hundred and eighty-nine (189,) General Statutes of Missouri, entitled "Of Landlords and Tenants," being section eighteen (18), of chapter eighty-five (85), Wagner's Statutes, shall be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 18. Every landlord shall have a lien on the crops grown on the demised premises in any year for the rent that shall accrue for such year, and such lien shall continue for eight months after such rent shall become due and payable, and no longer. When the demised premises or any portion thereof are used for the purpose of growing nursery stock, a lien shall exist and continue on such stock until the same shall have been removed from the premises and sold, and such lien may be enforced by attachment in the manner hereinafter provided.

SEC. 2. That section twenty-six (26) of the aforesaid act shall be and the same is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 26. When any person who shall be liable to pay rent, (whether the same is due or not, or whether the same be payable in money or other thing, if the rent be due within one year thereafter), intends to remove or is removing, or has within thirty days removed, his property from the leased premises, or shall in any manner dispose of such crop, or attempt to dispose of the same, so as to endanger, hinder or delay the landlord from the collection of his rent, or when the rent is due and unpaid, the person to whom the rent is owing, may, before a justice of the peace, or the clerk of a court of record, having jurisdiction of actions by attachments in ordinary cases, of the county in which the premises lie, make affidavit of one or more of the facts aforesaid, and that he believes, unless an attachment issue, he will lose his rent; whereupon such officer shall issue an attachment for the rent against the personal property, including the crops grown on the demised premises of the person liable for the rent; but no such attachment shall issue until the plaintiff has filed with the officer the instrument of writing, statement or petition, upon which he sues, in the manner provided by law in actions by attachment, and given bond in double the amount sued for with good security to the defendant, to indemnify the defendant if it appear the attachment has been wrongfully obtained. Approved April 2d, 1877.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That section five (5) of an act entitled "An Act concerning fees and salaries, and to classify the several counties of this state with reference thereto," approved March 29, 1872, be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows: "Section 5. Judges of inferior courts of record in towns and cities shall be allowed, and receive in lieu of all other fees, perquisites or benefits whatsoever, in cities or towns having a population not exceeding five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, five hundred dollars ($500); and in cities or towns having more than five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), to be paid out of the city or town treasury: Provided, That, in cities having a population of one hundred thousand (100,000) or more, the city or common council may give such additional compensation, to be paid out of the city or town treasury, to the judge or judges of such court, as shall be deemed reasonable, not exceeding a sum sufficient to make the entire salary five thousand dollars ($5,000); which additional compen

sation shall be fixed prior to the election of such judge or judges, and shall be provided for in the annual appropriation ordinance of each year, and shall not be increased or diminished during the term of office of such judge or judges. County judges shall be allowed such salary as shall be fixed by their respective boards, to be paid out of the county treasury."

Approved May 11, 1877.

AN ACT to prohibit any city, town or village in this state from receiving from the county treasury a greater proportion of the surplus fun or tax, than shall be received by any other city, town or village within the same county.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That no city, town or village within any county in this state shall be entitled to, or shall receive from the county treasury of such county, any greater proportion of surplus of all taxes which may be collected for county purposes, than any other city, town or village within the county.

SEC. 2. Nor shall any such city, town or village be entitled to, or receive from the county treasury any greater drawback of its proportion of the taxes paid into the county treasury by reason of any appropriation by the county board out of the county treasury for the making and repairing of roads and highways, the building and repairing of bridges in such county, without any such city, town or village within such county, than is now allowed by law to all other cities, towns and villages within the same county. Any acts or parts of acts conflicting with this act are hereby repealed.

Approved May 4, 1877.

