other, would be common alike to all, and none would be either sovereign or independent in their accustomed domestic and internal affairs. But notwithstanding this sovereignty of the several States, within their territorial limits, yet that sovereignty is limited and restricted therein by the national Constitution; for the powers of the States and of the national government, both exist, and are exercised, within the territorial limits of the respective States, as separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other within their respective spheres, and making therein a duality of government.1 But the sphere of action of the national government is as far beyond the judicial powers of the State courts, as if the divisional line of power was marked out by land-marks and boundaries visible to the eye, and sensible to the touch. And so are the processes of each within their spheres of action. Neither may intrude upon the other; within their proper limits or spheres of power and authority neither is responsible to the other; but in cases of conflict of authority, if any such occur, the authority of the United States is supreme over all, so far as is necessary to sustain and preserve the rightful supremacy of the national Constitution, courts and laws. This power results to the Federal courts from the fact that the Constitution of the United States, and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, are declared by the Constitution itself to be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every State are bound thereby, "anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."3 If conflicts of power or jurisdiction unhappily arise, the national 'Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 714; In re Steamboat Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19, 24. * Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406, 407; U. S. v. Keokuk, 6 Wall. 514, 516; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166, 195, 196; Duncan v. Darst, 1 How. 301, 310; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Pennoyer. Neff, 5 Otto, 714, 733; Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 6 Otto, 1 and 10. In the case last cited the United States Supreme Court say: "The govern ment of the United States, within the scope of its powers, operates upon every foot of territory under its jurisdiction. It legislates for the whole nation, and is not embarrassed by State lines. Its peculiar duty is to protect one part of the country from encroachments by another, upon the national rights which belong to all." 3 14th amendment; Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Pennoyer v. Neff, 5 Otto, 714, 733. 12 CONCURRENT JURISDICTION - OPPOSING PROCESS. authority has supremacy, and the questions are to be decided by national courts.1 Concurrent Jurisdiction. Where there is concurrent power in the courts, as on some subjects there is, the general rule of law is that the tribunal which first obtains jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit or particular case, will retain and dispose of it; but to this there is the exception which allows certain suits to be removed from the State courts to the circuit courts of the United States. 2 Opposing Process. And so where processes from different courts, State and Federal, are attempted to be levied upon property of a common defendant, the first levy accompanied with actual possession places the property in legal custody, and will be respected. If this rule of law be violated, and property levied on and reduced to possession, by the Marshal of the United States, on process from a United States court, be taken out of his possession by a sheriff, on the process or orders of a State court, the remedy therefor, of the Marshal, or plaintiff in the writ under which he held the property, is not by injunction from the United States court to restrain the illegal interference simply as such, but the remedy is at law, by action of trespass against the sheriff, or by an attachment against that officer from the United States court, to enforce the proper deference to its process and authority.4 And, upon the same principle, money in the hands of an officer of the United States, and which he holds for purposes of disbursement under the national law, cannot be reached by garnishee process from a State court, in behalf of a creditor of one to whom such money is, by law, about to be paid. 1 Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 407; U. S. . Keokuk, 6 Wall. 514; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227; Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 6 Otto, 1, 10. 2 Shelby v. Bacon, 10 How. 56; Green v. Creighton, 23 How. 90; Peale v. Phipps, 14 How. 368; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166, 196; Exparte Thus, where a purser Holman, 28 Iowa, 89, 105; Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191, 197; Smith v. McIver, 9 Wheat. 532. 3 Taylor v. Caryl, 20 How. 583, 594; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334; Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400. 4 Cookendorfer v. Preston, 4 How. 317. 5 Buchanan . Alexander, 4 How. 20. in the United States Navy held moneys payable to certain seamen as wages, was garnished, by State process, at the suit of a boarding-house keeper, to whom such seamen were indebted for board, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the money was the money of the government until paid over by the purser, and therefore the process of garnishee would not lie, and also for the reason that such proceeding is calculated to obstruct or suspend the functions of government, for that, if allowable, it might equally extend to all the monetary relations of the gov ernment and its distributing agents.1 So goods imported, but not yet entered in a custom house of the United States, are not liable to attachment or other State process against them or their owner. They are in the custody of the United States, and can only be removed from such custody by the persons, and in the manner, contemplated by the acts of Congress. Every proceeding interfering with, or disturbing that custody, is unlawful.2 The first levy of goods and chattels, whether under State or Federal process, places the property in the custody of the law, and withdraws it from liability to the process of the other. By the levy a special property in the goods is vested in the officer, and he may maintain an action for them, if deprived of their custody. Hence two levies under different authorities are incompatible, for the property cannot, at the same time, vest in both the officers. 