entitled to, and is there liable, also, to taxation, if in a different sovereignty.1 A sale or transfer by the owner, valid where the owner lives, is valid in the State where the property is, not only as between the parties thereto, but also as against all others, except citizens or subjects of the State wherein the property is, having prior just claims against the owner, to which it may be subject, or as against the claims of the State itself. The right of satisfaction of these out of the property is paramount. So if the owner die intestate, the property is to be distributed in the manner and to those to whom it descends by the law of his domicile at the time of his death, but being first subject to such local claims of persons or the State as exist where it is situated. The residue, after satisfying these, is to be thus distributed by the local court, or turned over to the administrator of the domicile of the deceased to be then distributed. And in like manner a devise or testamentary disposition of the personal property, valid by the law of the domicile of the testator, is (subject to the liabilities and exceptions aforesaid,) valid where the property is situated in such other jurisdiction, and will be so distributed, either by the court of the country where situated, or else the residue, after satisfaction of liability, will be turned over to the administrator or executor of the deceased, in the courts of the country of his late domicile. But this rule of law, though general, as before stated, is nevertheless subject to alteration or legislative control of the several States, they being sovereign in their own domestic affairs; and therefore, where a different rule is by statute enacted in a State, then such local statutory law of such State will govern in regard to personal property therein situated, although the property be owned by a resident or citizen of another State. So, if ated, it will not be enforced in the courts of such State as against credi tors of the assignor. Ibid.; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N, Y. 192, 199. 'See Post Sec. IX. of this chapter. 2 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103; Kelly v. Crapo, 45 N. Y. 86. Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424; Johnson v. Copeland, 35 Ala. 521; Hill v. Townsend, 24 Tex. 575; Townes v. Durbin, 3 Met. (Ky.) 352; Grattan v. Appleton, 3 Story, 755; 4 Swearingen v. Morris, 14 Ohio St. 424; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381; Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128; Despard e. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192, 199; Dupuyo. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; 2 Kent's Com. *429. 5 Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192, 200. to enforce the law of the owner's domicile, or to enforce a sale of property there made by him, valid where made, would violate the policy of the State where the property is situated, or be contrary to good morals, or work an injury to citizens or residents of such State, the law of the former will control. So, if the personal property has a sort of fixed locality and purpose, as if the owner has mills or other local property to which there is personal property appurtenant or servient in its uses, then the rule of law is in some respects different. Under such circumstances personal property thus servient may pass with the realty, under the local laws of the State or country. In regard, however, to remitting the effects of assets of a decedent's estate to the administration at the domicile, after satisfying local claims, it is held not to be so much a rule of imperative law requiring the same to be done, as it is a matter within the just and sound discretion of the court. 3 Leaseholds. The proceeds of leasehold estates are to be regarded as personal effects, and as coming within the rule of following the person of a decedent, and as distributable in accordance with the law of his domicile.4 III. SALES AND TRANSFERS VALID WHERE MADE, ARE VALID ELSEWHERE. A legal transfer of personal property by a duly recorded deed in a State where such transfer carries the ownership, and is valid irrespective of possession thereof, has like validity in all other States where property of the description transferred is by law recognized as property, notwithstanding the absence of possession under such transfer, and notwithstanding no record is made. of the deed, in the State or States to which such property is removed, and irrespective of any law of such latter State or States requiring, as a prerequisite to validity, the recording of transfers of such property, where the possession thereof has not passed with the transfer to the grantee in the deed. The contract being valid where made, and not made in reference to performance in 1 Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657; Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 192, 200. 2 Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300. 192, 200; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mas. 381; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103. Despard v. Churchill, 53 N. Y. 4 192. any particular place, is valid everywhere else where the subject matter of it is regarded in law as property. The local State laws thus requiring recording are intended to operate on property within the State, and contracts or sales made within such State, and cannot affect contracts made out of the State as to property also out of the State at the time, however the latter be brought into the State thereafter.1 Thus, when an absolute title to movables is acquired in a State where the property is situated by the laws of that State, such title will be respected in every other State wherein the property comes, if it be such property or thing as by law of the latter State is regarded as legitimate subject of ownership.2 If, in making such title, the laws of the other State wherein the title was acquired come in question, they are to be proven as facts, State courts not taking notice of the statute laws of other States. 3 In Suarez v. Mayor of New York, the vice-chancellor lays down the same doctrine in the following terms: "It is an universal principle of jurisprudence at this day, in civilized countries, that the succession of personal or movable property, wherever situated, is governed exclusively by the law of the country where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death." 