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kuow that Smith was connected with any bank or case before us, and they involved exactly the same money institution."
point. It was held in each of those cases, after an The case under another aspect was before us on a elaborate examination of the subject, that the deformer occasion. Merchants’ Bank v. The State Bank, frauded bank was entitled to recover. 10 Wall. 604. We there held, after the most careful But surely it ought to require neither argument nor consideration, that the legal title to the certificates authority to support the proposition that where the was, by the purchases made by its cashier, vested in money or property of an innocent person has gone into the State Bank. We find no reason to change this the coffers of the nation by means of a fraud to which view. The finding of the court shows clearly that its agent was a party, such money or property cannot Hartwell knew when he received the certificates that be held by the United States against the claim of the they did not belong to Mellen, Ward & Co., and that wronged or injured party. they did belong to the plaintiff, and that Smith repre- The agent was agent for no such purpose. His dosented the plaintiff as its agent. Hartwell was privy | ings were vitiated by the underlying dishonesty and to the entire fraud from the beginning to the end, and could confer no rights upon his principal. was a participant in its consummation.
The appellee recovered below the amount claimed. It is not denied that Smith acted in entire good A different result here would be a reproach to our faith. What he did was honestly done, and it was ac- jurisprudence. cording to the settled and usual course of business. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed. Hartwell was the agent of the United States. He was appointed by them and acted for them. He did, so far as Smith knew, only what it was his duty to do,
LIMIT OF AUTHORITY OF BANK CASHIER and what he did constantly for others, and it is not
AS TO CERTIFYING CHECKS. denied that it was according to the law of the land. 12 Stat. 711. Smith no more suspected fraud, and
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, NOVEMhad no more reason to suspect it, than any other of the
BER 19, 1877. countless parties who dealt with the sub-treasury in like manner.
DORSEY V. ABRAMS. There could hardly be a stronger equity than that in
Where a check on its face shows that it was not drawn in favor of the plaintiff. It remains to consider the law the usual course of business, and is not a commercial of the case.
check, the cashier of the bank on which it is drawn has
no power to bind the bank by certifying the check as The interposition of equity is not necessary where a good. trust fund is perverted. The cestui que trust can follow
Accordingly, where a check payable to bearer had Indorsed
upon it the words “ To hold as collateral for 1,000 P.T. it at law as far as it can be traced. May v. Leclere, 11 oil,” etc., held, that an indorsement by the cashier that Wall. 217; Taylor v. Plummer, 3 Maul. & Sel. 562.
it was good when properly indorsed would not bind
the bank. Where a draft was remitted by a collecting agent to
CTION by plaintiff against defendants, who did a sub-agent for collection, and the proceeds were ap
business under the name of “The Citizens' Sayplied by the sub-agent in payment of the indebtedness
ings Bank of East Brady, Pa.," on the following check; of the agent to himself, in ignorance of the rights of
“ EAST BRADY, Pa., Dec. 30, 1875. the principal, this court held that, there being no new
Citizens' Savings Bauk of East Brady, Pa. advance made and no new credit given by the sub
Pay to P. Dorsey, or order, two thousand dollars. agent, the principal was entitled to recover against
A, W. MCCOLLOUGH.
To hold as collateral for him. Wilson & Co. v. Smith, 3 How. 763; see, also, 1,000 P. T, oil pipage paid Bank of the Metropolis v. The New England Bank, 6
to Jan. 4, 1876. How. 212.
Certified on the face, “Good when properly indorsed."
