read as follows: Sec. 2. That all executions, orders of sale, writs and process, which, before the passage of this act, were issued out of the Circuit Court of Stoddard County, and which, had not this amendatory act been passed, would have been returnable to the August term, 1877, of the Circuit Court of Stoddard County, are hereby continued in full force, and made returnable to the September term, 1877, of said court in conformity with this act.

SEC. 3. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with or repugnant to this act are hereby repealed. Approved March 20, 1877.

AN ACT to encourage the destruction of rats.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for any county court in this state to offer a reward not exceeding five cents per scalp for the destruction of rats, the same to be paid out of the county treasury of the county in which the rats are killed; Provided, That no reward shall be paid for any number of rats less than fifty.

SEC. 2. Any person claiming such reward shall produce the scalp to the clerk of the county court of the county in which such rats are killed, within one week thereafter; whereupon the clerk shall administer to such persons the following oath: You do solemnly swear (or affirm as the case may be) that the scalps produced by you are of rats killed or taken by you, or some person employed by you, within this county, and within the past week.

SEC. 3. The clerk shall forthwith destroy such scalps and give to the person proving up the same, under the hand of such clerk, a certificate setting forth in plain and legible handwriting without interlineation, the number of scalps, the name and residence of such person; which certificate shall be in the following form: State of Missouri,

County of

}

This is to certify that

SS.

in the County rat scalps,

of did this day prove before me and is entitled to the sum of $-Given under my hand this day of 18-. SEC. 4. Such clerk shall keep a register of all such scalps in a book which shall be kept for that purpose, in which he shall note down every certificate granted, the number of scalps proven, and shall transmit a copy of such register, under the seal of the court, to the treasurer of the county, who shall not allow and pay any certificates which shall not correspond with such register.

SEC. 5. Such clerk shall issue a certificate to any person proving not less than fifty in number; and for administering said oath and issuing certificate, he shall be entitled to a fee of 25 cents, to be paid by the party to whom the certificate is issued.

Approved March 20, 1877.

AN ACT authorizing the appointment of a Marshal or Janitor of St. Louis Court of Appeals, and providing for their compensation.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. The St. Louis Court of Appeals shall appoint a marshal and a janitor, whose respective duties and terms of office shall be governed by the laws applicable to the marshal and janitor of the supreme court of this state.

SEC. 2. The marshal of the St. Louis Court of Appeals shall receive compensation for his services in a sum not to exceed the sum of $2,000 per annum, to be paid quarterly, such compensation to be fixed for his services by the St. Louis Court of Appeals by order of said court entered of record.

SEC. 3. The janitor of said court shall receive compensation for his services in a sum not to exceed the sum of $900 per annum, to be fixed by said court by order entered of record, and to be payable monthly, except as hereinafter directed.

SEC. 4. The said marshal and janitor shall receive out of the state treasury one-third of their respective salaries, as may be fixed by order of said court, in four equal instalments; and said marshal and janitor shall present their accounts to the state auditor, approved by the presiding judge of said court, and the auditor shall draw his warrant therefor upon the treasury, to be paid out of the appropriations made for the payment of the civic officers of the state.

SEC. 5. The business of the St. Louis Court of Appeals being now carried on at a daily inconvenience to said court and the suitors therein, for want of the legislation hereby intended, an emergency is hereby declared to exist requiring the immediate enforcement. of those provisions; wherefore this act is to take effect from and after its passage.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

SECTION 1. When any owner, tenant or sub-tenant of a lot or lots or tract of land, shall file with any justice of the peace, within the county in which said lot or lots or tract of land may be situated, his or her affidavit or the affidavit of any other creditable person for them, stating that from knowledge, information or belief the party or parties owning, controlling, or working the adjoining lot or lots or tract of land, and upon which said party or parties are sinking shafts, mining, excavating and running drifts, and that said drifts in which said parties are digging, mining, and excavating mineral ore or veins of coal, extend beyond the lines and boundaries of said lot or lots or tract of land, owned, controlled, or worked by them, and have entered in and upon the premises of the party or parties making said affidavit, or for whom said affidavit is made, the justice of the peace, after first being tendered his lawful fees, shall issue his written order and deliver or cause the same to be delivered to the county surveyor or his deputy, commanding him, after his reasonable fees have been tendered, to proceed without delay to survey said drift by entering any and all shafts upon said lot or lots or tract of land that he (the surveyor) may see fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the course and distance of said drift or drifts, and to locate the same upon the surface.

