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main of the United States; over and along any of the military or post-roads of the United States which have been or may hereafter be declared such by act of Congress, and over, under, or across the navigable streams or waters of the United States." There is nothing to indicate an intention of limiting the effect of the words employed, and they are, therefore, to be given their natural and ordinary signification. Read in this way the grant evidently extends to the public domain, the military and post-roads, and the navigable waters of the United States. These are all within the dominion of the National government to the extent of the National powers, and are, therefore, subject to legitimate congressional regulation. No question arises as to the authority of Congress to provide for the appropriation of private property to the uses of the telegraph, for no such attempt has been made. The use of public property alone is granted. If private property is required it must, so far as the present legislation is concerned, be obtained by private arrangement with its owner. No compulsory proceedings are authorized. State sovereignty under the Constitution is not interfered with. Only National privileges are granted.

The State law in question, so far as it confers exclusive rights upon the Pensacola Company, is certainly in conflict with this legislation of Congress. To that extent it is, therefore, inoperative as against a corporation of another State entitled to the privileges of the act of Congress. Such being the case the charter of the Pensacola Company does not exclude the Western Union Company from the occupancy of the rightof-way of the Pensacola and Louisville Railroad Company under the arrangement made for that purpose.

We are aware that in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, this court decided that a State might exclude a corporation of another State from its jurisdiction, and that corporations are not within the clause of the Constitution which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." Art. IV, § 2. That was not, however, the case of a corporation engaged

of a State can enjoin a foreign corporation from pursuing its business. Until the State acts in its sovereign capacity individual citizens cannot complain. The State must determine for itself when the public good requires that its implied assent to the admission shall be withdrawn. Here, so far from withdrawing its assent, the State, by its legislation of 1874, in effect, invited foreign telegraph corporations to come in. Whether that legislation, in the absence of congressional action, would have been sufficient to authorize a foreign corporation to construct and operate a line within the two counties named, we need not decide; but we are clearly of the opinion that, with such action and a right of way secured by private arrangement with the owner of the land, this defendant corporation cannot be excluded by the present complain

ant.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

REPORT OF EX PARTE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS NOT A LIBEL.

ENGLISH HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, COMMON PLEAS DIVISION, JANUARY 30, 1878.

USILL V. HALES.

An ex parte application was made to a police magistrate in open court by certain persons who had been employed by the plaintiff upon a railway, for a summons against the plaintiff under the Masters and Servants Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict., c. 141), on the allegation that he had not paid them their wages, though he had received funds to enable him to do so. The magistrate refused to grant their application, on the ground that the facts as stated by them did not bring the case within his jurisdiction to do so, and afforded no ground for criminal proceedings. The defendants, who were newspaper proprietors, published a fair report of the proceedings before the magistrate, which contained matter defamatory to the plaintiff. Held, that the defendants were protected by the privilege which attaches to all fair and impartial reports of judicial proceedings, and that such privilege was not taken away either by the fact that the magistrate decided that he had no jurisdiction, or that the application was made ex parte.

in inter-state commerce, and enough was said by the ACTION for libel, brought against the proprietors of

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court to show that if it had been, very different questions would have been presented. The language of the opinion is (p. 182): "It is undoubtedly true, as stated by counsel, that the power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce includes as well commerce carried on by corporations as commerce carried on by individuals. *This State of facts forbids the supposition that it was intended in the grant of power to Congress to exclude from its control the commerce of corporations. The language of the grant makes no reference to the instrumentalities by which commerce may be carried ou; it is general, and includes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships, associations, and corporations. * *The defect of the argument lies in the character of their (insurance companies) business. Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce. * * Such contracts (policies of insurance) are not inter-state transactions, though the parties are domiciled in different States." The questions thus suggested need not be considered now, because no prohibitory legislation is relied upon except that which, as has already been seen, is inoperative. Upon principles of comity, the corporations of one State are permitted to do business in another unless it conflicts with the law, or unjustly interferes with the rights of the citizens of the State into which they come. Under such circumstances no citizen

a newspaper (the Daily News) for the publication of certain matter defamatory to the plaintiff.

Two other actions brought by the same plaintiff against the proprietors of the Standard and Morning Advertiser were by agreement argued at the same time.

