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If we assume it to be true, as a general proposition, to make insurances, "provided the office shall recog. that the policy speaks from the date of its issue, and nize the rate of premium and be otherwise satisfied that the obligation of the applicant to make a full
with the risk," it was held that the company was disclosure continues down to the completion of the bound to issue a policy where the insurance was contract, and that the occurrence of a material change proper one and the premium was paid or tendered. before the contract is consummated must be commu- although before the premium was received at the home nicated to the company, we do not advance essentially office the property was consumed by fire. in the case before us. The question recurs, when was
In Chase v. Hamilton Ins. Co., 22 Barb. 5:27, the the contract of Dr. Day consummated? If on the 14th agent forwarded a proposition for insurance, which was of October, when the renewal-receipt was delivered, altered by the company, and the alteration communias the company contends, then the rule mentioned cated to and accepted by the applicant, and the prebars the plaintiff's right to recover. If, as the plaintiff inium paid to the agent. Held, that the company was contends, the contract by the intention and under- bound to issue its policy and was liable for the loss. standing of the parties relates to the first of October,
In Insurance Co. v. Webster, 6 Wall. 129, the party when the premium was paid by the applicant and the having received his policy, it was held that he was not certificates of health presented and transmitted, or to
affected by afterward signing a memorandum that a point of time within a few days thereafter, within
the insurance was to “take effect when approved by which the company ought to have examined and to
E. D. P., general agent." See also, Cooper v. Pacific have accepted a risk in all respects suitable to be
M. L. Ins. (0., 3 Big. Ins. R. 656; 7 Nev. 616; Curpenaccepted within its own rules, then the general rule ter v. M. S. Ins. Co., 4 Sandf. (h. 408; Am. Horse quoted is not applicable. The case is governed by Ins. Co, v. Patterson, 28 Ind. 17; City of Darenport v. different principles. It is not necessary, therefore, to
Peoria M. and F., 17 Iowa, 276; Le Furom v. Insurance question the principle assumed in the authority quoted,
Co., 2 Big. Ins. R. 158. or to examine the cases cited to sustain it.
Second objection. We are of the opinion that the exceptions to the
At the close of his charge the judge instructed the charge of the judge, upon the theory that the repre
jury as follows: "That the plaintiff is not responsible sentations by Dr. Day were made on the 14th day of for or in any way affected by any of the statements in October, or that concealment was then practiced by
Dr. White's affidavit, unless the jury find that before him, on the ground that the previous representations,
and at the time of filing it with the agent of the comnecessarily and as a matter of law, were continuous, pany she had actual knowledge of its contents and and that the contract was consummated on that day,
adopted and used them as her own declarations. That cannot be sustained. It was a question proper under
affidavit is her declaration or no, as she knew and was all the circumstances for the consideration of the jury.
advised of it and procured and approved it.” To which If they had found for the plaintiff we are of the
instruction the counsel for the insurance company then opinion that the verdict would not have been vacated
and there excepted.
In establishing her case at the trial the plaintiff was as being without or against the evidence. In many English companies a formal acceptance of
bound to prove that notice of the death of her husband, the proposal for insurance is issued. In some com
Dr. Day, had been given to the company, and that a
demand of payment of the amount claimed had been panies this acceptance is unconditional, so that the
made. For that purpose only she offered in evidence premium be paid within the month, the letter of acceptance running to the effeet :hat the proposal has
the proofs of loss which had been furnished to the been accepted, and that a receipt is ready at the office
company, except the affidavit of Dr. White, forming a
part of the same, which she did not offer in evidence. for the premium, upon the payment of which the assurance will commence, but that if the same be not
Those proofs contained the sworn statement of Mrs. paid within thirty days a reappearance and fresh cer
Day herself, the sworu statement of Dr. Isaac White, tificate will be required. In other companies the
certificates of the clergy man and undertaker, and proof acceptance is qualified by the condition, not only that
of identity by J. F. Patterson. the insurance shall not commence till the payment of
These affidavits were all on one paper, and the court the premium, but that no material change shall have
required that the proofs of loss should be put in 'as an occurred prior thereto. Bunyon, p. 58, cited Bliss,
eutirety; that is, that all the papers containing the $ 99.
