that a treaty was revoked by a war subsequently entered into, even although the treaty had express reference to the conduct of bellige rents during war; and he referred to Vattel and other authorities in support of his views that such treaties were binding, and so he thought it must be in reason. A nation could not make a secure contract with another if it might be annulled with impunity whenever it suited the purposes of any of the parties-it might be the powerful against the weak.

Mr. Anderson said he ventured to think that the only fit or proper time for a convention of nations for ameliorating the laws by which their conduct towards each other might be regulated, was during peace, which was the normal state of nations. A congress of belligerents and neutrals during war, to establish a code of international law, would be simply absurd. Mr. Anderson illustrated his views by referring to what took place in 1856 on the termination of the Crimean war. The great Powers of Europe at that time availed themselves of the opportunity of a return to peace to review the rules of the law of nations during war, and they agreed to a solemn declaration of the following four important propositions:-1. That privateering should be abolished. 2. That free ships should make free goods, except contraband. 3. That neutral goods in enemy's ships should be free, except contraband; and 4. That blockades in order to be lawful must be effective.

The United States of America refused to agree to the first declaration abolishing privateering, unless it were extended so as to secure the entire immunity of private property at sea; which the Powers were not all prepared to adopt. And as it was a condition precedent, that the four propositions should be all accepted in their integrity, the United States are beyond the pale of the four propositions, so far as they depend on the resolutions of the congress, and the United States have been the first great sufferers from their refusal to concur in these declarations. Their merchant ships and commerce have been at the mercy of privateers commissioned by the Confederates, and their direct loss from the destruction of ships and cargoes was to be counted by millions, besides the indirect loss sustained to their carrying trade, which was still greater. They could not even take shelter under the neutral flag of a friend, because, not having the benefit of the second proposition, the Confederate cruisers and privateers were entitled to search neutral ships for their enemy's goods. After stating that the United States Government saw its error in this matter, but too late, and noticing the diplomatic correspondence between the Federal Government and the British Government on the subject, Mr. Anderson proceeded to say that most of the European Powers- namely, France, Russia, Prussia, Holland, and Italy-had expressed their approval of the Federal proposal, that there should be entire immunity of private property from capture at sea; Mr. Anderson ventured to think that the adoption of the American proposal would be for the interest of Great Britain, and in a greater degree,

even, than any other nation in the world, seeing she had so much private property at sea. It had been said that, if there were an immunity to private property from capture at sea, an end would be put to blockades, which might be imposed, not only at garrisoned and fortified places, but at cities and unfortified places, and might be extended to prevent the importation and exportation of goods, or to give any succour to the enemy. This view introduced another question of much difficulty and importance, viz., whether the right of blockade should not be confined to fortified places. Some publicists maintained that blockades had this restriction by the common consuetudinary law of nations. But however this might be, and assuming that, according to the law as it now stands, blockades exclude the ingress and egress of articles of commerce, Mr. Anderson thought it ought not to prevent intercourse between belligerents and neutrals for commercial purposes. It was a legitimate mode of warfare to invest a place of strength with a view to its reduction. or for the purpose of preventing it from receiving supplies of men and material necessary for its defence. This could not be objected to so long as war was recognised as an arbiter of national disputes and destinies. But the blockade of commercial positions along a coast, without any regard to military operations, and with the real design of carrying on a war against the trade of peaceful and friendly Powers, instead of a war against armed men, was a proceeding irreconcilable with sound commercial policy. To watch every bay and creek upon an ocean frontier, in order to seize any vessel with its cargo which should attempt to enter or go out, without any direct effect upon the true objects of war, was a mode of conducting hostilities which would find few advocates if now for the first time proposed for adoption. The injury was inflicted, not only on the enemy, but on neutral and friendly nations; they were sufferers in the common calamity. Why should this be? The maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, was a fundamental rule in the law of nations. A blockade of commerce transgressed this rule. Blockades were originally introduced when naval warfare was essentially different from what it is now. They were considered to be instrumental in bringing the war to a speedy termination, by bringing the enemy to submission; and to accomplish this desirable end, neutrals were content to stand by. They were willing to submit to the lesser evil in order to avoid or terminate the greater calamity-the prolongation of hostilities-and hence it was a maxim in the law of blockades that to be lawful they must be effective-a maxim recognised long before it was declared by the Congress of Paris, although, like many other rules in international law, it had been frequently violated, as in the noted instances of what were called "Paper blockades," the blockades of the Berlin Decree and of the Orders in Council. These latter were justified as retaliatory-a strange delusion. The Berlin Decree, by crippling trade and commerce, inflicted a grievous injury on friendly States, and the Orders in Council in a tenfold degree aggravated the mischief, and this was called "retaliation"!

