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are not advised as to whether or not they were charged with passing counterfeit money by the state court. But even if they were so charged, the state courts might, perhaps, very properly hold and punish them for just such an act. In such a case, when the federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the offenses, the court which first arrests and gains jurisdiction over the offender, will maintain it to the end. If the petitioners in this case were in custody of the state officers, on process issued from the state courts, charging them with counterfeiting United States coin, or larceny, or robbery, or any other crime, no one will, at this late date, hold that they ought to have been discharged, or that any sort of a case was made so as to bring them within the provisions of the habeas corpus act. It was not claimed in that case that the petitioners were held in custody of the state officer, by reason of any act or thing committed or omitted in pursuance of, or permitted by, an act of Congress; but, on the other hand, we might reasonably infer that they were in custody for the very reason that they had violated both national and state laws, which prohibit counterfeiting the lawful money of the United States.

Counsel for respondent earnestly claim and strenuously insist that, if the relators failed to return Blair to Chicago, in pursuance of the authority conferred on Bull, but instead thereof took him to New York, and eventually to Liverpool, without authority, they would be guilty of kidnaping; that the failure to return Blair to Chicago, as directed by Governor Beveridge, was a fraudulent act, and vitiated the whole proceedings, and made the capture and removal of Blair wrongful and unlawful ab initio. There is some force in this reasoning. But it derives its force mainly from the ingenious manner in which the proposition was stated, and the very able argument made in support of it. The proof shows that Blair was indicted in Chicago for perjury, said to have been committed in connection with procuring a justice of the peace to issue a writ of replevin for goods in possession of a railroad company in Chicago. Suit was commenced by Blair, and the goods recovered, when he abandoned the suit and made no further appearance thereon. This led to the indictment. There was some testimony tending to show that Turtle had expressed an intention, or at least knew of an intention on the part of others, to take Blair to England to answer to the charge of fraudulently removing goods from that country. But there is no testimony which shows Bull had any such intention, or any knowledge of any such intention on the part of others, before he reached St. Louis with Blair. If Bull had taken Blair back to Chicago, who can doubt that he would have stood justified in all places for what he was so authorized to do. There would, then, have been no question about the validity of the capture and removal of Blair. Unquestionably Bull ought to have taken Blair back to Chicago, as he was authorized to do by Governor Beveridge's warrant. But if he failed to discharge the duty then resting on him in the premises, and betrayed the trust reposed in him by the governor, and thus violated the laws of the State of Illinois, to which he may be amenable, can it therefore be said that he was guilty of the great crime of kidnaping in this state, when he was clothed with all necessary authority of law to do what was actually done in this state in and about the arrest and removal of Blair? If the process on which Blair was arrested and removed from the state was regular on its face, and therefore lawful, can it be claimed that Bull might have been arrested and held for kidnaping in any state through which they passed before reaching the State of Illinois? To do this would be equivalent to disregarding the indictment against Blair-the requisition of Governor Beveridge, and the appointment of Bull as

his messenger-the warrant of Governor Garber, the arrest of Blair on the warrant of the governor, and his removal from this state on the requisition aforesaid. To do this, we would be required to hold that, if the officer, Bull, was dishonest, and exceeded his authority as messenger, and committed a wrong in removing Blair beyond the confines of Illinois, the wrongful acts so done and committed would relate back to the arrest and removal of Blair from this state, and invalidate the whole proceedings had under the requisition. I am not prepared to go to that extent.

I think it would take an extreme case to justify me in holding to be criminal an act which appears to be not only harmless aed justifiable, but sanctioned by the supreme law of this land. This would be carrying the doctrine of "relation" too far; and where neither the law-making power nor the courts have defined the duty or marked the way, I think no judge ought to undertake to follow a path that leads but to darknesз and doubt. For my part, I prefer to keep within the "plain and well-beaten path of duty," made so by the constant use of the courts and judges for many years past.

These views lead me to conclude

1. That Blair was properly indicted in Cook County, State of Illinois, for the crime of perjury.

2. That the requisition, and warrant, issued by Governor Beveridge, under which Bull acted as messenger, were regular in form, and therefore valid and binding on all concerned.

3. That the warrant issued by Governor Garber, on which Blair was arrested and removed from this state, was regular on its face, and was a valid and lawful

one.