SEC. 2. The surveyor shall, before entering upon said duty, read said order to the party or parties owning, controlling, or working any shaft or shafts on said lot or lots or tract of land.

SEC. 3. If said party or parties owning, controlling or working said shaft or shafts on said lot or lots or tract of land, shall refuse, hinder, or prevent said county surveyor or his deputy and his assistant from entering said shaft or shafts or drifts to make the survey so ordered by the justice of the peace, and every person so offending, shall on conviction be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term of not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding $300, or by both said fine and imprisonment.

SEC. 4. This act to take effect and be in force ninety days after the adjournment of the present session of the General Assembly.

Approved March 20th, 1877.

THIRTIETH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF ILLINOIS.

AN ACT to punish the offense of advertising for divorces.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That whoever advertises, prints, publishes, distributes, or circulates or causes to be advertised, printed, published, distributed or circulated in any circular, pamphlet, card, hand - bill, advertisement, printed paper, book, newspaper or notice of any kind, with intent to procure, or to aid in procuring any divorce, either in this state or elsewhere, shall be fined not less than $100, nor more than $1,000 for each offense, or imprisonment in the county jail not less than three months, nor more than one year, or both in the discretion of the court.

This act shall not apply to the printing or publishing of any notice or advertisement required or authorized by any statute of the State of Illinois.

Approved April 12, 1877.

AN ACT to amend section 36 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence," approved March 27, 1874.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That section 36 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence," approved March 27, 1874, be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows: Sec. 36. Whoever willfully and maliciously and forcibly breaks and enters, or willfully and maliciously, without force (the doors or windows being open), enters into any dwelling-house, kitchen, office, shop, storehouse, warehouse, malthouse, stilling-house, mill, pottery, factory, wharf- boat, steamboat, or other water craft, freight or passenger railroad car, church, meeting-honse, school-house, or other building, with intent to commit murder, robbery, rape, or mayhem, or other felony or larceny, shall be deemed guilty of burglary, and be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term not less than one year nor more than twenty years.

AGREEMENT TO PAY TAXES-DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TAXES" ASSESSED" AND "PAYABLE"-Under a contract by a lessee of real estate, to pay all taxes "legally required or demanded of the premises," and "within the year they become due," he will not be required to pay taxes assessed during the term, but payable after its expiration. This case is distinguishable from Valle v. Fargo, and Waterman v. Harkness, heretofore decided by this court. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Doan v. Fallon.

PRACTICE IN COURT OF APPEALS-PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO ASSIGN ERRORS AND FILE STATEMENT AND BRIEF. -Where no assignment of errors and no statement and brief are filed as required by law, and no cause for the failure is shown, on motion of respondent the judgment of the court below will be affirmed with an assessment of ten per cent. damages against appellant. [Citing Wag. Stat. p. 1066, § 22; p. 1067, § 31; p. 1068, § 35.] Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Kliffman v. Skeele.

PRACTICE AT LAW AND IN EQUITY-PARTIES DEFENDANT-COSTS.-In a proceeding by the holder of an allowed demand against the estate of a decedent, to set aside a final settlement for irregularities in publishing notice, etc., if a proceeding in equity, to subject real estate to payment of debts, the widow, as well as the heirs, should be made

parties; if merely to set aside the final settlement, the administrator alone should be made party defendant. But, as the circuit court assumed jurisdiction, the widow should have been brought in by summons so as to do complete justice, it appearing that the property is sufficient to pay the debt. Costs should be awarded against the administrator who made the false settlement alone. Judgment reversed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Keitkamp v. Biederstein.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-REPLEVIN AND DETINUE-ALLEGATA AND PROBATA-VARIANCE. The statutory proceeding for the claim and delivery of personal property in this state (Wag. Stat. 1023) resembles the common-law actions of replevin and detinue. Where plaintiff alleges in his petition, that the property claimed is in the possession of defendant, and it turns out on the trial that defendant had not the property in possession, there is a variance between the allegations and the proof. Plaintiff is not at liberty to allege anything he pleases, and recover on his proofs at variance with his petition. An action for the specific recovery of personal property can not be maintained in this state, where the defendant was not in possession or control of the goods at the time of the commencement of the action. [Citing Johnson v. Garlick, 25 Wis. 705; Coffin v. Gephart, 25 la. 257; Houghton v. Newbury, 69 N. C. 456; Hall v. White, 106 Mass. 599; Mitchell v. Roberts, 50 N. H. 485.] Judgment reversed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J. — Davis v. Randolph.

