and we have no jurisdiction to review this interpretation of the indictment. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525. Hence the only question before us is whether that combination taken by itself was within the penalties of the Sherman Act. The validity of the leases or of a combination contemplating them cannot be passed upon in this

case.

Thus limited the question does not require lengthy discussion, and a large part of the argument addressed to us concerned matters not open here. On the face of it the combination was simply an effort after greater efficiency. The business of the several groups that combined, as it existed before the combination, is assumed to have been legal. The machines are patented, making them is a monopoly in any case, the exclusion of competitors from the use of them is of the very essence of the right conferred by the patents, Paper Bag Patent Case, 210 U. S. 405, 429, and it may be assumed that the success of the several groups was due to their patents having been the best. As, by the interpretation of the indictment below, 195 Fed. Rep. 591, and by the admission in argument before us, they did not compete with one another, it is hard to see why the collective business should be any worse than its component parts. It is said that from seventy to eighty per cent. of all the shoe machinery business was put into a single hand. This is inaccurate, since the machines in question are not alleged to be types of all the machines used in making shoes, and since the defendants' share in commerce among the States does not appear. But taking it as true we can see no greater objection to one corporation manufacturing seventy per cent. of three noncompeting groups of patented machines collectively used for making a single product than to three corporations making the same proportion of one group each. The disintegration aimed at by the statute does not extend to reducing all manufacture to isolated units of the lowest degree.

It is as lawful for one corporation to make every part of a steam engine and to put the machine together as it would be for one to make the boilers and another to make the wheels. Until the one intent is nearer accomplishment than it is by such a juxtaposition alone, no intent could raise the conduct to the dignity of an attempt. See Virtue v. Creamery Package Manufacturing Co., ante, p. 8. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396.

It was argued as an afterthought that the act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, under which the United States took this writ of error, was repealed by the Judicial Code of March 3, 1911, c. 231. 36 Stat. 1087, 1168. But it is not mentioned among the statutes expressly repealed by § 297 of the latter act, it is not superseded by any other regulations of the matter, it is a special provision, and on principles similar to those discussed in Ex parte United States, Petitioner, 226 U. S. 420, it must be held not to have been repealed. See further Johnson v. United States, 225 U. S. 405, 419; Petri v. Creelman Lum-. ber Co., 199 U. S. 487, 497.

Judgment affirmed.

ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS v. ALEXANDER.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

No. 738. Submitted December 2, 1912. Decided February 3, 1913.

In order to hold a corporation personally liable in a foreign jurisdiction it must appear that the corporation was within the jurisdiction and that process was duly served upon one of its authorized agents.

227 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

A corporation is not amenable to service of process in a foreign jurisdiction unless it is transacting business therein to such an extent as to subject itself to the jurisdiction and laws thereof.

Under the Carmack Amendment the initial carrier is not liable to suit in a foreign district unless it is carrying on business in the sense which would render other foreign corporations amenable to process. No all embracing rule has been laid down as to what constitutes the manner of doing business by a foreign corporation to subject it to process in a given jurisdiction. Each case must be determined by its own facts.

The business done by a foreign corporation must be such in character and extent as to warrant the inference that it has subjected itself to the jurisdiction.

Where a railroad company establishes an office in a foreign district and its agents there attend to claims presented for settlement, as was done in this case, it is carrying on business to such an extent as to render it amenable to process under the law of that State. Service of process on a resident director of a foreign corporation actually doing business in the State of New York is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the corporation.

THE facts, which involve the construction of the Carmack Amendment as to the place where the initial carrier may be sued, and also as to what constitutes carrying on business within a district so as to make the initial carrier amenable to process therein, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Lawrence Greer and Mr. F. C. Nicodemus, Jr., for plaintiff in error:

The requirements of due process of law forbid that a corporation be held amenable to service of process in a foreign jurisdiction unless engaged in business therein of such character and in such a manner and to such an extent as to bring itself within the jurisdiction so that service of process upon an agent directly representing the authority of the corporation would constitute reasonable notice to the corporation to appear and defend. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100; Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works,

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

227 U.S.

190 U. S. 46; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602; Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. Rep. 738; Earle v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 127 Fed. Rep. 235; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369; Fairbank & Co. v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pac. Ry. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 420; Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98; Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 428; Green v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518; Herndon-Carter Co. v. Norris, Son & Co., 224 U.-S. 496; In re Hohorst, Petitioner, 150 U. S. 653; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 405; Maxwell v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co., 34 Fed. Rep. 286; Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437; Merchants' Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 358; Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194; New England Mutual Life Ins. Co v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407; Peterson v. Chic., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 364; Societe Fonciere et Agricole des Etats Unis v. Milliken, 135 U. S. 304; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350; Tuchband v. Chic. & Alton R. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 437; Union Associated Press v. Times-Star Co., 84 Fed. Rep. 419.

Although engaged in business within the State of New York, and elsewhere throughout the United States, in the usual and customary course of interstate commerce conducted in obedience to the provisions of the act of Congress regulating trade and commerce among the several States, the plaintiff in error is not engaged in business within the State of New York, so as to be amenable to service of process therein. Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 46; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407; § 1, act of Congress approved February 4, 1887, as am nded by act of Congress approved June 10, 1910; § 20, act of Congress approved February 4, 1887, as amended by act of Congress approved January 20,

1906; Allen v. Pullman Co., 191 U. S. 171; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420.

Mr. Phelan Beale for defendant in error:

The cause of action herein arose within the State of New York and certain acts were to be performed there which bring the case within the purview of Pennsylvania · Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407, therefore the service herein must be sustained. Burckle v. Eckhardt, 3 N. Y. 132; Childs v. Harris, 104 N. Y. 480; Coghlan v. S. C. R. R. Co., 142 N. Y. 101; Connecticut Mutual Life Assurance Co. v. Cleveland, Columbus & Cincinnati R. R. Co., 28 How. Pr. 180; Ellis v. Willard, 9 N. Y. 529; Hiller v. Burlington & Missouri R. R. Co., 70 N. Y. 228; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Beebe, 174 Illinois, 13; Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank of Chicago, 91 U. S. 406; State Tax on Foreign Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Sprawn v. Brandt-Dent. Co., 71 App. Div. 236, aff'd. 175 N. Y. 463; Union Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 169 U. S. 538; Waldron v. Canadian Pac. R. R. Co., 22 Washington, 353; § 432, New York Code of Civil Procedure.

The decisions in the cases of Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, construing the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act, show conclusively that the plaintiff in error was actually engaged in doing business within the State of New York. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186; Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Wallace, and Same v. Crow, 223 U. S. 481; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 190 U. S. 407; 34 Stat. L. 74, Chap. 3591, § 20.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant in error, Alexander, filed his complaint against the plaintiff in error, St. Louis Southwestern Rail