4. That all of these proceedings were had under and in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof, known as the "extradition act."

5. That any effort or attempt on the part of the state authorities to hold or punish the relators for the removal of Blair under the requisition for extradition, are without authority and void.

6. That the writ in this case was properly issued, and inquiry thereunder properly made, for the purpose of showing that the relators were held in custody for removing Blair from this state on the requisition of the governor of Illinois.

It necessarily follows that the relators have not invoked in vain the aid of this "high prerogative writ." They must, therefore, be discharged from the custody of the respondent, and it is so ordered.

BOOK NOTICES.

AMERICAN REPORTS. VOL. XIX. The American Reports, containing all Decisions of General Interest decided in the Courts of Last Resort of the Several States, with Notes and References by ISAAC GRANT THOMPSON. Vol. XIX. Albany: John D. Parsons, Jr. 1877.

Previous volumes of this excellent series of reports we have already noticed in the columns of this journal. The present volume contains decisions of general importance from the following reports: 10 Bush.; 49, 50 Cal.; 41, 42 Conn.; 6, 7 Heisk.; 49, 50, 51 Ind.; 13, 14 Kas.; 114, 117, 118 Mass.; 49, 50 Miss.; 3, 4 Neb.; 60, 61 N. Y.; 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 Tex.; 47 Vt., and 37 Wis. The notes appended to many of the cases are of considerable value; but we would suggest that, when cases are cited in the notes, they should be cited as well from the reports where they are originally found, as from previous volumes of this series. Under the

system adopted by the editor of this series, unless one possesses the complete series, a single volume is, so far .as the annotations are concerned, of little value.

RECENT LEGISLATION.

MISSOURI LEGISLATURE-SESSION OF 1877. AN ACT defining the Powers and Duties of Grand Juries.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SEC. 1. All grand juries are hereby authorized to find and present bills of indictment for either felonies or misdemeanors committed against the laws of this State.

SEC. 2. In all counties or cities, in which by law the jurisdiction to try and determine felonies shall be vested in one court, and the jurisdiction to try and determine misdemeanors shall be vested in another court, the grand jury organized and connected with the court having jurisdiction over felonies shall return into such court any indictments for misdemeanors found by them.

SEC. 3. The court into which such indictments shall be returned shall, without delay, canse all such indictments to be certified and transmitted to the court having jurisdiction to try and determine the charges in such instruments contained, and the trial therefor shall proceed without other information. Approved March 1st, 1877.

AN ACT to amend an act, entitled "An Act to authorize the different County Courts to appoint additional Justices of the Peace," approved February 10th, 1869; the same being section two, chapter eightyone, of Wagner's Missouri Statutes.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SEC. 1. Section one of an act, entitled "An Act to authorize the different County Courts to appoint additional Justices of the Peace," approved February 10th, 1869, be amended to read as follows:

SEC. 1. The different county courts shall have power and jurisdiction to appoint not more than two additional justices of the peace in the different townships of their counties, whenever a petition shall be presented to them, signed by twelve or more qualified voters of any township, setting forth that they live more than five miles from the next justice of the peace of such townhsip; provided, that the said justice so appointed shall live in the immediate neighborhood of the petitioners, and at least five miles from the nearest elected or appointed justice of the peace of such township.

Approved March 1st, 1877.

AN ACT to amend sections twenty-five and twentyseven of chapter two hundred and one (201) of the General Statutes of Missouri, the same being sections twenty-five and twenty-seven, article three, of chapter forty-two of Wagner's Statutes.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. That section twenty-five of chapter two hundred and one of the General Statutes of Missouri be and the same is hereby amended, by striking out the word "ten" and inserting the word "twenty," so as to read as follows: Section 25. Every person who shall be, convicted of feloniously stealing, taking and carrying away any money, goods, right in action or other personal property or valuable thing whatsoever, of the value of twenty dollars or more, or any horse, mare,

gelding, colt, filly, ass, mule, neat cattle, sheep or hog, belonging to another, shall be deemed guilty of grand larceny.

