The Bank of the United States is a corporation with exclusive privileges; it is not a public, but a private corporation; consisting of such persons as may become subscribers, their assignees and successors. (Bank charter, sec. 7.) The Federal Government is a subscriber to the amount of seven millions out of thirty-five millions of dollars, and elects directors in proportion to its stock. It may be said that this is, in part, a public, and in part a private corporation. Let it be so. In the Convention, the power of incorporating was proposed to be given to Congress generally, and negatived.

It was proposed to be given in cases where the particular States had not the power, which might, nevertheless, be exercised for the public good; negatived.

It was proposed to grant the power of incorporating, specially, for roads and canals; negatived.

It was proposed three times to incorporate an University; negatived.

To establish post and military roads; negatived.

To establish seminaries for the promotion of literature, arts, and sciences; negatived.

The same for the promotion of agriculture, trade, commerce and manufactures; negatived.

So that in whatever possible form the power of incorporating could be proposed, it was steadily rejected by the Convention. The power of direct incorporation having been thus repeatedly refused to the General Government, can they assume it by indirect means-by unforeseen, unsuspected construction? It is assumed as an indirect means, necessary and proper to carry into effect the following enumerated powers, viz: To collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to borrow money on the credit of the United States; to coin money.

Every written act made in pursuance of a power, should recite in substance the power that authorizes it. In the Bank charter, there is no statement of the express or enumerated power which it is established to execute; no mode and manner of executing it specifically pointed out and prescribed; no power of removal, dismissal, change, or alteration is reserved to Government, if any such should be needed; no directing control, excepting in the proportion of one-fifth; four-fifths belonging to the stockholders. Moreover, several minor incidental privileges are attached to that Bank, which the Constitution will by no means justify; such as to hold lands in mortmain; to enable aliens to hold lands; to change the course of descent into succession both as to lands and chattels; to exempt lands

from forfeiture and escheat; to prohibit the right of taxation by the States.

Against this unanswerable list of usurpations, the advocates of the Bank insist on its great financial utility to the Government and to the nation. We are not inclined to deny that it has greatly contributed to restore specie payments, and to introduce a reasonable approximation to an uniform currency, much better and sooner at least, than we had any prospect of these results without the Bank.

. Let all this be admitted then for the present; and let the people be asked the question, are these results compensation sufficient for the utter destruction of your Constitution-for setting it absolutely at nought-and usurping, in defiance of it, by direct opposition and by ingenious construction, powers that the history of the Convention proves, beyond all doubt, were never meant to be granted? It is well for the president and direction of the Bank, to take that view of the question which a bureau of brokers and bankers' clerks would naturally take; but is this a statesman-like view of it? Is it such a one as an American legislator should adopt? If the Constitution be defective, take the constitutional mode of amending it; but it ought not to be treated by an American Congress as waste paper, or abandoned, as Mr. Gallatin abandons it as a vain effort at impossible attainment.

The next consideration before us is, was the institution of a National Bank imperiously called for by the circumstances of the times, 1816?

This point is greatly laboured by the advocates of the Bank charter, and therefore we notice it. But there are two considerations to be borne in mind on this part of the subject, viz. That the true construction of the Constitution cannot be made to depend on circumstances that have happened thirty years subsequent to the acceptance of that instrument by the people; also, that however expedient the Bank might have been in 1816, there is no such need of it at present, nor is it likely that any of the circumstances that tempted its adoption in 1816 will exist in 1836. Granting its utility when instituted, it is now functus officiis, we may well do without it four years hence. Let us, however, go back to 1816.

It is a fact, that in August and September, 1814, the incorporated Banks from New-York southward, had refused specie payments.

The United States' Bank was chartered 3d of March, 1816, and went actually into operation the latter end of January, 1817.

On the 29th of April, 1816, and the 22d of July, 1816, the resolutions of Congress enabled the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Dallas, to give notice that the taxes and imports would be collected in specie on the 20th of February, 1817.

On the 23d of February, 1817, specie payments were resumed by the Banks generally, particularly by those in Philadelphia.

Since that time, they have been insisted upon from every Bank, whose paper is accepted by the Bank of the United States; prudent indulgencies have occasionally been given by this last mentioned institution; but it may be assumed that no Bank is, or ought to be considered worthy of public credit, but such as give cash for their notes when required.

This is the great secret; had Government, from the beginning, acted on this principle (and they might have done so) no United States' Bank would have been necessary. All that the Bank has done, has been done by a steady adherence to this resolution at their own counters, and by insisting on it from every other Bank. But their own institution has been, for a time, as wofully mismanaged as any other; the want of judgment, in Philadelphia, during the first years of that institution, and the fraudulent mismanagement at Baltimore and elsewhere, put the very existence of this Bank in jeopardy. It was saved by the severe, but energetic measures of Mr. Cheves.

