was held, that the state courts had concurrent cognizance of the indictable offence of opening a letter contrary to the act of congress, and that congress might constitutionally confer such a jurisdiction. On the other hand, it was decided in Missouri, in Mattison v. The State, 3 Missouri Rep. 421, that their courts had no cognizance of the case of counterfeiting the current coin, and that a statute of the state, providing for the cognizance and punishment of such crimes, was void. The doctrine was, that the states had no concurrent legislation on the subject, and that the power resided exclusively in congress. So, the constitution of the United States (art. 4, sec. 2,) having declared that persons held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, and escaping into another, should be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor might be due; the laws of New York, in furtherance of this duty, have provided for the arrest of such fugitives, on habeas corpus, founded on due proof, and for a certificate in favor of the right of the claimant, and delivery of the fugitive to him to be removed. But the fugitive is entitled to his writ of homine replegiando, notwithstanding the habeas corpus and certificate. N. Y. Revised Statutes, vol. ii. p. 560, sec. 6-20. See volume 2d, p. 32, on this point, and see, in American Jurist for April, 1837, vol. xvii. pp. 96-113, the substance of the report of the committee on the judiciary in the legislature of Massachusetts, respecting the validity of the act of congress of February 12th, 1793, providing for the seizure and surrender of fugitive slaves. It urges the right and duty of providing, by the writ of habeas corpus or of replevin, for the trial by jury of the question whether the person seized be a freeman or a slave. The act of congress authorizes the owner of the fugitive slave, by himself or his agent, to seize at once the fugitive slave, and carry him before a judge of the United States, or any magistrate of the county, city, or town, in the state where the slave is seized, and upon satisfying the magistrate by proof that the person seized is such fugitive slave, he is to give a certificate, which amounts to a warrant to remove the slave. This law is generally found to be insufficient to give the claimant the requisite constitutional protection in his property, or the fugitive due protection of his liberty; and its execution meets with embarrassment in the northern states, and several of them have endeavored, by local statutes, to supply the deficiency. The constitution of the United States, and the act of congress, evidently contemplated summary ministerial proceedings, and not the ordinary course of judicial investigation. Story's Com. on the Constitution of the United States, vol. iii. 677. Wright v. Deacon, 5 S. & Rawle, 62. In the last case it was held, that the writ of homine replegiando did not lie to try the right of the fugitive to freedom, though on the return of the fugitive to the state from which he fled, his right to freedom might be tried. See further, infra, vol. ii. 32, notes, c. d. Ibid. 257, note 6. It seems to be an unsettled question whether statute provisions relative to the surrender of fugitives from labor, in obedience to the constitution of the United States, be of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States, or may be aided by auxiliary statute provisions in the states. But the case of Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters's R. 539, may be considered as settling the question in favor of the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. See infra, vol. ii. 32, 248.1 It was there declared, that the national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the contrary, was bound, through its proper department, legisla

1 Thornton's case, 11 Ill. 332. In the matter of Kirk, 1 Parker, C. R. 67. In the matter of Perkins, 2 Cal. 424, an act which gave remedies in the state courts to the claimants of fugitives was held to be not unconstitutional, but a competent legislative act under the police power of the state. It is held in the Supreme Court that a state enactment imposing a penalty on any one who should harbor or secrete a fugitive slave did not conflict with the law of the United States. Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. U. S. 13. McLean, J., dissenting.

tive, executive, or judiciary, as the case might require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the constitution. Any legislation by congress, in a case within its jurisdiction, supersedes all state legislation, and impliedly prohibits it. See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheaton, 21, 22. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton, 122, 193, S. P.1

1 The act of 1793, providing for the reclamation of fugitives from justice and from service, has, so far as it relates to the latter, been amended, and to a considerable extent, superseded by the act of Sept. 18, 1850. The act of 1850, has repealed, so far as concerns the penalty, the fourth section of the act of 1793. Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. U. S. 429. The judicial duties imposed by this act, are to be performed by any United States commissioners who may have the power of arresting or imprisoning for offences against the United States; (United States v. Stowell, 2 Curtis, C. C. 153,) by the judges of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, and of the Superior Courts of territories, and by such special commissioners as the respective courts may appoint.

It is made the duty of all U. S. Marshals to obey and execute all warrants and process of such judges and commissioners: and, after the arrest of any fugitives, such officers are liable for an escape with or without their assent. The commissioners are authorized to appoint suitable persons to execute process and warrants.

When any fugitive has escaped, or shall escape into another state or territory, the owner, or his duly authorized agent, may pursue and personally arrest said fugitive, or may demand a warrant and arrest from the officer having due authority; when the fugitive must be taken before a commissioner or judge, whose duty it is to hear and determine the complaint in a summary manner. And upon satisfactory proof to be taken before him, or by other satisfactory testimony taken in the state from which the fugitive fled, and also affidavits of the identity of the fugitive, and that he owes service to the claimant, and that he escaped, it is the duty of such judge or commissioner to deliver to the claimant a certificate of the proceeding had, with authority to remove the fugitive to the place from which he fled. The testimony of the fugitive is not admissible. Any assistance rendered to a fugitive to enable him to escape from the claimant, or any obstruction offered to his arrest, is made penal, and also subjects the party to damages at the suit of the owner. Weimer v. Sloane, 6 McLean, 259.

All citizens are required, when called upon, to render the officer personal assistance when they may be resisted in the performance of their duties. No authority, in the execution of this act, is conferred upon any person but the officers of the United States, and persons authorized by them. See Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. U. S. 13. Graves v. the State, 1 Smith, (Ind.) R. 258. Held, in this case, that the state has no authority to prescribe the mode in which the claimant shall proceed to arrest the fugitive.

