law of the latter, yet, that in Mississippi, on presentation of a copy from where originally probated in the State where made, authenticated as a record, in accordance with the act of Congress, it may then be admitted to probate in Mississippi, and will pass lands situated therein. 1

Executory Contracts and Deeds made in Pursuance Thereof. Sometimes the transaction is partly affected by both the law of the place of contracting and the law of the situs of the property contracted for. Thus, if an executory bargain be made in one State to purchase lands situated in another State, the manner of perfecting the bargain, so far as relates to the transfer or title to the land, is to conform to the lex rei site of the property, or law of the State where the land is situated; but the executory contract itself is construed and controlled, if not otherwise expressed, by the law of the place of contracting.2

Official Powers are Local. The acknowledgment and certification of a deed taken and made by an officer of a State must be taken and certified within the State under which the officer holds his authority to do the act. He cannot receive or certify the acknowledgment in a different State than the one under the laws of which he holds his office or has power to act.3 In a case in Delaware, the court say: "The taking the acknowledgment of a deed is an official, perhaps a judicial, act, and the authority of the public officer cannot extend beyond the limits of his appointment."4 III. COURTS OF OTHER STATES MAY ACT UPON THE PERSON of the OWNER.

Jurisdiction over the Person. But, although a State court cannot, in law or in equity, reach or control the title to lands, or the possession of lands situated within a different State, by any direct action or process against the land itself, and cannot decree away the title thereto, or authorize a commissioner to convey the same, yet if a court of general equity jurisdiction obtain jurisdiction of the person of the owner of lands so situated, in the course of an equity proceeding involving a proper case for coercion of the title by a direct action of the court, as in cases of

1 Crusoe v. Butler, 36 Miss. 150; Wells v. Wells, 35 Miss. 638.

2 Glenn v. Thistle, 23 Miss. 42; Bethell v. Bethell, 54 Ind. 428.

66.

Harris . Burton, 4 Harr. (Del.)

4 Ibid.

trust or fraud, or even contract, in case the lands were within its jurisdiction, then such equity court may compel a conveyance by order or decree acting directly on the person of such owner, and may enforce the same with all the powers incident to a court of chancery in case of disobedience.1 And so it may compel a sale of realty lying partly out of its jurisdiction for the satisfaction of a trust or mortgage, by direct action against the persons of those concerned, if it get jurisdiction of their persons. But in such cases the court does not convey or authorize the act. It merely acts on the person, and compels the exercise of powers already by him possessed. It is not like conferring power on an administrator to sell lands lying in another State. The latter cannot be done. 2

In the case cited below of Muller v. Dows, the circuit court of the United States for the Iowa district decreed a sale of the whole of a railroad, which lay part only in Iowa, and the other part in Missouri, and the proceeding was sustained by the United States Supreme Court. But this was a proceeding in a national court, and the parties in interest were in court, and the case is not as one in a State court, whose jurisdiction over the local property is circumscribed within the boundaries of its territorial limits; whereas, United States courts doubtless have power to reach interests, however local, in a chancery proceeding, with all the parties before them, if enough of local jurisdiction be obtained as to a part of property involved, and which is an entirety, to enable them to act on the part so situated within the district of the forum; especially so where, as in the case just cited, both States are within the same circuit of a United States court.

When such a decree of a court of one State compelling the

1 McElrath . Pittsburgh & Steubenville R. R. Co., 55 Penn. St. 189; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 26; McGregor v. McGregor, 9 Iowa, 65; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cr. 148; Sturdevant v. Pike, 1 Ind. 277; McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McL. 622; Watts v. Waddle, 6 Pet. 389; Northern Ind. R. R. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co., 15 How. 233, 243; White v. White, 7 Gill & J. 208; Vaughan v. Barclay,

6 Whart. 392; Lewis o. Darling, 16 How. 1; Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464.

McElrath v. Pittsburgh & Steubenville R. R. Co., 55 Penn. St. 189; Muller v. Dows, 4 Otto, 444, 450, in which latter case the United States Supreme Court refer to and recognized the correctness of the Pennsylvania case above cited. Wood . Warner, 15 N. J. Eq. 81, 85.

conveyance of land situated in another State comes in question. in the courts of the State wherein the land is situated, it will be entitled to full faith and credit in these latter courts as to what is the real or true equities of the parties thereto, if jurisdiction of the defendant in the decree was obtained by the court rendering the same; and such decree may be pleaded as a defense to an action or suit, or as a cause of action, if applicable, in the courts of such latter State. 1

Actions for Breach of Covenant. And actions for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment may be maintained in the courts of one State when the covenant was entered into in another State in reference to a subject matter situated in the latter. Such action affects the person of the defendant or covenanter, and not the status or title of the land.

