17th of April, 1860, and referred the plaintiff to the fifth condition.

The plaintiff refused to accept the title, and brought an action to recover the damages for the non-performance of the

contract.

The question for the opinion of the Court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover. If the Court should be of opinion in the affirmative, judgment was to be entered for the plaintiff for such interest as the master should assess, with the costs; if in the negative, judgment was to be entered for the defendants, with costs.

Joshua Williams (Steele with him), for the plaintiff, was stopped; and

The COURT called upon

Dowdeswell (Raymond with him), for the defendants.-There has been no breach of the conditions of sale. This was a purchase by private contract, so that the purchasers had an opportunity of looking into the deed of 1860 before they purchased the property. It was the intention of the defendants to sell the interest which they had, and nothing more, and this intention is disclosed on the conditions of sale. In Souter v. Drake (1) it was held that unless there be a stipulation to the contrary, there is, in every contract for the sale of an existing lease, an implied undertaking to make out the lessor's title to demise as well as that of the vendor to the lease itself. But there were here no negative words limiting the right to take objections to the title.

[HANNEN, J.-You should have provided that the vendor must be satisfied with the title on the face of the deed of 1860.]

In Spratt v. Jeffrey (2), where leases were sold by the lessor " as he holds the same, and the vendee agreed to accept an assignment without requiring the lessor's title," it was held that the vendee was to purchase without inquiring into the title of the lessor, and could not refuse to complete because of an objection to that title. When the defendants say, "We produce our title under the deed of 1860," they in effect say, "We furnish that title as it appears on the deed of 1860, and nothing more,"

(1) 5 B. & Ad. 992; s. o. 3 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) K.B. 31.

(2) 10 B. & C. 249.

[LUSH, J.-You purport to sell a freehold estate, and your proviso assumes that the last deed shews a freehold title.]

He cited Corrall v. Cattell (3) and Hanks v. Pulling (4).

LUSH, J.-I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. Unfortunately for the defendants they have not, in my opinion, framed the conditions of sale so as to shew what they really meant to convey. The contract is for the sale of a freehold residence, and if there had been no conditions of sale the purchaser would have been entitled to a full written title. The question is, to what extent the conditions qualify this right. Now, the fifth of these conditions is that [the learned Judge read the condition]-so that it is provided that the abstract shall commence with a certain conveyance. It is no doubt intended to restrict the right of inquiry, and not to allow it during any period prior to the date of the conveyance; but this leaves the purchaser still entitled to have a freehold title disclosed on the face of the conveyance. I quite agree that if it had been a question whether this was an error or misstatement which only gave the purchaser a right to compensation, the case might have been different. Well, the deed of 1860, when produced, shews that this property is conveyed in fee, subject to certain covenants and conditions contained in a deed of 1860, without intimating what they are. It therefore clearly does not shew the title to which the plaintiff was entitled under the sale, but a title encumbered with conditions of which no one knows anything. The purchaser is therefore called upon to take property which, for aught he knows, may be subject to a right of way, or liable to receive drainage upon it, or may be subject to covenants restricting the use of the house, and otherwise impeding the enjoyment of the property. Therefore, without trenching on any of the cases cited, we must hold that the limitation in the contract is to prevent the purchaser from taking any objection to the title prior to the deed of 1860, but

(3) 4 Mee. & W. 734; s. c. 8 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 225.

(4) 6 E. & B. 659; s. c. 25 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 375.

that he must have a good title on the face of this deed. If he had referred to some of the cases which have been cited he would have had no difficulty in framing conditions according to his understanding of the contract.

HANNEN, J.—I am of the same opinion. Mr. Dowdeswell very properly said that the question for us to consider is, what is the meaning of the parties, so far as it can be gathered from the fifth condition? . It seems to me that the objection taken by the plaintiff is not avoided by the language of the parties entering into this agreement. The plaintiff is not seeking to investigate the title prior to this abstract, but he proposes to inquire into the title really conveyed by the deed of 1860. It is necessary, in order that he should know whether he has a good title under that deed, that the nature of the deed should be disclosed. But for this purpose the covenants and conditions subject to which the property is conveyed should be forthcoming, otherwise it is impossible to know what contract the parties are making.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Attorneys-Gold & Son, for plaintiff; G. W. Greenwood, for defendant.

....

By 14 & 15 Vict. c. 105. s. 3, if any person, pending or after the election of any guardian, shall wilfully, fraudulently, and with intent to affect the result of such election, . personate any person entitled to vote at such election, he shall be liable on conviction by two Justices to three months' imprisonment :—Held, that the section makes no provision against the offence of personating a voter who is dead at the time of the election, as the offender cannot be convicted of personating any one "entitled to

vote" at the election.

[For the report of the above case, see 38 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. p. 51.]

1868. Nov. 28.

[IN THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.] 1868. Nov. 25. Poor-Rate Metropolitan Board of Works-Sewers-Land and Buildings connected therewith.

THE QUEEN V. THE METRO-
POLITAN BOARD OF WORKS.

The Metropolitan Board of Works are not rateable to the poor-rate or the general district rate in respect of the land occupied by the sewers of the metropolis; but they are rateable in respect of land and buildings which are occupied by them in connexion with the sewers, and which have an occupation value.

[For the report of the above case, see 38 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. p. 24.]

THE NORTH-EASTERN RAILWAY

COMPANY, appellants, v. THE

LOCAL BOARD OF SCAR

BOROUGH, respondents.

-

Public Health Assessment of General District Rates Power of Appointing Special Valuer Local Government Act, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98. ss. 55, 56.-Union Amendment Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 103. 8. 28.