SEC. 2. That section twenty-seven of the same chapter of the General Statutes be, and the same is hereby amended, by striking out the word "ten" and inserting the word "twenty," so as to read as follows: Section 27. Every person who shall steal, take and carry away any money or personal property or effects of another under the value of twenty dollars (not being the subject of grand larceny without regard to value) shall be deemed guilty of petit larceny, and on conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Approved March 1st, 1877.

AN ACT to prevent the discharge of persons by the "Habeas Corpus Act," who have been convicted of crime and erroneously sentenced.

WHEREAS, many persons convicted of crime have been erroneously sentenced and are liable to be discharged at any time, by virtue of the provisions of the "habeas corpus act," wherefore an emergency exists for this act to take effect and be in force from and after its passage; therefore,

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SEC. 1. No person shall be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the "habeas corpus act," for the reason that the judgment by virtue of which such person is confined was erroneous as to time or place of imprisonment; but in such cases it shall be the duty of the court or officer, before whom such relief is sought, to sentence such person to the proper place of imprisonment, and for the correct length of time, from and after the date of the original sentence, and to cause the officer or other persons, having such prisoner in charge, to convey him forthwith to such designated place of imprisonment.

SEC. 2. This act to take effect and be in force from and after its passage.

Approved March 1st, 1877.

AN ACT authorizing the imprisonment of persons, convicted of misdemeanors in other places than County Jails.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SEC. 1. Whenever any person shall, because of a conviction for any misdemeanor, be subject to imprisonment in a county jail, such person may, at the discretion of the court, be confined in any work-house or other place of imprisonment, belonging to any town or city in such county or in any incorporated city, from which said county has been separated by law. Provided the county court of such county shall have contracted or agreed with the town or city owning such work-house or other place of confinement for the custody and keeping of such convicts; and cities or towns having no work-house or houses shall have authority to work convicted persons on the streets, bridges or other public works in such city or town.

SEC. 2. All persons committed to any work-house or other place of confinement, under the provisions of the foregoing section, shall be imprisoned for the full term of their sentence, unless sooner discharged by due course of law.

SEC. 3. This act shall apply to insolvents confined in jail for non-payment of costs under the General Statutes of the State.

SEC. 4. All persons committed to any place of confinement under the foregoing provisions shall be under

the control of the person in charge thereof, and subject to the same rules and regulations as other prisoners there confined.

SEC. 5. All acts and parts of acts, inconsistent with the provisions hereof, are hereby repealed. Approved February 28th, 1877.

AN ACT to repeal an act entitled "An Act to more fully provide for the organization of Counties into Municipal Townships, and to further provide for the local government thereof, and repealing all former acts relating thereto," approved March 24th, 1873, and also to repeal all acts amendatory of said act.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SEC 1. That an act entitled an act to more fully provide for the organization of counties into municipal townships, and to further provide for the local government thereof, and repealing all former acts relating thereto, approved March 24th, 1873, and all acts amendatory thereof, be, and the same is hereby repealed, except so far as may be necessary to settle up the affairs of townships existing under said act, as hereinafter provided.

SEC. 2. From and after this act goes into effect, no further proceedings shall be had in any township except such as may be necessary in order to collect the debts due to, and to pay those due by such township, to sell and dispose of all property of such township, and such other proceedings, as shall be absolutely necessary for a full and complete settlement of the affairs of each township; but for said purposes, each officer of each township, as now constituted, shall retain his full official authority.

SEC. 3. All real and personal property owned by any township shall be disposed of at that time, upon such terms, and in such manner as the voters of said township shall direct; and for that purpose a meeting shall be held in each township within sixty days after this act shall take effect, notice of which shall be given by the township clerk, by putting up written or printed hand-bills in not less than ten of the most public places in said township; said meeting when assembled shall have power by a vote of a majority of those present to create an agent with full powers to sell and convey by deed or otherwise, all real and personal property of said township, and to dispose of the proceeds, and may also give said agent power to call subsequent meetings, when he or any specified number of the voters of the township may desire such meetings, and to prescribe the notice to be given thereof; the proceeds of all property owned by, or of debts due to any township, shall, after payment of the debts of said township, be paid into the county treasury, and be paid out on the order of the county court in improving the roads of said township.

