566.1 In the earlisest decision reported on the subject in the English law, Lord HARDWICKE recognized the rule, that personal estate in cases of intestacy, follows the person and becomes distributable as provided by the law of his domicile. He reaffirmed the same doctrine a few years afterwards, and such has been the doctrine of the English courts ever since. The Supreme Court of the United States, WAYNE, J., in Ennis v. Smith, say: "In the United States the rule has been fully recognized," and that "the rule prevails, also, in the ascertainment of the person who is entitled to take as heir or distributee." So it may be regarded as well settled law, that wherever a person may die intestate, his personal property is distributable wherever it may be, according to the law of his domicile.4 Lands Descend According to the Law of the State wherein Situated. Not so, however, in regard to the realty. Lands descend, in all cases of intestacy, according to the law of the State or territory in which they are situated." Removal from the State. If the family of a decedent removes from the State wherein he dies, and take with them, or remove, the personal property of the deceased, into another State, before administration is granted of the estate, and administration be had in the State into which the property is thus removed, then the rights of distribution thereof is in accordance with the laws of the place of decedent's domicile, and from which the property has been removed. Creditors seeking enforcements of their claims must do it through administration in the State to which the property is removed." Proof of the Law of the Domicile of Deceased. The law under which such right of distribution is claimed, or under which any other right is claimed, must be produced and proven by the 1 Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 424, 425. Pipon v. Pipon, 1 Ambl. 26; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 750; Burne v. Cole, 1 Ambl. 415. 3 Thorne v. Watkins, 2 Ves. Sr. 35. Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400, 424, 425; Olivier v. Townes, 14 Martin, 92, 99; Shultz v. Pulver, 3 Paige, 182. 5 U. S. v. Fox, 4 Otto, 315, 320; Wat kins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Clark v. Green v. Rugely, 23 Tex. 539. party claiming the benefit thereof.1 And if not so produced and proven, it will be presumed by the court to be the same as the law of the forum, or place where the court is held. The law, if statutory, should be proven in accordance with the act of Congress of May 26th, 1790.8 V. THE LOCALITY OR SITUS OF MONEY OBLIGATIONS AND DEBTS. Follows the Owner's Domicile. The legal situs, or locality, of bonds, mortgages, and debts generally, and all obligations and undertakings for payment of money, and all choses in action, follows the personal domicile of the owner thereof, and is not taxable at the residence or domicile of the debtor.5 Exception as to Bank Notes. To this doctrine of legal situs there is an exception of circulating bank notes. In the case of Cleveland, Painesville & Ashtabula Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, the United States Supreme Court advert to and disregard the several decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holding a different doctrine from the above. An effort was made by law to tax the bonds, held by non-residents, on the Cleveland, Painesvillle & Ashtabula Railroad, and to collect the tax by requiring the railroad company to withhold the amount from dividends of such bondholders and to pay the same to the State. The Supreme Court of the United States held, not only that the State laws had no extra-territorial force, and therefore could not reach the property of the bondholders, but also that such legislation was void as in violation of the contract between the bondholders and the debtor corporation. That court, FIELD, J., say: "The bonds issued by the railroad company, in this case, are undoubtedly property, but property in the hands of the holders, not property of the obligors. So far as they are held by non-residents of the State, they are property beyond the jurisdiction of the State." A contrary doctrine would give to an obligation as many places of local situs as there might be different domiciles in different States of joint and several obligors or debtors. Nor does it alter the case that the debt be secured by mortgage on real estate situated in a different State than that which is the domicile of the creditor. The mortgage is but a security, and confers no interest on the creditor in the mortgaged property, but only a right to realize his debt thereof over others. If such local mortgage could give a situs to the debt or bonds secured thereby, then in case the security be on lands in different counties or States, which of these localities would become the situs of the debt? It could not be at each. It is with the creditor, or that one of them, if several, who holds possession of the obligation. It follows the person. And a debt is not property.3 VI. MORTGAGES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. Mortgages of personal property made in the State where the property is at the time situated, and which are there recorded as required by law, so as to be valid where made, will be held valid in every other State into which the property is afterwards carried or removed. This, too, is the law, although possession of the property remains in the mortgageor. 5 VII. SUBSCRIPTIONS TO CAPITAL STOCK. Governed by Law of the Company's Residence. Subscriptions made in one State to the capital stock of a private corporation which exists by law in another State, and there transacts and carries on its business and has its principal offices or places of business, are contracts to be performed in the latter State at such place of business, and are governed and are to be construed by the laws of that State. VIII. VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS. Of Personalty, How far Valid in Other States. Voluntary assignments of personal property for the benefit of creditors, 'Cleveland, Pain. & Asht. R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300. 