The defamatory matter complained of was contained in a report of an application to a London police magistrate, which had appeared in the three publications. The application was for a summons under the Masters and Servants Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict., c. 141), to compel the plaintiff to pay certain wages alleged to be due to the applicants, who had been employed by him upon an Irish railway. The applicants stated that the plaintiff, their employer, had himself received payment from the contractor, and complained of his conduct in withholding from them what they had earned. The magistrate, after hearing the facts, refused to grant their application, on the ground that the facts afforded no ground for criminal proceedings.

The action was tried before Lord Coleridge, C. J., at Westminster, and the jury found that the report was a fair and impartial one of what took place. The judge ruled that the report, if fair, was privileged, and the plaintiff obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection.

Sir H. Gifford, Solicitor-General (with him Bremner Yelverton and Arthur Child), showed cause.

Sergt. Ballantine and Short, in support of rule.

Lord COLERIDGE, C. J. I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. This was an action against a newspaper for a bona fide and fair report of a proceeding before a magistrate. Three persons who had been employed by a civil engineer upon an Irish railway, and who had heard that this civil engineer had been paid, whilst they themselves, as they said, had not been paid by their superior officer, the plaintiff in the action, went before a police magistrate in London; and I must take it for the purpose of my judgment that they applied to him for a summons under the Masters and 'Servants Act. That means that, if there had been materials at the hearing upon which the magistrate thought that the case had been made out, he would have had jurisdiction to issue that summons. Supposing that the complainants had, in his opinion, substantiated their complaint, in that event he would have had jurisdiction to issue an order under the Masters and Workmen Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 141. In the result, however, he thought that the facts stated by the complainants showed that there was no ground either for summonses against the complainant, or for an answer under the Masters and Workmen Act; and it turned out, therefore, in the result that, in a certain sense, the application had been made to him with regard to matters in which he had no jurisdiction. But it has long been held, and most properly held, that it is not the result but the nature of the application made to a magistrate which founds his jurisdiction, and that, whenever there is an application, made to a magistrate as to a matter over which he has jurisdiction, he has then jurisdiction for the purpose of ascertaining whether the facts make out the case for the exercise of that jurisdiction. The distinction between the cases where there is an inherent want of jurisdiction on account of the nature of the complaint, and where there is what may be called want of jurisdiction because the facts do not make out the charge, is very well explained in the case of Reg. v. Bolton, 1 Q. B. 66, which is founded on the decision of Brittain v. Kennaird, 1 B. & B. 432, and the judgment of Richardson, J., in that case. Therefore, in this matter I must take it that the magistrate had jurisdiction to enter upon the inquiry. What, therefore, was done during this inquiry upon which the magistrate had jurisdiction to enter can only be described as a judicial proceeding. It was a proceeding before a judge who, so far as the jurisdiction went, had jurisdiction to conduct it. That seems clear both upon principle and upon authority. If so, this is prima facie a privileged publication, because it is found to be a fair and bona fide report of a judicial proceeding, and it is too late now to dispute whether the rule of privilege does or does not extend to the publication of such proceedings. It has been laid down again and again in broad terms that the publication of proceedings in a court of justice are privileged if the report of such proceedings be fair and honest; and the report in this case has been found to be so. An attempt has been made, however, to distinguish this case, and to take it out of the general proposition by bringing it within an undoubted qualification that has been grafted upon the general rule. It is contended that this is what may be called a report of an ex parte or preliminary proceeding. Now, there is no doubt that, in the cases which have been