preliminary proofs should be put in evidence, and the The practice is not uniform, and there is nothing re- same were thereupon put in evidence by the plaintiff, markable in allowing a certificate of health to stand including the affidavit of Dr. White. In Dr. White's good for thirty days, no reappearance or examination affidavit thus introduced occurred the following quesfor that interval being required.
tions and answers: “How long have you known the Among the cases relating to this subject the follow- deceased ? I have known Dr. R. H. B. Day seventeen ing may be referred to as showing the effect of the years. How long was deceased sick? About five contract by relation, and that the consummation of months. Date of your first visit ? November 28, 1870. the contract does not necessarily depend upon the Date of your last? January 22, 1871. Of what disease delivery of the policy.
did he die? Pulmonary consumption.” It appeared In Lightbody v. N. Am. Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 24, it was further that Dr. White was not a resident of Washingheld that a policy bearing date on the day the prem- ton, but left that city immediately after making the ium is paid takes effect by relation from that day, affidavit mentioned, on the 28th of January, 1871. although the policy be not delivered for several days Mrs. Day testified that Dr. White had not seen her afterward. In this case the buildings were burned on husband at any time between September, 1869, and the day jafter the premium was paid and before the the latter part of November, 1870. policy was delivered.
The struggle as to Dr. Wbite's aflidavit and the rulIn Perkins v. Wash. Ins. Co., 4 Cow. 465, the rule ing upon it are quite immaterial. He stated in answer was applied in á case where the agent was authorized to one of the questions that Dr. Day had beeu ill about
edging officer was a compliance with the statute and the acknowledgment was valid. Decree of Circuit Court, W. D. Tennessee, affirmed. Kelly et al., appeltants, v. Calhoun et al. Opinion by Swayne, J.
2. Deed from corporation - There is no statutory provision in Tennessee as to the execution or acknowledgment of deeds by corporations. In such cases the officer affixing the seal is the party executing the deed within the meaning of the statutes requiring deeds to be acknowledged by the grantor. (Lovett v. Steam Mill Association, 6 Paige, 69). Ib.
five months, and as he died on the 22d of January, 1871, this would carry his illuess back to the 22d of August, 1870, of course including all the month of October of that year. The insurance company apparently sought the benefit of this evidence on the contest in regard to Day's health.
It is, however, manifest that White's statement was not one of personal knowledge, but was upon rumor, or made without sufficient reflection. This is evident both from the testimony of Mrs. Day, which is entirely unimpeached and uncontradicted, that Dr. White did not see her husband during all of the year 1870 until the latter part of November. Upon this subject she could not well be in error. It was equally evident from the statement of White himself, that this first visit to Day was on the 28th of November, 1870.
Day's bodily health on the first day of October, 1870, was satisfactory to the company, and the attempt was to show an unfavorable alteration between that date and the 14th of the same month. But White had not seen him during those fourteen days, nor for months before nor for more than six weeks afterward.
Whether the presentation of the affidavit of White by Mrs. Day made its contents evidence; whether she knew its contents or not; whether she did or did not adopt or procure it, was not of the slightest cousequence. The paper contained nothing that was legal evidence upon the point in issue, and a verdict founded upon it could not have been sustained. The disposition of the subject by the judge was one that could not possibly work legal injury to the insurance company. There was, therefore, no error. Starbird v. Barrons, 43 N. Y. 200; Pepin v. Lachenmeyer, 45 id. 27; People v. Brandreth, 36 id. 191; Porter v. Ruckman, 38 id. 211; Corning v. Troy Iron and Nail Works, 44 id. 577.
The effect of facts set forth in preliminary proof as admissions is discussed in Insurance Company v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32. Where an agent of the insurance company stated that the proofs were sufficient to show the death of the insured, but that they showed that he committed suicide, it was held that the whole admission must be taken together. Where the party or ber agent stated in the preliminary proofs that the deceased had committed suicide, furnishing the verdict of a coroner's jury to that effect, and where the narration of the manner of the death of the deceased was so interwoven with the death of the deceased that the two things were inseparable, it was held that the whole was competent to go before the jury.
We see no occasion to question the positions of that case.
Upon the whole case we are all of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed.