J. Y. FOSTER, Cashier. A party who, without right and with guilty knowledge, obtains money of the United States from a dis- The Court of Common Pleas of Clarion county, bursing officer, becomes indebted to the United States, where the case was tried, charged upon the material and they may recover the amount. An action will lie points in substance as follows: The certification of a whenever the defendant has received money which is check written out would contain a statement that the the property of the plaintiff, and which the defendant drawer had funds sufficient to meet it in the bank, is obliged by natural justice and equity to refund. applicable to its payment, and an agreement on behalf The form of the indebtedness or the mode in which it of the bauk that these funds should be retained and was incurred is immaterial. Bayne et al. v. The United paid upon the check whenever it was presented. The States, 3 Otto, 643.
cashier has a right, by virtue of his office, to make this The United States must use due diligence to charge certificate when the drawer has funds. Cook v. State the indorsers of a bill of exchange, and they are liable Bank, 52 N. Y. 96. Even if the drawer had no funds we to damages if they allow one which they have accepted apprehend that the certificate of the cashier would hold to go to protest. U. S. v. Barker, 12 Wheat. 560; Bank the bank when the transaction was within the range U.S. v. The United States, How. 711; United States of its legitimate business, but the acts of the cashier, v. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet. 378.
or other officer of the bank, only bind the stockholders In these cases and many others that might be cited, when such acts are within the regular and just sphere the rules of law applicable to individuals were applied of banking transactions. Lloyd v. West Branch Bank, to the United States. Here the basis of the liability 3 Harris, 172. We do not think this transaction within insisted upon is an implied contract by which they such sphere. The certificate of the cashier upon the might well become bound in virtue of their corporate paper upon which suit has been brought would not, character. Their sovereignty is in no wise involved. therefore, bind the stockholders, without proof that
The cases of The Atlantic Bank v. The Merchants' they authorized him to make such certificate, or withBank, 10 Gray, 532, and Skinner v. The Merchants' out proof of such usage and practice on the part of the Bank, 4 Allen, 290, are in their facts strikingly like th cashier as would justify third persons in believing
poses of the case. We may say, however, in regard to the fifth assignment, that the point referred to was not based upon any evidence in the case. There was no error,
therefore, in declining to answer it. Judgment affirmed.
COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
BOUNDARIES. When fixed monuments do not govern courses in deed. -The rule that in deeds of land, courses, distances and quantities must yield to natural or artificial monuments is not an inflexible one. It applies with less force to monuments which are artificial than to natural, permanent monuments, and when there is any thing in the description which shows that the courses and distances are right in themselves they will prevail, because the primary object in all cases is to carry out the intention of the parties. Accordingly, when it is apparent from the face of the deed that the intention was to convey a specific quantity of land, if the courses and distances given would include such quantity, and the description by monuments embraces more or less, the former should be followed. Judgment below affirmed. Higginbotham v. Stoddard, appellant. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided January 15, 1878. Reported below, 9 Hun, 1,]
that such usage was authorized. The judgment was for the defendants and plaintiff took a writ of error.
Paxson, J. This was a suit brought against the defendants, an unincorporated banking association, to recover the amount of a check held by the plaintiffs, a copy of which is here given ut supra.
