our of the United States had not been vindicated, that is, if a salute to the flag was the test, but Huerta had gone from power. A better opportunity was now afforded the Mexican people to justify the faith of the republics of North and South America.

Eighteen months in office had revealed in practice the principles underlying the foreign policy of President Wilson. Of the problems facing him at the opening of his administration he had disposed of the controversy with Great Britain, and in such a way as to emphasize our belief in the inviolability of treaty obligations, and in Mexico had carried to a triumphant conclusion the most important phase of his Latin American program. Although the Mexican problem had yet to assume its most threatening character, and pending controversies with Japan and Colombia were unsettled, the President had indicated his mode of procedure in each case, and his conduct in other matters and his expressions of purpose gave ample warrant for the thought that difficulties were to be lessened by a general acceptance of his leadership. In evaluating the work of the administration Charles W. Eliot placed as the principal achievements, not the legislative enactments upon tariff, currency and the trusts that had occupied so much of the attention of the President, but the "contributions to sound international policies and conduct." 1 It is this record and the

1 Harper's Weekly, August 22, 1914. Also printed in Congressional Record, LI, Appendix, 869.

impression that its character had made abroad as well as at home that stood as a matter of history when the European war broke upon the world and gave President Wilson the leadership of the American people in the greatest crisis of their history.

CHAPTER III

MAINTENANCE OF NEUTRALITY

Outbreak of the European War - Initial Position of the United States- Meaning of Neutrality-Attitude upon British Policy - Plans of the Administration Difficulties with Germany - American Proposal for Modus Vivendi - Duties of the United States - Result of American Adherence to Rules of International Law - Possibility of an International Tribunal.

UPON the outbreak of the European war the President, as was expected, issued a proclamation of neutrality, and followed it by a statement to the belligerent governments that he would welcome an opportunity to act in the interest of European peace, at that or any future time. Of more vital significance in view of the developments soon to appear, the United States sent an identic note to the several powers on August 6, 1914, in which attention was called to the differences of opinion as to the rights of neutrals on the sea and the proposal was made that for the duration of the war, the laws of naval warfare laid down in the Declaration of London be accepted by all nations.1 In making this suggestion the administration took the basic position it was to occupy in the ensuing months of diplomatic controversy.

1 Official correspondence relative to the Declaration of London was published by Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce, European War Series, No. 1, pp. 5–8.

The Declaration of London had been formulated at a conference of ten maritime powers in 1909, but had not been formally ratified except by the United States.1 Yet there had been very general approval of its proposals.2 In this situation the government of the United States took the opportunity accorded at the outset of a European war, in which the participation of Great Britain made certain the vital importance of the rules of naval warfare, to propose to the belligerents a modus vivendi. The importance of the suggestion lay not only in the possibility of an agreement among the belligerents as to the rules, but in the thought that had underlain the original declaration and that had characterized many earlier American positions, that is that the rights of neutrals should be determined by a power greater than the will of any single belligerent. In taking such a position at the outset the American government made easier many a subsequent step in its defence of the rights of neutral nations.

Before replies were received from the belligerents another phase of the position of the United States as a neutral came to occupy the centre of attention. To the people of the United States the war appeared as one more in a long series of European quarrels, and, long accustomed to a non-interference in European affairs, they naturally looked upon themselves as spectators and possible mediators in this Great War. It was apparent at once, how

1 For text of the Declaration of London see American Journal of International Law, III, Supplement, 179.

2 For detailed information upon status of the Declaration in 1914, see ibid., IX, 199.

ever, that, as in previous conflicts, there were to be groups in the United States deeply sympathetic with the various nations involved. At the outset the sympathies were largely those born of nationality and language. It was not clear that basic principles in governmental or social theory were issues in the conflict. It did not appear at that time that the conflict was one between autocracy and democracy. It seemed that there were elements of each on both sides. However, the influence of nationality appeared really threatening, as it had not during earlier European quarrels, for several millions of the citizens of America had been born in the portions of Europe involved in the war.

In the President's conduct or words there was no hint of American participation in the conflict. But in less than a month the differences in points of view of American citizens arising out of differences in national stocks became so evident and speakers so intemperate that the President issued an appeal to his fellow-countrymen "to be neutral in fact as well as in name." (Statement No. 21.) "We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another." Such advice quite obviously sprang from an assumption that the greatest dangers for the United States in this conflict were not those threatening vital American interests on land or sea, but those to be found in actions of