SEC. 4. As soon as this takes effect the township clerk, justices of the peace and constables, and all other officers having any records, papers, books or documents pertaining to his or their offices, shall deliver the same to the county clerk, to be by him disposed of as ordered by the county court; papers, books and documents, so delivered by constables and justices of the peace, shall be delivered to their successors to be appointed by the county court; and while the same may remain in the hands of the county clerk, he shall give copies therefrom when called for, which shall be as valid in all courts and elsewhere, as if certified by said officers.

SEC. 5. From and after this act takes effect, all laws then in force in relation to counties not under township organization, and applicable, shall be applicable to all counties affected by this act, and the several county courts therein shall fill all vacancies and perform all

things within their authority, necessary to put all of said laws into full and complete force in their respective counties.

Approved March 5th, 1877.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

LIFE INSURANCE-MEDICAL EXAMINER-SCOPE OF HIS AGENCY-FILLING UP APPLICATION.-Flynn et al. v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., Court of Appeals of New York, 6 Ins. L. J. 63. Opinion by EARL, J. The duty of a medical examiner is simply to ascertain and report to the company the health of the applicant by filling up the blank report, and obeying the instructions furnished him. Authority to solicit or fill up applications is not incident to his agency as medical examiner, nor within its scope, and the company is not responsible for his acts in filling up the application and advising the insured to make answers which were false. Dr. V., the medical examiner of the defendant, under the instructions of its agent, called upon the assured to make the medical examination. He informed the assured that he had come to examine him for a lifepolicy, and then took the blank application and commenced to ask the questions therein contained, and insert the answers. In answer to a question whether the assured had had any one of numerous diseases mentioned (among them disease of the bladder, disease of the kidneys, disease of the brain and nervous system), he replied, "You know that little sickness that I had down yonder?" alluding to a time, some two years before, when for a brief period he was insane; and the doctor replied: "We called that insanity, but we were a little mistaken; it was nothing more nor less than an undue excitement from a specific cause, and it is not worth while to make mention of it." The assured also called his attention to the fact that he had had some difficulty about his kidneys or bladder, and that Dr. B. thought he had the gravel. Dr. V. said that Dr. B. was mistaken, and that he had prescribed for him and cured him. The doctor then wrote in the application, in answer to the question, "Whooping cough, measles; no effects from them," omitting all mention of the kidney, bladder and gravel difficulty. In answer to the question, "Has the person had any serious illness, local disease or personal injury?" the doctor advised him that he had known him for ten years, and that he had had no serious illness, and wrote "No," for the answer. After the assured had answered the question as to his usual medical attendance, the following question was read to him: "Have you consulted any other medical man; if so, for what and when?" and under the advice of Dr. V., "No," was written for the answer. All these answers were proved on the trial to be untrue. The policy was issued based upon them. In delivering judgment, the court assumed that there was no collusion between the assured and Dr. V., and that the assured gave to the doctor full and accurate information as to all the questions asked before his answers were written, but held that, as Dr. V. had never been appointed the agent of the defendant to procure applications for insurance, and as he had never acted as such, but was simply the medical examiner of the defendant, and was never held out by it as an agent for any other purpose, it was simply his duty to ascertain and report to the company the physical condition and state of health of an applicant for insurance, by filling up the blank report, and obeying the instructions furnished to him. Reynolds on Life Assurance, 123; Bunyon on Life Assurance, 51; Angell on Life and Fire Insurance, § 283. There are cases to be found in the books where insurance companies have been held

bound by misstatements contained in applications made or written by or under the advice of their agents authorized to solicit insurance and take applications. Plumb v. Cattaraugus County Mut. Ins. Co., 18 N. Y., 392; Rowley v. Empire Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. 550; American Life Ins. Co. v. Malone, 21 Wall. 152; Miner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 9 American Rep. 235; Baker v. Home Life Ins. Co., 5 Ins. L. J. 661. But these cases do not apply to the authority delegated to a medical examiner.