The J. Y. Foster who certified the check is the cashier of the defendants' bank. It was alleged upon the trial, and there is evidence tending to prove, that the certificate of Mr. Foster was a forgery. Mr. Foster has recognized it and confirmed it by his subsequent acts and declarations,
We do not regard the question of the alleged forgery as an important element in the discussion of this case. It was conceded that at the time McCollough drew the check upon the bank he had no funds there, and no right to draw. It is also apparent that the check was entirely out of the usual course of banking business. This is plain from the face of the instrument. Instead of being a mere order upon a bank to pay a certain sum of money to a person therein designated, or to bearer, it has the significant indorsement in one corner, " to hold as collateral for 1,000 P. T. oil," etc. This indicates plainly that the check was given merely as collateral security for the delivery of the oil. If any doubt could exist upon this point, it is put at rest by the testimony of Dorsey, the plaintiff, himself. He says: “The first check was given for borrowed oil; if the oil was not returned, the check was to be paid; that check was carried for thirty days; supposed it was all right and not forged. The second check was taken when oil was advancing, and I would not extend the check without he would give me a check which would secure me for the return of the oil." If the certificate of Foster that the check was good when properly indorsed " is to bind the bank, then the cashier has made the bank security for the delivery of 1,000 barrels of oil. This he could not do without authority. It is an act entirely outside of any of the ordinary recognized duties of the cashier of a bank. There is not a word in the evidence to show that the defendants, or any of them, knew of this transaction, much less sanctioned it. An attempt was made to show a similar course of dealing by the bank as to prior transactions; that is to say, to certify checks drawu without funds, to be held as collateral for oil. It was not successful, however. The checks certified were what the witnesses call “straight checks," by which we understand commercial checks for the payment of money, free from clog or condition. As to such checks, it is not outside the line of a cashier's duties to certify them when requested, if the drawer has funds in the bank. It has been decided that he has a right to make such a certificate by virtue of his office. Cook v. State Bank, 52 N.Y. 96. The effect of such a certificate we need not discuss, as the question is not before us. Nor need we consider at length the proposition that the plaintiff was a bona fide holder for value. The face of the check was notice that it was not drawn in the usual course of business; that it was not a commercial check. The plaintiff's owu testimony shows, as we have seen, that he was only to hold it as a security for the oil. He had no right to draw the money upon the check until default in the delivery of the oil. There was ample to put him upou inquiry as to the authority of the cashier.
We are of the opinion that the learned judge of the court below was entirely accurate in his rulings embraced in the first assigament. This practically dis
COMMON CARRIER. Stipulations in bill of lading exempting carrier from liability: when shipper bound by.-A carrier received goods for shipment. Afterward, on the same day, the carrier sent to the shipper a bill of lading, wherein it was provided that the carrier should be exempt from liability for loss from fire. The shipper procured insurance from plaintiff, and the goods were thereafter, while being transported, burned, without negligence on the part of the carrier. Plaintiff, having paid the loss, brought action against the carrier. Held, that plaintiff had only the rights of the shipper as to holding the carrier liable; that if the goods had not left the place of shipment at the time the bill of lading was received by the shipper, he would be bound by the condition exempting from liability for loss by fire, and it was for plaintiff to show that they had then left to relieve him from such condition. Order below affirmed. Germania Fire Ins. Co., appellant, v. Memphis. & Charleston R. R. Co. Opinion by Rapallo, J. [Decided January 15, 1878. Reported below, 7 Hun, 233.]
CORPORATION. When knowledge of officer is knowledge of corporation: president of bank.-G. was president of a bank and controlled its business, and was also executor, having in trust an estate. He was largely indebted to the bank, which was on that account in an embarrassed condition, and G. was also embarrassed financially and unable to pay what he was owing. Nearly $17,000 belonging to the estate was on deposit in the bank. G. sold to the estate stock in the bank belonging to him for $17,000, and in payment thereof drew his check as executor against the fund on deposit. This amount he deposited to bis own individual account in the bank. Held, that in the transaction the knowledge of G. acquired as executor and as an individual was imputable to the bank when it received on deposit the moneys paid by G., as executor, for the stock, and the stock being an improper investment of trust funds, the bank was liable to the cestui que trust for the profit it made out of the transaction, which was
the amount of moneys received by it from the funds parian owners. Held, that the riparian owners only of the estate and credited to the individual account of could set up this objection of unconstitutionality. Ib. G. Judgment affirmed. Holden v. New York & Erie 3. Public right to float logs on small streams.- The Bank, appellant. Opinion by Folger, J. Church, C. law of this State recognizes the right of the public J., Miller and Earl, JJ., concur.
to use such streams through private property for raft[Decided January 29, 1878.]
ing and floating logs as far as necessary for public ac
commodation. Ib, INDORSEMENT.
