in less than the statutory period, and that this action, though started after the lapse of the time fixed by the contract was brought within the statutory period of both States.

The liability sought to be enforced is the "liability" of an interstate carrier for loss or damage under an interstate contract of shipment declared by the Carmack Amendment of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906. The validity of any stipulation in such a contract which involves the construction of the statute, and the validity of a limitation upon the liability thereby imposed is a Federal question to be determined under the general common law, and, as such, is withdrawn from the field of state law or legislation. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Michigan Central Railroad v. Vreeland, ante, p. 59. The liability imposed by the statute is the liability imposed by the common law upon a common carrier, and may be limited or qualified by special contract with the shipper, provided the limitation or qualification be just and reasonable, and does not exempt from loss or responsibility due to negligence. Adams Express Company v. Croninger, and Michigan Central Railroad v. Vreeland, cited above; York Co. v. Central Railroad Co., 3 Wall. 107; Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Express Company v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, 267; Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 112 U. S. 331.

The policy of statutes of limitation is to encourage promptness in the bringing of actions, that the parties shall not suffer by loss of evidence from death or disappearance of witnesses, destruction of documents or failure of memory. But there is nothing in the policy or object of such statutes which forbids the parties to an agreement to provide a shorter period, provided the time is not unreasonably short. That is a question of law for the determination of the court. Such stipulations have been sustained in insurance policies. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford

Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386. A stipulation that an express company should not be held liable unless claim was made within ninety days after a loss was held good in Express Company v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264. Such linitations in bills of lading are very customary and have been upheld in a multitude of cases. We cite a few: Central Vermont Railroad v. Soper (1st C. C. A.), 59 Fed. Rep. 879; Ginn v. Ogdensburg Transit Co. (7th C. C. A.), 85 Fed. Rep. 985; Cox v. Central Vermont Railroad, 170 Massachusetts, 129; North British &c. Insurance Co. v. Central Vermont Railroad, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 4, aff'd 158 N. Y. 726. Before the Texas and Missouri statutes forbidding such special contracts, short limitations in bills of lading were held to be valid and enforceable. McCarty v. Gulf &c. Ry., 79 Texas, 33; Thompson v. Chicago &c. Ry., 22 Mo. App. 321. See cases to same effect cited in 6 Cyc., p. 508. The provision requiring suit to be brought within ninety days is not unreasonable.

For the errors indicated, the judgment must be reversed for such further proceedings as may be consistent with this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES Concurs in the result. MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissents.

227 U.S.

Opinions Per Curiam, Etc.

OPINIONS PER CURIAM, ETC., FROM JANUARY 14, 1913, TO MARCH 10, 1913.

No. 178. GEORGE MENGEL, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. BLANCHE MENGEL AND LOUIS ECKHART, SHERIFF. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. January 27, 1913. Per Curiam. Dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. (Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 112, 118; McCorquodale v. Texas, 211 U. S. 432; Farrell v. O'Brien, 199 U. S. 100-101; Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U. S. 102.) Mr. Benjamin I. Salinger for the plaintiff in error. Mr. I. S. Pepper for the defendants in

error.

No. 134. THE GULF, COLORADO & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-IN ERROR, v. J. H. THORN. In error to the County Court of Sabine County, State of Texas. January 27, 1913. Per Curiam. Judgment reversed with costs, and cause remanded for further proceedings, upon the authority of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503. Mr. J. W. Terry, Mr. Gardiner Lathrop, Mr. A. H. Culwell, Mr. A. B. Browne, Mr. Alexander Britton and Mr. Evans Browne for the plaintiff in error. No appearance for the defendant in error.

No.. Original. Ex parte: IN THE MATTER OF NATHAN EISEMANN, PETITIONER. Submitted January 27, 1913. Decided February 3, 1913. Motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus denied. Mr. Eugene P. Carver for the petitioner.

Decisions on Petitions for Writs of Certiorari. 227 U. S.

No.

Original. Ex parte: IN THE MATTER OF DAN CHAIN, PETITIONER. Submitted January 28, 1913. Decided February 3, 1913. Motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus denied. Mr. A. M. Belcher and Mr. H. W. Houston for the petitioner.

No. Original. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF WILLIAM ARMSTRONG TO STRIKE THE NAME of FLETCHER DOBYNS FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. Submitted February 24, 1913. Decided March 3, 1913. Motion for leave to file petition denied. Mr. William Armstrong in support of the petition.

No. Original. Ex parte: IN THE MATTER OF GORDON R. MCGEE, PETITIONER. Submitted March 3, 1913. Decided March 10, 1913. Per Curiam. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (Ex parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663, 674, and authorities there cited.) Mr. Frans E. Lindquist for the petitioner.

Decisions on Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, from January 14, 1913, to March 10, 1913.

No. 917. LOUISIANA & TEXAS LUMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER, v. C. S. SWIFT. January 20, 1913. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. Mr. L. C. Boyle and Mr. Joseph S. Brooks for the petitioner. Mr. Cone Johnson for the respondent.