FRAUD-EVIDENCE OF CONTRACTS IN WRITING-PRACTICE-IMMATERIAL AVERMENTS.-In an action on a written contract of subscription to a fund for the erection of a hotel, where the answer admits the execution of the contract, but says it was procured by false and fraudulent representations, as set out in the answer, and such representations appear not to be false or fraudulent in law, and would not be sufficient to set aside the contract in equity,such answer would not amount to a defense to an action at law. Evidence offered to contradict the terms of a written contract is incompetent. Where statements and representations are made in the course of antecedent conversation, and the contract is afterwards reduced to writ ing, the parties are only bound by the written statements. But in case of fraud, what transpired before the execution of the contract, might be proven to impeach its fairness. [Citing 8 Wheat. 211]. Fraud vitiates all contracts at com mon law. [Citing 3 Coke R. 78]. Whether representations made by the agent of plaintiff as to the manner of constructing the hotel, so as not to be offensive to defendant, were made in good faith, is immaterial. If defendant wished to rely upon them, he should have had them inserted as conditions in the contract. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-New Lindell Hotel Co. v. Bailey.

WILL-UNCERTAINTY AS TO DEVISEES.-Where a will provided that the beneficiaries of the trust should be all the poor widows and women whose husbands had left them unprovided for, without any just cause, of or over the age of fifty years, of irreproachable character, who had resided not under three years within eight miles of the town of Winslow, and who had no certain income; held, there was not such vagueness or uncertainty as to the devisees as would invalidate the will. Judgment reversed. Opinion by HowK, J.-De Bruler et al. v. Ferguson, Adm'r, etc.

encing his official conduct, being without a valid consid eration and void, must be held to be of no value, and not an undue reward within the meaning of the statute. Judg. ment affirmed. Opinion by NIBLACK, J.-State of Indiana v. Walls.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-ACTION TO SET ASIDEPLEADING.-In an action to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance of real estate, and subject the same to the pay. ment of a judgment in favor of a creditor of the grantor, it is necessary to allege in the complaint and prove on the trial that, at the time the conveyance was made, the debtor did not have left enough other property subject to execu. tion to pay all his debts, and it is not sufficient to charge that, some months or years after the conveyance was executed, no other property could be found on which to levy, or that it was subsequenly ascertained that the debtor had become wholly insolvent. Judgment reversed. Opinion by NIBLACK, J.-Sherman et al. v. Hogland.

LIABILITY FOR SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS-REMOTE CONSEQUENCES.-Under the 12th section of the liquor law of 1873, a wife may sue for the death of her husband caused by intoxication; but the seller of the intoxicating liquor can not be held liable for consequences which are not the natural result of his act, and the death of the intoxicated person caused by a train of cars is not naturally or necessarily connected with the fact of selling liquor to him. The death need not take place immediately and directly upon the cause, but it must be produced by a chain of natural causes and effects unchanged by human action, or the party who committed the first act will not be responsible. The running of the train of cars in this case was the human action which changed the course of natural effects and causes connected with the act of selling the intoxicating liquor. 56 Ind. 311. Judgment reversed. Opinion by BIDDLE, J.-Collier v. Earley.

TRUSTEE'S SALE-TIME FOR PAYING BID-POWER OF RECEIVER-ERRORS.-1. On a trustee's sale of land under a power in a trust-deed, made late in the afternoon, a party bid $2,938, and the holder of the notes bid $10,770, and exhibited his certified check upon a bank for $10,000, and paid the amount of his bid on the following Monday: Held, on a contest between the bidders as to their rights to a deed, the sale being announced for cash, that the payment on the following Monday was a substantial compliance with the terms of the sale. 2. When the holdor of notes, secured by deed of trust, becomes the purchaser of property at the trustee's sale, a mere indorsement of the amount of his bid on the notes will be a sufficient compliance with the power and terms of sale requiring to be for cash. 3. A receiver of an insurance company, holding notes given to the company and secured by deed of trust, has the rightful power to bid off the property to save a sacrifice. He succeeds to the rights of the company in this respect. A bidder at a trustee's sale of property under a trust deed, which has been reformed for a mistake, can not assign for error any matter in the decree of reformation, or its directing a deed to be made without redemption, as he has no interest in these questions. Opinion by SHELDON, C. J.-Jacobs v. Turpin.

