specifications and patents. Before the Committee of the House of Commons, in 1851, the principal demand of the advocates of the Act of 1852 was a great reduction of fees. In 1863, the legislation is again asked, not to remedy grievances existing under the old law, but those produced by that reduction of fees which was then so loudly demanded, and which we are now told so multiplies useless and frivolous patents, that it is hardly possible to know what is new.

The rapidity with which the worthlessness of provisional specifications and of patents granted under the new law is ascertained, is shown by the large number, about 1,200 out of the 3,200 petitions provisionally registered each year, on which £5 is paid, but which are not worth £20 more, to enable them to reach the great seal; and by the still larger proportionate number, 550 only out of 2,000 patents, on which £25 has been paid, that pay the duty of £50 at the end of the third year for an additional four years' protection; and by the ridiculously small number, probably not more than 100 annually out of the 2,000 patents granted, upon which the further duty of £100 is paid at the end of the seventh year for another seven years' protection. If this be the result of the working of a law passed specially to encourage the spirit of invention, surely it is a most signal failure. If its object were to protect property in invention, the failure is nearly as great, for only 100 out of every 2,000 patents which have complied with all the conditions of the law and paid the fees, have at the end of seven years any value at all to be protected. Can it be to the interest of the public that 2,000 patentees annually should have the privilege of advertising their so-called inventions, which, by their refusal to pay the £50 stamp duty at the end of the third year, they admit to be almost worthless, and which, were the truth to be stated, had little other object than to be used as an advertising medium, and were never intrinsically worth the £25 paid for the patent? And can true invention be stimulated, when the avenues to progress are choked up by this infinity of petty interests, good to tax, hinder, and harass real invention, but useless for aught else?

It will, however, be replied that the failure of so many patents affords no reason why the few really new discoveries which were made should not receive the protection which the patent laws afford them.

No one desires to deprive property of any description of the protection which the common law affords equally to all, but it is another thing to demand for ideas or plans, the value of which have to be proved, the protection of a close monopoly which circumscribes and impedes the operation of others, and the dangerous tendency of which cannot be better described than in the words of Lord BaconEspecial care must be taken that monopolies, which are the canker of all trading, be not admitted under pretext of public good." It may be and no doubt is true that individual patentees benefit by the existing law; but this does not prove their right to the privileges they enjoy under it, nor does it prove that the vast amount of money

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and time spent in procuring patents, the misdirected industry, the false hopes excited, the spirit of gambling encouraged, is not vastly more injurious to the country in a pecuniary and moral point of view than any individual benefit or so called stimulus to invention which may arise from them is advantageous. Every system of protection may be defended on the same grounds; the principle of protection is to benefit the few at the cost of the many.

To be entitled to the privileges claimed under the principle recognised by the patent law, the onus ought to rest on the inventor to show no prior use, before he could obtain a patent. It is, however, absolutely impossible to ascertain this; and yet patents are constantly granted under which any one having previously used the same machine or process in the ordinary course of his business without having legally published it, though he never attempted to conceal it, must either pay any royalty demanded, or be driven to defend himself at the cost of an action to invalidate the patent. Almost every one who thinks he has made a discovery believes that what is new to him, and which he has not found described in books, must necessarily be new to those whose lives have been devoted under the keenest competition to the profitable pursuit of their trades; they all seem to forget that an idea originating in their minds, most probably from some accidental circumstances, may have occurred to many minds at about the same time, and that the probability that a stranger should be the first to discover a new process or improvemeut is exceedingly small.

Another argument in favour of the patent law is, that but for this protection, inventors as a class would not exist, and that the country would thereby be deprived of advantages of inestimable benefit. It may be replied, that important inventions which have influenced the greatness of our country were made before these laws existed. There was no patent for the invention of paper (A.D. 1200), nor for that of glass (A.D. 1310), nor for gunpowder (A.D. 1450), nor for printing (A.D. 1430), nor oil-painting (A.D. 1297), nor for the mariners' compass (A.D. 1302), nor for many other really new discoveries of world-wide utility. I believe that now, as in times past, the necessities of each period will call forth talent to meet any emergency that may arise; that the spirit of invention requires no artificial stimulus, and that no legislative interference will produce our Watts, Arkwrights, Cromptons, Brunels, Stephensons, or Armstrongs.

If we endeavour to form an opinion of the value of the existing law in the minds of those most likely to benefit by it, we find they are either indifferent to its maintenance or entirely opposed to it. The witnesses examined before the Parliamentary Committee in 1851, were thirty-one in number, seventeen of whom were in favour of the law, eleven against the law, and three undecided in their opinions, but generally supporting the principle of the law; but, of the seventeen witnesses supporting the law,. eight were patent agents and barristers, whose examination was almost exclusively

confined to the best mode of improving the law without any reference to the principle on which it rests. Since 1851, we find the opinion that patent laws are mischievous and delusive has rapidly gained ground, both in England and on the Continent. Brunel, Stephenson, Armstrong here; M. Chevalier and Say in France; and a large number of distinguished men in Germany, are among the advocates for the repeal of these laws; and, even among the witnesses in favour of patents, there are several who acknowledge that invention must go on, and that the inventive power exists and would be exercised independently of the patent laws. In short, patents place inferior minds before the public on an apparent equality with those of a superior order; they give the guarantee of the law to inventions; the seal of the Patent-office is adduced to prove the knowledge and skill of the patentee, who relies on the ignorance of the public of the fact that the possession of a patent is no voucher, either for quality, novelty, or cheapness.

