A party having a right of action may proceed thereon against one and the same defendant, or defendants, in the courts of two or more States, at one and the same time, if the cause of action be a transitory one, but there can be but one satisfaction.' It seems, however, that the pendency of a suit in a Federal court will be good cause for abating a suit between the same parties, and involving the same subject matter, commenced in another Federal court. It has also been held that the pendency of a suit in the State court may be pleaded in abatement to a suit subsequently brought by the same parties, and for the same cause, in the circuit court of the United States. But this is not so clearly established, as will be seen from the cases cited in the note. Where concurrent jurisdiction is entertained by different courts, the better reason seems to be that the one first obtaining cognizance of the case should be a bar to the other. Comity demands it, and the additional fact that otherwise the judgments of the two courts might conflict. But this might be avoided, provided, as soon as judgment is obtained in one court, there would be a stop put to the case pending in the other. And this would give rise to a race of diligence in the courts. Judgment in Another State a Bar or Cause for Abatement. But, although an action pending in another State is no bar to a suit or action, for the same cause of action, in a State court, or cause for abating the same, yet the general ruling is that recovery of a judgment in another State for the identical cause of action is a bar to an action in the court of a State, or United States, for by such recovery the cause of action is extinguished, or merged in the judgment, and no longer exists as a ground of recovery.4 plea of lis pendens is pleaded, ought to be able to see, by inspection of the proceedings relied on in the other action, that the character thereof is such as to subject the defendant to a double recovery for the same cause of action, before allowing the same as a cause of abatement. See, also, McJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 487; Brown v. Joy, 9 John. 221. Hogg v. Charlton, 25 Penn. St. 200, and cases cited above. Ex parte Balch, 3 McL. 221; Earl v. Raymond, 4 Id. 233; Hacker v. Stevens, 4 Id. 535. 3 Earl v. Raymond, 4 McL. 233; U. S. v. Wells, 11 Am. L. Reg. (N. 8.) 494. Contra, White . Whitman, 1 Curt. 494; Whitaker v. Brainson, 2 Paine, 209. See, also, Walsh v. Dur kin, 12 John. 99; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige, 606; Burrows v. Miller, 5 How. Pr. 51; Strong v. Stevens, 4 Duer, 668. North Bank v. Brown, 50 Maine, 214; Bank of North America v. But to be a bar the adjudication must be of the principal matter in controversy, and must be final, upon the merits; it is not sufficient if merely of some collateral or interlocutory motion or proceeding, to bar another action or suit for the principal cause of action involved, or to bar a like motion for a collateral or interlocutory order or proceeding, though the principal subject matter of the two suits be the same, if of such principal subject matter there be not also a former adjudication pleaded and proven. 1 Wheeler, 28 Conn. 433; Cin., etc., R. R. v. Wynne, 14 Ind. 385; Child v. Eureka Powder Works, 45 N. H. 547; Barnes v. Gibbs, 2 Vroom, 317; McGilvrey v. Avery, 30 Vt. 538; Rogers v. Odell, 39 N. H. 452. And the application of this rule will not yield to the fact that an appeal has been taken from the judgment. Bank of North America . Wheeler, supra. Neither will the rule yield to the fact that there is no property of the defendant in the State where the judgment was obtained, but that there is property where the second suit is attempted to be brought. Child v. Eureka Powder Works, 45 N. H. 547. 'Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184, 202; Lazier v. Wescott, 26 N. Y. 146; Walsh v. Durkin, 12 John. 99. CHAPTER XV. PENAL AND STATUTORY ACTIONS NOT ENFORCEABLE IN OTHER STATES. I. ONE STATE CANNOT ENFORCE THE STATUTES AND PENAL LAWS OF ANOTHER. II. A STATE CANNOT, IN VIRTUE OF ITS OWN PENAL LAWS, PUNISH ACTS COMMITTED AGAINST THE LAWS OF ANOther. III. STATUTORY ACTIONS FOR DEATH OF A PERSON. IV. STATUTORY REMEDY, BY INDICTMENT, FOR DEATH OF A PERSON. I. ONE STATE CANNOT ENFORCE THE PENAL LAWS OF Another. Statutory Penalties. Statutory penalties can only be enforced in the courts of the State by the laws of which they are imposed; they cannot be enforced elsewhere either by force of the statute creating them, nor upon the principles of comity.1 Thus, where the capital stock of a banking corporation was limited in amount by law, and a penalty provided for excess of increase thereof, as a forfeiture of the excess, it was held that there could be no extra-territorial enforcement of the forfeiture. And so, where a note was made in one State, and payable therein, with usurious provisions, subjecting the parties to a penalty to be paid to the State in behalf of the school fund, under a statute which required judgment in favor of the State to be rendered for such penalty, in case of suit upon the note, and an action to enforce payment of the note was prosecuted in another State, it was held that the courts of such other State could not render judgment 1 First Nat. Bank of Plymouth v. Price, 33 Md.487; Derrickson v.Smith, 3 Dutch. 