rule applies to questions of infancy, coverture, majority and of legal capacity generally. Thus persons having attained to their majority or being of contracting age by the laws of the State wherein they contract, may do so in reference to personal interests and matters wherever such interests and property may be, whether in one State or any other. But if the transaction be for the selling or conveyance of lands, then the capacity to sell or convey must be such as is required by the law of the State wherein the lands lie, and this too whether the contract be made or executed in the State of the vendor's domicile or in the State where the lands are situated, or in an entirely different State from either. In other words, the law of the State where the lands. lie governs as to the age of contracting and other capacity of persons selling or conveying the same; but the law of the place of contracting, as above stated, governs as to capacity to contract in selling or conveying personal property, and in all contracts of a personal nature. The mere question of majority and freedom from parental control is regulated by the law of the domicile. At common law it was as to both sexes at the age of twenty-one. By the civil law, as in force in Louisiana at the time of its cession to the United States, persons attained their majority at the age of twenty-five. But by the act of the Legislature of Orleans Territory of the 20th of May, 1806, the law in this respect was changed, to take effect in two years next from that date. By this change the age of twenty-one, as at common law, was fixed as the time of attaining to majority.3 By the same act it was provided that persons then in said Territory who had come therein from any other country and persons thereafter coming therein from another country, of twentyone years of age, and who had attained to their majority in the country from whence they came, according to the law thereof, should continue to enjoy the rights of majority in the Territory.4 Capacity to Marry. Capacity of persons to marry depends, as a general principle, upon the law of the country or State wherein the marriage is celebrated, and not upon the law of the 1 Huey's Appeal, 1 Grant's Cases, 51; Story's Conflict of Laws, §§ 51, 65; Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251; White . Howard, 46 N. Y. 144. 2 See cases cited above. domicile, if the marriage take place in a different State or sovereignty. There are exceptions to this rule of cases, involving usages, laws or customs, which outrage the moral senses and principles of the advanced civilization of the age, as for instance polygamous and incestuous marriages, though tolerated where entered into, will not be regarded as legal in communities where such practices are inhibited by law. But where there is a mere inhibition or incapacity to marry in one State and marriage is had in another, it is otherwise, as where a citizen of New York, who labored under disability to marry again during the lifetime of a former wife from whom there had been a divorce, married again in New Jersey, himself and the person whom he so married in New Jersey both residing at the time in New York and continued thereafter to reside in New York until his death, the widow was adjudged entitled to dower as his widow by lawful marriage, she having no knowledge at her marriage of the exist ing inhibition in law to her husband's marriage in New York, and it not appearing that they went to New Jersey to be married in order to evade the effect of the law of New York. 3 But where parties are incapacitated by the law of their domicile from marrying, and with the intent to avoid such law escape into another jurisdiction where their marriage is valid and are there married, and then return to the place of their domicile, such a marriage will be considered as invalid as being in contravention of the law by which the parties were governed.4 Plea of Infancy. When the plea of infancy is set up in defense of a suit on a contract made in a different State than the one wherein the suit is pending, then the law of the place of making the contract is the rule of decision; and if there be no evidence before the court as to what that law is, then the common law on the subject is presumed to be the law. So that proof 1 Pondsford v. Johnson, 2 Blatchf 51; 2 Kent's Com. *459 and notes; Story's Conflict of Laws, § 101 et seq. See supra, Chap. XVIII. Pondsford v. Johnson, 2 Blatchf. 51; 2 Kent's Com. * 459. Pondsford v. Johnson, 2 Blatchf 51; State v. Kennedy, 76 N. C. 251; Commonwealth . Kinney, 6 The Reporter, 733; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157; Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick. 433; Stevenson v. Gray, 17 B. Mon. 193. Le Breton . Nouchet, 3 Martin, 60; 2 Kent's Com. * 459 and notes. 5 Holmes v. Mallett, Morris, (Iowa,) 82; and, ante, Inter-State Law of Contracts, Chap. VIII.; Huey's Appeal, 1 Grant's Cases, 51. of an age, at the time of making the contract, which fixes infancy on the defendant within the terms of the common law, dispenses with the necessity of evidence to prove the law of the place of the contract in support of the plea.1 18 1 Holmes v. Mallett, Morris, (Iowa,) C CHAPTER XX. LEGAL STATUS AND JURISDICTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND PERSONAL INTERESTS. I. THE LEGAL STATUS FOLLOWS THE OWNER. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE. SALES AND TRANSFERS VALID WHERE made are VALID ELSEWHERE. LOCALITY AND SITUS OF MONEY OBLIGATIONS AND DEBTS. SUBSCRIPTIONS TO CAPITAL STOCK. VIII. VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS. IX. WHEN PERSONAL PROPERTY IS TAXABLE. I. THE LEGAL STATUS FOLLOWS THE OWNER. No fixed Situs. In the language of RANNEY, J.," personal property has no fixed situs." It" adheres, in contemplation of law, to the person of the owner, and is disposed of in almost every respect, whether of transfers inter-vivos, testamentary dispositions, or successions by the law of his domicile." This is a universal rule of law among all civilized people, and has become a sort of common law of the world. So thoroughly is it a part of the jus gentium or law of nations, that instead of the local law of place giving way to it as matter of comity, it is itself, in virtue of its universality, a part of the local law in every civilized community. In the language of the court, in Despard v. Churchill," personal property is subject to the law which governs the person of its owner, 1 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300; Ackerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N. Y. 86; Partee v. Silliman, 44 Miss. 272. 2 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424, 429; Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black. 665, 690; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 John. Ch. 460; Harvey v. Richards,' 1 Mas. 381; Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394; DeCouche v. Savetier, 3 John. Ch. 190; DeGobry v. DeLaistre, 2 Har. & John. 193; Shultz v. Pulver, 3 Paige, 182; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300. 8 53 N. Y. 192. as to its transmission by last will and testament; and this principal, though arising in the exercise of international comity, has become obligatory as a rule of decision by the courts." As is said by Lord LOUGHBOROUGH: "It is a clear proposition, not only of the law of England, but of every country in the world where law has the semblance of science, that personal property has no locality. The meaning of that is, not that personal property has no visible locality, but that it is subject to that law which governs the person of the owner, both with respect to the disposition of it and with respect to the transmission of it, either by succession or by the act of the party. It follows the law of the person. The owner, in any country, may dispose of his personal property. If he dies, it is not the law of the country in which the property is, but the law of the country of which he was a subject, that will regulate the succession." And RANNEY, J., in Swearingen v. Morris, above cited, says: "Indeed, so universally has it been treated as a part of the jus gentium, and thus incorporated into the municipal law of every country, that C. J. ABBOTT declared it not correct to say, that the law of England gives way to the law of the foreign country; but that it is a part of the law of England that personal property should be distributed according to the jus domicilii." Justice RANNEY adds: "The doctrine has been universally acted upon in this country, and it will be readily seen that it could nowhere be applied with greater benefit or less inconvenience than between the States of the American Union." II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE. Local Liabilities. To this general rule of the law there are these exceptions: That visible or tangible personal property situated in another State than that of the owner's domicile is there first liable, by paramount right of the local government, and of creditors of the owner therein resident, to be distributed in satisfaction of all just demands against the same or against the owner thereof, which the local government or its citizens or subjects3 are 1 Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black. 690. 2 14 Ohio St. 424, 429. Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424, 429; Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657. And if claimed under a transfer of the owner, as, for instance, an assignment with preferences, for benefit of creditors, then if such transfer be prohibited by the law of the State where the property is situ |