But however strong the arguments against patents-based on those great principles of natural law which maintain entire freedom of thought and action, or their inconsistency with the principles of free trade, or their requiring for their support a system of legislation applied to departments of industry, and to operations of the mind of man, which, for the benefit of the world at large, ought to be entirely unfettered-they are not stronger than those derived from the injurious effects they produce on a large number of persons by diverting them from their ordinary occupations, and stimulating them, by delusive promises of protection and large profits, to become speculators in inventions; or from the false direction they give to industry, inducing it to work in secrecy and to shut itself out from obtaining knowledge from those engaged in similar pursuits, communication with whom would either increase their measure of success, or prevent a useless expenditure of time and money. Το prevent the secret use of inventions was one of the original objects of the patent law, but that it now produces any such effect is very difficult of proof. It would indeed be more easy to show that it encourages secrecy.

Besides these objections to the patent law there are those arising from the unsound principle on which it is based. A monopoly is not the proper reward for invention; it must always be most unequal in its operation. To reward the exercise of inventive power by one, and to restrain the exercise of a similar power by others, appears an anomaly; and besides this, as we have already shown, the beneficial monopoly, when it occurs, is rarely enjoyed by the original and true inventor.

But it is said that the privileges and the protection assumed to be secured to the patentee are the only price the public pay for the disclosures he makes of his discovery. This is an ingenious, but surely a very erroneous view of the operation of the patent laws. If the object were simply to prevent the same thing being done in exactly the same way, as in the case of a reprint of a book or the copy of a

picture, the evil would be limited indeed; but it not only does this, but more, and it is here the injury to the public begins. The operation of the law, encouraging as it does what are called rambling patents, taken out to cover many ideas relating to one subject, places such difficulties in the way of real improvements as to embarrass the engineer or mechanic in carrying on his ordinary work, and obliges forced and unjust pecuniary compromises, that the current progress of works of public utility may not be impeded. The public therefore pays trebly; directly, in the extra price put upon the article produced; indirectly, in the hindrance offered to improvement, and in the expense imposed upon those who, driven on by the necessities of the great undertakings in which they are engaged, invent as they proceed to meet the emergencies of the moment, and then find themselves surrounded by claims for compensation for the use of ideas which have been patented, but which have never been practically applied.

Again, it is one of the evidences of the unsoundness of the principle upon which patents are based, that a complicated system of jurisprudence and of legislative machinery is specially required to maintain it. The supporters of the existing law nearly all advocate the establishment of new tribunals. All their ar guments assume that courts can decide upon the merits of an invention better than the public; that it is a duty of the State to find out and to keep records of what has been already invented for the use and benefit of inventors; and that the aid of the law is required to secure adequate reward to the inventive genius of the country, as though experience had not sufficiently proved that every branch of industry is prosperous in proportion as it is relieved from legislative interference and protection. They also suggest that a court, or council, or board should be established to examine all petitions for protection, with power to grant or to refuse permission to obtain a patent. To one class, the professional inventors, such a system might be satisfactory, but to the only man the country need care for, the true man of genius, the ardent, sanguine, selfreliant inventor, no adverse decision of a court would be satisfactory. He considers himself in advance of his age, and would never consent to be bound by the decision of official judges; indeed, it is notorious that the few really important improvements, speaking nationally, which have been patented, have at first been received by the public with ridicule, and have rarely been thoroughly adopted during the inventor's life. Many of the advocates of these laws appeal to their existence in foreign countries, and to the facility with which foreign patents are obtained, as an argument in their favour; but in Switzerland there is no patent law; the Swiss Federal Council and the Helvetic Corporation find no disadvantage in the freedom of invention. The Swiss compete with the inventive genius of all the world, and considering the smallness of their population they have always been famous for their ingenuity and manipulative skill; they have no want of inventive power either scientific or practical, no

lack of mechanical skill, no want of success in its application, and yet there is no patent law to encourage the one or to protect the other.

Whilst, then, our manufacturers are exposed to the inconveniences, restrictions, and taxation of our patent law, foreigners are taught by the publication and extensive circulation of every specification how to make our newest machines, and to follow our newest processes, and this information is given to them free from our self-imposed royalties and patent law charges, to our injury and to their benefit ; whereas, if our patent law be repealed, and foreign countries retain theirs, this country will have the advantage of knowing all their improvements, whilst they will not have the same facility of learning

ours.

I will only add that, after most careful consideration, I cannot avoid the conclusion that our patent law is based on an erroneous principle; is inadequate to accomplish the end it professes to attain ; and is prejudicial to the country. It fails to reward where reward is due, but rewards where it is not due. It fails in the protection it contracts to give. It induces the circulation all over the world of the best possible descriptions of our most recent improvements and discoveries to the benefit of our rivals. It imposes an arbitary and unfair tax on our industry, which the honest man pays, and the dishonest man evades. It checks rather than stimulates improvements; it encourages litigation. It gives a false and injurious direction to industry, and encourages secrecy and distrust. It oppresses the rich and deludes the poor inventor. It teaches an unsound dependence on the law, instead of encouraging individual inquiry and selfreliance. It is almost the only remnant in our statute book of protection to individual interests, in opposition to those of the public, and of the maintenance in its entirety of the principle of monopoly. And while the advantages which the law professes to give to the public in compensation for these great disadvantages, are, the publication of specifications, protection to property in inventions, and encouragement to the inventive genius of the country-great doubts may reasonably be entertained as to the propriety of the first, and there is no satisfactory evidence to prove that either of the other objects is obtained.

Recent Gold Discoveries. By THOMAS M'COMBIE.

A WIDE spread uneasiness has been recently visible, particularly amongst annuitants, persons having fixed incomes, and even other persons whose interest is at stake, as to the danger of gold becoming deteriorated in value. The same was exhibited about twelve years since, at the time that the great discoveries of gold were made. I then expressed my belief that they were, to a great extent, fallacious. I still remain of the same opinion, and I have no doubt that the