments to the federal Constitution, proposed by the first Congress, in 1789, in conformity to recommendations of most of the State Conventions which adopted it, were also sanctioned by the State legislatures, and not by Conventions specially called for the purpose. And this was agreeable to the fifth section of the third article of the Constitution, which points out the mode of amendments: so that it appears Conventions of delegates of the people are not necessary in making additions to the original compact; but it may be by the legislatures of the States. The amendment, respecting the election of President and Vice President, afterwards adopted, was made in this manner. But the difference is not material between these two modes of adopting amendments; as in either case, it is the act of the people by their representatives.

Up to the year 1789, from the time of the declaration of Independence, in July, 1776, and indeed from the beginning of 1775, the several States had assumed and exercised sovereign authority within their respective territories, although a continental Congress had been held from September, 1774 and united council and action had happily prevailed during the war of the Revolution. But that Congress, composed also of delegates from the several States, and appointed by the legislatures thereof, did not possess authority to carry into full effect the measures which they considered proper and important, without the consent of the State legislatures. It could only devise and recommend; and the decision of the several States was essential to consummate the plans and requisitions of the grand council of the confederacy. The imbecility and defects of such a political body were often felt and acknowledged, during the war for Independence, from 1775 to 1783; and when the contest with England was over, the defect was in some respects even more apparent and more deplored. By foreign governments, the thirteen States were considered as one nation; and the welfare and prosperity of the whole, in a domestic view, rendered it equally necesary-also, that there should be a supervising and gen

eral government, as to national objects and purposes. The debt incurred by the war was of great amount; and the credit and honor of the United States required its speedy payment. And, while the resources of the country were perceived to be fully adequate to its extinguishment, it was also evident, that so long as the States should act separately, there could be no just hope of accomplishing this most important object. Uniformity in measures through all the States, relating to foreign commerce and foreign intercourse, was found to be essential, as well for the reputation of the country with other nations, as for the present peace and future prosperity of the United States. Insurrection had already occurred in some of the States; and it was believed that the laws and measures of a single State had less authority and respect than those which should be adopted by a general government. In a word, there appeared to be no foundation for internal peace, for national prosperity, or for political respectability in the estimation of the civilized world, but in UNION. The most intelligent citizens, of undoubted patriotism and political knowledge and experience, in all the States, declared their conviction of the necessity of vesting greater power in Congress, as the only effectual remedy for existing evils, and for the prevention of future extensive national calamities.

Governor Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, expressed this opinion in two public addresses to the legislature, in 1785 and 1786; and near the close of the year last named, the General Assembly of Virginia adopted a resolution in favor of a continental Convention, for such a purpose.*

The great object proposed to be attained, when the Convention was called, was uniform and united action of all the States, "for the general welfare, for common defence, and for the security of the blessings of liberty;" and for delegating sufficient political authority to Congress, to direct, control and enforce all measures for the benefit of the States collectively. And this object was kept in view by the Convention which prepared the Constitution, and recommended it to the several States for adoption. It was provided, that the federal or general government, to be formed under it, should have authority to enact and execute all laws of a general nature, and affecting the whole

*The first step was a meeting at Annapolis, in Maryland, September, 1786; but only five States were represented in the Convention; and nothing was then done, but to recommend a Convention of delegates from all the States to be held at Philadelphia in the Spring of 1787.-And the Virginia Assembly soon after proposed the same measure.

country; but did not give it power to legislate for the States on common local subjects, relating to their internal police.

The Convention was called "for the purpose of revising the articles of the Confederation, and for reporting to the several legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein, as should, when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the federal compact adequate to the exigences of government and the preservation of the UNION."

There were different plans proposed in the Convention, as a remedy for the evils which existed, or were then apprehended. One was to grant full power to Congress, to regulate commerce, and to raise a revenue from imports to discharge the public debt; and to have Congress one body as it had formerly been. But the majority of the members early discovered a preference for a complete general government. And the great question was, whether it should be strictly national, or federal. The former system, it was supposed, would nearly annihilate the State governments, while the latter would be adequate to the objects in view, would still reserve to the States a great portion of their separate authority, and would be most agreeable to a large majority of the people. And the frame of Government, finally prepared and adopted, was of a federal rather than of a national government: or, as Mr. Madison has said, was partly national and partly federal."