referred to by the plaintiff's counsel, the term ex parte proceeding has been over and over again used by judges of great eminence: sometimes affirmatively, in saying that an ex parte proceeding is not privileged; and sometimes negatively, for example, in saying "this being a proceeding not ex parte is privileged." I do not doubt, for my own part, that if this argument had been addressed to the court some sixty or seventy years ago, it might have met with a different result from that which it is about to meet with to-day. That the cases cited in support of it have made a certain impression upon our minds it is useless to deny. It seems to me in vain to say that, in the judgment of the great judges referred to, we do not find a rule laid down that an ex parte or preliminary proceeding is not privileged; and upon this ground, good or bad, that it is very hard on an individual to have a matter which was stated against him behind his back, with no means of answering it, reported in the public papers, while his answer is not similarly reported. There are strong observations in the case of Duncan v. Thwaites, ubi supra, which no doubt go far toward establishing that proposition. There is also a dictum of one of the greatest legal authorities reported. Lord Eldon in that case said that every lawyer would be startled by the proposition that a report of an ex parte application was privileged; and undoubtedly there have been few greater lawyers than Lord Eldon. But we are not now living, so to speak, within the shadows of these cases; and it is idle to deny that in cases decided since that time learned judges have come to conclusions which it is not for me to say are inconsistent, but which at least appear to my mind irreconcilable with these earlier decisions. I find some excellent good sense in the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in the case of Wason v. Walters, and there is a passage in it which I should desire to adopt. It is said that whatever disadvantage might attach to a system of unwritten law, it has at least this advantage, that its elasticity enables those who administer it to adapt it to the various conditions of society and to the habits of the age in which we live, so as to avoid the inconsistencies which might otherwise arise. In this way only the law of libel has gradually developed itself into any thing like a settled form, and I entirely concur in the opinion there expressed. It is well known that, in important cases, ex parte proceedings are published day by day, especially in some particular cases of inquiry which would be excluded from privilege according to the rule proposed. It is well known that in the course of inquiries before coroners cases are reported from day to day in the newspapers, and it is unheard of that an action should be brought by persons affected by such reports, if they are bona fide. That seems to introduce this element into the determination of these cases, that there is a certain elasticity in the rules which are to be applied to the question of privilege-development is perhaps the more correct word to employ and courts have from time to time applied, as best they might, that which they think to be the good sense of the rules which exist to cases which have not been positively decided to have come within them. If there had been a case directly in point with the present - a case in which the proceedings had begun and terminated with an ex parte application, and where the jury had found that the report of the proceedings was bona fide honest and fair-if there had been a case similar to this in which the report had been held not to be privi

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leged, I do not hesitate to say, for my own part, that I would gladly have acted upon such a case; for I do not disguise that my own judgment is not at all satisfied with the alleged enormous advantage to the public from these small cases being published from day to day, although they inflict pain upon individuals, nor do I see the extreme good resulting which is supposed to justify them. But it is, of course, the duty of the judge, nevertheless, to declare the law, not in accordance with what he thinks it ought to be, but as it is; and if he finds a rule established and laid down, it is far better that he should accept and apply it judicially and honestly, even if he is not satisfied in his own mind with the application of that rule. Therefore I come to the consideration of this case, feeling that the general tendency of the law has been of late years to hold such publications as this as privileged. I do find one case which to the best of my judgment appears to cover the present one; and that is the case to which much reference has been made-the case of Lewis v. Levy, ubi supra. I do not propose to take up time by reading the whole of this judgment, or any thing like it; but I find that what was held to be entitled to privilege there was this-the publication of a fair and correct report of proceedings taking place in a public court of justice; and it was accepted as a part of the rule that the privilege extended to proceedings taking place publicly before a magistrate, on the preliminary investigation of a criminal charge, terminating in the discharge of the person charged. I am perfectly aware that there may be a distinction -a subtle distinction, a distinction which I will not say is a mere shadowy distinction, but a subtle distinction between the case before us and the case of Lewis v. Levy. But I cannot disguise from myself that the argument by which the Court of Queen's Bench was led in that case, the ratio decidendi upon which the court acted, covered the present case. This is a case, as I have already explained, in which there was a judicial proceeding terminating, not in the discharge of the party charged, but in the refusal of the magistrate to grant a summons against the person charged, on the ground that such a proceeding was not warranted by the facts disclosed. I think, therefore, resting my judgment upon this case, and upon Currie v. Walter, ubi supra, the principles of which it adopts, that these rules must be discharged.

