car, and he and his wife took seats in the ladies' car, and when he came into the State of Kentucky at Henderson he was informed that he must leave the ladies' car and go forward into a compartment car which was set apart exclusively for colored persons; that he refused to go and was informed that he could not go any farther, and that he would not be allowed to go on the train unless he did go into that car, or be transported on that train to the end of his trip. In the other case he got into the ladies' car, himself and wife, at Henderson, Kentucky, and when the conductor came along, which was some little time after he had started from Henderson, he was then informed that neither he nor his wife could ride in that car and that he must go forward into the car in front set apart for colored p ssengers. He declined to do this, and when they arrived at a station some thirty miles this side of Madisonville, he was compelled to either go into the car assigned to colored persons or to quit the train, and he quit the train. Now that was the petition as it stood. There was a demurrer to the petition, and that as the court thought brought up the validity of the act of the Legislature, which has been read to you, directing the railroad companies in this State to separate the white and colored passengers on their railroads in this State, and making it a penalty upon the companies or conductors if they did not do this.

6:

"From the arguments, the court concluded the law was unconstitutional. It was so broad in its terms that it applied to interstate commerce, and applied to persons traveling from other States into the State of Kentucky, that there was no discrimination made, and that the whole law, therefore, was unconstitutional, because there was no power in the State of Kentucky to thus interfere with interstate commerce, that being a matter entirely within the jurisdiction of the United States and for Congress. Thereupon the defendant set up as a justification that they had rules and regulations by which their passengers riding on their trains were to be separated, and that they had made separate places in their trains for the whites and blacks, and that they had made a rule to that effect independently of any legislative act of the State of Kentucky; not relying upon the act of the State of Kentucky, but relying upon their common law rights to make rules and regulations for the conduct of their business, alleging that the rule was а necessary one for the proper

conduct of their business and that it was in the interest of both white and colored passengers. There was a demurrer to that answer by the plaintiff, claiming that a common carrier could not make a rule like that. The court held upon the demurrer to the answer that as a common carrier they had a right to make rules and regulations by which their passengers were to be divided, and that such rules and regulations must be reasonable, and that they must be necessary in the proper conduct of the road and for the benefit of the passengers, both white and colored; that it was simply a common law liability that whatever division might be made, there must be equal accom-modations for the colored and the white passengers.

"Having thus disposed of the answer, there was a reply made by the plaintiff, in which he denies the fact that there was such a rule or regulation, and if there was it was not reasonable within the meaning of the law. That, then, is the issue for you to try-was there such a rule or regulation made by the defendant, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, by which their conductors were authorized to refuse to transport plaintiff unless he went into the car set apart for colored passengers? And another issue of fact is, whether or not, in fact, on those trains the accommodations

which were thus set apart for the colored passengers were equal in every respect with those set apart for the white passengers.

"Now in regard to the question of whether or not there was such a rule or regulation at the time of this occurrence, the court instructs you that there was not such a rule or regulation; that the rule or regulation as presented did not cover the action of the conductors on these two occasions, as you will see from the instructions to the conductors which were read. There was, as the proof before you has shown, limits to these rules, and that as far as practicable white and colored passengers should be separated, nevertheless by the request that they should be separated they understood that if they refused they were not to be put out of the train by force nor were they to be refused transportation. You will observe in this case that there was no violence used, no insult offered, but according to the issues as made up by the pleadings the plaintiff and his wife were told that they must go into the car which was set apart for colored people, otherwise they could not go at all, and in that respect the regulation thuspleaded does not cover up the action of the conductor in this action. The conductors did not have that right under this regulation.

"The other issue of fact that is given to you is, whether or not there was the same accommodation in every respect for this plaintiff and his wife on these two occasions that there were for white passengers on this train. That is a question for you to determine. The question of damage in this particular case is important, because as I see, so far as the case is presented to you, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for something. Now, whether he is entitled to more or less is for you gentlemen to say. “You see from these statements that counsel has discussed questions which are not strictly for your consideration. Under the laws this is a very important question-far more important than any rights the defendant may have. The plaintiff has come to you, gentlemen of the Caucasian race, the white race, and asked from your hands a fair, impartial and unprejudiced verdict. It is no doubt true that every man who has been born and raised and lived under what was formerly a slave state, feels a prejudice toward the African race, which except for the previous slavery he would not have felt. Yet in our changed condition those who were slaves are freemen now, and politically and civilly our equals. Such is the law, such will always be the law in a country like ours. It is simply, therefore, in this case a question of equal rights. The law which I have given you eliminates from your consideration a very troublesome and a very important and perhaps a very perplexing question of whether or not such a rule, if it had been made, which would prevent colored people from traveling, except in a coach set apart for them, was a reasonable one, and that I say is eliminated from this particular case.