AN ACT to amend section two (2) of an act entitled "An Act to provide for the assessment and taxation of bridges across navigable waters on the borders of this state," approved and in force May 1, 1873. SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That section two (2) of an act entitled "An Act to provide for the assessment and taxation of bridges across navigable waters on the borders of this state," approved and in force May 1, 1873, be so amended as to read as follows:

SEC. 2. In default of the payment of any such tax assessed against any such bridge company, as aforesaid, such bridge structure and approaches thereto, so far as the same are located within this state, together with the land on which the same is located, as described by the assessor, and the franchise belonging thereto, shall be sold for such tax at the same time and in the same manner as other real estate shall be sold in such county for delinquent tax; and any county, city, town, school district, or other municipal corporation, interested in the collection of the tax levied upon such bridge, may become the purchaser at such sale, or at any sale of such property under judgment recovered upon or to force the collection of such tax; and if the property so sold is not redeemed, may acquire, hold, sell and dispose of the title thereto. Approved May 3d, 1877.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the people of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That, in any and all cases where different persons have the right to use, in separate or distinct quantities or proportions, the water or water-power furnished by a dam across any river in this state, it shall be lawful for such persons and the owner or owners of such dam and water-power to fix and determine upon some

fair, impartial and reasonable mode and manner, by a system of weirs, or weirs and floats, or other reasonable plan of measuring and delivering to each person entitled to use the water or water-power furnished by such dam, his just share or proportion thereof; which regulation, when made and acknowledged by such persons and the owner or owners of such dam and water-power, and recorded in the recorder's office of the county in which such dam is situated, shall be binding upon all persons entitled to use the water or water-power furnished by such dam; and in case any such dam is owned by a corporation, such corporation may, by by-laws or resolution entered upon a book kept by the corporation and subject to the free inspection of all persons interested, make such regulations: Provided, however, That in all cases the regulations made for measuring and delivering such water or water-power shall fairly and impartially apportion the same to each person entitled to the same, according to his just share thereof; and provided further, That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to impair any covenant, contract or agreement heretofore executed to any person or corporation, for water or water-power, or their legal rights thereto.

CONVERSION-TITLE BY POSSESSION OF ICE ON THE RIVER.-Where plaintiffs, in an action for the conversion of property by defendant, offer evidence tending to prove that they were in lawful possession of a quantity of ice, not yet removed from the river, but which plaintiffs had marked and staked off, and expended money upon for the purpose of preserving it fit for use and valuable as a commercial commodity, they should be allowed to go to the jury with their case; and if the jury are satisfied of the truth of the testimony offered in their behalf, plaintiffs are entitled to recover. Where the facts are established by the evidence as above, it is error to sustain a demurrer to the evidence. Judgment reversed. Opinion by BAKEWELL, J.-Hicky v. Hazard.

POSSESSION AS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF PERSONALTY-JURY WEIGHS THE EVIDENCE PRACTICE AND PLEADING.-In a suit growing out of the attachment of property claimed by a third person, where there is evidence tending to sustain his claim, and also evidence tending to prove that his rights were only colorable and for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the party in actual possession, the jury are to determine the value of conflicting testimony, and this court will not undertake to say whether witnesses for plaintiff or defendant were best entitled to belief. Where there was new matter in the answer to which there appears to be no reply, and such new matter was treated by the trial court as denied, though we might properly affirm the judg ment against plaintiff in error, as no point was made in regard to this matter, it will be treated here as though the new matters were properly denied. The instructions given were substantially correct, and supported by evidence. The instructions refused did not properly present the law. There was no error in overruling or sustaining objections to evidence. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by HAYDEN, J.-Zallee v. Hilger.

TRIAL BY REFEREE-FINDING TREATED AS VERDICT OF JURY.-The report of a referee will not be disturbed, if there is any evidence to support it. The referee is not conclusively bound by the testimony of plaintiff as to the amount he has received from defendant, where by the careless oral statements of the witness it would appear that

INDICTMENT-DRAM-SHOP LICENSE.-Where the law legalizes the sale of intoxicating liquors by more than one form of license (as, for instance, a dram-shop license, or by a dealer in drugs), the indictment must, at least in general terms, negative both licenses. (State v. Brown, 8 Mo. 210.) In this case the offense was charged under the statute of 1874.-State v. McBride.

