New York of the connecting carrier, effected by that statute, must be held to be there present and subject to service of process. In view of the recent consideration of the Carmack Amendment in this court it is unnecessary to now enter upon any extended discussion of it. The object of the statute was to require the initial carrier receiving freight for transportation in interstate commerce to obligate itself to carry to the point of destination, using the lines of connecting carriers as its agencies, thus securing for the benefit of the shipper unity of transporation and responsibility. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. p. 203. The provisions of the amendment had the effect of facilitating the remedy of the shipper by making the initial carrier responsible for the entire carriage, but the amendment was not intended, as we view it, to make for corporations through connecting carriers liable to suit in a district where they were not carrying on business in the sense which has heretofore been held necessary to confer jurisdiction.

We reach the conclusion that this case is to be decided upon the principles which have heretofore prevailed in determining whether a foreign corporation is doing business within the district in such sense as to subject it to suit therein. This court has decided each case of this character upon the facts brought before it and has laid down no all-embracing rule by which it may be determined what constitutes the doing of business by a foreign corporation in such manner as to subject it to a given jurisdiction. In a general way it may be said that the business must be such in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is served and in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent has been served with process. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, supra, p. 407; Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., supra, p. 532. Applying the general princi

ples which we regard as settled by this court, Was this company doing business in the State of New York in that sense?

The testimony discloses that the two roads together constitute a continuous line from St. Louis, through the States of Illinois, Missouri, Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana into Texas, and are together known as the "Cotton Belt Route." This combination has an office in the city of New York, upon the door of which, as upon the stationery and literature of the companies, the symbol, "Cotton Belt Route," is found in use. Underneath appears the general description, "St. Louis Southwestern Lines," and there is also named a general eastern freight agent and traveling freight agent of the lines. With this joint freight agent at the office in New York the matter of the plaintiff's claim was taken up and considered, and correspondence concerning it was had through his office, and a settlement of the claim attempted. It was only after such negotiations for a settlement had failed that this action was brought. Here, then, was an authorized agent attending to this and presumably other matters of a kindred character, undertaking to act for and represent the company, negotiating for it and in its behalf declining to adjust the claim made against it. In this situation we think this was the transaction of business in behalf of the company by its authorized agent in such manner as to bring it within the District of New York, in which it was sued, and to make it subject to the service of process there. See in this connection, Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 415; Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 255.

In our opinion the court did not err in holding the corporation subject to process and duly served in this case. Judgment affirmed.

227 U.S.

Syllabus.

SCOTT v. LATTIG.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO.

No. 86. Argued December 13, 1912.-Decided February 3, 1913.

An error in omitting an island in a navigable stream does not divest the United States of the title or interpose any obstacle to surveying it at a later time.

Purchasers of fractional interests of subdivisions on the bank of a navigable stream do not acquire title to an island on the other side of the channel merely because the island was omitted from the survey.

Lands underlying navigable waters within the several States belong to the respective States in virtue of their sovereignty, subject to the paramount power of Congress to control navigation between the States and with foreign powers.

Each new State, upon its admission to the Union, becomes endowed with the same rights and powers in regard to sovereignty over lands under navigable waters as the older States.

An island within the public domain in a navigable stream and actually in existence at the time of the survey of the banks of the stream, and also in existence when the State within which it was situated is admitted to the Union, remains property of the United States, and even though omitted from the survey it does not become part of the fractional subdivisions on the opposite bank of the stream; and so held as to an island in Snake River, Idaho. United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U. S. 391, followed; Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U. S. 510, distinguished.

17 Idaho, 506, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the title to an island in a navigable river and whether it remained public land after the survey, are stated in the opinion.

1

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

227 U. S.

Mr. Oliver O. Haga, with whom Mr. James H. Richards and Mr. McKeen F. Morrow were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

Public grants convey nothing by implication; they are to be strictly construed against the grantee, contrary to the usual policy of the law in the consideration of grants. Nothing passes by a public grant but that which is necessarily or expressly embraced in its terms. United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 546; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 411; Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman Pal. Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 49.

Whenever the question in any court, state or Federal, is whether the title to land which has once been the property of the United States has passed from the Federal Government, that question must be resolved by the laws of the United States. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 517; Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92.

Congress alone has, under Art. IV, § 3 of the Constitution, the power to determine the manner of disposing of the public lands, and it has the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of titles emanating from the United States. United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526; Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 268; Kean v. Calumet Canal & Imp. Co., 190 U. S. 466.

The United States holds the title to the beds, below high water mark, of the navigable streams within a Territory for the benefit of the whole people, and in trust for the State or States to be ultimately created out of such Territory. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 28; Weber v. State Harbor Comrs., 18 Wall. 57; Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661; Knight v. United Land Ass'n, 142 U. S. 161; San Francisco v. Le Roy, 138 U. S. 656; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70.

In the United States the law does not distinguish be

227 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

tween tidal streams and non-tidal streams which are navigable in fact. McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; The Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1.

Grants by Congress of portions of the public lands within a Territory to settlers thereon, though bordering on or bounded by navigable waters, convey of their own force title to the upland only, or what lies above ordinary high water mark. And such grants do not impair the title and dominion of the future State, when created, to the bed of the stream below ordinary high water mark. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70; Eldridge v. Tresevant, 160 U. S. 452, 467.

The use of the shores of navigable streams and the right, title or interest of riparian proprietors, or the owners of the upland, to such shores and to the beds of the streams must be determined by the laws of the several States, subject only to the rights vested by the Constitution in the United States. Shively v. Bowlby, supra; St. Anthony Falls Co. v. St. Paul, 168 U. S. 349, 361; St. Clair County v. Lovingston, 23 Wall. 46, 68; Barney v. Keokuk, U. S. 338; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 U. S. 646, 660; Pollard v. Kibbe, 9 How. 471; Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 671; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 187; Mobile Trans. Co. v. Mobile, 187 U. S. 479; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212.

94

The courts of the United States will construe the grants. of the general Government without reference to the rules of construction adopted by the States for their grants, but whatever incidents or rights to the soil under navigable waters, or below high water mark, attach to the ownership of the upland conveyed by the Government will be determined by the States, subject to the condition that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the grants or the use or enjoyment of the property by the grantee. Shively v. Bowlby; St. Anthony &c. Co. v. St. Paul, and McGilvra v. Ross, supra.