[Decided January 29, 1878.] Accommodation indorser of note secured by mortgage : holder not bound to look first to mortgage. – Defendant
PLEADING. was accommodation indorser upon notes discounted
Complaint not stating facts sufficient to constitute by a bank, and to secure which the bank bad taken a
cause of action: action against receiver. - A complaint mortgage from the maker. Held, that the bank was
alleged that plaintiff was “entitled to the possession not bound to first exhaust its remedy on the mortgage,
of, and the rents, issues and profits” of certain land but might bring its action against defendant in the
described; that in an action in the Supreme Court befirst instance, nor did it alter the case that the notes
tween the defendants, except one Cameron, Cameron were given to pay up an antecedent indebtedness, and
was appointed receiver of the rents and profits of the that defendant was known to the bank to be an accom
land, and a large sum of such rents, etc., had come into modation indorser. Judgment below affirmed. First
his hand; that plaintiff had demanded the same and National Bank of Buffalo v. Wood. Opinion by Mil
payment had been refused by Cameron, and asked reler, J.
lief that Cameron should account for the moneys re[Decided December 11, 1877.]
ceived by him as receiver, and be restrained from payLEASE
ing over the moneys, and be required to pay the same 1. Surrender of, by operation of law: making new
into court. No judgment or relief was asked against lease.- Although since the statute of frauds a parol
any one except the receiver. The complaint did not contract for a new lease of the same premises may
allege any facts showing that the plaintiff was entitled
to the rents and profits, or allege that he ever owned operate as a surrender in law of a term created by a lease in writing and under seal, such new lease must
or possessed the premises. Held, that the allegation be a valid one, and a parol lease for seven years would
that plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the not operate as a surrender. Judgment below affirmed.
land, etc., was a mere allegation of a conclusion of
law, and the complaint did not state facts sufficient to Coe v. Hobby, appellant. Opinion by Allen, J.
constitute a cause of action. Judgment below af2. Reduction of rent not making new lease. — A surrender of an existing lease and the granting of a new
firmed. Sheridan v. Jackson. Opinion by Earl, J.
[Decided January 15, 1878. Reported below, 10 Hun, one cannot be implied from an agreement to reduce the
89.] rent. The new agreement becomes a part of the antecedent one, and the two constitute a lease for the unexpired term. Ib.
NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. (Decided January 15, 1878. Reported below, 7 Hun, 157.]
Agency: agent cannot act for two principals.-The
law will not allow a person to act as agent for two MASTER AND SERVANT.
persons standing in positions antagonistio to each 1. When relation does not exist so as to render liable other, and to demand and receive compensation from for negligence — A number of persons, who had sever- each, without the full consent of both parties freely ally caused to be cut and placed in the Racket river a given. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Feb. 5th, 1877. large number of saw logs for the purpose of being Meyer v. Hanchett. floated down the river to their respective mills during Attorney: lien of.-The lieu of an attorney for the high water of the spring of 1867, made a contract services rendered in obtaining a judgment is not dewith a firm to drive all the logs down the river and feated by the dormancy of the judgment. If the deliver them at the booms of the respective parties. judgment is revived, and the money is made thereon, Other logs belonging to other parties were also floated the lien is still good. Supreme Court of Georgia, Jan., down the river, the other parties taking charge of 1878. Jenkins v. Stephens. driving them. All these logs were intermingled pro- Common carrier: liability for loss by Chicago fire. miscuously in the stream. By the negligence of those -Suit by appellee for goods not delivered. Defense, having charge of driving the logs, a number of them that, without the fault of the carrier, the goods were dammed up against a town bridge and carried it away destroyed in the great Chicago fire of 1871. Held, and destroyed it. Held, that the firm was not the (1) that this fire was not the act of God so as to reagent or servant of the parties owning the logs so as lease common carriers from liabilities as imposed by to make such parties or any of them responsible for its the common law. Supreme Court, Illinois, Jan. 21st, negligence, and such parties employing it were neither 1877. Dispatch Transit Co. v. Thielbar. jointly nor severally responsible for the loss of the Constitutional law: statute as to killing cattle.bridge. Judgment below reversed. Town of Pierpont That part of the statute of June 22, 1867, which gives v. Loveless et al., appellants. Opinion by Rapallo, J. to the owner of live stock “double the value of his
2. Constitutional law: who cannot raise question of con- property injured, killed or destroyed” on a railroad stitutionality of act. — By an act of legislature passed track, in case the same is not paid within thirty days in 1850 the Racket river was declared a public high
after demand therefor is made upon the company, is way for the purpose of floating logs. It was claimed unconstitutional and void. Supreme Court, Nebraska, by plaintiff that this act gave defendants no right to Oct., 1877. Atchison & Neb. R. R. Co. v. Baty. put these logs in the river, as the act was unconstitu- Constitutional law: impairing obligation of contional io not providing for compensation to the ri- tracts.-A State law which increases homestead exemptions, so far as it applies to debts previously con- Court of Justice, Dec. 21, 1877, Q. B. Div. Hall v. tracted, impairs the obligation of contracts, and is Mayor of Batley (37 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 710). unconstitutional and void. Supreme Court of Ala- Sale of personal property: insolvency of vendee: venbama, December, 1877. Wilson v. Brown.