INDICTMENT-CRIMINAL PRACTICE.-The fact of the acquittal of one of several defendants, jointly indicted for the same crime, is not admissible in evidence upon the trial of another. (State v. Phillips and Ross, 24 Mo. 475.) The refusal of an instruction, which might properly be given, is not error if the same law is given in other instructions. The Supreme Court will examine the whole record in capital cases, although there be no brief nor assignment of errors filed.-State v. Orr.

INDICTMENT-CRIMINAL PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE.Although at common law it was necessary to aver in the indictment upon what part of the body a mortal wound was inflicted, it was not necessary to prove the fact as charged. An indictment which charges that "defendant, etc., with a gun and leaden bullets, etc., did shoot, etc., in and upon divers places of the body" of the deceased, is a good indictment under sec. 27, ch. 1090, Wagner's Statutes, which provides that an indictment shall not be invalid because of the omission "of an averment not necessary to be proved.-State v. Edmonson.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SALARIES OF STATE OFFICERS.Prof. Riley, State Entomologist, applied for a writ of mandamus directing the state oflicer to issue his warrant for the professor's salary; Held, that the writ be denied; that sections 20 and 43 of article 4, and section 19 of article 10, of the state constitution, render invalid all acts of the General Assembly appropriating money for the payment of salaries of state officers, unless such acts shall have been passed within two years; and that even where the statute continues the officer in office, he has no legal claim for payment of his salary. (S. & J. Board of Public Schools v. Patton, 62 Mo. 444.)-Ex parte The Mo. State Board of Agriculture.

INDICTMENT-CRIMINAL LAW.-Where the defendant provoked a rencounter with deceased, and in the evening of the same day, several hours afterwards, returned to the place where the difficulty had occurred, and shot and killed deceased without any new affray, or other provocation, the offense is murder in the first degree. Instructions on the subject of insanity ought not to be given where there is no evidence to sustain them. The alleged seduction of defendant's daughter by deceased can not be admitted, where there is no proof that defendant knew of the fact, and no proof that he did the killing because of it. Where a juror upon the voir dire said he had not formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but it was proved upon motion for a new trial that, before he was called as a juror, he had said (referring to the case against defendant): "There are so many cases coming here on change of venue, that some of them ought to be strung up;" and, "I have heard something about the murder, or I have heard about it, and damn Taylor, he ought to be hung;" and, "I understand there is a man to be tried here at this term for murder, and from what I hear, he ought to be hung, or, will be hung," the judgment of conviction must be reversed. And the question whether a new trial should have been granted, does not depend upon whether the juror was competent or not, but upon other reasons, viz., the right of defendant to a panel of

FORGERY.-1. The false making, with fraudulent intent, of an instrument in the general form of a bank check, requesting the bank to "pay W. G. C., Jr., or bearer, one fifty dollars in current funds," constitutes the crime of forgery under sec. 1, ch. 166, R. S. 2. At the left upper corner of the check were the figures $150.00. Whether this would authorize the court to supply the words "hundred and" between "one" and "fifty" in the body of the instrument, quaere: but the check at least calls for the payment of fifty dollars. 3. The check is apparently a valid obligation, and would create a liability if genuine, and therefore had a tendency to defraud. Opinion by COLE, J.-State v. Coyle, Jr.

RESCISSION OF CONTRACT.-1. Upon the sale of a machine designed for a special use, whether it be an absolute sale with express or implied warranty, or a sale on trial, the vendee must return or offer to return the machine within a reasonable time, if he wishes to rescind the contract on the ground that the machine is not well adapted to use. 2. The question as to what is a reasonable time is generally for the jury; yet the delay may be so long that the court will, as matter of law, hold the offer to return too late. 3. Where the trial is without a jury, this court, on appeal, reviews the evidence. Opinion by LYON, J.— Paige v. McMillan.