LIBEL AGAINST SHIP SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED ON BOND UNDER ACT OF MARCH 3, 1847 - LIBELANT'S REMEDY SOLELY ON BOND.-Senab v. Str. Josephine, United States District Court, District of Louisiana. From original opinion by BILLINGS, J. Where a party libeled a ship which was subsequently released on bond under act of Congress of March 3, 1847, the libelant must look exclusively to the bond of release for the satisfaction of his claim, and can not participate in the proceeds realized from the sale of the ship under a subsequent libel, except in cases of fraud. The bond becomes the substitute for the vessel. In The Union, 4 Blatchf. 93, an order had been made in the district court, directing the re-delivery of the vessel which had been released upon bond and stipulation. Judge Blatchford said: "This order assumes that the discharge of the vessel from the seizure, and her delivery to her owners, was not absolute, but that she is still subject to the exertion of the power of the court for the purpose of satisfying any decree. No case has been furnished in which this power of the admiralty has been exerted; and, on principle, I do not well see how it can be maintained. The vessel, after being discharged from the arrest, upon the giving of the bond or stipulation, returns into the hands of her owner, subject to all previously existing liens or charges, the same as before the seizure, except as respects that on account of which the seizure was made. She is also subject to any subsequently-accruing liens or charges in the hands of her owner, or in the hands of any person to whom she may have been transferred. The redelivery, therefore, of the vessel, if permitted, or enforced, must necessarily be a re-delivery subject to all these existing or subsequently-accruing liens, and also to the rights of any bona fide purchasers, if a sale has in the meantime taken place. The complication and embarrassment growing out of the exercise of the power if sanctioned are apparent, and this doubtless accounts for the absence of any precedent in the books." The act of Congress of March 3, 1847, provides: "It shall be the duty of the marshal to stay execution on such process, and to discharge the property arrested if the same has been levied, on receiving from the claimants a bond or stipulation." In The Wild Ranger (Brown. and Lushington Rep. 84), the point before the court seems to have been determined by Dr. Lushington. In that case the Wild Ranger had collided with the Coleroon. Two suits were instituted against her, the one on behalf of the owners of the Coleroon, and the other on behalf of the owners of the cargo. In the first suit, that on behalf of the owners of the Coleroon, the ship was released on bail, the form of the stipulation being, "if he, the said defendant, shall not pay what may be adjudged against him in the said cause with costs, execution may issue forthwith against us, our heirs', executors' and administrators' goods and chattels, for a sum not exceeding-." After the release the vessel was arrested at the suit of the owners of the cargo, and in that suit was sold, and the proceeds placed in the registry of the court. Both suits went to judgment. The libel on behalf of the owners of the vessel had been amended, and the decree was for £92 in excess of the damages claimed in the original libel and stipulated for in the release

bond. On the other hand, there was a surplus of £1,498 in the registry of the court, in the second suit, beyond the payment of the judgment in favor of the owners of the cargo. The application was to have this £92 paid out of the proceeds in the registry in the second suit. Dr. Lushington refused the application; the following are his reasons: "Now, the bail given for the ship in any action is the substitute for the ship; when the bail is given, the ship is immediately released from that cause of action and can not be arrested again for that cause of action. Also, if the ship is sold in another action, the proceeds, save by the operation of some act of Parliament, are liable only to the payment of liens. In this case then, after the bail was taken, the ship herself never could have been made liable for damage or interest." I am of opinion that the proceeds of a ship sold in another action are in legal consideration as the ship itself, and, therefore, can not be made available to answer this demand. It would seem that the act of Congress authorizing the release of vessels on bond, providing for their release, either before or after arrest, contemplates that the bail shall, in the absence of fraud, in all respects, be a substitute for the vessel. It would seem that the embarrassments and complications of the opposite rule would be very great. The authority of the cases cited sustains fully this reasoning. Upon the delivery to the claimant of the vessel, upon bail, the right of the libelant to re-arrest the vessel, except in case of fraud, was lost; and since he can not resort to the vessel, he can not to her proceeds.

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ASSIGNMENT OF DEBT DUE FROM MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-SUBJECTION OF FUND IN HANDS OF CORPORATION TO PAYMENT OF ASSIGNEE'S CLAIM-PLEADING JUDGMENT UNDER PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF.-A person holding a claim against an insolvent debtor, who assigned to his creditors in satisfaction a portion of his salary due from a public corporation, not liable to garnishment, may, in a suit brought for that purpose against his debtor and the corporation, obtain judgment against his debtors on a proper statement of facts, and upon the prayer for general relief, and in the same proceeding may have a decree subjecting the fund in the possession of the corporation to payment of the judgment. [Referring to parallel case of Lutley v. Woods et al., decided by this court, January term, 1876]. Judgment reversed. Opinion by LEWIS, C. J.—Beal v. McVicker et al.