But now matters are entirely changed. Nimble steamers, as blockade runners, have great opportunities and facilities for evading a blockading squadron, and by affording supplies they sustain a beleagured enemy. The opening of internal communication by road, railway, and canal, affords means of ingress and egress to the country blockaded, independently of the ocean. The blockade was thus deprived of its efficiency, and the blockading force became a permanent obstruction on the ocean, the great highway of the nations, which ought not to be tolerated.

Mr. Anderson thought that if there were an immunity of private property from capture at sea, the right of search of private ships should be limited to a search for articles contraband of war, and these ought to be restricted to warlike instruments distinctly specified, or materials by their nature fit to be used in war. There was an important precedent for this restriction. At the commencement of the Russian war an Order in Council was issued by which contraband was limited to "gunpowder, saltpetre and brimstone, arms and ammunition, marine engines and boilers, and the component parts thereof."

Mr. Anderson, among other illustrations of the right of search, and of its abuses referred to the search of the Trent, and the seizure of the Confederate commissioners. He observed that such

a question as that which arose in the case of the Trent might never again occur, but the result might well be regarded as a triumph of international law. All the powers of Europe, as one man, reprobated the proceeding as an outrage on the rights of neutrals. But the Federal States of America, though they yielded, refused to acquiesce in the principle on which restitution was demanded. Indeed, the Secretary of War went so far as to declare that the commissioners were surrendered only by way of concession, and he maintained that they were contraband of war, and had been properly seized by Captain Wilkes. It would, therefore, Mr. Anderson thought, be right by a declaratory proposition of the other great powers to remove all doubt on so important a subject. After narrating the circumstances as to the seizure by Captain Wilkes, of the Southern commissioners, Mr. Anderson proceeded to say that nothing was clearer in international law, than that an ambassador from a belligerent to a neutral State was not contraband of war. It was the right of the neutral to have ambassadors from both or either of the belligerents; and what rendered the proceedings of Captain Wilkes perfectly preposterous was, that the commissioners, at the time they were seized, were proceeding from one neutral port to another. Supposing Mr. Adams, the Ambassador of the Federal States at the Court of St. James, had been forcibly taken from an English packet, between Calais and Dover, by a Confederate cruiser, what would those States have said if the British Government had not demanded restitution?

How marked was the contrast between this conduct of America and that of Great Britain in the recent misunderstanding with Brazil! In the belief that certain Brazilian officers had offered an