ADMIRALTY LAW. Liability of shipowners in cases of collision : limit of liability of stipulators. — Shipowners are in no case liable for any loss, damage or injury occasioned by collision beyond the amount of their interest in the colliding ship and her freight peuding, except for costs and interest by the way of damages in case of default of payment and suit to recover the amount. Nor are the stipulators, either for cost or value, eve, liable for any default of their principal beyond the amount specified in the stipulation which they gave, except for costs and interest by the way of damages in case of their own default to make payment pursuant to the terms of the stipulation. (9 Stat. at Large, 635; The Cordes, 21 How. 26; The Ann Caroline, 2 Wall. 548; The Union, 4 Blatch. 92; The Palmyru, 12 Wheat. 10; Houseman v. North Carotina, 15 Pet. 51; The Hope, 1 W. Rob. 155; The John Dunn, 1 id. 160; The Volant, 1 id. 386; The Dundee, 2 Hagg. 143; E. parte Rayne, 1 Gale & Davisou R. 377; Gull v. Laurie, 5 Barn. & Cress. 163; Ives v. Bunk, 12 How. 165; The Diuna, 3 Wheat. 58; Sreed v. Wister, 8 id. 696). Decree of Circuit Court S. D. New York, affirmed. Sparrow et al., uppellants, v. Avery et al. Opinion by Clifford, J.
Check properly stamped and puid not object of taxation under revenue law: collector entering pluce where kept. – Under section 3,177 of the United States Revised Statutes, authority is given to any collector, deputy collector, or inspector of internal revenue to euter, in the day time, any building or place within his district, where any articles or objects subject to such taxation are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining such objects or articles, and the provision is that auy owner of such building or place, or any person having the agency or superiutendence of the same, who refuses to admit such officer or suffer him to examine such articles or objects shall for every such refusal forfeit five hundred dollars. Held, that under this provision paid bank checks, which were duly and sufficiently stamped at the time they were made, signed, and issued, are not articles or objects subject to taxation, and an officer of a bank where such checks are may lawfully refuse to suffer the collector to examine such checks. (Cases, etc., cited, United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 74; 1 Bishop Cr. Pro. [2d ed.) sec. 81; Arch. Cr. Pl. & Ev. [18th ed.] 54 Rev. Stat. sec. 3,418; 18 Stat. at Large, 310; The Mary Ann, 8 Wheat, 389; The Hoppet, 7 Cr. 393; 2 Pars. on Ship aud Admr. 386; The Curoline, 7 Cr. 500; The Anne, 7 id. 571; Conkl. Treat. [5th ed.) 546; 2 Colby Cr. Law, 114; People v. Wilbur, 4 Park. C.C. 21; Com. v. Cook, 18 B. Monr. 149; Steel v. Smith, 1 Baru, & Ald. 99; Conkl. Treat. [6th ed.] 548.) Judgment of Circuit Court, Minnesota, affirmed. United States, plaintiff in error, v. Mann. Opinion by Clifford, J.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.
1. What is substantial compliance with statutes of TenTuessee relating to.- By the statutes of Tennessee deeds for the conveyance of lands are to be " acknowledged by the maker or proved by two subscribing witnesses” and the prescribed formula of acknowledgment is * Personally appeared before me, etc., the within named bargainer with whom I am personally acquainted and who acknowledged that he executed the within instrument, etc.” Held, that an acknowledgment wherein it was certified that the individual executing it was Personally kuowu to the acknowl
3. Legislative right to compel payment by city of Construction of contract for surrender and re-issue of equitable claims. - It is competent for the legislature railroad bonds. — There being matters of dispute be- to impose upon a city the payment of claims, just in tween S. and D. and A. Railroad Company, in which themselves, for which an equivalent has been received, certain bonds of the company were involved, S. pro- but which from some irregularity or omission in the posed in writing to surrender all of such bonds and proceedings by which they were created cannot be procure a release from D., if the company would in ex- enforced at law. (Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; The change therefor execute and deliver to him a specified Town of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango County, number and amount of new bonds secured by mort- 16 Barb. 615; Same case in Court of Appeals, 3 Kern. gage on the railroad. A portion of the old bonds were 143.) Ib. handed in and canceled and new ones issued. With 4. Retroactive law. — A law requiring a municipal reference to the other old bonds there was a dispute corporation to pay such a claim is not within the conbetween S. and third parties. Held, that the company stitutional provision inhibiting the passage of a retrowas not bound to make the exchange with reference to active law. Ib. the remaining bonds until 8. obtained control of them
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. and surrendered them. Decree of Circuit Court, Kan- 1. Necessary contents of note or memorandum. - The sas, reversed. Union Pacific R. R. Co., appellant, v.
