power to make them must necessarily be exclusively in Congress, as clearly so as if expressly declared. That others may be allowed to vary, with varying circumstances and differences of locality. That in the latter cases, the States may prescribe the rules to be observed, until Congress shall supersede them by its own enactments, made in virtue of the national Constitution, which is the supreme law. 1

Injunctions. State courts cannot, by injunction or otherwise, stay or arrest the processes, or jurisdiction, of a United States court, or in any manner interfere therewith. It is not by reason of paramount jurisdiction of the Federal courts that this cannot be done, but because in their sphere of action the Federal courts are independent of the State tribunals. So, for the same reason, State courts are exempt from all interference of the Federal tribunals. The United States circuit courts, and the State courts, act separately and independently of each other, and, in the language of the United States Supreme Court, “in their respective spheres of action, the process issued by the one is as far beyond the reach of the other as if the line of division between. them was traced by land-marks and monuments visible to the eye."4 This, too, although their action be within the same territorial limits.

Relative Powers. The national Constitution has clearly and wisely defined the respective spheres of these State and national judiciaries, and their relative subordination to, or supremacy of, each other, by an express grant of the powers of the national courts, thereby indicating with equal clearness and wisdom those appertaining to the courts of the States, in this, that by the same instrument it is declared that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." This clause evidently refers as well to judicial powers as to others, and the deduction therefrom is that when the judicial

powers which, by the Constitution, are expressly granted to the United States courts, are stated and enumerated, then all other rightful judicial powers of republican governments are to be recognized as remaining with the States, and are in the courts thereof, respectively, so far as their exercise has been authorized by the respective State legislatures and constitutions; or unless modified or restricted by some express prohibition of the Constitution of the United States.

To enumerate these grants, then. By Section 2 of Article III. of the Constitution, it is declared that: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases, before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make."

Here, then, is the extent of the national judicial power. All else, except where prohibited, remains in the States; and except such, if any, as may be conferred by subsequent constitutional amendments. How this grant of power has been distributed by Congress, among the several national courts, is not material to this treatise, other than in a general way, as our more immediate purpose is to treat of the inter-State relation and distribution of the judicial powers, as between the State and national judiciaries, and also, as to the inter-State relations of the several States themselves, and their courts, toward each other, and not to the practical or administrative exercise thereof by the courts of either the one or the other, further than may incidentally become necessary in prosecuting the main purpose of this work.

Domestic Character of Judgments. Judgments of the national courts are not foreign to the courts of the respective districts, nor are they foreign in their relation to the courts of the several States; but are domestic and homogenous throughout the nation, in like manner as those of the State courts are throughout the States in which they are rendered.1

The judgments, decrees and proceedings of the national courts prove themselves everywhere by the seal of the court from which they emanate, and need no such additional authenticity as the judge's certificate, or other evidence of their genuineness, than a certificate of the clerk and the seal of the court. These are prima facie evidence of their validity in all other American courts, State and national. They do not come within the provisions of Section 1 of the 4th Article of the Constitution, or the act of Congress relative to the authentication of records and judicial proceedings of the several States, in each State, but are of themselves entitled to full faith and credit in every State and Territory, and wherever our national jurisdiction extends, and in every department thereof.2

In like manner the records and proceedings of the State and Territorial courts, certified and authenticated by the clerk, and seal of the court, so as to give them authenticity in the courts of the same State, will also give them authenticity and credit in the courts of the United States, without the particular authentication prescribed by act of Congress in respect to their authentication for use in the courts of another State; for the act of Congress in that respect is not applicable to the records and proceedings certified from a State to a Federal court, these courts not being foreign to each other, as the State courts of the different States are.3

Trial by Jury. Private Property for Public Use. The provision of the United States Constitution that secures the right of

1 Er parte Schollenberger, 6 Otto, 369, 376, 379, may be cited as bearing upon this subject.

2 Article 4, Cons. U. S.; Thomson v. Lee Co., 22 Iowa, 206; Reed v. Ross, 1 Bald. C. C. 36; Niblet v. Scott, 4 La. Ann. 245; St. Albans v. Bush, 4 Vt. 58; Barney v. Patterson, 6 Harr. & J. 182; U. S. v. Wood, 2 Wheeler's Cr.