ABORTION-EVIDENCE-DYING DECLARATION.-1. In a criminal action for producing the death of a pregnant woman in attempting to perform an abortion upon her, it may be shown that deceased visited defendant's house shortly before her death, and evidence may be given of conversations between the deceased and the witness occurring about the time of such visits; but such evidence shall only be considered as tending to show the intention with which the deceased visited the defendant. 2. The clause in the bill of rights which gives the accused the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" does not exclude the dying declarations of the person whose death is the subject of the charge, in respect to the circumstances of death. Opinion by COLE, J.-State v. Dickinson.

PLEADING - TRUSTS.-1. When the complaint alleges facts showing that defendant holds a certain sum of money in trust for the plaintiff and another person, and that each of said cestuis que trust is entitled to an aliquot part of the amount, and the trust is not denied, it is not necessary to make the other cestui que trust a party. 2. A mother, with minor children, being sick, conveyed land to defendant (who was her mother) in pursuance of an understanding that defendant should take the title in trust for such children; but by mistake the trust was not expressed in the deed, for which no consideration was paid; and afterwards defendant conveyed the land to bona fide purchasers and received the proceeds of sale. Held, that such proceeds in defendant's hands are charged with a trust in favor of the children. Opinion by COLE, J.-Hubbard v. Burrell. PLEADING -ADVERSE POSSESSION EVIDENCE.-1. In an action for damages to real property caused by defendant's breach of contract in the manner of locating and building its road thereon, where the complaint alleges plaintiff's title in fee simple, a general denial puts such title in issue. 2. Actual adverse possession of the premises by plaintiff alone, or with his co-tenant, for more than ten years under claim of title exclusive of any other right, founded upon a deed which purported to convey to such occupant an undivided half of the premises, held sufficient to establish his title to such undivided half. 3. Plaintiff put in evidence a deed from his co-tenant, executed before the commencement of the action, purporting to convey to him an undivided half of certain other premises, with proof that the instrument was intended to convey such cotenant's undivided half of the premises here in question;

and also a deed executed by the same grantor since the commencement of this action, designed to correct the error in his former conveyance, and purporting to convey his undivided half of the premises in dispute. Held, that the latter deed was properly admitted in evidence; that it cures the defect in the former deed, and the plaintiff's rights are the same as though such former deed had been correctly drawn. Opinion by LYON, J.-Hutchinson v. C. N. W. R. R. Co.

FAILURE TO PERFORM AS AGREED-DAMAGES.-1. If one who has contracted to perform a certain work fails to perform it within the time agreed upon, or, where no specific time is named in the contract, fails to perform it within a reasonable time, the other party may treat the contract as rescinded, and will not become liable on quantum meruit by refusing to permit its further performance. 2. If, within the time for performance (whether a specific or a reasonable time), the party who was bound to perform the work is refused permission to fulfill the contract on his part, he may recover quantum meruit. 3. In an action upon such a contract, where there is evidence from which the jury might find that plaintiff's offer to complete the work was made after the time for performance had expired, it is error to instruct them that, if defendant refused such offer, plaintiff may recover what the work done was reasonably worth. Opinion by LYON, J.-Davis v. Hubbard.

RIGHT OF WAY-DEED-CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE-ADVERSE POSSESSION.-1. Where the owner of several adjacent lots in the conveyance of one of them grants a right of way thereto (not being a way of necessity) over the next adjoining lot, such grant is inoperative as against one to whom he sells and conveys such adjoining lot, unless the latter has actual or constructive notice of the grant. 2. Where the deeds of the two lots are made and delivered on the same day, and are subsequently both recorded on the same day, and there is no such use of the property at the time as would charge a purchaser of either of the lots with notice of the existence of an easement therein, such purchaser takes without constructive notice of the easement so granted. 3. To establish an easement by prescription, it must be shown, not only that it has been enjoyed uninterruptedly the requisite length of time, but that the user was adverse and not permissive. 4. No user of land by a third person, not injurious to the reversion, will create an easement therein as against the owner of the fee, where, during the whole period of such user, the land has been in the possession of a tenant for life or years. Opinion by LYON, J.-Pentland v. Keep.

DOWER-VENDOR'S LIEN.-A vendor's lien for unpaid purchase-money is superior to the widow's right of dower. Opinion by DEADERICK, J.-Boyd v. Martin, p. 382.