But to whatever mismanagement the present Bank may have been, or may be liable, we think it cannot honestly be disputed, that Mr. Dallas out of the House, with the aid of Mr. Calhoun principally in the House, did so bring their institution to bear on the other Banks, as to compel them into specie payments greatly to the advantage of the public, much sooner than these incorporations would have resumed them with their own conseut; this inference is fairly deducible from the coincidence of times and circumstances. The Committee of the House of Representatives have, in their zeal to display the great utility of their favourite institution, run into some exaggerations and contradictions which they might have avoided; but as these do not reasonably add to, neither do they destroy the merits of the Bank at that period.

That the war with Great-Britain was necessary to our national character, and that it has done us great good in that respect, few people in the present day will deny. But it was forced on a reluctant administration when it was proclaimed; and there was a want of foresight in providing against the exigency, that was truly astonishing. The expenses of that war were double what they might, and ought to have been; and the

derangement of the national finances-the result of general mismanagement-was no greater than might have been expected from antecedent imbecility. Every thing was conducted ill but the fighting part-there was no failure there.

During great part of this war period, the Banks issued their paper, uncontrolled; the paper currency became depreciated; metallic money was superseded and disappeared; the country was inundated with worthless bank notes inconvertible; Mr. Dallas' treasury notes, well imagined, did not succeed, for all the bankers were, of course, opposed to them; the currency of the country became at length so deranged, that it was not surprising men of sound patriotism, were tempted to pass over their constitutional objections and yield their assent to the most plausible scheme that occurred, of reviving public credit. Mr. Dallas was alive to these constitutional objections; but he was at the head of the Treasury, and the finance of the nation pressed heavy on his shoulders; no wonder he felt himself driven to the remedy adopted. He satisfied himself with the same arguments that have so successfully quieted the qualms of Messrs. Madison, Gallatin and McDuffie.

Objectionable as it is, the United States' Bank did prove a remedy; and though it is not every thing that its partial friends and interested defenders would make it, we should be wanting in honest candour, not to acknowledge, that the paper currency of this country has been wonderfully amended by its operations, and is, in consequence of them, in a state, not perfect indeed, but not reasonably to be complained of.

The evils that gave origin to the present Bank, are now seen, and fully understood; they can now be guarded against by 'common prudence; the same exigence for a desperate remedy is not likely ever to occur again; and if it does, the means employed by the Bank of the United States, can now be applied by any other less objectionable institution, or by Government, with equal efficacy. What are those means?

The refusing the notes of every Bank, that does not give cash for its notes when demanded.

To this rule, the Bank itself rigidly conformed; as, from the cash loan negotiated by Mr. Sergeant, and the facilities afforded by Government, well it might.

Another rule of safety remains to be adopted, though we do not feel bound, in this place, to point out how it is to be enforced. We mean, the total abolition, or rigid rejection of every bank note, or any paper substitute, under five dollars.

We have not the slightest hesitation-no, not the slightest, in correcting the number five, by substituting fifteen; filling up the chasm

by eagles, half eagles and quarter eagles; and by dollars, half dollars and quarter dollars.

A mixt currency of this description (no paper lower than fifteen dollars) would be attended with the following advantages:

It would retain, permanently, a sufficient quantity of specie at home, to facilitate the convertible character of all other paper money.

It would prevent the ill consequences of any sudden run upon a Bank from what has, in England, acquired the serio-comic title of "late panic"-the pressure on a Bank, or Banks generally, from any sudden alarm; for this, in all cases, takes place first of all with the numerous holders of small notes, which the present plan would exclude.

It would put a great stop to counterfeiting, which is practised most on that class of society most easily cheated; the poor who hold small notes.

It would be a must meritorious act of mercy and kindness towards the poor, who constitute the mass of every society, and who are the most deeply injured at present by a bank insolvency, because they are the most confiding class, and can least afford to suffer the loss of the small pittance they possess.

It would greatly facilitate the cash payment of taxes.

It would furnish a market for the produce of our gold region, the most extensive hitherto discovered in the world; and the most valuable; inasmuch as it affords no more than an ample remuneration for the labour bestowed. It is not likely to produce any thing like a glut in the bullion market, if we may judge from present appearances, but yields a sufficient profit to those who conduct their works with industry and skill.

We suggest these hints, on the supposition that a mixt currency will continue to be generally adopted throughout the United States; persuaded, however, that the greatest good of the greatest number, will be most effectually promoted by a refusal on the part of every government, to erect any banking corporation whatever, any where, or to any extent, great or small. Let every man who chooses be a bank competitor before the public, and all evils will cure themselves. But if a mixt currency is meant not to degenerate into an inconvertible paper-currency, the circulation of small notes must be somehow or other prevented; else, sooner or later, they will banish bullion.

In the report of the Committee of April, 1830, the great utility of the Bank is argued, from the losses sustained by the community, in consequence of the depreciation of the currency that took place about the time when the Bank was instituted. VOL. VIII. NO. 15.

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