note or memorandum required by the statute of Stewart. Opinion by Wait, C. J.
frauds must furnish evidence of a complete and prac
tical agreement, and unless the essential terms of 1. Of leased land upon which a distillery stands : acts the sale can be ascertained from the writing itself or of distiller bind ouner of land. - The unlawful acts by reference in it to something else the writing is not of the distiller bind the owner of the property, in a compliance with the statute, and if the agreement be respect to the management of the same, as much as if thus defective it cannot be supplied by parol proof. they were committed by the owner himself. Power Accordingly receipts given for the payment of money to that effect the law vests in him by virtue of his on an alleged purchase of real estate not containing lease, and if he abuses his trust it is a matter to be set- any thing to show what real estate was the subject of tled between him and his lessor, but the acts of viola- purchase, held, not sufficient under the statute. tion as to the penal consequences to the property are (Baptist Church v. Bigelow, 16 Wend. 31; Morton v. to be considered just the same as if they were the acts Dean, 13 Metc. 385; 2 Kent's Com. [12th ed.]511; Norris of the owner. (The Vrouw Judith, 1 C. Rob. 151; v. Lain, 16 Johus. 151; Dung v. Perkins, 52 N. Y. 494; Spring Valley Distillery, 11 Blatch. 265; The Reindeer, Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 id. 467; Wright v. Weeks, 25 id. 2 Cliff. 68; U. S. v. Bugs of Coffee, 8 Cr. 464; The Ship | 153; Parkhurst v. Van Cortland, 1 Johns. Ch. 273; 14 Crockery, Parker R. 230.) Judgment of Circuit Court, id. 15; Barry v. Coombs, 1 Pet. 648; Clark v. Burnham, Iowa, affirmed. Dobbins, plaintiff in error, v. United 2 Story C. C.; Story on Sales (4th ed.) sec. 257). De. States. Opinion by Clifford, J.
cree of Supreme Court, D. C., reversed. Williams et 2. Confessions of lessee of distillery admissible against al., appellants, v. Morris, executor. Opinion by Clifowner in proceedings for forfeiture. — Accordingly ford, J. admissions by the lessee of property upon which a 2. Part performance : what party claiming benefit of distillery is situated, which was proceeded against must show. -- Where the attempt is to take the case out under the revenue act for the purpose of forfeiture, of the statute upon the ground of part performance, held, admissible against the owner of such property the party making the attempt must show by clear and in such proceeding. Ib.
satisfactory proof the existence of the contract as laid MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
in his pleading, and the act of part performance must 1. Construction of guaranty: contract with private
be of the identical contract which he has in that mancorporation. -- Where an ordinance of a city authoriz
ner set up and alleged. It is not enough that the act ing a contract with a gas company and the issue to it
of part performance is evidence of some agreement, of bonds of the city, provided that the company should
but it must be unequivocal and satisfactory evidence of “guaratee the said bouds and assume the payment of
the particular agreement charged in the bill or answer. the principal thereof at maturity,” held, 1st, that the
(Phillips v. Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch. 149; Browne on guaranty embraced both the principal and interest of
Fraud, sec. 452 ; Jones v. Peterham, 8 Serg. & R. 543; the bonds; and 2d, that the ordinance contemplated
Morphett v. Jones, 1 Swanst. 172; Ex parte Hooper, two undertakings by the company - one to the bond
19 Ves. 477; Frame v. Dawson, 14 id. 386; 7 id. 341; 3 holder aud one to the city. The guaranty was to be
Parsons on Cout. (6th ed.] 60; Chitty on Cont. [10th for the security of the boudholder; it was to be an
ed.] 66 and 278; 1 Story's Eq. (9th ed.) sec. 761). Ib. undertaking to answer for the city's liability. The other undertaking was to be for the security of the
COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. city by placing the company under obligation to provide for the payment of the principal of the bonds on
ARREST AND BAIL. their maturity, au obligation which otherwise would Cause of action not entitling to arrest included in comnot have existed. Judgment of Circuit Court, Louisi-plaint takes away right to arrest. — If a plaintiff unites a ava, affirmed. Jefferson City Gas-light Co. v. Clark et bailable and a non-bailable cause of action in the same al. Opinion by Field, J.