Cases, 326; Murray v. Marsh, 2 Hayw. (N. C.) 290; Buford . Hickman, Hempst. 232; Mason v. Lawrason, 1 Cr. C. C. 190; Mewster v. Spalding, 6 McLean, 24; Bennett v. Bennett, Deady, 299; Dean v. Chapin, 22 Mich. 275.

Mewster v. Spalding, 6 McLean, 24; Bennett v. Bennett, Deady, 299.

trial by jury, has reference to trial in courts of the United States, and not to those of the several States. Likewise the provision that private property shall not be taken for public use, without compensation therefor. This inhibition binds the Federal government only, and is not obligatory upon the governments of the States. In the case here referred to, of Barron v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, the Supreme Court of the United States, MARSHALL, C. J., say: "The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual States. Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated."

2. Citizenship and Allegiance. The Constitution of the United States declares that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside.4

5

This amendatory declaration but reflects the prior annunciations of the Supreme Court, in respect to the citizens of the United States being, in virtue thereof, citizens of the States in which they reside. In the case here cited, of Gassies v. Ballon, the party alleged that he was a naturalized citizen of the United States, and resided in the State of Louisiana. The allegation was held to be equivalent to an averment direct that the party making it was a citizen of the State of Louisiana. MARSHALL, Ch. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "A citizen of the United States, residing in any State of the Union, is a citizen of that State." Thus the citizenship of the State, where resident, is recognized as flowing from that of citizenship of the United States, both by the Federal ruling of the Supreme Court, and by the Constitution as subsequently amended, being a reflex of the unity of government and national supremacy referred to in the preceding section of this chapter. Or, as Chief Justice

1 Proffatt on Trial by Jury, § 83; Livingston v. Mayor of New York, 8 Wend. 85, 100; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243.

'Barron, etc. v. Mayor, ctc., of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243.

87 Pet. 247.

Article 14, § 1, of Amendments to the Constitution.

'Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. 761.
• Ibid.

MARSHALL expresses it, "The national and State system are to be regarded as one whole." This supremacy and sovereign unity of government, in a national point of view, is still more strongly indicated in the oath of allegiance required by law of Congress to be administered to persons when being naturalized. The sworn allegiance is that he will support the Constitution of the United States, and not of any State.

3. Suits between Two or More States. In suits between two States, involving a civil controversy, the Constitution vests the jurisdiction exclusively in the Supreme Court of the United States. 1

Such jurisdiction is limited to civil controversies, as contradistinguished from those of a political nature. It is necessary that some right of property, or pecuniary interest, or value, be involved for determination of the court. Mere political interests or questions will not, alone, confer jurisdiction, for such are not the subject of judicial investigation or control, as has been shown in Chapter I. of this work. The political right to be a State cannot be determined in any court. Such questions do not come within the compass of judicial authority, but are to be determined by the political departments of the government. So, in regard to the right of a State to be a member of the American Union. In all these cases, the action of the political departments — the President and Congress of the United States-determines the matter, and will be accepted and conformed to by the courts, as a finality. But where the proper element of jurisdiction is present in a cause, jurisdiction thus far will not be prevented by the presence of political elements."

1 § 2, Art. 3, Cons. of U. S.; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657. 2 Georgia v. Stauton, 6 Wall. 74; Georgia v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 500; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 755; New Jersey v. New York, 3 Pet. 461, and 5 Pct. 284; Kentucky v. Ohio, 24 How. 66; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478; Missouri v. Iowa, 7 How. 660, and 10 How. 1; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1; Fellows

v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366; Foster .. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet. 511; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343. The State must be a party on the record. Osborn v. Bank of U. S. 9 Wheat. 738. But a suit against a governor of a State, as such, answers this require ment. Governor of Georgia v. Mandrazo, 1 Pet. 110.