The acts of 1793 and of 1850, are examined in Sims's case, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 285. In Miller v. McQuerry, 5 McLean, 469. And in a charge to the grand jury by Mr. Justice Nelson in the Circuit Court for the southern district of New York, 1 Blatchf. C. C. 635.

LECTURE XIX.

OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE POWERS OF THE SEVERAL STATES.

WE proceed to consider the extent and effect of certain constitutional restrictions on the authority of the separate states. As the constitution of the United States was ordained and established by the people of the United States, for their own government as a nation, and not for the government of the individual states, the powers conferred, and the limitations on power contained in that instrument, are applicable to the government of the United States, and the limitations do not apply to the state governments unless expressed in terms. Thus, for instance, the provision in the constitution, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, was intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and does not apply to the state governments. (a) The people of the respective states are left to create such restrictions on the exercise of the power of their particular governments as they may think proper; and restrictions by the constitution of the United States, on the exercise of power by the individual states, in cases not consistent with the objects and policy of the powers vested in the Union, are expressly enumerated.'

"No state," says the constitution, (b) "shall enter into any

(a) Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Peters's U. S. Rep. 243. See, also, in the matter of Smith, 10 Wendell, 449.

(b) Art. 1, sec. 10.

1 Although no state can be permitted to establish a permanent military government, yet a state may use its military power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. U. S. 1. The interests involved in this case are of unusual importance, extending to the fundamental principles of the government, and they received a thorough and profound discussion.

treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility. No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, nor lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

Most of these prohibitions would seem to speak for themselves, and not to stand in need of exposition. I shall confine myself to those cases in which the interpretation and extent of some of these restrictions have been made the subject of judicial investigation.

(1.) Bills of credit.

Bills of credit.

Bills of credit, within the purview of the constitution of the United States, prohibiting the emission of them, are declared to mean promissory notes, or bills *408 issued by a state government, exclusively on the credit of the state, and intended to circulate through the community for its ordinary purposes as money redeemable at a future day, and for the payment of which the faith of the state is pledged.(a)

(a) Craig v. The State of Missouri, 4 Peters's U. S. Rep. 410. In the case of Briscoe v. The Bank of Kentucky, 11 Peters, 257, the question what were bills of credit of which the omission was prohibited to the states, was extensively discussed. They were defined to be paper issued by the authority of a state on the faith of the state, and designed to circulate as money; and under this definition it was adjudged, that a bank of the state of Kentucky, established in the name and on behalf of the state, under the direction of a president and twelve directors chosen by the legislature, and the bank exclusively the property of the state, and with a capital of two millions, and with authority to issue notes payable to bearer on demand, and receive deposits and make loans; and the notes of which bank, by a subsequent act, were to be received on executions by plaintiff, and if refused, further proceedings to be delayed on the judgment for two years, was not within the prohibition of the constitution of the United States against the emission of bills of credit. Mr. Justice Story dissented from this decision, and said that the late Chief Justice Marshall was of opinion with him, when the same case was before the court, and argued at a preceding term; and he further said, that he would not distinguish the case in principle from that of Craig v. The State of Missouri. It appears to me, with great submission to the Supreme Court,

The prohibition does not therefore apply to the notes of a state bank, drawn on the credit of a particular fund set apart for the purpose. (a) Through all our colonial history, paper money was much in use; and from the era of our independence down to the date of the constitution, bills of credit, issued under the authority of the confederation congress, or of the individual states, and intended for circulation from hand to hand, were universally denominated paper money; and it was to bar the governmental issues of such a delusive and pernicious substitute for cash, that the constitutional prohibition was introduced. The issuing of such bills, by the State of Missouri, under the denomination of certificates, was adjudged to be unconstitutional, though they were not made generally a legal tender, but they were, nevertheless, made receivable in payment of taxes, and by all civil and military officers in discharge of salaries and fees of office. Instruments, however, issued by or on behalf of a state, binding it to pay money at a future day, for services actually received, or for money borrowed for present use, were

that this decision essentially overrules the case of Craig, and greatly impairs the force and value of the constitutional prohibition. In the case of Linn v. State Bank of Illinois, 1 Scammon's R. 87, decided by the Supreme Court of that state in 1833, it appeared that the State Bank of Illinois was owned by the state, and authorized to issue notes or bills in small sums from twenty dollars to one dollar, drawing interest, and receivable in payment of debts due to the state; and that the legislature were pledged to redeem the bills, and creditors were stayed from collecting their debts for three years, unless they would receive the bills in payment. The court held, that the analogy was so striking between that institution and the Missouri loan office, as to render the decision in Craig v. The State of Missouri in point, and binding on the states; and, consequently, it was adjudged that the act establishing the State Bank of Illinois was unconstitutional, and its notes void. And in the case of McFarland v. The State Bank, 4 Arkansas R. 44, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held itself bound and concluded by the decision in Briscoe v. The Bank of Kentucky, though it was admitted to be inconsistent with the doctrine and decision in the prior case of Craig v. The State of Missouri. The court evidently regretted that the case of Craig had been overruled, as it contained the sound and true constitutional doctrine. The Bank of Arkansas stood on the same ground, and had the same essential qualities, and its notes were bills of credit within the decision of Craig, and not bills of credit within the decision of Briscoe, and the latter decision they held themselves bound to obey.1

(a) Billis ads. The State, 2 M'Cord's Rep. 12.

The principle of Briscoe v. The Bank of Kentucky was reaffirmed in Darrington v. Bank of Alabama, 13 How. U. S. 12.