complaint he waives his right to bail iu both, and an 2. What amounts to substantial compliance with con- order of arrest cannot be sustained, if, upon any one tract. — The indorsement by the president of the com- of the causes included in the action, the defendant is pany on the bonds guaranteeing "the payment of the not liable to arrest. (Smith v. Knapp, 30 N. Y. 581; principal and interest ” thereof, was a substantias McGovern v. Payne, 32 Barb. 83.) Order below reverscompliance with the provision of the ordinance and ed. Madge v. Puig. Opinion by Allen, J. contract as to the guaranty. Ib.
[Decided Dec. 11, 1877.]
upon lands for the purpose of taking material for reStatutes relating to must be strictly followed : official | pairs when the navigation of the canal is endangered oath in form prescribed must be taken by officials.-In (1 R. S. 221), and that plaintiff had no claim against statutory proceedings affecting the property of a citizen defendants for that reason for the gravel taken from the statute must be strictly followed and any de- such land. Judgment below reversed. Ten Broek v. parture in substance from the formula prescribed Sherill. Opinion per Curiam. by law, vitiates the proceedings. Accordingly where a [Decided Nov. 27, 1877.] statute required commissioners to make a village im
EVIDENCE. provement and assess the cost upon property to be 1. When judgment admissible in collateral action: to benefited to make oath before entering upon their
show status of witness. - In an action in which the duties "faithfully and fairly to discharge the duties,” | former husband of a witness was plaintiff, for the pureto.; an oath by each one to perform the duties “to
pose of showing the status of the divorced wife and the best of his ability,” held, not a compliance with the
her competency as a witness, the judgment of divorce statute and the acts of the commissioners invalid.
was introduced in evidence by plaintiff. Held, that it (Gilbert v. Columbia Ins. Co., 3 Johus. Cas. 107; Rex v.
was admissible for the purpose mentioned, and could Cooke, 1 Cowp. 76; Adams v. S. & W. R. R Co., 10
not be impeached collaterally, and that objections (1), N. Y. 328; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Den. 595; Seymour v.
that it was improper and immaterial, and (2), that the Judd, 2 N. Y. 464; Sharpe v. Spier, 4 Hill, 81; Thatcher
record showed upon its face that the divorce was v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; Thompson v. White, 4 S. & R.
granted upon improper and illegal testimony, would 135; In re Cambria Street, 75 Penn. St. 357 ; People v.
not lie. Judgment below affirmed. Wottrick v. FriedConnor, 46 Barb. 333.) Judgment below reversed.
man. Opinion by Allen J. Morris v. Village of Portchester. Opinion by Alleu,
2. Questions designed to show bias of witness. — For J.
the purpose of showing a hostile relation between a [Decided Nov. 27, 1877.]
witness for plaintiff and defendant, defendant asked BILLS OF LADING.