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The Constitution of the United States, from which the federal Government derives its powers, was framed by men deputed by the legislature or authority of the several States; and, though it was submitted to the consideration of the people of the United States, and adopted by them through their delegates, its acceptance or ratification depended, not on the majority of the whole people in the aggregate, but on the majority of States. And it is evident there might have been a majority (or two-thirds) of the States in favor of the Constitution, without there being two-thirds of the whole people in all the States. The government, therefore, is a federal, rather than a national government, strictly speaking. Still, it is a general government; it is the government of the United States. Nine States constituted the requisite majority: but if Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina had been opposed to it, by a large majority in each, there would not have been twothirds of the people for it. It was not a majority of the people, but of the States, then, which ratified the Constitution; and so the instrument itself provided and required. The apportionment of the Senate is proof also, that the

general government is federal, and not strictly national. Every State is equally represented in that body, without regard to its population. But this is utterly irreconcilable with the doctrine of those, who say the general government is a national one, in which the whole people are equally represented. Neither numbers nor property are represented in the Senate; but States. The provision or principle which operates in the choice of President, when there has been no choice by the Electors, shows also the federal character of the government. Each State has a vote-instead of taking all the votes of the representatives in the aggregate, as in all cases where the numerical majority govern. It may, however, be justly said with Mr. Madison, that the government of the United States is partly federal and partly national. And yet the federal features prevail, and give the true character of the compact.*

The federal government was designed to be, and by a proper and natural construction of the Constitution, is, one of limited powers. Its jurisdiction or authority relate to certain specific objects, which are expressly enumerated. They are high and extensive powers; and with every intelligent man must be supposed to include the right to carry the specified powers into full effect. Any other construction would involve an absurdity. And yet the exercise of powers not expressly given, or clearly implied, would evidently be an unwarranted usurpation. In the exercise of powers fully given, Congress, or the federal government, is sovereign and uncontrollable by the States; much more so by a single State. But further and beyond such delegated power, it has not legitimate authority. All else remain with the States respectively, or with the people thereof. The man

*The Convention consisted of fifty members. Fifteen more were chosen, but. did not attend. And several who attended did not put their names to the Constitution, as they disapproved of some parts of it: but after it was adopted, they generally gave it their decided support. Some members, who attended the Convention a great part of its session, and who approved of the Constitution, were absent, when the vote passed for its adoption. The members of the Convention were not in proportionate numbers to the population of the respective States: Delaware had five, Pennsylvania eight, New Jersey five, Massachusetts only four, Virginia seven, New York three, Connecticut three, Maryland five, South Carolina four, North Carolina four, New Hampshire two, Georgia two. The difficulty was at once perceived of framing a general government, so as to avoid collision with State authority, and to be free from the charge of being imperium in imperio. And it was designed to guard against this difficulty and this imputation by stating to what subjects the power of the federal government should extend. In these cases, its authority is exclusive and paramount; and in all other cases, it is by implication, without just author-ity or jurisdiction.

ner in which, and the State governments by which the federal Constitution was formed, clearly implies this: and in the first section of the first article, it declares, that the powers to be vested in and exercised by the general government were granted by the several States.

Such was the design and such the only reasonable construction of the federal compact. The powers of the general government were conferred on it by the States. It is the agent of the States for general purposes, and may justly act only on subjects on which its constituents have authorized it to act. For the original States were not creatures of the federal government; but the federal government is the creature, the agent of the several sovereign States. In the convention for forming the Constitution, Mr. King, a delegate from Massachusetts, (afterwards of New York,) is reported to have said-"it was of the nature of a commission, given by the several States, for performing acts of a general nature, which no one State was, separately, competent to do."

No one State may justly oppose the authority of Congress, unless it should make a law for such a State only, and that manifestly an arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust law nor may Congress justly interfere with the laws of a State, unless such laws are clearly repugnant to the authority of Congress, conferred on it by the Constitution; or unless a State assumes to exercise authority prohibited to it by the federal compact.

To say, "that the federal government has as much right to control the acts and measures of a State, as a State has to control those of a town or county," is entirely incorrect and unsound. A State creates or forms a county or district within its territory; and such district or county is still a part of the State, and to be governed by the majority of the State in all cases whatever. But the federal government did not create or form the original States; and has no just authority over them, only in so far as is expressly granted by the States. In forming new States, it may be somewhat different; as certain conditions may be justly required by Congress on their admission into the Union; yet not interfering with their powers, as independent governments after their admission, except in cases of a general nature, as specified in the federal Constitution.

Thus the federal compact was designed for the consolidation of the Union, though not strictly speaking for the consolidation of the States; the federal government over the whole for general or national purposes being sovereign