2 Ibid. 3 Murray v. Charleston, 6 Otto, 432. 4 Jones v. Taylor, 30 Vt. 42; Fergu son v. Clifford, 37 N. H. 86; Jeter v. Fellowes, 32 Penn. St. 465; Fouke v. Fleming, 13 Md. 392; Wilson v. Carson, 12 Md. 54; Shelton v. Marshall, 16 Tex. 344. Jones v. Taylor, 30 Vt. 42. Penobscott R. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 12 Gray, 244. when valid by the laws of the State wherein they are made, are, upon general principles of public policy and comity, recognized in the courts of other States as obligatory, whether such assignments would have been valid or not if made in such other of the States wherein they are sought to be enforced, except in so far as bona fide transfers, payments, liens, or other interests may have intervened.1 Of Realty, Must Conform to the Lex Loci Rei Sitæ. An assignment to creditors made in one State or Territory of lands situated in a different State, must conform to the law of the place where the lands are situated, in the legality of its purpose. Its validity depends upon the lex loci rei sito. Thus, an assignment executed in the District of Columbia, in view of insolvency of the makers, of lands situated in the State of Iowa, and designed to prefer certain creditors, is repugnant to the law of Iowa inhibiting such preferences, and will, therefore, be held of no effect in Iowa, and in equity will be set aside." IX. WHERE PERSONAL PROPERTY IS TAXABLE. Taxable Property. Goods and chattels, horses, cattle, and other movable property of a visible or tangible character, are liable to taxation in the jurisdiction or State wherein the same are, and are ordinarily kept, irrespective of the residence or domicile of the owner.3 Legal protection and taxation are reciprocal, so that such personal property and effects of a co poreal nature, or that may be handled and removed, as receives the protection of the law is liable to be taxed by the law where it is thus protected. But this rule does not apply to property 'Brashear v. West, 7 Pet, 608; Black v. Zacharie, 3 How. 483; Mowry v. Crocker, 6 Wis. 326; Whipple v. Thayer, 16 Pick. 25; Burlock v. Taylor, 16 Pick. 335; Daniels v. Willard, 16 Pick. 36; Means v. Hapgood, 19 Pick. 105; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 John. Ch. 460; Sanderson v. Bradford, 10 N. H. 260; Saunders v. Williams, 5 N. H. 213; Smith . Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 23 Wis. 267; Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29, 32; Atwood v. Protection Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 555. Loving . Pairo, 10 Iowa, 282. Hartland v. Church, 47 Maine, 169; Steere v. Walling, 7 R. I. 317; Mills v. Thornton, 26 Ill. 300; People v. Com'rs Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 292, Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind. 288; Blackstone Manf. Co. v. Inhabitants of Blackstone, 13 Gray, 488; Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. County of Mor gan, 14 Ill. 163. 4 Bank of U. S. v. Mississippi, 12 Sm. & M. 456; De Pauw v. New Albany, 22 Ind. 204; Egleston v. Charleston, 1 Tread. (S. C.) Const. 45. which is in transit, or which is temporarily within a State, as, for instance, if a resident of one State go into another on a visit or business, traveling in his own conveyance, or carrying with him personal effects for his own use during his temporary stay, or sent into a State for sale, such property is not subject to taxation there, although entitled to and receiving the temporary protection of the law for the time being. 1 Intangible Property. Interests of an intangible character are taxable only where the owner makes his residence, for in contemplation of law they accompany the person of the owner; as, for instance, debts owing in one State to a person in another. State are not taxable at the place of the debtor's residence.2 Tangible Personal Property. It is said to be a general principle of the law, that tangible personal property having no fixed locality follows the person of the owner and is taxable at his domicile, provided there be no express law taxing it where it is situated, if in a different jurisdiction; but this rule, we think, is confined to cases where the domicile of the owner is in the same State and only in a different county or district, and not to cases where the owner resides in a different State. In the case here cited of Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. County of Morgan, Justice CATON, speaking of local taxation of real estate, says: "The same rule does not apply to personal property, but that it follows the residence of the owner is certainly true, and is there taxable when the owner resides within the State and the property is only temporarily absent;" and further he gives the following illustration: "Thus, if a man keeping a livery stable in Springfield had a team absent on a journey in another State at the time the assessment was made, he would be bound to include that property in the schedule of taxable property, while the rule might be different if he had personal property permanently located in another State or another county."4 The owner of the property in this case was a railroad company; the personal prop 'St. Louis c. Wiggins Ferry Company, 40 Mo. 580; Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 Ill. 163; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 240; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 242. 2 Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Geo. 387; Ante v. of this chapter; Hayne v. Delieselline, 3 McCord, 374; Murray v. Charleston, 6 Otto, 432. 8 3 Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. County of Morgan, 14 Ill. 163; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224, 231. 4 14 Ill. 165. |