LOPES, J. In this case three men, who believed themselves aggrieved by the conduct of the plaintiff in respect of the payment of their wages, applied to a magistrate in open court for a summons under the Masters and Servants Act, and the magistrate refused the application, considering it a matter for civil and not a criminal court. The defendants afterward published a report which the jury have found was a fair report of what occurred. On principles of public convenience the ordinary rule is that no action can be maintained in respect of a fair and impartial report of a judicial proceeding, though the report contain matter of a defamatory kind and injurious to individuals. It was argued that the matter in respect of which the application was made was not within the jurisdiction of the magistrate. But the cases are clear to show that want of jurisdiction will not take away the privilege if it is maintainable on other grounds. Nor do I think the privilege is confined to the Superior Courts. It is not the tribunal, but the nature of the alleged judicial proceedings, which must be looked at. The point mainly relied on by the defendants was, that

the application to the magistrate was ex parte, and as such could not be privileged. Had the matter before the magistrate been in the nature of a preliminary inquiry, and if the ultimate judicial determination was to remain in abeyance until a further investigation, I should have thought there was authority at any rate for the defendants' contention, though how far these authorities might be followed in the present day I think doubtful; but the matter of the application was finally disposed of by the magistrate, and I can find no case where a fair report of a judicial proceeding finally dealing with the matter in open court has been held libelous. There are authorities which, until they are carefully examined, would seem to support the contention that an ex parte proceeding in court is not privileged; but, so far as I can ascertain, these are the cases where the proceeding was preliminary, and where there was no final determination at the time of the alleged libelous report. On the other hand Carrie v. Walters and Lewis v. Levy, ubi supra, are strong authorities in favor of the report in this case being protected. I am of opinion, therefore, that these rules must be discharged. Rules discharged.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS, MARCH TERM, 1878.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

Justification: excluding manager of alms-house from witnessing performance of priestly functions. — In an action for assault and battery, it appeared that plaintiff's husband was the keeper of an alms-house, of which she was at that time in charge; that the defendant, McKenna, a Catholic priest, was endeavoring to administer the sacrament of penance to a sick inmate of the house, who was a Catholic, and had requested him to administer it; that such administering required entire secrecy between the defendant and the sick person; that the plaintiff had refused to leave the room after being requested to retire; and that a sufficient and proper amount of force was used to compel her to leave. Held, that the plaintiff being rightfully in the room, and the defendant a mere visitor, there was nothing in the priestly character of the defendant, or in the offices of religion which he was about to perform, that gave him the control of the room, or any legal authority to exclude or remove from it by force any person lawfully there, and the facts relied upon in justification did not, as matter of law, furnish any defense. Cooper v. McKenna. (Mass. L. Rep.)

CONTRACT.

Acceptance of order payable on happening of future event: construction of. The following order was presented to defendant for acceptance: $445. "Lowell, Feb. 3d, 1875. Mr. Blodgett please pay to C. H. Robbins the sum of four hundred and forty-five dollars, and oblige, to be paid when the house is finished. J. T. Willis." Across the face of the order was written, I accept the order. Chas. A. Blodgett." The order was given by Willis, a contractor, to the plaintiff for work done by him on the house in question, belonging to the defendant, for Willis, while the latter was still at work under his contract. The house was finished but not by Willis; and the house was sold in an unfinished state by the defendant to one Litchfield, who

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finished it. In an action in the order against defend ant, held, that the order being general in its terms and payable absolutely when the house is finished, it was immaterial who completed it. If the defendant wished to limit his liability, he should have done so when he accepted the order. Cook v. Wolfendale, 105 Mass. 401; Russell v. Barry, 115 id. 300; Somers v. Thayer, id. 163. The time when the defendant's liability accrued being dependent on the happening of an event, the contract between Willis and the defendant was competent, as bearing on the question whether the time had arrived when the defendant became liable (Robbins v. Blodgett, 121 Mass. 584); but it is not competent to limit the extent, or change the character of the liability, created in express terms by the order and acceptance. Robbins v. Blodgett. (Mass. L. Rep.)

FIRE INSURANCE.

Mortgagor and mortgagee: when mortgagee not entitled to insurance money on mortgaged premises.-Under a provision in a mortgage the mortgagor was to keep the house on the mortgaged premises insured against fire for not less than $3,200 for the benefit of the mortgagee. The mortgagor procured from defendant a policy insuring, in his name, the house for $1,500 and the furniture for $500. The defendant did not know of the provision in the mortgage. The house being burned, the mortgagee notified defendant of his claim and defendant paid the amount of the insurance to the mortgagor. Held, that the mortgagee had no right of action against defendant for the amount of insurance on the house. Stearns v. Quincy Mutual Fire Ins. Co.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

BILL OF EXCHANGE..

