hatreds, and us, with still uninvaded soil, either plunged straightway into conscription, or engaged in a life-anddeath struggle to avert it. The people would enter on that struggle in a mood of war-weariness and war-hatred in which every European nation would share, and an issue in favor of forced service would destroy the national unity, totally alter the character of our political institutions, and undermine the case on which, with a good conscience, the country embarked on a conflict for the ending of the Prussian military spirit. It is enough to repeat that, in my view, no existing British party would survive it without a fundamental and probably a revolutionary change.

But as the country assumes and believes in a victory for the Allies, it is of the utmost consequence to ensure that its deep underlying mood should find embodiment in the terms of peace. It is obvious that nothing which provides for a mere resumption of the war of naval estimates—the war of steel and gold'

would find an assenting party, for that implies the destruction of progressive England. But it is equally out of proportion to insist that the Allied powers should press for a cut-and-dried solution of the problem of armaments

on the crude lines of destruction of the German fleet and naval arsenals. It would be far more pertinent that when the Prussian domination,' to use Mr. Asquith's phrase at the Guildhall, is ended, the Allies should summon and provide for a European Conference. To this assembly Germany, unlike the France of 1815, would necessarily be a party. The Conference would, of course, be a temporary instrument. But it would be specially charged with the constitution of a European or rather a world-Parliament, on which in turn would devolve the settlement of a new scale and a restricted use of purely national forces. Such an issue in itself excludes the notion of a dismembered Germany, taking over from France the seeds of revenge implanted by the Treaty of Frankfort. It is to this general end, with increasing agreement as to means, that Liberal sentiment in France, England, Belgium, and even Russia - mindful of the assistance offered by the Kaiser in 1905 for the crushing of the Russian revolution is moving with no uncertain step.

The one hidden factor is the attitude of Germany after the war. It is there that the supreme danger and uncertainty of the situation rest.

I

"THE Asiatic considers only superior force, and respects those only who he knows will use this superiority to the utmost limit. This respect we have won for ourselves in a signal manner, and it will bear fruit in the future.'

With this vaunt Count von Waldersee greeted his countrymen upon his return, in 1901, from Peking, where he had commanded the German East Asiatic Expedition. As an estimate of the Oriental the statement may well challenge criticism. Its importance lies, however, in the insight which it affords into the principles which have dominated German policy in the Far East. German ships and subjects made their first appearance in China and Japan under British protection. In 1842, by the Treaty of Nankin, England had forced from China recognition for her subjects, and the United States and France followed her example with similar treaties two years later. A decade later still, Commodore Perry opened Japan to foreign intercourse. But it was not till 1860 that a Prussian squadron, on a diplomatic mission representing thirty-three German states, appeared in Eastern waters. Through the assistance and influence of Townsend Harris, the veteran American minister, a treaty was negotiated between Prussia and Japan. The other states of the Confederation were not included in the treaty, the Japanese plenipotentiaries, who were appalled by the long roster of names, not being prepared to

grant treaties by wholesale. Similar assistance was rendered by the British and French representatives in the negotiation of a treaty with China. This treaty, in a secret article, obliged the Prussians to forego for a period of five years the right of diplomatic representation in Peking. During this interval, as before, the subjects of the various German states were glad to avail themselves of the protection afforded by the officials of friendly powers.

In 1866 the first Prussian minister arrived in Peking. He took up his residence in an exceedingly unpretentious building adjoining the British legation grounds. With 1871 there naturally came an accession of prestige, but for many years Germany's position was well represented by the humble quarters in which her diplomatic representative was lodged. Bismarck regarded the lack of vital interests in the Near and Far East as elements of advantage, allowing Germany to maintain a neutral attitude in the disputes of the European powers until such time as she could play her stake at the best odds. Moreover, a conciliatory foreign policy was necessary, in order, as he says in his Memoirs, "To win the confidence, not only of the smaller European states, but also of the Great Powers, and to convince them that German policy will be just and peaceful, now that it has repaired the injuria temporum, the disintegration of the nation.' As expressions of this policy he explains the conciliating attitude of Germany with reference to the Caroline Islands and

Samoa. Until his retirement, therefore, Germany had no well-defined purpose of her own in the Orient, and politically she was a mere makeweight to the general policy of Great Britain.