RAILROADS-RIGHT TO CONDEMN PROPERTY - POWER OF CORPORATION DE FACTO-PRACTICE.-1. It matters not whether certain railway companies were empowered by their charters to construct a railroad within the city of Chicago, if, after their consolidation, the legislature, by an amendatory act, recognizes the existence of the consolidated company and the name adopted, and its authority so to construct its road, as this will confer the power. 2. A provision, an act amendatory of the charter of a railway

company, that the rate of speed at which its trains, etc., may be run in the city, shall be under the control of the common council, is a legislative recognition of its rights to construct its road within the city limits. 3. In a proceeding by a railway company to condemn land for the use of its road, it is sufficient that it is de facto a corporate body. 4. After the introduction of evidence on an assessment of damages for property sought to be condemned, the court, on motion of certain tenants of one of the land owners, swore the jury to try the issues presented by their pleas questioning the right to condemn. The proof of these issues was nothing more than what the land owners insisted upon, and this, working them no prejudice, was held no error as to them. 5. Where the witnesses on both sides, in a proceeding to condemn property, testified as to its value at the date of the institution of the proceeding, except three, and from their testimony it did not appear that the property was worth more at the time of the trial, it was held that a modification of an instruction confining the jury to its value at the first date was not of sufficient importance to affect the rights of the land owner. Opinion by SHELDON, C. J.-McAuley v. C. I. & C. R. R.

PRACTICE-REFUSING LEAVE TO PLEAD AFTER DEMURRER-AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS-Set-off-CONTRACT-COMMON COUNTS.-1. When plaintiff files, with his declaration under sec. 37 of the practice act, the requisite affidavit, and the defendant demurs, and his demurrer is overruled, the question whether the court abuses its discretion in refusing leave to the defendant to plead, depends whether his affidavit, accompanying his plea, shows a substantial defense to the merits. 2. If the affidavit accompanying the plea proposed to be filed after the overruling of a demurrer to the declaration, does not show facts necessarily constituting a defense, the court is warranted in refusing leave to file the plea. 3. When a defendant undertakes to set up by affidavit the facts relied on to sustain his plea, he will be held to the same strictness in matters of substance as in pleading. 4. Where real estate is bought under a warranty deed, and there is an apparent incumbrance found not satisfied of record, and the grantor proposes to allow the expenses of recovering the same, a plea of set-off as to such expenses to a suit upon notes given for the purchasemoney, which fails to show that the defendant accepted the offer and expended his time and money on the faith of it, and shows no consideration for the promise, and does not distinctly aver that the amount of the proposed set-off is then due and unpaid, is substantially defective. 5. The fact, that notes are given for a larger sum than was agreed by the parties to be due for land purchased, does not render them void, but goes to the consideration partially, and there may be a recovery pro tanto. 6. If a note, given for the purchase of land, is held void for any cause, a recovery may be had under the common counts of the sum actually due. Opinion by SCHOLFIELD, J.-McCord v. Crooker.

OFFER TO ALLOW JUDGMENT TO BE TAKEN UNDER THE CODE.-A defendant in a civil action for assault and battery may, at any time before trial, although he may have already answered by filing a general denial, serve upon the plaintiff, in accordance with section 523 of the civil code, an offer in writing to allow judgment to be taken against him for a sum specified in such offer; and then, if the plaintiff fail to accept such offer, and afterwards fails to recover judgment against the defendant for more than the amount so offered, the defendant may, in the same action, recover judgment against the plaintiff for costs accru

ing after such offer. Opinion by VALENTINE, J.-Clippen. ger v. Ingram.

OFFICE OF BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.-1. The office of a bill of exceptions is to bring upon the record some portion of those proceedings in a cause which do not otherwise go upon the record. It must, therefore, be filed in the court in which the proceedings are had, and then becomes itself a part of the record of the cause. If a party desires to use this part of the record in proceedings in error, he should obtain a certified transcript and attach the same to his petition in error. He may not take the original bill of exceptions signed, but never filed, and therefore never a part of the record, and attach that to his petition in error as sufficient evidence of the proceedings claimed to be erroneous. Opinion by Brewer, J.-Jackson v. Stoner, Adm'r.