Acceptance by signature: words of acceptance. - A bill of exchange is not sufficiently accepted by the acceptor's name being written across the face of it. There must be an acceptance in writing on the bill, and the signature of the acceptor. In an action by the drawer against the acceptor of a bill, it was proved that the bill was directed to the defendant, that the defendant was seen to write his name across it, and that it was given for value. Neither the word " cepted," nor any thing beyond the bare signature of the defendant, was written upon the bill. Held, that the action was not maintainable. Com. P. Div., March 2, 1878. Hindpaugh v. Blakey, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.)

221.

CARRIER OF PASSENGERS.

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Railway company: liability as carriers of passengers' luggage: duty at end of journey: delivery to owner.- It is the duty of a railway company, in regard to the baggage of a passenger which has reached its destination, to have the baggage ready for delivery upon the platform at the usual place of delivery until the owner in the exercise of due diligence can call and receive it; and it is the owner's duty to call for and remove it within a reasonable time. Ex. Ch. Div., January 21, 1878. Patscheeder v. Great West. Railway, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 149.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Fellow-servant: "joint station staff:” injury to servant of one company by negligence of servant of another

company. A person who is injured by the negligence of another's servant cannot be a fellow-servant with the servant whose negligence causes the injury, so as to exempt the master from liability, unless he is under the control and orders of the master. Defendants and the G. N. Company owned adjoining stations, which were worked by a "joint station staff," the cost of whose salaries was borne equally by the two companies. S., one of such staff, was hired by the G. N. Company, and received his salary from them. While engaged in his duty as signalman, S. was killed by the negligence of defendants' engine driver. Held (reversing the judgment of the Exchequer Division), that S. was not defendants' servant, so as to be a fellow-servant with the engine driver; and therefore his widow could recover damages from defendants for his death. Ct. App., February 23, 1878. Swanson v. North E. Ry. Co., 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 201.

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Practice in proceedings for: dismissal.- A resolution of composition was adopted in this case, by which the creditors agreed to accept notes of a new firm to be composed of two members of the old firm and such other person or persons, if any, as they might associate with them, with a fresh capital of at least twenty thousand dollars, which, if borrowed, should not be withdrawn until the composition was paid. The uew firm was formed of all the members but one of the old firm, with the capital required, and a deed of release was signed by the creditors. The capital had been borrowed and was repaid soon after. The new firm paid the first and second installments of the composition, but stopped payment on the third. A day or two before this the case had been dismissed. Held, that the dismissal should not be vacated and the case sent back into bankruptcy, because (1) creditors of the new firm could not prove their debts or be paid in this proceeding, and (2) because the remaining partner, himself innocent, lost his opportunity, by the discharge, of seeing that the composition was faithfully and fully carried out. U. S. Dist. Ct., Mass. In re Ewing, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 109.

DISCHARGE.

1. Will not release lien of judgment.-A discharge in bankruptcy will not release the lien of a judgment which was not proved. Sup. Ct., Ga. Darsey v. Mumpford, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 181.

2. Homestead exemption.-The lands, etc., claimed to be exempt under the Homestead Exemption Law of Georgia, must be laid off and designated as such homestead before the debtor is entitled to such exemption; and this, although such lands had been previously set apart to him in proceedings in bankruptcy as exempt under such law. Ib.

FIDUCIARY DEBT.

1. Executor, when not discharged.-Where an executor has so administered as to render himself personally liable to the creditors of the testator, his debt to them is a fiduciary debt, and unaffected by a discharge granted to him in bankruptcy. Sup. Ct., Ga. March 19, 1878. Lawrence v. McKenzie.

2. Enforcement of judgment not discharged in bankruptcy. Such a debt having been found against the executor by an award of arbitrators on the reference of a cause pending in court, and the award having been excepted to before the adjudication of bankruptcy, and the exceptions having been withdrawn and the award made a judgment of the court while the proceedings in bankruptcy were pending, the judgment may, after discharge granted or before, be enforced by execution, both against property acquired subsequently to adjudication, and against property set apart by the assignee as exempt. Ib.

3. Proof of fiduciary debt.-The proof in bankruptcy of a fiduciary debt, and the receipt of a dividend thereon out of the bankrupt's estate, constitute no obstacle to the collection of the balance, though the dividend was, by consent of all the creditors, larger than the debt was entitled to in the regular course of bankruptcy administration. Ib.