116; Halsey v. McLean, 12 Allen, 439; Graham v. Monsergh, 22 Vt. 543; Slack v. Gibbs, 14 Vt. 357; Indiana v. Helmer, 21 Iowa, 370; Scoville v. Canfield, 14 John. 338, 340; De Wolf v. Johnson, 10 Wheat. 367; Van Shaik v. Edwards, 2 John. 355; Van Reimsdick v. Kane, 1 Gall. 371; Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 194, 204; Richardson v. Burlington, 33 N. J. 190; Tanner v. Allen, Litt. Sel. Cases, 25; Barnes v. Whitaker, 22 Ill. 606; Sherman v. Gassett, 9 Ill. 521. 2 First National Bank of Plymouth v. Price, 33 Md. 487. for the penalty, and judgment was rendered for merely the sum justly due.1 In disposing of this case, the Supreme Court of Illinois, CATON, J., said: "With the penalties imposed by the law upon the usurers, for their violation of it, we have nothing to do. That is a matter between the State of Iowa and her citizens. We cannot punish her citizens for violating the laws to which they owe obedience. We cannot render judgment in favor of that State for the benefit of her school funds for the penalty or forfeiture of ten per cent. per annum, which this law imposes. We have no jurisdiction to vindicate the violated majesty of her laws, as was held in Sherman v. Gassett. That task must be left to her own tribunals."3 II. A STATE CANNOT, IN VIRTUE OF ITS OWN PENAL LAWS, PUNISH ACTS COMMITTED AGAINST THE LAWS OF ANOTHER STATE. Penal Statutes and Punishments are Local. Acts rendered penal by law are penal only because the law makes them so; and they are, therefore, only penal if committed where the law is in force that makes them penal. It follows from this that although the laws of a State render certain acts penal, yet they are only so when the acts are committed in that State. If committed elsewhere, they are not penal, except as they may be against the law of the place where committed. If the penal laws of two States be the same, it does not follow that an act committed in one of the States, violating the penal law of that State, also violates the penal law of the other State; but, on the contrary, it only violates the law of the State wherein it is committed. It does not violate the law of the other State, for the reason that the law of such other State had no force where the act was committed; and where there is no law there is no legal wrong. Hence it is, that the penal or criminal laws of one State cannot be invoked by such State to enforce penalties incurred, or to punish acts done in a different State. And it does not matter whether the supposed penalties be to the public or to persons: the rule and the reason thereof are the same: penal laws of one State are never enforced against acts committed or penalties incurred in other States.4 1 Barnes o. Whitaker, 22 Ill. 609. 29 Ill. 521. 3 22 III. 609. Graham v. Monsergh, 22 Vt. 543. In this case, Graham v. Monsergh, the question involved was one of bastardy, which occurred in another State. That is, all the circumstances, including the birth of the child, transpired outside the territorial limits of Vermont, and the parties were, at the time of the occurrences, non-residents. The child was born in the State of New York. The proceeding was had under the statute of Vermont. Objection thereto, and a motion to dismiss, was made on the ground that the statute could "not extend to children begotten and born in a foreign country." At the time of the arrest the mother was temporarily within the State of Vermont, and the child was in the keeping of a family residing therein. The reputed father was arrested in that State. The motion to dismiss being overruled, defendant excepted. The case was then tried on plea of not guilty; a verdict for complainant and order of affiliation was entered against him under the statute. The case was taken to the Supreme Court, and the whole court agreed that such a proceeding was, in its nature, confined to causes of action arising within the State. The learned Justice REDFIELD, delivering the opinion, says: "And if we allow a case which accrued in a neighboring State or province to be brought into our courts, we could not exclude such a case coming from Japan, or Farther India, or Kamschatka; or if we admit such cases to come into our courts from countries where similar laws exist, we must, equally, from countries where no such laws exist, and, for aught we can perceive, from those countries where polygamy is allowed to the fullest extent. We should thus be liable to become engaged in a species of knight-errantry, in a ludicrous attempt to redress the wrongs and regulate the police of other countries, in matters which very little concern us. The truth is, the proceeding is altogether a matter of internal police, and, in its very nature, as exclusively local as is the administration of criminal justice. It is not necessary here to consider how far the case of a woman, bona fide, coming into this State to reside, before the birth of the child, might merit a different consideration. It is supposable, too, that, should the birth of such a child occur during the temporary absence of the mother from the State, with the continuance of the animus revertendi, she might, on her return to the State, be entitled to proceed against the father under the statutes." The proceeding was or |