JURISDICTION-FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE TO SECURE LOAN OF SCHOOL FUNDS.-In a suit to foreclose a mortgage to secure bonds given to a county, to the use of a township, for a loan of school funds, the act of the legislature, (Acts of 1874, p. 160). Held, that there is nothing in said act or in the law which takes away the jurisdiction of the circuit court, or deprives a mortgagee of his right to proceed against the mortgagors in the circuit court. [Citing Wag. Stat. p. 953, § 1.] The provision of the act of 1874, being that, "whenever the amount of a loan of school funds, secured by mortgage containing a power to sell, shall become due, the county court may make an order on the sheriff to levy the same, with costs, on the property described in the mortgage, a copy of which order, duly certified and delivered to the sheriff, shall have the effect of a fi. fa.," it was error to sustain a demurrer to the petition because it was filed in the circuit court. Judgment reversed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Lincoln County, to use, etc., v. McLellan, Adm'r.

NEGLIGENCE-ACTION FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM -EVIDENCE NECESSARY-DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.-An

action for injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant in failing to supply proper material for a scaffold, and the defective construction of such scaf fold, upon which plaintiff was employed to work, can not be maintained, except where plaintiff is able to prove, by competent testimony, that the defects existed either in construction or materials; that defendant or his agents knew of such defects, and plaintiff did not know of them prior to exposing himself to the danger. Plaintiff can not recover if he knew of the hazard before the accident, or if it was the result of his own negligence. In the absence of positive proof of negligence, the accident and injury would be attributable to misadventure, inevitable fate, or other causes for which defendant would not be liable. [Citing Schultz v. Pacific R. R., 36 Mo. 32; Wooden v. Baltimore, etc., R. R., 32 Md. 410; Greenleaf v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 29 Iowa, 14; Wharton on Neg. § 212-13]. Employers are bound to use reasonable care in supplying suitable apparatus for the performance of the work, and are liable for injuries caused by their negligence in this respect. [Citing Gibson v. P. R. R., 46 Mo. 163; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, 62 Mo. 230.] Where the evidence offered by the plaintiff does not support the issue, a demurrer to the evidence should be sustained. The demurrer to evidence admits the facts, and every inference legitimately to be drawn therefrom in favor of plaintiff. In sustaining demurrer to the evidence, the court applies the law to the facts. [Citing Schuchardt v. Allens, 1 Wall. 369–71; Reed v. Deerfield, 8 Allen, 524; Todd v. O. C., etc., R. R., 7 Allen, 207; Brown v. European, etc., R. R., 58 Me. 389; Brooks v. Somerville, 106 Mass. 275; Denny v. Williams, 5 Allen, 4; Bailey v. Kimball, 26 N. H. 351; Mason v. Lewis, 1 Greenl. (Ia.), 494; Ellis v. Ohio, etc., Trust Co., 4 Ohio St., 628; Thrings v. Cent., etc., R. R. Co., 7 Robt. (N. J.), 616; Gray v. McNeal, 12 Ga. 424; Stuart v. Simpson, 1 Wend. 376.] The court does not weigh the evidence. Evidence insufficient to support a verdict is quoad hoc no evidence. Judgment aflirmed. Opinion by HAYDEN, J.-Nolan v. Schickle.

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ATTORNEY AT LAW-AUTHORITY TO COLLECT AND SATISFY JUDGMENT REVOKED BY CLIENT'S DEATH-SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT.-1. The authority of an attorney at law to collect and satisfy a judgment recovered by him is revoked by the death of his client, and without a new retainer by his personal representative, he will have no authority to intermeddle with the collection. 2. If an attorney of a judgment-plaintiff collects the same and enters satisfaction of the judgment after the plaintiff's death, the entry will be set aside on motion by the personal representative of the deceased creditor, although it may affect a purchaser of real estate from the judgment-debtor. Opinion by SCOTT, J.-Turnan et al. v. Timke.