3 Several Executions held by the Same Officer, or by Different Officers. An officer levying and having two or more executions, against the same defendant, if no legal preference attach to either, may levy both upon the same goods, and, there being no priority on either, the proceeds will be proportionately applied on both (or, if there be priority, the court, if requested, may apply the funds); and, if a levy has first been made on one writ, and another comes afterwards into an officer's hands, he may apply any surplus proceeds, after satisfying the first, upon the latter writ.4 But, in case the writs are held by different officers, this becomes, in a manner, impracticable, and more especially so where 'Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20. v. Clarke, 4 How. 4; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450. • Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400, 403. the writs and the officers represent and rest for their authority upon different jurisdictions, as where one is an officer of a State court and the other an officer of a Federal court, and each holding a writ or writs against the same execution defendant.1 Exempt Property, if Levied on, Recoverable by Suit. Though property levied on lawfully by an officer of a United States court cannot be levied on by State process while thus in the hands of the Marshal, yet it has been held that, if the levy be illegal or wrongful, as where the property levied on execution is exempt by law from execution, levy and sale, that the debtor owner of the property may maintain an action in the State court, against the Marshal personally, for the property. The Jurisdiction first Attaching Controls. Where a State or a Federal court first obtains jurisdiction of a subject matter of litigation, of which these courts have concurrent jurisdiction in law, the court in which jurisdiction thus actually attaches, draws to itself all the attributes of the case, and is entitled to exclusive control and jurisdiction to determine and dispose of the whole case. Therefore, if the defendant therein be subsequently impleaded, of the same subject matter in a State court, he may successfully plead the pendency of the proceedings in the Federal court in bar of the action or proceedings in the State court.3 And if he be sued as a trustee, he is bound so to plead, or else account for any loss that occurs from omitting such duty.4 Therefore, in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the State and national courts, where jurisdiction first attaches over the subject matter of the particular case, in the Federal court, the defendant therein, if sued afterwards, in the same matter, in a State court, may plead the pendency of the suit in the Federal court in bar of the action in the State court, and such plea is effectual in law. If the ruling in the State court be against the validity of the plea, then the defendant has a remedy by writ of error or appeal, as the case may be, to the Supreme Court of the United States, under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act.5 So, where an assignee, for the benefit of an insolvent's creditor, is first brought into a United States court, by a bill in equity to set aside the assignment as fraudulent, filed therein before the institution of any proceeding against him, on the same subject, in a State court, and after being thus impleaded in the Federal court, he is sued in a State court in reference to the same subject matter, he may not only thus defend, successfully, by pleading to the latter proceeding the pending suit in the Federal court, but is bound so to do, or else be held responsible in the Federal court for the consequences, or losses, incurred to the trust fund by omitting so to do.1 In Cases of Conflict United States Supreme Court the Arbiter. The ultimate decision in cases of conflict, or doubtful right, as to the correlative powers of the Federal and State courts, is the appellate power of the Supreme Court of the United States; in all matters touching these powers, the decision of this tribunal, within the pale of its jurisdiction, is supreme.2 State courts have no control whatever over the officers and agents of the national government, as to the discharge of their duties or powers, and cannot by writs of mandamus enforce performance of acts pertaining thereto, nor restrain the same by injunctions.4 3 In Ex parte McNiel, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of these correlative powers of the Federal and State governments, and the regulation thereof, say: "In the complex system of polity which prevails in this country, the powers of government may be divided into four classes. Those which belong exclusively to the States. Those which belong exclusively to the national government. Those which may be exercised concurrently and independently by both. Those which may be exercised by the States, until Congress shall see fit to act upon the subject. The authority of the State then retires and lies in abeyance until the occasion for its exercise shall recur."5 In illustration of these principles, that court holds that the commercial power vested in Congress by the Constitution is partly of this last character. That some of the rules necessary in the regulation of that subject, from the nature of things, must be uniform throughout the country; and that to that extent the |