these corporations are interested are certain to come before the Legislature. Its action ought to be free not only from any obligation, conscious or unconscious, but even from a suspicion of such obligation, that the public may have full confidence in its impartiality. The pay now allowed to a member of the Legislature for his services makes

it unjust to put upon him any further expense. I believe the giving of such passes ought either to be forbidden or compelled by law, and that any expense involved should be borne by the State. This may be done by a fair and proper mileage system, which seems, however, to require an amendment to the Constitution, mileage being by it limited to "travelling to the General Assembly and returning home once in every session, and no more;" or you may deem it wise for the State to purchase and give such passes; or, if within its power, to require the railroad corporations to give them. They could hardly object to a law which should compel them to do only what they now do voluntarily.

Another custom of the same character and open to the same criticism I call to your attention,—

the entertainment, often with profuse hospitality, of committees or of other members on behalf of some special interest having legislation pending. Expenses of this nature, properly incurred, ought, in my judgment, to be borne by the State rather than by the special interest, which may thereby gain some advantage. The only remedy seems to be an absolute prohibition of such entertainment.

ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS.

The suggestions I have made in reference to the suffrage, elections and legislation have been with a desire and hope that, if they meet your approval, they will tend to make our government more thoroughly representative, its laws a truer expression of the people's will, and its power more directly within their control. With the same purpose I commend to your consideration its system of administrative and executive work. With much truth Massachusetts has been described as a commission-governed State. Its great Departments of Education, Health, Charities, Prisons, Reform Schools, Almshouse and

Workhouse, Agriculture, Railroads, Insurance, Fisheries, Harbors and Lands, Savings Banks, and others, are governed by independent boards, practically beyond the control of the people. Besides these there are commissions on Gas, Pharmacy, Dentistry, Civil Service, Arbitration, Cattle, Wrecks, Pilots, State Aid, and others for special and temporary purposes. Almost without exception the members of these boards are appointed by the Governor, but only with the advice and consent of nine other men. Their tenure of office is usually for a term of several years, often without power of removal by any one, sometimes subject to removal for cause or otherwise by the Governor with the same consent. The latter power in effect necessitates a trial upon formal charges, which seldom would be made or could be proved, except for flagrant malfeasance in office. The subordinate officials are generally appointed by the boards. These boards and their work are practically beyond the control of the people, or of any one immediately responsible to them, except in the limited power of the Governor occasionally to appoint a single member. The people of the

State might have a most decided opinion about the management and work of these departments, and give emphatic expression to that opinion, and yet be unable to control their action. The system gives great power without proper responsibility, and tends to remove the people's government from the people's control. The head of the Executive Departments of the State, elected by the people and directly responsible to them, has but little power and few duties, except social and perfunctory. I make this criticism on the system with full knowledge that, as a rule, the work of these boards has been excellent and their members faith

ful public servants. But Massachusetts may not always be so fortunate. Is it not far safer to rely upon a sound system than on the chance that a defective system may be made to work well by good officials? I submit that the first essential of sound administration is to couple power with responsibility by making it subject to the people's control. Speaking of this necessity, one of the ablest and most experienced public officials, Mr. Seth Low, has said, "Power without responsibility is always dangerous, but power with responsibility

to a constituency, which can readily call it to account, is not dangerous. It is the first requisite of efficient administration."

To accomplish this, I suggest for your favorable consideration, first, whether boards and commissions, whose work is wholly executive, ought not to be departments of State, each with a single responsible head; second, whether power of removal of their members, for cause stated, ought not to be given to the Governor as the chief executive, thereby compelling him to exercise a supervision of their work, and making him, and so making them, responsible to the people for its administration. Such power has been given to the Mayor of our largest city, as the best and safest system of municipal administration. it not be safely entrusted to the Governor of the Commonwealth? It makes any man conservative; its selfish use for patronage only is fortunately sure to be both disagreeable and destructive.

Can

EDUCATION.

From the earliest days Massachusetts has generously provided for the education of her children