The power given to local boards by the Local Government Act, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98. s. 56, of making a special valuation of property, subject to the general district rates, where the assessment for the poor-rate is in the judgment of the board an unfit criterion for making a general district rate, is not affected by the new provisions respecting valuations of parishes in unions prescribed by the Union Assessment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 103).

[For the report of the above case, see 38 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. p. 65.]

. 1868. THE QUEEN V. THE INHABITNov. 18. f ANTS OF SCULCOATES.

Order of Removal-Suspension-Costs of Maintenance of Widow-Irremovability by Residence-35 Geo. 3. c. 101. s. 2.49 Geo. 3. c. 124. s. 3. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. -28 & 29 Vict. c. 79. s. 8.

On the 19th of November, 1860, an order was made for the removal of J. G. and E. his wife, from the respondent to the appellant parish, but was suspended in consequence of the illness of J. G. He and his wife continued to reside in the respondent parish. He remained ill so as not to be able to be removed till his death, which happened on the 13th of June, 1861, shortly before which event E. also became ill and unable to travel. For twelve months after her husband's death she was irremovable by virtue of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. s. 2; and she remained ill in the respondent parish up to the time of her death, on the 10th of April, 1867. The respondent parish paid for their maintenance from the date of the order of removal, up to the time of their respective deaths, and the appellants repaid to them the amount which they had expended up to the death of J. G-Held, that the respondent parish was entitled to recover from the appellant parish the expenses of relieving E. from the 13th of June, 1862, up to the 25th of March, 1866, when she became irremovable by residence under the 28 & 29 Vict. c. 79. s. 8.

The

take the premises in his occupation. company nevertheless did not take possession at the expiration of the specified period, and the tenant continued his business on the premises for a further space of two years, but at a reduced rate of profits, the company having by virtue of their powers demolished the surrounding neighbourhood. At the end of the two years the tenant received a summons from a metropolitan police Magistrate, under the 8 Vict. c. 18. s. 121, to appear for the purpose of having the amount of compensation due to him assessed. On the hearing of the summons the tenant, in addition to the usual items of compensation, claimed in respect of reduced profits of trade consequent upon the demolition by the company of the surrounding neighbourhood from the time of the expiration of the six months' notice to the date of the hearing of the summons :Held, that he was not so entitled, the claim being one which, in the absence of statutory powers, could not have been made the subject of an action, and the keeping on of the business at a reduced rate of profits, after he might have compelled the company's acceptance of the premises, being his own voluntary act.

[For the report of the above case, see 38 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. p. 49.]

1868. Nov. 28.

}

AMYS, appellant, v. CREED,
respondent.

Nuisances Removal Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 121), s. 12.-Sanitary Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 90.)-Notice to Owner.

Where a nuisance is ascertained by the nuisance authority to exist, it is not necessary before taking proceedings against the owner, under section 21. of the Sanitary Act, 1866, and section 12. of the Nuisances Removal Act, 1855, to serve him with a notice in the form given in the schedule in the latter act, Form (C.).

[For the report of the above case, see 38 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. p. 22.]

By 26 & 27 Vict. c. 117. s. 2, power is given to the inspector of nuisances to inspect at all reasonable times animals, meat, &c. exposed for sale, or deposited in any place for the purpose of sale, or of preparation for sale, and intended for the food of man ; and if it shall appear to the Justices that any of the articles are diseased, unsound or unwholesome, the person "in whose possession or on whose premises the same are found," is liable to a penalty. By section 3, a penalty is imposed on persons preventing the inspector from entering "any slaughter-house, shop, building, market or other place." The appellant was a butcher carrying on busi

ness at his shop in a town, but residing at and occupying a house and some land at the outskirts, and nearly a mile distant from his shop. A quantity of diseased meat, loaded in carts, was carried into the yard belonging to the said shop, and there seized by the police. Within this yard there was a slaughter-house :-Held, first, that the yard was a place within the meaning of section 2; secondly, that assuming that the word "place" was used in the same sense in section 2. as in section 3, the word "place" in section 3. is not to be limited to places ejusdem generis with "slaughter-house, shop, building or market."

[For the report of the above case, see 38 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. p. 67.]

The defendant held a house and premises as tenant of the plaintiff, but without any lease or written agreement. He let part of the house to T, and, having received notice to quit on the 25th of December, 1866, he gave notice to T. to quit on the 21st of December. T. refused to go out; the defendant did all in his power to give up possession. The plaintiff brought an action of ejectment against him and T; judgment was signed on the 21st of May, 1867, and on the 29th of May possession was given by the sheriff to the plaintiff:-Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover rent for one half-year, and also the costs of the ejectment, on the ground that there was an implied contract that the defendant would deliver up the absolute possession of the house and premises at the expiration of the tenancy.

The declaration contained a special count, alleging that the defendant was tenant upon NEW SERIES, 38.-Q.B.

the terms that he should at the determination of the tenancy give up possession to the plaintiff; that the tenancy was duly determined, yet that the defendant did not give up possession, whereby, &c. The defendant pleaded to this count, payment of 40s. into court:

The Court, being of opinion that, under the circumstances of the case, the defendant could not have intended to admit that the plaintiff was entitled to recover more than the sum of 40s., intimated that it would, if necessary, allow such an amendment as would leave the defendant at liberty to deny that there had been a breach of the contract alleged in the count.

The first count of the declaration stated, that the defendant broke and entered a messuage and land of the plaintiff, that is to say, all that messuage being No. 73, Wardour Street, in the parish of St. James, Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, together with the stable, outbuildings and appurtenances thereto belonging, and ejected the plaintiff from his possession thereof and kept him so ejected for a long time, and during that time took and received to the use of the defendant all the issues and profits, and the beneficial use and occupation

L