LIMITATIONS-NEW PROMISE.-A mere payment upon a debt, without other acknowledgment, is simply an acknowledgment of indebtedness to the extent of such payment, and is no new promise to pay the remainder. Opinion by DEADERICK, J.-Lock v. Wilson, p. 784.

PRACTICE-PLENE ADMINISTRAVIT-BURDEN OF Proof. -In an issue on the plea of plene administravit, the burden of showing assets is upon the plaintiff. Citing 11 Vin. Ab. 349; 2 Phil. Ev. 295; 6 Com. Dig. 311. Opinion by SNEED, J.-Gilpin v. Nooe, p. 192.

BANK-DEPOSIT.-If a teller receives money from a depositor for deposit to his credit, without a deposit-ticket or pass-book, and by mistake credits the money to the wrong person, the bank is liable therefor to the depositor; though such act be contrary to the rules and general custom of the bank. Opinion by MCFARLAND, J.-Jackson Ins. Co. v.

Cross, p. 283.

SUPREME COURT-PRACTICE-FORMER ADJUDICATION.— A former judgment of reversal, in the Supreme Court, is

conclusive of nothing save that the cause was reversed. The opinion then declared as to the law is in no respect binding upon the court upon a subsequent appeal. Opin. ion by FREEMAN, J.-Bynum v. Apperson, p. 632.

BILLS AND NOTES-INDORSER.-A third party who indorses a note before it has been indorsed and transferred by the payee, becomes a second indorser only; the payee is in legal contemplation the first indorser, though, in fact, he did not first write his name on the paper. Opinion by SNEED, J.-Binckley v. Boyd, p. 149.

COMMON CARRIER-INEVITABLE ACCIDENT.-A carrier is not liable for the loss of goods caused by an unprecedented flood, where no warning was received, sufficient to reasonably awaken apprehensions of danger. Citing M. & C. R. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176; Denny v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 13 Gray, 481. Opinion by DEADERICK, J.-Lamont v. N. & C. R. R. Co., p. 58.

STATE ARBITRATION-AWARD.-The state may divest itself of its sovereignty, and meet its citizens on equal terms, in referring matters in dispute to arbitrators; and such arbitration will be governed by the rules of law ap plicable to private parties, and the state will thereby waive her reserved exemption from suits, so far as the award is concerned. Opinion by NICHOLSON, C. J.-State v. Ward, p. 100.

INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH-DAMAGES.-Where a wife sued as administratrix, for damages resulting from the death of her husband, an employee of the defendant, a railroad company, it was erroneous to instruct the jury that they might, in assessing damages, consider the shock to the feelings of the wife." Opinion by NICHOLSON, C. J. -Nashville & Chattanooga R. R. Co. v. Stevens, p. 12.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - GARNISHMENT.-A municipal corporation is not subject to garnishment at the suit of a creditor of one of its employees. Citing Bank v. Dibrell, 3 Sneed, 379; Burnham v. Fordulac, 15 Wis. 193; Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ills. 596; Baltimore v. Root, 8 Md. 102; Hawthorne v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 59. Opinion by SNEED, J.-Memphis v. Laski, p. 511.

TAXATION -ASSESSMENT - PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS.An assessment for the new paving of a street in a city, made alone upon the lots fronting on the streets to be improved, in proportion to their frontage, is unconstitutional and absolutely void. Citing Chicago v. Larred, 34 Ills. 203. Opinion by FREEMAN, J.-Taylor v. Chandler, p. 349.