BILL OF EXCHANGE-BONA FIDE HOLDER.-1. When a bill of exchange of a third party, payable to order, is indorsed before maturity as collateral security for a debt contracted at the time of said indorsement, the indorsee is a bona fide holder for value in the usual course of business, and payment by the acceptor to the indorser, without authority from the indorsee, will not discharge the bill. 2. Where Y. B. & Co., payees of a bill of exchange, indorse the bill before maturity to a bank, as collateral security for an advance thereon, at the time of the transfer, and the bank, upon the payment of the bill, is to apply the proceeds thereof in payment of such consideration, and after protest of the bill for non-payment, the acceptors remit to Y. B. & Co. the amount of the bill without authority from the bank, and Y. B. & Co. fail to turn over the remittance from the acceptors to the bank; held, in an action on the bill by the bank against the acceptors, that the court erred in instructing the jury to the effect, if they found the truth to be that Y. B. & Co., the original payees, simply indorsed the draft to the bank for collection, with authority or directions to apply the proceeds when collected to the account which the bank had with the said Y. B. & Co., the bank holding and accepting the paper, under such circumstances, became the agent or trustee of Y. B. & Co., as such instruction was not warranted by the evidence, and was liable to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the bank. Opinion by HORTON, C. J.-State Savings Ass. of St. Louis v. Hunt.

SALE OF LUMBER-ESTIMATE OF QUALITY MADE BY THIRD PARTY-EVIDENCE-CUSTOM.-1. On a sale and delivery of lumber, where it is a part of the agreement between the parties that the quantity and quality shall be estimated by a third person named, his estimate is binding unless impeached for fraud or mistake. 2. The lumber sold being, at the time of sale, piled in a certain city in another state, evidence of a custom in that city that, when lumber had been estimated in the pile, the seller should deduct from the estimate one-half the sheeting contained therein, was inadmissible without proof that the custom was known to the parties, or had existed so long as to warrant a presumption that they contracted with reference to it. Opinion by COLE, J.-Scott v. Whitney.

SALE OF GOODS - REPRESENTATIONS - EVIDENCE.-1. Hop roots were sold upon a representation that they" were all right and would grow," and they did grow, but proved to be nearly worthless, a large portion being male roots, and others wild. Held, that the question whether such represen tation was a warranty of the quality of the roots in any other respect than their vitality or power of growth, was properly submitted to the jury upon all the facts in evidence. 2. Where the damages claimed for breach of the warranty as to such roots were only for the failure of the crop of the year in which they were first planted, evidence of the character of the crop produced by the same roots the next year, as compared with that produced by other roots in that year, with the same soil and cultivation, was admissible to show the quality of the roots in question. Opinion by COLE, J.-Brooks v. McDonnell.

RAILWAY NEGLIGENCE-Knowledge of Conductor— NOTICE.-The owner of certain horses and goods, destined for the village of L., shipped them in a common box stock car of the defendant, which car was to be run on defendant's road to A., and thence on its branch road to L.; and plaintiff, who was employed by the owner to accompany him and aid in taking care of the property, rode with it in said box car to A., with the knowledge and consent of the conductor who ran the train to that point. Such conductor in fact received fare for plaintiff's ride from A. to L. (which was not in his run), though he had no authority to do so. Some hours after the arrival of said car at A., when the train, of which it was then a part, was about starting for L., plaintiff went into said car without the knowledge or consent of the conductor or other persons in charge of that train, and without doing anything to bring the fact to their attention before the accident complained of. Before the train started, the car was locked by one of defendant's employees; and afterwards, while in motion, goods therein took fire through defendant's alleged negligence, and plaintiff was injured before he could procure the door to be opened. Held, that defendant was not chargeable with notice of plaintiff's presence in the box car between A. and L. merely by reason of the knowledge possessed by the first conductor. Opinion by COLE, J.-Jenkins v. C. M. & H. P. R. R.