witness if a suit for crim. con. brought by witWhen fraudulent bills by general owner af cargo give ness against defendant was not pending, to which he no title : estoppel: fraudulent delivery by owner wrong
answered there was such a suit. Held, that the quesfully in possession. — Fraudulent bills of lading of tion was competent and a question by plaintiff, asking wheat purporting to have been shipped by N. at
if witness had not a had suit several years ago against Buffalo by certain canal-boats and consigned to de
defendant for crim. con. which was settled, it not fendants at New York, were made and transferred to being shown that there were two suits, was also comdefendants, and defendants paid certain drafts drawn petent. Ib. by N. against the supposed cargoes. At the time the
[Decided Nov. 20, 1877.] wheat described was on board a vessel in transit be
INJUNCTION. tween Milwaukee and Buffalo, under a bill of lading Liability of plaintiff: undertaking: terms of under which had been transferred to plaintiff as security for taking fix liability thereunder.-Without some security the payment of a note of N., discounted to enable him before the granting of an injunction or without some to pay a draft drawn on plaintiff for the purchase order of the court or judge requiring some act on price of the wheat. Subsequently, without authority the part of the plaintiff which is equivalent to giving of plaintiff, or any act on its part enabling him to security such as a deposit of money in court, the dedo so, N. fraudulently shipped the wheat by the canal- fendant has no remedy for any damages which he may boats mentioned, and delivered it to defendants, they sustain from the issuing of the injunction. And not parting with any value at the time on the faith of when an undertaking is executed by sureties defendant such delivery. Held, that at the time of the making has no greater or other reliance than is afforded by the of the false bills of lading plaintiff was the pledgee terms of that instrument. Accordingly, where a bond and special owner of the wheat in possession; that N. was given under old code, S 222, the condition of had no authority to transfer title to the same; that which was that the plaintiff would pay to the defendN.'s unauthorized interference with the wheat and de- ant such damages, not exceeding a specified amount livery to defendants did not relate back so as to make as the defendant might sustain by reason of the invalid the transfer by the false bills; that plaintiff junction, “if the court shall finally decide that the was not estopped from asserting title to the wheat by | plaintiff was not entitled thereto," and after the suit the interference of N., and that after demand of the had progressed and the injunction had been modified wheat and refusal to redeliver it was entitled to by the court, the parties of their own free will made a maintain an action for the same against defendants. settlement and the suit was, in pursuance thereof, disJudgment below affirmed. Marine Bank of Buffalo v. continued, held, that the condition of the underFiske. Opinion by Allen, J.
taking was not broken by plaintiff's failing to pay [Decided Dec. 4, 1877.]
damages, and an action could not be maintained there
Orders below reversed. Palmer v. Foley. OpiuCANALS. Appropriation of soil for repair of.- Defendants con
ion by Folger, J. tracted with the State to build a new dam in place of
[Decided Nov. 13, 1877. ] an old one, and a short distance below, across the
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. Mohawk. Thereafter the State took proceediugs to 1. Charter of Saratoga Springs: mandamus: issue of appropriate an acre of plaintiff's ground near the dam, corporate bonds: warrant to pay moneys. — Under the and gravel was taken from the acre to tighten the old provisions of the charter of the village of Saratoga dam, so that it could be used for canal navigation Springs moneys cannot be paid from the treasury save while the new dam was being built. Held, that the on the warrant of the trustees. By Laws 1875, chap. appropriation was not in violation of the provision of 517, the trustees of the village are authorized to raise the statute authorizing the canal commissioner to enter money by the issue of bonds for the payment of the
floating indebtedness of the village, and from the tractor on a quantum meruit. - Where the law remoness so raised claims are to be paid on the warrant quires that all municipal work of a certain character of the auditors. Held, in order to entitle one holding a shall be performed under contract let to the lowest claim against the village, which, if valid, would be in
and best bidder after due advertisement, no recovery cluded in the floating indebtedness, to compel by man
can be had for work done in any other manner; and dainus the receiver of taxes or financial officer of the peither the municipality nor its subordinate officers village to take steps in order to pay his claim, he must can make a binding contract for such work except in procure a warrant from the auditors directing such compliance with the requirements of the law. Sup. payment. An authenticated copy of the proceedings Ct. Pennsylvania, Nov. 12, 1877. Addis v. City of Pittsof the village auditors, showing the audit of plaintiff's burgh (4 W, N. Cas. 529). claim, is not a warrant, and would not be sufficient. Negligence : carrier of passengers: person invited on Order below affirmed. People ex rel. Cooke v. Wood. horse car by driver:- Where the driver of a street car Opinion by Folger, J.
invites a boy to get on the car and give him a glass of 2. Title a part of legislative act in this State. - In this water, and then directs him to get off while the car is State, especially in local and private acts, the title is in motion, and refuses to stop the car when requested, part of the act. Ib.
but, o the contrary, increases its speed, held, that the [Decided Dec. 4, 1877.]
company was liable for an injury to the bor in getting
off the car. In order to render the company liable for NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.
injuries caused by the acts of its servants it is not ne
cessary that the relation of passenger and carrier should Carrier of passenger: liability of steamboat company
exist. N. Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. Term, 2d Dept., Dec., 1877. for loss of baggage. — A steamboat company is liable Day v. Brooklyn R. R. Co. (N. Y. Week. Digest). for the value of passenger's baggage destroyed by a fire on the steamer, unless it be clearly proved that the fire occurred from some cause over which the company NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. had no control. Court of Q. B., Quebec, Dec. 14, 1877. Canadian Nav. Co. v. McConkey (Mont. L. News.)