ATTORNEY-LIEN-PRACTICE.-An attorney has a lien upon real estate recovered for his client, for the payment of his reasonable fees; and the court in the same case may declare such lien, but nothing more, if the client be sui juris; but if the client be under disability, a reference may be had to ascertain the amount of the fee, of proceedings under which the client must have actual notice. Opinion by MCFARLAND, J.-Perkins v. Perkins, p. 95.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-EVIDENCE-DECLARATIONS.In an action upon a bond, against a surety, alleging covenants broken, the declarations of the principal, made after the breach complained of, are inadmissible. Citing 1 Greenl. Ev. § 187; Snell v. McGavock, 1 Swan, 208; Transdale v. Phillips, 2 Swan. 384. Opinion by MCFARLAND, J. -White v. German National Bank, p. 475. Wheeler v. State of Tennessee, p. 393.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-STOCK of Goods.-A trust deed on a stock of goods in trade, reserving to the grantor the right to continue making sales in the usual course of business, and to replenish and increase the stock, etc., is fraudulent in law, and void. Citing Collins v. Myers, 16 Ohio, 547; Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 213; Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 Y. Y. 501; and overruling Hickman v. Perrin, 6 Cold. 135. Opinion by FREEMAM, J.-Tennessee Nat. Bank v. Ebbert, p. 153.

FACTOR-CONVERSION.-A conversion, in the sense of the law of trover, is an appropriation of property to one's own use, or exercising dominion over it in defiance of the owner's right; and the mere selling of goods, obtained from an unauthorized agent, without knowledge of the principal's title, will not render a factor liable as for a conversion. Overruling Taylor v. Pope, 5 Cold. 413. Opinion by FREEMAN, J.-Roach v. Turk, p. 708.

ARBITRATION—AWARD.-Where the terms of a submission to three arbitrators provided as follows: "And thereupon the three shall try the case upon the testimony and argument of counsel; it is further agreed, that the decision

of the above referees shall be final;" it was necessary that all the arbitrators should unite in the award, and the decision of a majority would be invalid. Opinion by DEADERICK, J.-Memphis and Charleston R. R. Co. v. Pillow, p. 248. LIFE INSURANCE EVIDENCE- WARRANTIES.-1. In a suit upon a wife's policy on the life of her husband, the latter's declarations, made after the delivery of the policy, are inadmissible. 2. False answers by the insured to the questions in the application, will not be held to the strictness of warranties, if they relate to matters not material to the risk assumed. Opinion by MCFARLAND, J.-Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Booker, p. 606.

BILLS AND NOTES-INDORSEMENT-FACTOR.-A factor who remits to his principal the latter's money, by a bank draft payable to the order of and indorsed by the factor, receiving no consideration for guarantying the draft, nor undertaking to guaranty it, is not personally responsible on his mere indorsement, nor liable to his principal in case of the failure of the drawer before payment of the draft. Citing Sharp v. Emmet, 5 Whart. 299. Opinion by SNEED, J.-Byers v. Harris, p. 652.

COMMON CARRIER-LIEN-CONSIGNEE.-If a consignee of goods refuse to receive them, or is absent, or after due effort can not be found, the carrier must store them a reasonable time, for and on account of the owner, whose agent he then becomes. The carrier's authority to sell under such circumstances exists, not by virtue of his lien, but by virtue of his trust relation to the owner. Citing Arthur v. Schr. Cassius, 1 Story C. C. 97; Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio, 47; Hunt v. Haskell, 24 Me. 342. Opinion by SNEED, J.-Rankin v. Memphis and Cincinnati Packet Co., p. 574.

NOTES AND BILLS-BANK-AGENCY-NOTICE.-1. If a bank officer receive a promissory note from the maker, no consideration passing, and place the note in the bank in order to make a colorable show of assets, even if such object be known to the maker, he is not liable on the note to the bank. Citing Agricultural Bank v. Robinson, 24 Me. 276; Lime Rock Bank v. Hewitt, 50 Me. 269. Otherwise, if consideration passed. Citing Agricul. Bank v. Burr, 24 Me. 270. 2. The agent's knowledge of want of consideration, when acting for the principal, is notice to the princicipal, however that knowledge may have been acquired. Citing Bank U. S. v. Davis, 2 How. 461; Union Bank v. Campbell, 4 Humph. 396; Fulton B'k v. Canal Co., 4 Paige, 137. Opinion by NICHOLSON, C. J.-Tagg v. Tennessee Nat. Bank, p. 479.