BOND-EVIDENCE.-1. In an action upon a bond, running to "The Williamsburg City Fire Insurance Company of Brooklyn, New York," and its "successors and assigns," such recital was held sufficient prima facie evidence of the incorporation of the plaintiff. Williams v. Cheney, 3 Gray, 215; Topping v. Bickford, 4 Allen, 120; Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 386, 450. 2. One condition of the bond being that the obligor should keep true and correct books, a book kept by him, containing entries relating only to the business of the company, was competent evidence against him and his sureties, of the amount of premiums collected by him. Whitnash v. George, 8 B. & C. 556; s. c. 3 M. & Ry. 46; 1 Taylor on Ev., § 710. Opinion by GRAY, C. J.—Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co. v. Frothingham.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT-SERVICE.-1. In an action upon a foreign judgment, the question whether such judgment binds the defendant depends upon the question whether the writ in that action was duly served upon him. 2. The defendant introduced evidence that he was not at the time of such alleged service, and had never since been, in the state where such judgment was rendered. Evidence of an admission by the defendant that he knew of the bringing of the action in such state, taken in connection with other testimony introduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was in that state at the time of the service, was competent to contradict the evidence introduced by the defendant, and to support the plaintiff's action upon the judgment. Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 19 Wall. 58; McDermott v. Clary, 107 Mass. 501. Opinion by GRAY, C. J.-Sears v. Dacey.

REVIEW-AMENDMENT-CHANGE OF PARTIES.-Petition for review of an action of replevin, which had been brought by the defendant in review to recover a certain lot of flour which had been sold by the plaintiffs to one Dupee, in which action the warehousemen who held the flour were nominally defendants, and which had been defaulted. The warehousemen had no other interest in the flour than simply as warehousemen, and, therefore, took no measures to defend the action. Meantime the purchaser became bankrupt, and when afterward his assignees in bankruptcy were appointed, judgment had been entered in the case upon default. Being the parties really interested in the flour, the assignees filed a petition to review the action. Held, 1. that a writ of review, like a writ of error, must be in the name of a party to the original Judgment, or of those who

have by law succeeded to his rights upon his death or bankruptcy. Gen. Stat. c. 146, §§ 30–38; Johnson v. Thaxter, 7 Gray, 242. As Dupee, the owner of the goods replevied, was not a party of record to the original action, his assignees in bankruptcy could not maintain a petition for review in his or their name. 2. But Depee, or his assignee, representing him, may have been under obligations to protect the warehousemen, and might, with their assent, have assumed the defense of that action in their name. White v. Dolliver, 113 Mass. 400. The real party in interest may, upon indemnifying the formal party of record against costs, be allowed to sue out a writ of review in his name. Fuller v. Storer, 111 Mass. 281. 3. The statutes authorize amendments by change of parties or of forms of action, or in other matters, either of form or substance, to enable the plaintiff to maintain the suit for the cause for which it was intended to be brought. Gen. Stat. c. 129, §§ 41, 82. 4. These statutes permit the substitution of a new plaintiff, and are applicable to petitions for review. Crafts v. Sikes, 4 Gray, 194; Emery v. Osgood, 1 Allen, 244; Davenport v. Holland, 2 Cush. 1. Opinion by GRAY, C. J.-Winch v. Hosmer.

A BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, in canvassing the votes cast in an election, have no right to go behind the returns sent up by the judges of election from the respective townships of the county.-Moore v. Jones.

PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO MEANING OF WORDS-EXCEPTION TO INSTRUCTION-CHALLENGE.-What is meant by the word "dollar" in a note case can be shown by parol evidence. A general exception to the whole instruction of the court below must be overruled if any part of it is right. Whether there are one or more plaintiff's or defendants, only four peremptory challenges to the jury on either side are allowable.-Bryan v. Harrison.

ACTION ON BOND PAYABLE IN "CURRENT FUNDS"-PAROL EVIDENCE.-On the trial of an action brought upon a bond dated August 19th, 1864, and payable six months after date, and expressed "to be paid in current funds when called for," it is not competent to prove that there was an agreement at the time the bond was executed that it should be paid in Confederate money.-Davis v. Glenn et al.

ONE WHO MALICIOUSLY PERSUADES ANOTHER TO BREAK A CONTRACT with a third person is liable to such person for damages. Therefore, in an action for damages, where the plaintiff had made a contract with a railroad company of which the defendant was president and superintendent, which contract the defendant maliciously, and in order to injure the plaintiff, refused to complete; held, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.-Jones v. Stanly.