THE NEW RULES OF COURT. Fire insurance: omission to state previous insurance :
Rules of all the Courts of Record of the State of Now York, verbal notice to agent. - The plaintiff, when making ap- with Notes, References and an Index, by Marcus T. plicatiou for insurance, mentioned to the defendants'
Huu, Reporter of the Supreme Court. New York:
Banks & Brothers, 1877. agent that there was a previous insurance in the Gore Mutual, but could not remember the amount which
General Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court, with Rules
of the Court of Appeals and other Courts of Record of the was on the property insured with the defendants. The State of New York, with Annotations and an Index.
New York: Baker, Voorhis & Company, 1878. policy contained a proviso that in case the insured should have already any other insurance against loss THESE books purport to cover the same ground and by fire on the property, and not notified to the com- may therefore be conveniently noticed together. pany and mentioned in or indorsed upon the policy, Each gives the rules of the various courts in force on the insurance should be void. The policy contained the first of January, with notes referring to decisions no mention of the insurance in the Gore Mutual. and kindred statutes. The first is the more elaborHeld, that the plaintiff could not recover. Court of ately, the second the more accurately, annotated. InError and Appeal, Ontario, Dec. 17, 187. Billington deed we are surprised at Mr. Hun's inattention to, or v. Provincial Ins. Co. (Mont. L. News).
ignorance of, some matters that should be within the Life tenancy: open mines : wusle: right of life tenant to cognizance of every lawyer, and more especially of pursue, underyround, veins of open mines restricted.- A. every one who undertakes to prepare such a work as died, seized of two tracts of land, separated by an inter- that to which he has set his hand. Here are a few of vening tract. Upon one of them a coal mine had been the errors that a casual reading has discovered: On opened in A.'s lifetime. A.'s widow who was a tenant page 7 he gives in full chapter 322, Laws 1874, which for life under A.'s will, leased both the tracts to the was expressly repealed by chapter 417, Laws 1877, but Westmoreland Coal Company, who owned the inter- he nowhere gives, so far as we observe, $ 191 of the vening tract. The coal company pursued under- Code of Civil Procedure, which takes the place of ch. ground a vein of coal from the open miue on one tract, 322. Of the 18 statutes cited as in force on page 29, all through their intervening tract, and within the bound- but two were repealed by the same act. The statutes ary of the other tract. Held, that the taking of coal as to law schools given on page 39 were repealed by the from the second tract constituted waste. Sup. Ct. same act and were superseded by $ 58 of the new code, Pennsylvania, Nov. 5, 1877. Westmoreland Coal Com- which Mr. Hun forgets to note. On page 57 he anpany's Appeal (4 W. N. Cas. 533).
nounces that “the Supreme Court is authorized by the Maritime law : life salvage; liability of owners of lost Revised Statutes (2 R. S. 199, $S 21 to 28), to compel the ship to contribute.-Where lives and cargo have been discovery of books, etc.," and that these provisions salved from a ship, but the ship has been totally lost, were not repealed by section 388 of the Code"; but the owners of the cargo are liable to pay salvage iu he neglects to say that they were repealed expressly respect of the lives, and the owners of the lost ship by chapter 417 of last year, and that their place is taken are not liable to contribute to such payment. Life by $8 803 to 809 of the new Code. Mr. Hun has also salvage awards can only be made out of the resalved, omitted to notice a number of recent cases pertinent to and not against owners of a ship personally. Eng. the matter in hand, but the errors of commission alHigh Ct. of Justice, P. B. & A. Div., Nov. 27, 1877. The ready oited will suffice, we believe, to justify the asSpecie ex Sarpedon (37 L. J. Rep. N. S., 505).
sertion that he has not done his work well. Municipal corporation: grading and paving: after On the other hand the book bearing the imprint of contract is properly let the city has no right to alter it Baker, Voorhis & Co., and which we understand was by an ordinance: no recovery can be had by a con- annotated under the supervision of Mr. Bliss, seeins to