STARE DECISIS-OLD LANDMARKS.-"Wild legislation prevails almost as an epidemic; new treatises, reports, periodicals and law magazines, are produced and thrown upon the country as if by magic; their indiscriminate use by the courts and profession induces the danger which has perhaps in some instances already resulted, of incorpo. rating into and diluting our jurisprudence with the construction of local laws of sister states, which are foreign to our statutes and institutions. Now, more than at any other period, is it important that we adhere to the old landmarks of the law. We may be certain we have done this, when we have relied upon the standard text-books and the old reports. In them is found the rule for every case." Opinion by TURNEY, J.-Jackson Ins. Co. v. Partee, p. 300.

agrees with the assignee to pay the note if an extension of time is allowed him, such agreement is a waiver of all objections or defenses he may have had to the note on the ground of fraud in its execution, and is a ratification of the original contract. Judgment reversed. Opinion by NIBLACK, J.-Doherty et al. v. Bell.

CRIMINAL CONVERSATION-EVIDENCE-ADMISSIONS OF WIFE. In an action to recover damages for alleged criminal intercourse between the defendant and plaintiff's wife, a paper written to the defendant by the wife tending to show the alleged criminal intercourse, but which was not sent to, or ever in the possession of the defendant, the husband taking it from the wife and keeping it, is not admissible as evidence on the trial, though the husband and wife were then divorced. If the statements of a wife were competent evidence against one charged with criminal conversation with her, the husband and wife, by collusion, might make out a case against the most innocent. Judg. ment reversed. Opinion by WORDEN, C. J.-Underwood v. Linton.

LAW OF DESCENT-ADULTERY OF WIFE-MORTGAGE EXECUTED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.-The Indiana statute of descents, (1 R. S. 1876, 413) providing that, "if a wife shall have left her husband and shall be living at the time of his death in adultery, she shall take no part in the estate of her husband," does not disable such wife from inheriting from a child of both parties which has died after the husband, and the wife's conveyance of such an interest would be valid. Where a mortgage was executed to secure a note given for a loan of money, and the money was in fact never loaned by the mortgagee, the latter acquired no property in the mortgage and could transfer none by his assignment. The mortgage came into being as an inoperative instrument and was never in esse. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Goodwin v. Owen et al.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PLEADING-DUTY OF CITY TO ERECT BRIDGES.-Where a city is a party to a suit, it will be presumed that such city is incorporated under the general law for the incorporation of cities, and the law under which the city was incorporated need not be stated in the complaint. Where the power of a city over a bridge within its limits is exclusive, a corresponding duty to keep such bridge in such repair, as the safety and convenience of the public may require, necessarily results therefrom; and where a bridge over a canal within the city's limits is suffered to decay, and the city fails to erect another, the city will be liable to respond in damages to the representatives of one who was drowned in attempting to ford such canal. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by Howk, J.-Lowery, Admr. etc., v. City of Delphi.

GUARDIAN AND WARD-Former RECOVERY.-Where a ward sued her guardian on his bond and recovered a judg. ment for $2,000, the full penalty of the bond, the jury at the same time finding that the guardian had in his hands $2,742 belonging to the ward, such judgment is no bar to a subsequent suit by the guardian to obtain a decree of the court declaring a certain judgment, taken by the guardian in his own name on a note of the ward's, and by him assigned to others with full knowledge of the facts, to be the property of the ward and restraining the assignees from collecting the same, etc. Such suit is for the purpose of restraining the misappropriation of a specific article of property not covered by the judgment on the bond, and for which the bond afforded no security. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Moon et al. v. Martin.

