performance." Thus notes drawn in one State and delivered and payable in another, for purchases made there, are governed by the law of the latter State, and are considered there made; for by delivery only, the act of making is fully consummated. If, in such case, nothing be said in the notes as to interest, then interest is allowable according to the law where the same are payable.3 The parties, however, may expressly stipulate in the instruments themselves, for such interest as is allowable in either State (but, semble, not for interest in conformity to the law of a still different or third State).

Performance in Two Different States. The principle of the law, however, that performance is to be in accordance with the law of the place at which performance is provided for by the contract, does not apply to contracts performable in parts, and which are performable partly in one State and partly in another. It is said that, in such cases, the law of the place where the contract is made prevails.5

But if a contract be entire, and indivisible, and is to be partly performed in the State where it is made, and partly in another, then the lex loci contractus, or law of the State where it is made, governs as to its validity; and, if invalid there, it is invalid everywhere else. The case of McDaniel v. The Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Company grew out of a contract for transportation of cattle, from Clinton, Iowa, to Chicago, in Illinois. The contract was made in Iowa, and the property there

1 Scudder v. Union National Bank, 1 Otto, 406, 413.

2 Cook v. Moffat, 5 How. 295; Lee v. Selleck, 33 N. Y. 615.

3 Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 194; Butters v. Olds, 11 Iowa, 1; Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33; Parson's Mercantile Law, 321. But though a note be so affected with usury, by the law where it is made, as would there incur a forfeiture on account thereof, yet such forfeiture cannot be enforced affirma. tively in another State, in a suit on such note. The court there will neither enforce the forfeiture nor the usury. Wright v. Bartlette, 43 N. H. 548. They will simply enforce the

payment of the principal and legal interest.

4 Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 194, 198; Butters v. Olds, 11 Iowa, 1; Peck v. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33; Smith v. Smith, 2 John. 236; Thompson v. Ketcham, 4 John. 285; Cox v. U. S., 6 Pet. 172; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65.

Morgan v. New Orleans R. R. Co., 2 Woods, 244. So, also, where practical, the laws of the respective States will be applied to such part of the contract as is to be performed in each. Pomeroy v. Ainsworth, 22 Barb. 118; Glenn v. Thistle, 23 Miss. 42.

6 McDaniel v. The Chicago & N.W. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 412.

received by the railroad. The contract contained a clause restricting the liability of the railroad company for loss in carriage, which, in effect, violated a law of Iowa, inhibiting such restrictions and declaring them void. On a trial in Iowa, growing out of a loss in carriage, the question arose as to the law of the contract, and it was held that the Iowa law was the law of the contract; that the restriction was inoperative, and that the rule of the common law was to apply to the case. The court, COLE, J., say: "The contract being entire and indivisible, made in Iowa, and to be partly performed here, it must, as to its validity, nature, obligation and interpretation, be governed by our law. And by our law, so far as it seeks to change the common law, it is wholly nugatory and inoperative. The rights of the parties, then, are to be determined under the common law, the same as if no such contract had been made."1

III. THE LAW OF THE REMEDY. LEX FORI.

The law of the forum, or place where suit is brought, governs as regards the remedy in the enforcement of contracts. Thus, contracts made in one State, and enforced by suit in another, whether made in expectation of performance in such latter State, or made without any designated place of performance, as for instance, a general promise to pay a sum of money, are governed, in their legal enforcement, by the laws of the place where the suit is brought, as to all things pertaining to the remedy. In the language of the United States Supreme Court: "Matters respecting the remedy, such as the bringing of suits, admissibility of evidence, statutes of limitation, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought."s

Pleadings and evidence are matters strictly appertaining to the remedy, and, in respect to their sufficiency and admissibility,

1 24 Iowa, 417, 418.

Scudder v. Union National Bank, 1 Otto, 406, 413; Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa, 251; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Douglas v. Oldham, 6 N. H. 150; Bank of U. S. v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361; Warren v. Lynch, 5 John. 239; Thrasher v. Ever

hart, 3 Gill & J. 234; Andrews v. Her. riot, 4 Cow. 508; Scoville v. Canfield, 14 John. 338; Broadhead v. Noyes, 9 Mo. 56; Wharton's Conf. of Laws, S 741 et seq.; Foote's Private International Law, 413; Story's Conf. of Laws, 556, 557.