But this period had not gone by without protest against such a laissez-faire attitude. Von Brandt, who represented the German government in Peking for nearly twenty years, repeatedly urged a more aggressive policy. He was particularly interested in the acquisition of a colony or naval station on the Asiatic coast, and this formed the subject of frequent memoranda to his government. At one time he visited the Island of Yezo, the northernmost of the four large islands of the Japanese group. He was at once impressed by its natural resources, its suitability for German immigration and settlement, and its desirability as a colony. These features he set forth in a lengthy report to his government, in which he stated that the island could readily be acquired by purchase, or, if need be, 'by force.'

II

With the accession of the present Kaiser there came a marked change in policy a change which was emphasized by the disagreement with Bismarck and the Chancellor's retirement. The utterances of the Kaiser became the watchwords of a new era and a new spirit. The young Emperor conceived it to be his duty to extend and enlarge that which his predecessors had bequeathed to him'; 'Germany,' he said, 'must not be crowded out in the universal pressure toward the East' [Drang nach Osten]; Germany must have her 'place in the sun.' He would make himself an Oriental potentate, thereby emulating his imperial grandmother, who appealed to his imagination most profoundly as Empress of India.

Fortunately for his purposes, the Kaiser had inherited from the first Emperor and his Chancellor a long-standing friendship with Russia, and, with this, also a tradition of Russian greatness and power. The work of the Russian empire-builders was then drawing near completion. In 1858 the Czar's dominions had been extended along the left bank of the Amur River to the Pacific Ocean; in 1860 the maritime province of Manchuria, between the Ussuri River and the sea, was ceded by China, together with the use of the harbor of Vladivostock; in 1891 the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad had been begun and the whole scheme of railroad development and territorial absorption had been launched which, in the schemes of Russia's statesmen, was to end only with the complete Russianization of Manchuria and Korea and the predominance of Russian influence throughout China. With this neighboring power, so far-reaching in policies, so irresistible in its advance, the Kaiser threw in his fortunes. For the next decade the threads of German policy in the Far East were closely interwoven with those of Russia. Every step taken by either power received the support of the other, and the advance was rapid.

The understanding was first put into practical effect during the Chinese-Japanese War. For many years the question of suzerainty over Korea had been a matter of dispute between the two neighboring empires. China had regarded Korea as a vassal state from time immemorial; Japan, realizing the designs of Russian policy and the weakness of the Chinese government, sought to establish Korea as an independent state. The real issue was between Japan and Russia, though it took the form of a war with China. Hostilities broke out on July 25, 1894; after a number of disasters, China was compelled

to sue for peace and Li Hung Chang was sent to Shimonoseki. The negotiations between these two powers, much to the disappointment of Germany, France, and Russia, were kept secret, Japan having no doubt detected a desire to interfere and being resolved to confront any protest with the fait accompli.

Her surmise was correct. When, on April 8, 1895, it became known that the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula formed one of the articles of peace, proposals for joint action to avert this result were sent by the Russian government to Berlin, Paris, and London. Germany and France assented, and on April 22, the ministers of the three countries in Tokio made representations to the Japanese government urging the retrocession of the peninsula, 'such territorial acquisition,' in their pious phrase, 'constituting a menace to the peace of the world.'

The answer of the Japanese government was delayed and might in the end have been unfavorable, had there not gone abroad the impression that the representations of the three powers, though couched in friendly terms, expressed a settled course of action. During the peace negotiations, the Russian fleet, assembled at Chefoo, made a demonstration which could leave no doubt in the minds of the Japanese that they were prepared to block any advance to Peking. Two German cruisers were also in the same port. To this was added the fact that the army and navy after the exertions of the past few months were not in a position to undertake new tasks.