LIEN.

1. Secured creditor: practice. - Where a secured creditor has proved his claim without stating the fact that such claim was secured, and has received a dividend thereon, if those interested in the distribution of the estate do not take advantage of the forfeiture of the security caused thereby, third parties, not being so interested, have no standing to do so. Sup. Ct., Penn. Bassett v. Baird, 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 177.

2. Release of lien.-The bankrupt, previous to the commencement of the proceedings, sold certain premises. Parties who had, prior to the conveyance, performed work upon the premises subsequently filed alien therefor, and proved their claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, but neglected to state that it was secured by the llen, and received a dividend. In an action to foreclose the lien, held, that the grantee of the premises could not claim that the lien was thereby released. Ib.

MECHANICS' LIEN.

Discharge in bankruptcy no defense to.- Where the creditor of a bankrupt, having part of his debt secured by a mechanic's lien, proved his debt and elected to retain his lien at an appraised value, the discharge of the bankrupt is no defense in a suit on the lien. Sup. Ct., Penn., Feb. 25, 1878. Streeper v. McKee.

PARTNERSHIP.

Proof: individual property of partners pledged: evidence.-Where the individual property of one of the members of a firm is pledged for a debt of the firm, the creditor may, and indeed is bound to prove at the request of the separate creditors, his whole debt without deduction against the joint assets; but can only prove the deficiency, after disposing of the security, against the separate assets of such partner. Evidence is always admissible between principal and surety to show what their equitable rights toward each other are. U. S. Dist. Ct., Mass. In re May. Ex parte Mass. Hosp. Life Ins. Co., 17 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 192.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

APPEALABLE ORDER.

Construction of New Code, § 1241: exercise of discretion of court below as to arrest not reviewable in Court of Appeals.-The provision of the New Code, § 1241, providing that a judgment may be enforced in certain cases by punishing the judgment debtor for a contempt of the court does not compel the court below to act and punish where the facts bring the case within the purview of the section. The court below has a discretion in the matter, and when it exercises that discretion by refusing to grant an order of arrest an appeal does not lie to this court. Appeal dismissed. Cochrane v. Ingersoll. Opinion per Curiam. [Decided April 16, 1878. Reported below, 11 Hun, 342.1

CARRIER OF PASSENGERS.

1. Not liable for loss by robbery of valuable securities carried on person of passenger.-Plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's railway holding the ordinary passage ticket for which he had paid the usual price. He carried in his clothing upon his person without the knowledge of defendant or notice to it, solely in his own care and custody, a package of negotiable securities of $16,000 in value. These securities were taken from him in the car of defendant, by violence, by three men who had no connection with defendant and whose presence in the car was not known to defendant though it might have been. The jury found that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence and that the defendant was guilty of negligence in not caring for the protection of the plaintiff, and that in consequence of that negligence the robbery took place. Held, that defendant was not liable for the value of the securities carried by plaintiff, and in an action for the loss accruing to plaintiff from the robbery, they could not enter into an estimate of the damages. Order below affirmed. Weeks v. N. Y., N. H. & Hartf. R. R. Co. Opinion by Folger, J.

2. How far carrier liable for neglect to protect passenger from robbery.-Though a carrier of passengers is bound to guard one going in his vehicle, from violence, the damages he must pay if he neglects his duty are such as would ordinarily result therefrom, as would naturally be contemplated by the parties. The carrier would be liable only for the safety of the passenger, his ordinary baggage, and such articles as are usually required by a passenger and reasonable for his personal use while on his way or at his place of destination. Ib. [Decided January 15, 1878. Reported below, 9 Hun, 669.]

CRIMINAL LAW.

False pretenses: post-dated check.-On the 28th of August the prisoner, having bargained for some goods of complainant, sent out from complainant's residence where he was, a friend who was with him to get, as he said, the money to pay for the goods. The friend soon after returned with a check on a bank, purporting to be drawn by one Steinbach, and dated August 29. This, prisoner represented to be a valid security, and attention being called to the fact that it was dated the 29th, stated that this was done because it was so late in the day and the bauk was closed. No account was kept at the bank by any Steinbach, and the check was worthless. The check was taken and prisoner and his friend took away the goods. Held, to constitute a false pretense, and the fact that the check was post

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