of the contract: Quare whether the State could impose such a penalty as to prior contracts as a mere consequence of unsuccessful defense. Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Snyder, 497.
9. Contract obligation; effect to violate, of statute imposing penalty for defending in bad faith against contract liability.
A state statute imposing on insurance companies an additional specified proportionate amount of the policy where there has been an un- successful defense interposed not in good faith, is not unconstitu- tional as violating the contract clause of the Constitution; and so held as to a statute of Tennessee to that effect. Ib.
10. Due process of law; effect to deny, of finding without evidence. A finding without evidence is arbitrary and useless, and an act of Congress granting authority to any body to make a finding with- out evidence would be inconsistent with justice and an exercise of arbitrary power condemned by the Constitution. Interstate Com. Comm. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 88.
11. Due process of law; validity of administrative orders. Administrative orders quasi-judicial in character are void if a hearing is denied; if the hearing granted is manifestly unfair; if the finding is indisputably contrary to the evidence; or if the facts found do not, as matter of law, support the order made. Ib.
12. Due process and equal protection of the law; validity of murzicipal ordinance, enacted under delegated power, providing for sewerage. Where the charter gives the municipality power to enact through the mayor and council such rules and regulations for its welfare and government as they may deem best, and the highest court of the State has decided that an ordinance providing for a system of sewerage is within this delegation of power, this court will not declare such ordinance a violation of the due process or equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the record does not show that the city was induced by anything other than the public good or that such was not its effect. Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 303.
13. Due process and equal protection of law; effect to deny, of enforcement of police ordinance.
One of the commonest exercises of the police power of the State or municipality is to provide for a system of sewers and to compel. property owners to connect therewith, and this duty may be en-
forced by criminal penalties without violating the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ib.
14. Due process and equal protection of the law; power of State to classify. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, neither the State nor its munic-
ipality can confer or exercise arbitrary power in classifying for purpose of regulating, licensing or taxing. Bradley v. Richmond, 477.
15. Due process and equal protection of the law; classification by State or municipality subject to guarantee. Whether the power of classifying be exercised by the State directly or by the municipality, it is the exercise of legislative discretion and subject to the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ib.
16. Due process and equal protection of the law; limitation on power of State to determine occupations subject to license and tax. The power of the State to determine what occupations shall be subject to license and tax is subject to no limitations save those of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend- ment, and nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from delegating this power. (Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183.) Ib.
17. Due process and equal protection of the law; validity of classification of business for licensing.
An ordinance imposing a license on business, dividing it into several classes and giving the power of classification to a committee of the council with power of review by the entire council, is not an ar- bitrary exercise of power within the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and so held as to the banker's license tax of Rich- mond, Virginia. Ib.
18. Due process and equal protection of the law; possible injustice by re- viewing power not ground for holding ordinance unconstitutional. An ordinance imposing license taxes and authorizing classification which provides for a review will not be held unconstitutional be- cause the reviewing power might approve of an unjust classifica- tion-such an objection would apply to any tribunal. Ib.
19. Due process of law; right to judicial review to protect constitutional rights.
If the right to be heard and obtain a review does not avail to protect rights under the Constitution, the right to judicial review remains.
under the general principles of jurisprudence. (Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321.) Ib.
Equal protection of the laws. See Supra, 12-18;
20. Ex post facto laws; application of provision against.
The prohibition in $10 of Art. I of the Constitution against ex post facto laws is a restraint upon the legislative power of the States and concerns the making of laws and not their construction by the courts. Ross v. Oregon, 150.
21. Ex post facto laws; application of provision; judicial decisions. While that prohibition is directed against legislative acts, and reaches every form in which the legislative power acts, and while a judicial decision is the act of an instrumentality of the State, if the purpose of that decision is not to prescribe a new law for the future but only to apply laws in force at the time to completed transactions, the ruling is a judicial and not a legislative act, and no Federal right or question is involved under the cx post facto provision of the Constitution. Ib. ·
22. Fifth Amendment; application of; not obligatory on States. The Fifth Amendment is not obligatory upon the States or their judi- cial establishments, and regulates the procedure of Federal courts only. (Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78.) Ensign v. vania, 592.
23. Fourteenth Amendment; application of. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are generic in terms and are addressed not only to the States but to every person, whether natural or judicial, who is the repository of state power. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 278.
24. Fourteenth Amendment; reach of.
The reach of the Fourteenth Amendment is coextensive with any ex- ercise by a State of power in whatever form exerted. Ib.
25. Fourteenth Amendment; cxercise of Federal judicial power under, to reach wrong done by state officer. Under the Fourteenth Amendment the Federal judicial power can redress the wrong done by a state officer misusing the authority of the State with which he is clothed; under such circumstances
inquiry whether the State has authorized the wrong is irrelevant. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, followed. Barney v. New York, 193 U. S. 430, distinguished. Ib.
26. Fourteenth Amendment; acts embraced by.
Acts done under the authority of a municipal ordinance passed in virtue of power conferred by the State are embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ib.
27. Fourteenth Amendment; power to enforce guarantees of. The power which exists to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment is typified by the immediate and efficient Federal right to enforce the contract clause of the Constitution as against those violating or attempting to violate its provision. Ib.
Governmental powers. See CONGRESS, POWERS OF.
Judicial power. See COURTS, 4, 5;
CRIMINAL LAW, 3.
Privileges and immunities of citizens. See Supra, 4.
28. Searches and seizures; effect of requiring production of books of de- funct corporation in the hands of an individual.
Notwithstanding a corporation ceases to do business and transfers its books to an individual, the books retain their essential character and are subject to inspection and examination of the proper au- thorities and there is no unreasonable search and seizure in requir- ing their production before the grand jury in a Federal proceeding. (Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478.) Grant v. United States, 74.
29. Self-incrimination; immunity from, and amnesty for crime, distin- guished.
There is a clear distinction between an amnesty for crime committed and the constitutional protection under the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to be a witness against oneself. Heike v. United States, 131.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. See STATUTES, A.
CONTEMPT OF COURT. See APPEAL AND ERROR, 3, 4.
CONTINUANCE.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 5; CONTRACTS, 10.
1. Construction; judicial; effect of in subsequent suit between same parties. The construction given to a contract by this court is either author- itatively controlling or conclusively persuasive in a subsequent suit between the same parties; and so held that the contentions relied on in this case as to the contract heretofore construed in United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U. S. 310, are, in the light of that decision, so frivolous that the judgment of the Court of Claims following it should be affirmed without further argument. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 165.
2. Government's liability under contract for use of steel hardening process. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U. S. 310, followed to effect that the Government is liable for royalties on the Harvey process even though every clement thereof was not used on the plates involved in this action, and even though the contractor furnishing the plates and who used the process by permission of the United States was not specifically required to use it. Ib.
3. Estoppel against enforcing contract for sale of land; effect of accepting lease.
Accepting a lease of property described in a contract for sale thereof, does not amount to an estoppel against enforcing the contract, if the instrument recognizes an outstanding dispute and provides that rights on either side shall not be affected. Gutierrez v. Gra- ham, 181.
4. Option to purchase or contract for sale and purchase of land. Held that the instrument involved in this case was an actual contract for purchase and sale of the land described therein and not merely an option which expired at the time specified therein. Ib.
5. Sale of ticket to place of entertainment; rights created by. The rule commonly accepted in this country from the English cases is that a ticket to a place of entertainment for a specified period does not create a right in rem. Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 633.
A contract binds the person of the maker, but does not create an in- terest in the property it concerns unless it also operates as a con-
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