IV. ONE STATE OWNING LANDS WITHIN ANOTHER.

Not Different from Private Ownership. The ownership of lands by one State within the terrritorial limits of another State is in nowise different from that of the ownership of an individual person. The title and estate in such case is acquired and held subject to all the incidents of ordinary private ownership, so far as regards the mere circumstance of a State being the owner. 3 If a different effect is claimed it must flow from the intent and purpose of the grant as shown by the muniments of title.

V. GOVERNMENT LANDS.

The doctrine as to local jurisdiction of lands, and of the title passing only in accordance with the lex loci rei site laid down in the previous sections of this chapter, has no application to the public lands of the United States. Over these the States and local governments have no control, and the State laws do not affect them in any manner whatever, until the title thereto passes out of the national government in such manner as is provided by national law. 4

'Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St.

474.

Jackson v. Hanna, 8 Jones Law, 188; Mott v. Coddington, 1 Robert. 267.

Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57;

Boggs v. Merced Co., 14 Cal. 279, 375; 3 Wash. Real Prop. 4th Ed. 188, § 19.

4 Turner . American Baptist Missionary Union, 5 McLean, 344; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 499.

Title from National Government. The national government only can grant to individuals, States or other grantees the right and title to the public lands of the United States.1

Congress has the sole power of declaring the dignity and effect of a patent or grant of lands issued or granted by the United States, and the character of the title thereby vested in the grantee to government lands thus disposed of, and no State law can lessen or enlarge the same; such grants carry the fee, and are the best title known to the law in both national and State courts.2

Action at Law will not Lie on Certificate of Entry in United States Court. It is equally well settled in the United States courts that no action at law, for recovery of lands, will lie against a defendant in possession, upon a mere entry or certificate of entry or purchase from the register and receiver of the United States land office. These are but evidences of an equity, and do not pass the legal title; and, though State statutes may allow such equitable evidence as a ground of recovery in State courts, against a defendant showing no better title, yet such statutes are not a rule of law or property in courts of the United States as evidence of legal title.3

Revocation of Patent. When the title has passed from the government by the issuance and delivery of the patent for lands, then the power of the political and ministerial departments of government over them ceases, and such patent cannot be revoked by mere act of the head of the land department, or secretary of a department. The courts of law or equity alone possess the power of setting the same aside for cause shown according to the course of local practice and jurisdiction, if in a State court, or of the Federal jurisdiction and practice, if the proceeding be in a United States court.4

'Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 712; Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543; United States v. Fernandez, 10 Pet. 303; United States v. Rillieux, 14 How. 189; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 499; Hooper v. Scheimer, 23 How. 235.

2 Hooper v. Scheimer, 23 How. 235;

Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 499; Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436; Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558.

8

Hooper r. Scheimer, 23 How. 235. Moore v. Robbins, 6 Otto, 530; C. S. v. Hughes, 11 How. 552, and S. C., 4 Wall. 232.

CHAPTER XXII.

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.

I. ON THE NATIONAL COURTS.

II OF THE STATE COURTS.

III. WRIT OF ERROR FROM UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TO STATE COURT.

IV. INCIDENTS TO NATIONAL LOCAL JURISDICTION.

V. INTER-STATE EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE.

VI. POWER OF ONE STATE TO ENFORCE THE PENAL LAWS OF ANOTHER AND TO PUNISH CRIME COMMITTED IN ANOTHER.

VII. LARCENY AT COMMON LAW BY BRINGING STOLEN PROPERTY INTO A STATE.

VIII. CRIMES COMMITTED PARTLY IN ONE STATE AND PARTLY IN AN

OTHER.

IX. CRIMES COMMITTED IN A STATE WITHOUT THE OFFENDER BEING

THEREIN.

X. NO CONCURRENT CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN STATE AND NATIONAL COURTS.

I. OF THE NATIONAL COURTS.

The national courts, according to best received opinions, have no common law criminal jurisdiction, or jurisdiction over common law offenses, as such; their jurisdiction is of statutory authority, and confined to offenses arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 1

But as to the entire absence of criminal common law jurisdiction there has been expressed a judicial doubt.2

There can be no doubt, however, that where, in the exercise of their legitimate jurisdiction over statutory offenses, the principles of the common law, as existing in criminal jurisprudence in the original States, when applicable, will be resorted to as rules of right.

1 1U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cr. 32; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13

How. 518; U. S. v. Fox, 5 Otto, 670.

U. S. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415.