3 Scudder v. Union National Bank, 1 Otto, 406, 413.

come within the rule of being governed by the law of the forum, or place where the trial is had. The case here cited very fully illustrates the application of this principle. It was an action in a court of Iowa, upon a sealed instrument for the payment of money, executed in the State of Maryland; an instrument of such a character as is usually termed a writing obligatory. The common law rule was shown to have prevailed in Maryland, by the pleadings, at the date of the instrument, and that thereby the consideration for which the instrument was given could not be brought in question by a plea of want of consideration. But the court held to the contrary, and the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the decision, upon the principle that the question was one as to the remedy merely, and was governed by the law of the forum, which had abolished the common law distinction and permitted the consideration of sealed as well as unsealed instruments to be enquired into by pleadings and evidence.1 In this case, the Supreme Court of Iowa, DILLON, J., say: "The plaintiff must take such remedy as our laws afford him. * * * Respecting what shall be good defenses to actions in this State, its courts must administer its own laws, and not those of other States." * * * And, "our act of the legislature, allowing the defense of want of consideration to be pleaded to all actions on subsequent sealed contracts, is a matter relating to the remedy, and does not impair the obligation of the contract within the meaning of the authoritative adjudications of the Supreme Court of the United States."

Whenever a remedy by suit is sought, the plaintiff takes such remedy as the law of the forum, or place of suit, affords, whether suit be in a State court or in a United States court. This is so, not only as to the law of trial, but also as to the enforcement of any judgment that may be obtained. Hence, as exemption laws pertain to the remedy, exemption from execution sale depends upon the law of the forum, and not upon the lex loci

contractus.2

1 Williams v. Haines, 27 Iowa, 251. See, also, U. S. v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361; Le Roy v. Beard, 8 How. 451; Warren . Lynch, 5 John. 239; Foote's Pri

vate International Law, 424 and 431.

Newell v. Hayden, 8 Iowa, 140; Helfenstein v. Cave, 3 Iowa, 287.

IV. STATUTORY BONDS IN STATE PROCEEDINGS.

What Statutory Obligations are Local. As a general principle, all statutory bonds, obligations and recognizances entered into in the course of judicial proceedings, and in accordance with the statute law of the forum where taken, made or executed, and in reference to such proceedings, as, also, official bonds for the faithful performance of statutory duties, the manner of enforcement of which are defined by statute, are local in their nature, and the enforcement thereof is confined to the courts of the sovereignty or State where made or entered into. The taking and enforcement thereof is a part of the internal policy of the State, and the means by which the State regulates its own internal concerns and conducts its official business, and, inasmuch as they are thus local, they cannot be enforced by suit in the courts of another State, either by proprio vigore of such statute laws, or upon the principles of comity. No State interferes with the internal affairs of another, nor will enforce obligations entered into with a view thereto, and intended to operate only in aid thereof.

Such securities are unlike those personal obligations which occur between men in their ordinary transactions of life, and which are made by private persons, as evidences of private right, and which rest for validity upon the general principles of the common law, and are made without regard to any local regulations for their validity or enforcement, and are, therefore, of equal legal and moral force, wherever the parties may thereafter be, and which, following the person, will be enforced in all countries where the rights and liabilities of contracts are by general law recognized and enforced. 3

What Statutory Obligations are Enforceable in Other States. Such contracts and obligations as these latter, that are dependent on the general law as to validity, and on the law of the forum for their enforcement, will be enforced, however, in the courts of another State, although they originate in the administration of the laws of a State, and are of a public nature, and under statutory provisions, where the obligation is plain and direct, and is

2

left for its operation, enforcement, and effect, to rest upon the rules of the common law. But when they are to have effect only in a particular way, and are enforceable only in a particular manner pointed out by the statute under which they are made, their enforcement is exclusively in the courts of the State in which they originate. The case of Pickering v. Fisk, above cited, was an action, in the court of Vermont, upon a bond executed by the sheriff of Grafton county, in the State of New Hampshire, and his sureties. The bond was payable to the State treasurer and his successors in office, conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office of sheriff. The suit was against one of the sureties, not in the name of the State treasurer of New Hampshire, but in the name of a private person, as permitted by the statute of New Hampshire, for neglect of duty in not serving and returning a writ of execution, and loss of plaintiff, incurred by such neglect. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that no action would lie on such bond in the courts of that State, at the suit of a person, as the New Hampshire statute tolerating such proceeding had no force within the State of Vermont, and could not be administered by the courts of the latter State. Remedies are administered only in accordance with the law of the forum.

The very learned Justice REDFIELD, in discussing a kindred question in Dimick v. Brooks,3 expressed grave doubts whether courts of one State can give effect to judgments of another State by the enforcement of collateral remedies which the prevailing party is entitled to in the forum where the judgments are rendered, as for instance, scire facias, or debt upon recognizances, of bail on mesne process, and suits against receiptors of property, upon replevin bonds, or against sheriffs for neglect of duty, believing them all to be confined to local jurisdiction; as, also, prison bonds, and warrants of attorney to confess judgment; and assumes it to be very clearly the law that remedy by scire facias to enforce any such collateral remedy, must be confined to the forum of the record.

Statutory Obligations. Official Bonds, Continued. Official or statutory bonds, taken in one State under and by virtue of a stat

1 Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102; Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411; Story's Conf. of Laws, § 625 a.

2 Ibid.

21 Vt. 569, 579, 580.