4 Sales Valid and Sales Invalid for Illegal Intent. Although it is the law that if property be sold, and delivered, in the State where the contract is made, and the sale is there legal, and no further act is to be done to complete the transaction on the part of the vendor, the price thereof may be recovered in another State wherein by law such sales would be illegal; yet if the intent is that the goods shall be illegally sold in another State, or that the vendor shall do some act to assist or aid in the illegal sale, the contract will be treated as void, and will not be enforced in the 1 Bank of United States v. Lee, 13 Pet. 107; De Lane v. Moore, 14 How. 253, 266; Bruce v. Smith, 3 Har. & John. 499; Crenshaw . Anthony, Martin & Yerger, 102, 110; Rabun v. Rabun, 15 La. Ann. 471; Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29, 32. 2 Taylor . Boardman, 25 Vt. 581. 3 Taylor . Boardman, 25 Vt. 581; Dakin. Pomeroy, 9 Gill, 1. And if no proof be given of what the law of the other State is, then the presumption is that it is the same as the law of the forum. Ibid. 42 Sandf. Ch. 173. 5 Banchore. Mansel, 47 Maine, 58, 61. State where it contemplated the goods were to be disposed of, and wherein by law such sales are prohibited. The case of De Lane v. Moore involved an ante-nuptial contract entered into and recorded in the State of South Carolina, where the property then was, and the parties then resided; after making and recording the contract, the parties thereto removed to, and became citizens of Alabama, taking the property with them, and there retaining it. After the death of the wife, the husband sold it, or a portion of it, in violation of the ante-nuptial contract. One defense against the right of the wife and her representatives set up was, that for want of recording in Alabama, the contract was inoperative, inasmuch as the husband exercised continuously the outward evidences of possession and apparent ownership; but the Supreme Court of the United States as to that point, ruled in favor of the continued force and validity of the contract. DANIEL, J., in delivering the opinion of that court, says: "The position here advanced is not now assumed for the first time in argument, in this court. It has, upon a former occasion, been pressed upon its attention, and has been looked into with care, and unless it be the intention of the court to retrace the course heretofore adopted, this may be now, as it formerly was, called an adjudicated question. The case of The Bank of the United States v. Lee, brought directly up for examination of this court, the effect of a judgment and execution obtained by a subsequent creditor in the District of Columbia, upon property found within that district, but which had been settled upon the wife of a debtor, by a deed executed and recorded in Virginia, according to the laws of that State, the husband and wife being at the time of making the instrument, inhabitants of the State of Virginia. The question was elaborately investigated, and the cases from the different States, founded on their registry acts, carefully collected. This court came unhesitatingly and clearly to the conclusion, that the deed of settlement executed and recorded in favor of Mrs. Lee, in conformity with the laws of Virginia, protected her rights in the subject matter settled, against the judgment of the subsequent creditor in the District of Columbia." Thus, it seems to be well settled in these States, that the ownership of personal property, and its liability * * * * * * 1 Smith v. Godfrey, 28 N. H. 379; 2 13 Pet. 107. Wilson v. Stratton, 47 Maine, 120. or non-liability to sale by another, or to execution for the debts. of another, are not affected by its removal out of one State into another; for although in the case of De Lane v. Moore,1 the ultimate ruling was against the claim of the wife's heirs, yet that ruling was expressly put upon the staleness of the claim, and the great lapse of time between the time of their arrival of age, the death of the parents, and the time of commencing the suit. IV. DISTRIBUTION OF A DECEASED PERSON'S MOVABLES. Follows the Law of his Domicile. The personal property of persons who die intestate is distributable according to the law of the deceased person's domicile, without regard to the place of his death, or the jurisdiction in which the property is situated; and such, too, is the rule in questions involving, in such cases, the inheritable capacity of claimants, as their legitimacy, marriage, and degrees of relationship.2 These principles have prevailed so long and so universally, that they have come to be regarded as part of the law of nations.3 If such be the national usage among governments foreign in every respect to each other, then still more forcible is the reason of the rule among kindred communities like the American States. WAYNE, J., quoting from Erskine's Institutes of the Laws of Scotland, says, in substance, that when a Scotchman dies abroad, his personal estate, in case he dies intestate, descends according to the law of Scotland; and that when a foreigner dies in Britain, his personal estate descends according to the law of his domicile or own country; and that such is the law, whatever the locality of the property may be, and that this law of Scotland, which is an instance of the law of the other European countries on the subject, was at one time different, but is now in accord with the general law, it having been so brought into harmony with the law of the rest of Europe by the decision of the House of Lords, in Bruce v. Bruce, 6 Brown's Par. Cases, 550, 1 14 How. 266, 267, 268. Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 465, 466; Warren v. Hofer, 13 Ind. 167; McClerry v. Matson, 2 Ind. 79. And in case of ancillary administration, the remaining property, after admin. istration, should be remitted to the administrator of the domicile by order of court for distribution. Ibid. Green v. Rugely, 23 Tex. 539; Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N. Y. 394, 404, 405. Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400. |