COUNTY COURT-POWER TO LIMIT TIME OF OBJECTING TO JUDGMENT FOR TAXES-APPEAL.-1. The county has the power to make a rule limiting the time for filing objections to judgment against delinquent lands for taxes, and may enforce the same by refusing to receive objections after the expiration of a reasonable time thus fixed. 2. The statute allowing an appeal from the county to the circuit court from judgments against lands for taxes being repealed on July 1, 1875, no appeal will lie to the circuit court where final judgment is rendered after that day, although the application for judgment is made and the land-owner defaulted in June, 1875. 3. The entry of an order defaulting a defendant is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies. Opinion by DICKEY, J.-Hess v. People ex rel. Miller.

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SWORN ANSWER AS EVIDENCE-CERTIFICATE OF EVIDENCE-MATTERS NOT OFFERED AT HEARING.-1. An intervening defendant in a proceeding for a mechanic's lien, who fails to show any title or interest in the property sought to be affected, has not such a standing in court as will enable him to call in question a decree establishing the lien. 2. A sworn answer, so far as responsive to the allegations of a petition for a mechanic's lien, is competent evidence, but in relation to new matter therein set forth not called for in the petition, is not evidence, but a mere matter of pleading. 3. The circuit court has no power at a term subsequent to the rendition of a decree, to permit evidence not introduced at the hearing, nor until after the decree, to be incorporated into the certificate of evidence or bill of exceptions, and if it does, it will be stricken out. Opinion by DICKEY, J.-L. S. & M. S. R. R. v. McMillan et al.

TRUSTEE'S SALE-PARTY PARTICIPATING IN, NOT ALLOWED TO URGE INADEQUACY OF PRICE RIGHT OF TRUSTEE TO PURCHASE AFTER SALE-SUFFICIENCY OF POWER OF ATTORNEY TO SELL AND CONVEY LANDWHEN EQUITABLE TITLE PASSES UNDER AN UNSEALED POWER-TRUST DEED CONSTRUED AS TO NOTICE OF SALE REQUIRED.-1. Where the owner of land, sold under a a power in a mortgage, attends the sale, and through his attorney bids upon the same, and allows it to be sold to another, he will not be permitted years after, and when valuable improvements have been made on it by subsequent purchasers, to impeach the sale on the ground that the property has sold for less than its true value. 2. While public policy and fair dealing will not allow a trustee, either directly or indirectly, to become a purchaser of property at his own sale, yet, after the sale is made and the property has passed beyond his control, he will have the same right to purchase it as a stranger, if the transaction is in good faith. 3. A power of attorney to sell and convey, under which a conveyance of land is made, must be in writing, and of equal dignity with the deed executed, in order to be valid at law. It must be under seal. 4. A power of attorney not under seal will be sufficient to authorize the attorney to sell land, but not to make a conveyance. 5. Where a trust deed authorizes the trustee, his legal representatives or attorney, to sell the land conveyed on default of payment, and a sale is fairly made under a power of attorney not under seal, and the purchase-money paid and a conveyance executed by the attorney, the sale will be good in equity, and the purchaser will acquire the equitable title to the premises, and may set up such title in bar of a suit in equity to have the sale set aside. 6. Where a trust deed or mortgage, with a power of sale, provides that the mortgagee may sell after having advertised such sale sixty days in a newspaper published in etc., by posting up notices in four places in the county, the word "by " will be regarded as inserted by mistake in place of the word "or," and it will be sufficient if notice is given by publication or by posting. Opinion by CRAIG, J.-Watson et al. v. Sherman et al.

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CONTINUANCE OVER SUNDAY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.1. In a trial for murder, where the jury failed to agree and the judge continued the term of the court from Saturday of the second week to the following Monday, when a ver. dict was rendered; held, not to be error. 2. The provisions of chapter 33, section 108, of Battle's Revisal are not in conflict with article 4, section 12, of the Constitution.-State v. Taylor.

PARENT AND CHILD-GIFT-PRESUMPTION-SUBSEQUENT DECLARATIONS.-The presumption that a parent intended the expenses of a child's education to be an absolute gift, will not be repelled by any declaration afterwards, of a wish that they shall be deemed an advancement, unless WHO MAY QUESTION DECREE-contained in a will legally executed. Whether a gift is an

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