dor's lien: warehousemen: actual delivery.-- Goods Eminent domain: erection of telegraph on line of remained in the possession of the appellants as unpaid railroad.-A railroad company may, for its own use, vendors, but the purchaser paid rent for them to the in operating its road, construct a telegraph line over appellants as warehousemen, and the goods were and along its right of way, and in so doing, cut down, transferred into the name of the purchaser in the if necessary, trees standing upon its right of way, appellants' books. Held (reversing the judgment of without subjecting itself to any additional claim of the court below), that, as no actual delivery had been the original land-owner for compensation. If such made, the vendor's lien revived upon the insolvency line of telegraph is built by the railroad company and of the purchaser, as against his assignees. English another party at their joint expense and for their joint Privy Council, Dec. 6, 1877. Grice v. Richardson (37 use, the latter is only responsible to the land-owner L. T. Rep. [N. S.) 677). for the damages caused by the additional burden, if any there be, cast upon the easement by its use of the telegraph line. Supreme Court, Kansas, Jan., 1877. West
RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS. ern Union Telegraph Co. v. Rich.
COMPOSITION. Estoppel: when unconstitutionality of law cannot be
Examination of bankrupt.- At the second meeting set up.-The plaintiff is a property owner on Ellsworth and petitioned councils for the improvement alleged bankrupt touching the question of best inter
in composition, an opposing creditor may examine the avenue, of said avenue in accordance with the Penn avenue
est of the creditors ; and the alleged bankrupt may be Act, was elected a commissioner, and as such gave his
directed to produce his books and papers to be used on time and energies to the work of making said improve
such examination. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. ment. When assessments were laid on the abutting
In re Ash, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 19. property for the payment of the cost of improvement, he refused to pay his assessment per foot front, alleg
CONTRACT. ing that it was exorbitant and unconstitutional; and 1. With third party in consideration of forbearance of contended for general taxation as the legal mode of bankruptcy proceedings.— The Bankrupt Act does not paying the cost. The city brought suit for the amount forbid the creditor of an insolvent debtor to take a of his assessment and the court below gave judgment contract or covenant from any third party, in considagainst him, holding that his own acts estopped him
eration of forbearance to institute proceedings in from alleging the unconstitutionality of the act under bankruptcy against such debtor; such a transaction is which the improvement was made. On appeal to this
not a violation of the act or of public policy. But if court the judgment of the court below was affirmed.
such creditor has received a transfer of property from Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Jan. 7th, 1878. Bid
the debtor, having, at the time, knowledge or reasonwell v. City of Pittsburgh.