USURIOUS INTEREST-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.— The act of March 9, 1867, (1 R. S. 1876, 599), which provides that six per cent. shall be the legal rate of interest, but that ten per cent. may be legal if agreed upon by the parties, is applicable to pre-existing contracts to the extent of making such contracts for the payment of interest at the rate of ten per cent. legal and valid; and the second section of said act, which provides for the recoupment of usurious interest paid, is so far applicable to pre-existing contracts as to enable the debtor to recoup from his creditor the illegal portion of usurious interest paid, even where the payment was made at a time when the law did not permit the recoupment of the excess paid over legal interest. The law in force at the time the remedy is sought governs as well with respect to the recoupment of usurious interest, as to the recovery of the rate of interest contracted for. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by Howк, J.— Bowen v. Philips, Adm'r., etc.

NEGLIGENCE-JUDGMENT.-1. In an action to recover for injuries to the plaintiff's house from an explosion of gas, ignited therein by his tenant, which the defendants, it was claimed, had negligently allowed to escape from their main, the record of a judgment in favor of the defendants, in an action by the tenant for injury to him by such explosion, is not admissible in bar of the plaintiff's right to recover. Eastman v. Cooper, 15 Pick. 276; Burlew, v. Shannon, 14 Gray, 433; Dutton v. Woodman, 9 Cush. 255; Lowell v. Parker, 10 Met. 309; Merriam v. Whittemore, 5 Gray, 316. 2. In such an action the plaintiff must himself be free from fault, and the negligence of a person to whom he has intrusted the charge and control of the property injured will be imputed to him. Opinion by COLT, J.-Bartlett v. Boston Gaslight Co.

EVIDENCE-REPUTATION.-The distinction between reputation and hearsay evidence is sometimes a difficult practical question, and is not always kept clearly in mind in the introduction of testimony upon a trial. General reputation is a fact. The mere declaration of one or many is hearsay. It does not require a multitude of witnesses to prove the fact that there is a general reputation upon a particular subject. The question is a simple one of fact. Is there a general reputation? Has the subject been so much discussed and considered, that there is in the public mind a uniform and concurrent sentiment which can be stated as a fact? By the public mind, of course, is not meant the mind of the whole public; but that portion of the public, which is cognizant of and interested in the matter of inquiry. Opinion by LORD, J.-Walker v. Moors.

PROMISSORY NOTE-USURY.-In an action upon a promissory note, it appeared that the defendant had agreed to loan one R the sum of $40,000; that a draft was given by defendant to R as a part of that loan; that at the time it was drawn by R and accepted by defendants, the plaintiff agreed to take it of R, and did take it, at a greater rate of discount than seven per cent. per annum, the sum allowed by the law of the state where the contract was made; that upon the loan of $40,000 made to R, the defendant was to receive two per cent. a month; and that the note in suit was made by the defendant, payable to the plaintiff, and given in exchange for the draft. Held, that the transaction was an attempt to evade the law against usury and that the draft and the note were both void. Dunscomb v. Bunker, 2 Metc. 8. Opinion by LORD, J.-Stanton v. Demeritt.

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DIVORCE CONDONATION.-1. Condonation, when lied on as a bar to an application for a divorce, implies some knowledge of the offense committed, and some degree of belief in its existence. When sufficient grounds for the inference are presented in the facts proved in their ordinary effect upon the mind, such knowledge is presumed. Anon., 6 Mass. 147. 2. But forgiveness of one act is not forgiveness of other acts of which the forgiven party had neither knowledge or reasonable ground of belief. Whether the condonation in any given case is to be confined to one or more acts, or is to include all past offenses, is to be decided by the language and conduct of the parties in view of the facts then known or reasonably sus pected by the forgiving party. Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. 733; D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar, 3 Hagg. 787. 3. When the terms of the condonation indicate an intention to forgive, without inquiry, all previous injury, actual knowledge of each distinct offense is not necessary. Keats v. Keats, 1 Swa. &

Tr. 446. Opinion by COLT, J.-Rogers v. Rogers. LEASE-CUSTOM.-In an action brought to recover damages for breach of a written agreement to hire plaintiff's house, evidence that "a universal custom and usage prevailed in the locality in which said house was situated, by force of which a lessor was required to cleanse a leased house before the lessee entered into possession of it," is not admissible in bar of the plaintiff's claim. In such a case, two questions arise: 1. Is this the subject of a cus