227 U. S. Statement of the Case. MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY v. HARRIMAN. ERROR TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS. No. 121. Argued January 20, 1913.-Decided March 10, 1913. Adams Express Co. v. Crominger, 226 U. S. 491, and Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Carl, ante, p. 639, followed to effect that the shipper who values his goods for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two duly published rates, based on valuation, is estopped from recovering a greater amount than his own valuation; and that the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of 1906 expresses the policy of Congress on this subject and supersedes all state legislation thereon. It is not unreasonable, and in fact is the method approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, in graduating freight according to value, to divide the particular subject of transportation into two classes those above and those below a fixed amount; and the establishment of two cattle rates, one based on a maximum fixed value and the other on the actual value, is not a violation of the Carmack Amendment of the Hepburn Act. The Carmack Amendment has withdrawn the determination of validity of all stipulations in interstate shipping contracts from state law and legislation. Under that amendment the validity of a provision that suit must be brought within a specified period is a Federal question to be settled by the general common law. The liability imposed by the Carmack Amendment is that of the common law and it may be limited or qualified by a special contract with the shipper limiting it in a just and reasonable manner except exemption from loss or responsibility due to negligence; and so held. as to a stipulation that suit be brought within ninety days from the happening of the loss. Limitation of the time within which to bring actions is a usual and reasonable provision and there is nothing in the policy of the Carmack Amendment that is violated thereby. THE facts, which involve the validity under the Carmack Amendment of a contract for interstate shipment of VOL. CCXXVII-42 Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 227 U. S. live stock and a provision therein fixing the valuation of the shipment in case of loss in consideration of a lower rate, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Alex. S. Coke, Mr. Joseph M. Bryson and Mr. Cecil H. Smith for plaintiff in error submitted: Under the act to regulate commerce á carrier may fix its rates with reference to its liability, or the time within which suit shall be brought, in case of loss or damage, increasing the rates where the liability is that fixed by common law or the time for filing it is long and reducing them where the liability is limited or the time within which to sue is short. Where tariffs duly issued, filed and published contain two rates for the shipment of cattle, one based upon the carrier's common-law liability with the statutory period for filing suit and the other based upon a limited liability with a time less than that prescribed by the statute for suing, such provisions are binding upon the carrier and the shipper and must be observed by them both in the collection and payment of charges and in the adjustment of loss and damage claims. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Albers Comm. Co., 223 U. S. 573; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. v. Int. Com. Comm., 200 U. S. 361, 391; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56; Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Louisville & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Motley, 219 U. S. 467; Chi. & Atl. R. R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155; Texas & P. K. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426. The courts, whether state or Federal, have no power to declare unreasonable the rates, rules or regulations specified by a carrier in its tariffs unless the matter shall first have been presented to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., supra; Robinson v. Balto. & O. R. R. Co., 222 U. s. 506; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 480; 227 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. Int. Com. Comm. v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 215 U. S. 452; Ïni. Com. Comm. v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 88. Where a carrier specifies two rates on cattle in its tariffs, one based upon its common-law liability and the other upon a limited liability fixed by the terms and conditions of its current live stock contract, such live stock contract, when properly executed, is valid, and the carrier's liability must be determined by its provisions. There is nothing in the Carmack Amendment forbidding the basing of rates upon limited liability or prohibiting contracts limiting liability in consideration of reduced rates. Prior to the statute of 11 Geo. IV, and 1 Wm. IV, c. 68, it was held that a carrier who had given notice that he would not be responsible for goods of greater value than five pounds, and in some cases ten pounds, unless the value was declared at the time of shipping, and the rate paid accordingly, would not be liable at all, even for the five pounds or the ten pounds, to a shipper who shipped a package of greater value, as an ordinary package, without disclosing its real value. Gibbon v. Poynton, 4 Burr. 2298; Clay v. Willan, 1 H. Bl. 298; Izett v. Mountain, 4 East, 371; Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Ald. 21. Under the statute 11 Geo. IV, and 1 Wm. IV, c. 68, which required the shipper to give notice of the value if the value exceeded ten pounds, it was held that the carrier is not liable, even if the loss happens by the gross negligence of his servants, where a parcel of greater value than ten pounds is delivered without declaring its value and paying the rate according to value. Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Ad. & E. N. S. 646. Long prior to the passage of the Carmack Amendment. it was held that a contract fairly made, agreeing on the valuation of the property carried with the freight rate based on an assumption by the carrier of liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even where the loss Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 227 U.S. resulted from the negligence of the carrier, would be upheld. Hart v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331. This rule has also been followed in Kidd v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 351; Calderon v. Atlas Steamship Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 874; S. C., 69 Fed. Rep. 574; The Kensington, 88 Fed. Rep. 331; Jennings v. Smith, 106 Fed. Rep. 139; Saunders v. Southern Railway, 128 Fed. Rep. 15; Macfarlane v. Adams Express Co., 137 Fed. Rep. 982; Missouri &c. Ry. of Texas v. Patrick, 144 Fed. Rep. 632; Taylor v. Weir, 162 Fed. Rep. 585; Blackwell v. Southern Pac. Co., 184 Fed. Rep. 489; Pierce Co. v. Wells-Fargo Co., 189 Fed. Rep. 561; and approved in Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 442; Calderon v. Atlas S. S. Co., 170 U. S. 272; The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, and Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477. For the cases in the state courts of last resort adopting the rule in the Hart Case, see Alair v. Railroad Company, 53 Minnesota, 160; Douglas Co. v. Railway Co., 62 Minnesota, 288; O'Malley v. Railway Co., 86 Minnesota, 380; Loeser v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 94 Wisconsin, 571; Ullman v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 112 Wisconsin, 150; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Hubbard, 72 Oh. St. 302. The main purpose of the Carmack Amendment was to give the holder of the bill of lading a right of action against the initial carrier for loss caused by connecting carriers, but it also creates a cause of action against the initial line which is in the nature of a right created by Federal law to take the place of rights prior thereto existing under the common law or under state enactments. Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 Ü. S. 186; So. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Crenshaw, 63 S. E. Rep. 865. The amendment has been frequently construed by state courts and by inferior Federal courts as not prohibiting agreements of the kind in question. Greenwald v. Weir, 199 N. Y. 170; Bernard v. Adams Express Co., 205 Massachusetts, 254; Travis v. Wells-Fargo, 79 N. J. L. 83; P. C. 227 U. S. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Mitchell (Ind.), 91 N. E. Rep. 735; Larsen v. Oregon S. L. R. Co. (Utah), 110 Pac. Rep. 983; Frye v. Southern P. Ry. Co., 247 Illinois, 564; Fielder v. Express Co. (W. Va.), 71 S. E. Rep. 99. For cases under the Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445, see Calderon v. Atlas S. S. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 874; aff'd 69 Fed. Rep. 574; id. 170 U. S. 272. Many States having statutory provisions restricting the right of common carriers to limit their liability by contract, nevertheless apply the rule of the Hart Case. D'Arcy v. Adams Express Co., 162 Michigan, 363; Alair v. Railroad Co., 53 Minnesota, 160; Douglas Co. v. Railway Co., 62 Minnesota, 288; Oppenheimer v. U. S. Express Co., 69 Illinois, 62: Johnstone v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 39 So. Car. 55. No law or public policy of a State can serve to set aside or change the rates, rules and regulations of a carrier affecting interstate commerce specified in its duly issued, filed and published tariffs. Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1. Congress has rightfully assumed jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and therefore state laws covering the same must yield. Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid & Beam, 222 U. S. 444; Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370; G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98. . Congress has so taken possession of the field of interstate commerce as to render inoperative state laws governing liability where the liability is a matter of contract based upon tariff provisions, in consideration of which the shipper was given a reduced rate. The finding of the state court that in this case there was in fact no reduction in the rate at which the cattle were to be carried and no consideration for the limitation, in the face of uncontradicted testimony showing that plaintiff in error did have two rates for the shipment of cattle and that defendants in error obtained the benefit of the |