"Therefore, it is a question for you now simply, what shall you do in the way of giving damages? As I say, there is no element here of force or violence or insult; there is nothing which would humiliate the plaintiff or his wife; it is simply a question of legal right, and for you to say what damage you can give as a compensation for these two failures and refusals to transport this plaintiff and his wife. You may take the case, gentlemen, and consider it carefully and impartially and without prejudice."

Under the instructions of the court the jury returned a verdict of one cent and costs for the plaintiff. The defendant immediately entered an exception and gave notice of an appeal

to the Supreme Court. Application for a writ of error will be made within the next few weeks. The case can not be docketed until next October, when an effort will be made to advance it, since large interests are involved and it is desired to have a final decision at as early a date as possible. Judgment in the meantime is suspended. The railroad company will prosecute an appeal in good faith to ascertain its rights under the pleadings. The appeal also includes Judge Barr's ruling declaring the separate coach law unconstitutional.

RECEIVERS.

The following is a list of the railroad lines in the hands of receivers, and the dates of their appointment:

Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific, Samuel Felton, receiver, appointed March 18, 1893; Louisville, St. Louis and Texas, Attilla Cox, receiver, appointed August 7, 1893; Knoxville, Cumberland Gap and Louisville, Clarence Cary, receiver, appointed December 20, 1892; Richmond, Nicholasville, Irvine and Beattyville, John McLeod, receiver, appointed December 2, 1891; Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Company, John McLeod, receiver, appointed October 14, 1893; Ohio, Kentucky and Virginia (North Division Charleston, Cincinnati and Chicago), Jay H. Northrup, agent for Samuel Hunt, receiver, appointed February 20, 1891; Paducah, Tennessee and Alabama, W. L. Huse and John Overton, Jr., receivers, appointed October, 1893; Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern, John Echols and St. John Boyle, receivers, appointed December 28, 1893; Short Route Railway Transfer, John Echols and St. John Boyle, receivers, appointed December 29, 1893; Ohio Valley, John McLeod, receiver, appointed December 30, 1893; Owensboro, Falls of Rough and Green River Railroad, M. V. Monarch, receiver; Middlesborough Belt Railroad, J. H. Bartlett, receiver.

Respectfully submitted,

C. C. MCCHORD,

CHAS. B. POYNTZ,

UREY WOODSON,

COMPLAINT

BEFORE THE

INTER-STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

THE RAILROAD COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY, A PUB. LIC CORPORATION OF SAID STATE, CONSISTING OF C. C. McCHORD, CHARLES B. POYNTZ AND UREY WOODSON, COMMISSIONERS,. Complainant,

VERSUS

THE LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, THE PITTSBURG, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY, THE PENNSLYVANIA RALROAD COMPANY, Defendants.

The petition of the above-named complainant, the Railroad Commission of Kentucky, respectfully shows:

I. That the complainant is a public corporation, created under and organized pursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky; that as such, it is its duty by the laws of said. Commonwealth to examine all through freight rates from points out of this State, viz: the State of Kentucky, to points in same; and whenever it finds that a through rate into or out of this State is excessive or unreasonable, or discriminating in its nature, to call the attention of the officials of the railroad com

pany creating such excesses or unreasonable or discriminating charges, and to urge on such company the propriety of changing such rates and desisting from such discriminations; and when such effort on the part of this complainant shall be unsuccessful, it is made its further duty to present the facts to this Honorable Commission and to appeal to it for relief; and that this petition is filed herein by the said complainant in pursuance of the aforesaid statutory requirement of the State of Kentucky, and on behalf of places hereinafter referred to and of dealers and shippers therein.

II. That the above-named defendants are common carriers, engaged in the through transportation of passengers and property by continuous carriage or shipment and wholly by railroad from points in the States of Kentucky and Tennessee to New York, in the State of New York, and to points in other States north and east of the Ohio river, and as such common carriers, the said defendants are subject to the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce, approved February 4, 1887, and acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto.

III. That certain through or aggregate rates have been established, adopted and enforced, and are now being charged and collected by said defendants for the transportation of tobacco from points served by the defendant, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, in the southwestern portion of Kentucky and the western portion of Tennessee, to the city of New York aforesaid, which, as applied to such transportation from some points in southwestern Kentucky and hereafter specifically mentioned or referred to, are unjust and unreasonable in themselves and relatively as compared with rates so charged on tobacco from other points in the said portions of Kentucky and Tennessee, and subject the first above-mentioned points in southwestern Kentucky, the traffic in tobacco therefrom and dealers therein, to unjust discrimination and undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage, and also constitute and give to said other points in southwestern Kentucky and in western Tennessee unjust, unreasonable and undue preference and advantage, any and all of which is in violation of said Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended. That said through or aggregate rates on tobacco do also result, in some instances, as will