WHEN ORDER OF COURT UNNECESSARY-DEFECTIVE DESCRIPTION IN DEED-JOINDER OF CLAIMS.-It does not require an order of court to authorize the bona fide receipt of money by a clerk and master, upon a bond before its maturity, given for the purchase of land at a sale under decree of court which has been duly confirmed. After the payment of the purchase money for land sold under decree of court, an order of court is not necessary to enable the master to make a valid deed to the purchaser. In case, however, the master and purchaser take upon themselves the risk of determining that the case is one in which such an order would be fit and proper, "That John Brown, the ancestor of the petitioners, died seized and possessed of a tract of land in said County of Guilford on the waters of 'Stinking Quarter,' adjoining the lands of," is not so defective a description that it may not be possible to identify with certainty the land meant. A claim for the recovery of real estate which has been sold under decree of a court of equity can not be joined in the same action with a claim against the clerk and master for the purchase-money. Brown et al. v. Cable et al.

NOTES.

THE new jury law of Florida provides that, when in any case, civil or criminal, a knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic is necessary to enable a juror to understand the evidence to be offered, he may be challenged if he does not possess such qualifications.

CHIEF JUSTICE GRANT, a Scotch judge, was called "the silent man." A couple of barristers once argued before him for two whole days the point whether a certain offense came within the purview of a certain act of Parliament. When the judge was quite sure they had exhausted their arguments, if not themselves, he quietly observed: "The act you refer to has been repealed."

The English Court of Appeal, (25 W. R. 159), have lately affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas in Seaman v. Netherclift, reported at length in this journal, 3 Cent. L. J. 543, holding that words spoken by a witness as such, and with reference to the subject of inquiry, are not actionable. The defendant, who was an expert in handwriting, was called as a witness before a magistrate on a preliminary investigation of a charge of forgery. In cross-examination he was asked if he had read the comments made by the judge in a previous case upon his evidence; having answered that he had, he voluntarily added a statement affirming that evidence in words defamatory of the plaintiff. It was beld, that the words were spoken as a witness, and with reference to the subject of inquiry, and were therefore privileged.

PROFESSIONAL COSTUME ONCE MORE.-The London Law Times gives the following rather amusing scene in the Natal Supreme Court. Dr. Smith, a barrister, late of the Norfolk Circuit, England, who, since his arrival in Natal, has acted as editor of a newspaper called the Witness, published at Maulzburg, brought an action against the Times of Natal, the opposition newspaper, for libel. He claimed £500 damages, on the ground that the Times had accused him of scurrility. The learned doctor attended at the supreme court, which was presided over by Connor, C. J., for the purpose of arguing his exceptions to the defendant's pleas, and was attired in the wig and gown of an English barrister. He was proceeding to argue his exceptions to the defendant's pleas, when the chief justice, in interrupting him, said: "You are not in costume." Dr. Smith looked puzzled, and the chief justice repeated the expres

sion.

Dr. Smith-I am not aware that there is anything wrong in my attire.

The Chief Justice-Yes, there is. You are dressed as an English barrister and not as an advocate of this court. Dr. Smith said he was very sorry if his robes were any way irregular, and he would be happy on another occasion to make any alteration which his lordship would desire. The Chief Justice-You must do it now. I can not hear you unless you do it.

Dr. Smith (in astonishment)-Do I understand your lordship to direct me to alter my attire in open court? The Chief Justice-Yes, if you wish to be heard. Dr. Smith-Would your lordship kindly indicate to me the nature of the change which I am to make at so short a notice?

The Chief Justice-You wear a wig. You must take it

off.

Dr. Smith-A wig is an antiquated article of attire, till lately worn, in some shape, by gentle-people. Any man is entitled to wear artificial hair here or in the street, and doing so, is at most an eccentricity.

The Chief Justice-Not so. It is a covering to the head, like a hat or any other, and you must not appear here covered.

Dr. Smith-Now that your lordship has expressed that view, which is quite new to me, I presume your lordship will not put me to the trouble of making the alteration now, but will allow me to correct the mistake another time? It would be more usual and more agreeable.

The Chief Justice (with energy)-No, now. If not, we must adjourn the case. When shall we adjourn it to? Dr. Smith-As far as I understand your lordship, if I take my wig off, I may go on?

The Chief Justice-Yes.

Dr. Smith (putting his wig on the table)-Then there it is, my lord; and I have six objections to the defendant's plea.

The whole of the doctor's objections, except one, were overruled.