Feeling that they had no other choice for the time than to bow to the inevitable, the Japanese government on May 10, 1895, notified the three powers of its compliance. The victors were obliged to satisfy themselves with an indemnity of 30,000,000 taels and promised

to withdraw their troops from Port Arthur and Wei Hai Wei within three months after the payment of that sum. At the last moment Japan attempted to secure an assurance that the Liaotung Peninsula would never be ceded to any other power; but for some reason, which became apparent only in the subsequent aggressive policy of Germany and Russia, the attempt was unsuccessful.

III

With Japan foiled, the two powers were free to pursue their separate designs. By the Cassini Convention Russia secured the right to build her railroad across Manchuria, and also a contingent interest in Port Arthur and a possible lease of Kiao-Chao Bay. Germany immediately began preparations for the seizure of some harbor on the Chinese coast. An expert was sent to the East to report on some point that would satisfy the requirements of a naval station. At various times in 1896 and 1897 German gunboats visited Kiao-Chao Bay and took soundings and observations. This point was finally selected and its acquisition was definitely determined upon. The plan was communicated to the Russian government and received its approval. This was clearly stated by the Foreign Secretary, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, in a speech in the Reichstag toward the close of 1896. The interests of Germany and Russia, so the minister declared, were not confined to the European continent, and these extra-continental interests,' he continued, 'will in all probability furnish us an opportunity of acting in harmony with the power with which we coöperated last year.' Further confirmation of the thorough understanding between the two powers is found in the fact that the acquisition of Kiao-Chao by Germany was not regarded as in

fringing in any way the rights in this same territory which Russia had acquired by the Cassini Convention. Everything was ready for the final coup when, by a happy providence, on November 1, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered in the western part of Shantung Province.

It happened that the unfortunate victims were members of a Catholic society which but a few years before had been expelled from Germany. This fact was now overlooked. In fact, the outrage was most opportune in furnishing Germany with a pretext for the execution of plans which had long been awaiting consummation. On November 10, 1897, a German squadron under the command of Admiral von Diederichs- he of Manila fame-arrived at the entrance of Kiao-Chao Bay and took up a position commanding the barracks and forts, and on the 14th a landing party took possession of the bay and the territory at its mouth, in the name of the German Emperor. On December 3 the large city of KiaoChao, twenty-five miles from the entrance to the bay, was captured, and the Chinese garrison compelled to evacuate. Cargoes of lumber and material began to arrive, and any idea that the German sojourn would be a short one was sufficiently refuted by the substantial barracks and dwellings which were rapidly erected.

With German forces already in possession, negotiations were opened at Peking. The German demands included: (1) An indemnity of two hundred thousand ounces of silver; (2) the rebuilding of a chapel; (3) the repayment of Germany's expenses incurred in the occupation; (4) the dismissal of the governor of Shantung from the public service; (5) The punishment of the murderers; (6) Germans to have the sole right to develop railroads and mines in Shantung Province and to

have a lease of Kiao-Chao as a naval station.

On November 20 the first meeting between Baron von Heyking, the German minister, and the members of the Chinese Foreign Office took place. The Chinese requested that the negotiations be deferred until Kiao-Chao Bay had been evacuated by the German forces. This was met with a decisive refusal. The request was repeated at a subsequent interview, and met with the same answer. On the ground that information in regard to the negotiations was getting abroad, the German minister now demanded that further conferences take place in his legation. Li Hung Chang and his colleagues were therefore compelled to submit to the humiliation of repairing to the legation to discuss this outrage upon Chinese sovereignty. Finding their opponent unyielding, the Chinese negotiators waived the evacuation of Kiao-Chao, and contented themselves with the request that Admiral von Diederichs be instructed to act with moderation, as disaffection was brewing among the people. About this time it was reported that the Emperor had signified to the Grand Council his willingness to accede to articles 1, 2, and 5 of the German demands, but that as regarded the rest, he would lose his life and throne rather than give way to such preposterous claims. In their extremity, Li Hung Chang and his colleagues, recalling the friendly assistance given in 1895, had recourse to the Russian and French legations, but found these deaf to their entreaties.

Contemporaneously with the seizure of Kiao-Chao it had been decided in Berlin to dispatch a squadron to the Far East with reinforcements and supplies. This expedition was entrusted to Prince Henry, the Kaiser's brother. In December, on the eve of the departure of the expedition, occurred the ban