able cause to believe the debtor to be then insolveut, Maritime law: neglect of vessel to display light.-Before
the contract is without consideration, and there can be a conviction can be had for a violation of the follow
no recovery upon it. Ct. of Appeals, Maryland. ing section ($ 4233, rule 10), “All vessels, whether
Ecker v. McAllister, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 42. steam vessels or sail vessels, when at anchor in road
2. Creditor receiving preference may not institute prosteads or fairways, shall, between sunset and sunrise,
ceedings.- No creditor who has received a preference, exhibit where it can best be seen, but at a height not
having, at the time, reasonable cause to believe his exceeding twenty feet above the hull, a white ligbt in
debtor insolvent, is authorized to institute proceedings a globular lantern of eight inches in diameter, and so
in bankruptcy. The debtor cannot be admitted as a constructed as to show a clear, uniform, and unbroken
witness to testify as to his intent in making the translight, visible all around the horizon, and at a distance
fer. Where the probable consequence of the act is to of at least one mile,” it must be made to appear that give a preference, he will be conclusively presumed to before the time of filing the libel the vessel had been seized by the collector of customs. Should the light
have intended to give such preference. Ib. be extinguished, from some unusual and unexpected
DISCHARGE. cause, for a short time, not from want of proper care When it will not be set aside.- Where the specificaou the part of the owners of the vessel, it would not tions filed in opposition to a discharge have been overrender such owners liable to prosecution. U. S. Dis- looked and a discharge granted, such error or irregutrict Court, E. D. Texas, December, 1877. In re Eclipse. larity is one which is the subject of review by the
Municipal corporation : liability of, for negligence in Circuit Court. Where proceedings for a review are executing work for owner of property.- By section 23 of
not taken within the time prescribed by the rules of the Public Health Act, in the case of a house being the Circuit Court, and the bankrupt has in the meaninsufficiently drained, the local authority “shall by time acted upon his discharge, the discharge will not written notice require" the owner to make a covered
be set aside for the purpose of having a trial on the drain emptying into any sewer which they may use; specifications. Ignorance of the fact that a discharge and, if the notice be not coinplied with, may do the
has been granted is no excuse for a delay in making work required, and recover in a summary manner the application to set it aside. U. S. Dist. Ot., S. D. New expenses incurred by them in so doing from the owner.
York. In re Buchstein, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 1. Held, that, if the owner waive his prima facie right to make the drain himself, and procure it to be made by the servants of the local authority with their consent, When assignee takes property subject to lien of.-In the local authority, in their public capacity, are liable the State of New York, an execution is a lien upon the for the negligence of their servants. English High property of the judgment debtor from the time it is
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
delivered to the sheriff, and an assignee in voluntary which ought to have been done, and decree a settleproceedings takes the property subject to such lien, ment upon the wife of property acquired with her although no levy has been made. Where no levy has separate means. U. S. Dist. Ct., W. D. Virginia. In been made under the execution, the sheriff has no re Campbell, Ex parte Campbell, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 4. right to take and sell the property, but the assignee
INJUNCTION. must sell it separately from other goods, and the execution creditor can then make application to the Bank
To restrain creditors of bankrupt: when granted : comrupt Court for satisfaction of his liep. U. 8. Dist. Ct.,
position.— No injunction to restrain creditors from S. D. New York. In re Paine, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 37.