indignity towards officers of the British navy, a demand for satisfaction was made; and not having been complied with, reprisals were resorted to, whether properly or precipitately I forbear to say. Notwithstanding the irritation thereby produced, and which was intensified by another serious dispute, the Emperor of Brazil, to his credit and honour, agreed to refer the question to the arbitration of the King of the Belgians, who gave his award in favour of Brazil. Her most Gracious Majesty took the first opportunity of writing a kind letter to the Emperor, expressing her hope and desire that what had occurred should have no effect in preventing an immediate return to friendly relations; a dignified and magnaminous course which testified to Her Majesty's attached people how strong were her convictions that a respect for the law is the surest foundation of social order and international tranquillity. Mr. Anderson thought that this example was worthy of acceptation in America. Would it not be well, he said, for both parties that their controversy should be disposed of in this spirit, rather than by a war of extermination on the one side, or exhaustion on the other? When nations, indeed, were bent on war, or were embroiled in it, the doctrines of international law had little influence. Reason was dethroned, and the worst passions of the soul usurped its place. But a reaction sometimes suddenly set in. Let us hope, Mr. Anderson concluded, that some lucid interval will be granted to those engaged in the terrible warfare now distracting America; that the time may soon come when the Northern States will awake from the delusion which confounds the bulk and size of a country with the greatness and strength of a nation; when they shall see that they may still be united by the closest and dearest ties with their kinsmen of the South, though constituting separate communities; while harmony could scarcely ever be restored or preserved by a forced union which could now be nothing but subjugation. Instead of struggling for military ascendancy or territorial domination, let both South and North vie with each other and co-operate with the civilised nations of Europe in cultivating the arts of peace, extending the dominion of trade and commerce, diffusing the blessings of education, and generally in ameliorating the condition of the human race. If they do, theirs will be an achievement more brilliant than the conquest of mighty empires-a renown more glorious and more enduring than the trophies and laurels of a thousand victories; for they will spread light, and peace, and joy through the dark places of the earth; they will give freedom to the oppressed of every clime, the Siberian exile, the African slave; and they will hasten the coming of the day when Federal and Confederate, and Muscovite and Pole, and Saxon and Saracen, and all nations shall be joined in the bonds of universal brotherhood.

Mr. NOBLE read a paper suggesting "An International Congress and Tribunal for the prevention of War." After some introductory remarks on the evils connected with war, Mr. Noble proceeded to say that his object was not so much to enlarge on

those evils as to suggest a practical and effective remedy, viz., the substitution of arbitration for war. If, at the conclusion of a war, negotiation, and even arbitration, was found necessary, why not provide an effective means of arbitration to prevent the effusion of blood? The constitution of a tribunal competent to deal with international disputes, whose authority would be maintained by the common consent of all civilized Governments, would be a most important problem, and Governments would act more wisely in solving it than in augmenting their armaments. Were a tribunal provided to which international differences could be referred, the result would be to infuse a spirit of moderation into the councils of nations, and thus to act as a powerful preventive of war. Why, then, not insist upon the constitution for this purpose of a High Court of Nations? Such a court of representatives, deputed by the various civilized Governments, composed of statesmen eminent for their knowledge of international law, for the wisdom and moderation of their counsels, and for the integrity with which they would pursue their functions, would form a tribunal to which any question in dispute might with safety be referred. Constituted by common consent, its decisions would be treated with universal respect, and the entire moral force of Europe would be enlisted in its support. The functions of such a court would be strictly confined to international disputes; and he thought the friends of peace in all countries should urge upon their respective Governments the assembling of a congress, whose task should be the formation of such an international tribunal, and, where necessary, the amendment of international law. The objections Mr. Noble anticipated to the proposal in question were that it was impracticable; that it would be impossible to ensure its efficient working; that nations would be found who would refuse to obey its judgments, and that war would still continue to exist. He briefly combated these objections, and proceeded to say that among the numerous advantages of the proposed scheme not the least would be the fact that, by appealing to a judicial tribunal, nations would be more moderate and just in their demands, the quarrel being removed from the domain of force to that of morals. Another advantage would be found in an arrangement that would certainly flow from the realization of this plan for a mutual reduction of armaments, and nations would cease from the present senseless rivalry, and divert a large proportion of those energies now worse than wasted upon instruments of destruction into peaceful channels.

DISCUSSION.

Mr. STEPHEN CAVE, M.P., said that in the debate in the House of Commons the Session before last, he had taken a part opposed to the views of Mr. Chalmers's paper. The debate was very interesting, and lasted two nights; but it had not been renewed, in consequence, possibly, of Great Britain having become, since the American disruption, a neutral instead of a belligerent Power. His opinions had been strengthened by the events of the American war-seeing, as he did, that the vast destruction of Federal merchant ships by the Confederate cruisers had not the smallest tendency to bring the war to a termination, but exasperated the