interfering with or molesting the bankrupt can be granted after the lapse of the full time provided by
the terms of composition. This rule is applicable to a Claim by wife against husband : waiver: jurisdiction : case in which the bankrupt has put in his answer to a wife's separate estate.- An assignee in bankruptcy filed suit in a State court before the composition could be a petition asking a reference to the register, with in- set up as a defense, and has been obliged to apply for structions to take an account of liens binding upon the leave to put in a supplemental answer setting up the bankrupt's real estate, and of their priorities, and to composition and its fulfillment, where he has bad ample summon lien creditors to show cause against a sale of time to apply for and obtain an injunctiou during the the real estate free of incumbrances. Pending that pendency of the composition proceedings. U.S. Dist. petition, in court, in term, and in consequence of it, the Ct., S. D. New York. In re Nebenzahl, 17 Nat. Bankr. bankrupt's wife preferred her petition in court, pray- Reg. 23. ing a settlement out of a certain parcel of the bank
PARTNERSHIP. rupt's real estate. By the same order of court which granted the prayer of the assignee's petition, the wife's
Indorsement of accommodation note in firm name.claim for a settlement was also referred to the register,
Where one member of a firm indorses an accommodawith instructions to take evidence and to make report
tion note in the firm name, for the benefit of a third in regard to it, as well as in regard to liens and their party, without the knowledge or consent of his copartpriorities. Six weeks after this order of reference, to
ner, such note cnnnot be proved against the firm assets. wit: ou the 8th of December, 1877, the assignee and all
U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York. In re Irving, 17 lien creditors, having been summoned before the regis
Nat. Bankr. Reg. 22. ter and been present before him, and being still before
REDEMPTION. him, the register made up his report as to the liens,
When incumbrancer will not acquire title by assignee and as to the wife's claim for a settlement. On the 12th of December, 1877, the register presented his re
redeeming with general funds of estate. — During pen
dency of a bill in equity brought by the assignee for port in court, in term, the assignee and lien creditors
the redemption and sale of the bankrupt's real estate, being present in person, or by counsel; and the assignee
an incumbrancer will not be permitted, by redeeming, then filed exceptions to the report, these exceptions re
to acquire any absolute title to the property to the exlating only to that part of the register's report which
clusion of the assignee or the other incumbrancers. treated of the bankrupt's wife's claim for a settlement.
Where the assiguee has used the general funds of the On this state of facts, it was, on sundry exceptions,
estate to redeem the real estate of the bankrupt from held, (1) that although the wife could not have been
levy, at the request of the subsequent incumbrancers, required to submit her claim to the judgment of the
the amount so paid should be refunded out of the proBankruptcy Court in the summary bankruptcy pro
ceeds of the sale of the premises. U. S. Dist. Ct., ceeding, yet that it was competent for her to waive her
Maine. In re Longfellow, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 27. right to an adjudication on plenary proceedings, and to submit voluntarily to the adjudication of the Bankruptcy Court. Held, (2) that in the summary bank
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. ruptcy proceeding, it was sufficient that the assignee and lien creditors had had opportunity to produce evi
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN, JANUARY AND
FEBRUARY, 1878. * dence and make argument before the register against the wife's claim for a settlement, and to file exceptions
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. to the register's report; and that they had had a day in court to object to the report of the register; and
1. Agreement made contemporaneously with, when
treated as one contract.-Achattel mortgage and a that, therefore, they had no right to insist that the
written agreement to govern the same subject-matter wife, against her wish, should be driven to a plenary
between the parties, executed contemporaneously, proceeding in another court. Held, (3) that clause
must be treated as one contract. Blakeslee v, Rossthird of section 4972, R. S. of U. S., gave full jurisdic
Decided Jan. 3, 1878. Opinion by Ryan, C. J. tion to the Bankruptcy Court over the subject-matter of the wife's “specific claim "to a settlement out of
2. Chattel mortgage void as to creditors.-A chattel the bankrupt's estate; and that her coming voluntarily
mortgage permitting the mortgagor to remain in posinto the Bankruptcy Court, by petition, to assert that
session, and to sell, and apply the proceeds, or any claim, gave the Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction, person
part of them, to his own use, is fraudulent and void ally as to herself, to “ascertain and liquidute " that
in law as against creditors. Ib. claim. Held, (4) that where a wife's separate estate has been changed from one form of investment to 1. Power of courts as to, in this country.-Courts in another by agreement between herself and her husband, this country possess, in actions for divorce, only the and, before the title in the property newly acquired power conferred by statute. (Barker v. Daylon, 28 bad been made to her, the husband becomes bankrupt, the Bankruptcy Court, as a court of equity, in a caso
* From 0. N. Conover, Esq., State Reportur. where its jurisdiction is clear, will treat that as done
pear in 430 Wisconsin Reports.