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ute or statutes thereof, and enforceable according to such statute or statutes, are not enforceable in the courts of other States, in the peculiar manner and for the purposes prescribed by statute.1 And not being given except for these peculiar purposes, and being enforceable only in the manner prescribed under the statute, it follows therefrom that, in other States, they are not enforceable at all; for the proceeding to enforce them, though judicial in character, is also administrative, as part of the machinery of State for carrying out the purposes of government in the various departments, and is essentially local to the tribunals of the State wherein they originate, as no State undertakes to administer the affairs, or enforce the laws of other States for purposes purely administrative."

Exceptions to the Rule. But, if the obligation be plain, certain and direct, and in accordance with the principles of general law prevailing among civilized communities, and are merely dependent for enforcement on the law of the forum, then, although the purpose be administrative, they will be enforced in another State, though of a public nature and resting upon statute.3

V. STATUTORY BONDS IN FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS.

Where Payable. Official bonds of officers of the United States, executed to the United States, conditioned for faithful performance of official duties, and delivered to the proper department of the government at Washington, are, in contemplation of law, made at that place, although executed, except as to delivery, in one of the States. In case of accountability, under such bonds, payment is to be made at the treasury. The bonds are entered into in reference to that place, under the laws of the United States, and those laws and the rule of the common law govern as the law of the contract.4

Where a collector's bond was signed by himself and sureties, in Florida, and mailed to the proper department at Washington for approval and acceptance, and one of the sureties died while the bond was in transit between Florida and Washington, and

Indiana v. John, 5 Ham. 218; Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102.

Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102; McFee v. South Car. Ins. Co., 2 McCord,

Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102.

Cox v. U.S., 6 Pet. 172, 204; Duncan v. U. S., 7 Pet. 435; U. S. v. Stephenson, 1 McLean, 462.

before its approval and acceptance, it was held that the bond was valid, and that the sureties were bound thereby.1

Taking Effect by Relation. That though delivered for acceptance and approval, or placed in course of transit for that purpose, and though the contract be not complete till approved and accepted, yet when these acts are performed by the proper government functionary they then relate back to the date of the bond, and make it a valid bond as of that date, and therefore the surety who had died in the interval was bound thereby, and recovery was allowed and sustained against his administrator, on the bond.2

Rule of Relation as to Bonds of Postmasters. But the rule of law is different as to the time of taking effect of a bond executed by a deputy postmaster to the postmaster-general. The latter takes effect when it is received by the postmaster-general and is by him accepted. Until then it is merely an offer.3 There is a difference in this respect between bonds of a postmaster and collectors' bonds. Collectors are authorized to discharge the duties of their office for three months without giving bond; in other words, they have three months in which to give bond; but postmasters must give bonds, with approved security, on their appointment. The appointment and giving bond are concurrent acts, and the appointment, without bond and security approved, does not in itself confer power to act. Hence, the date and taking effect of a postmaster's bond bear relation to the date of his appointment; whereas, a collector's bond, when accepted by official approval, relates back to its date, so as to cover the interval of time in which he had acted officially prior to its approval. 4

In the case of Le Baron, the Supreme Court of the United States say: "It is like the case of Bruce v. The State of Maryland, where it was held that the bond of a sheriff took effect only when approved by the county court; because it was only on such approval that the sheriff was authorized to act.'

Attachment Bonds. On an attachment bond executed to the marshal of the United States, in a proceeding by attachment in the United States Circuit Court, a suit lies, in the same court,

1 Broome v. U. S., 15 How. 143. 2 Ibid.

3 U. S. v. Le Baron, 19 How. 73, 77.

4 Ibid.

11 Gill & J. 382. 619 How. 77.

in behalf of the marshal as plaintiff, if averred to be for the benefit of persons citizens of a different State than that of the defendant, although the marshal's office has expired, and he has ceased to act as such officer. The real plaintiffs are those for whose use the suit is brought.1

VI. RULE OF DAMAGES ON INTER-STATE OBLIGATIONS.

The measure and rule of damages to be awarded for the breach or non-performance of contracts made in one State, and expressed to be performable or payable in another State, it has been held, are the law of the State wherein the contract is made. The lex loci contractus governs in that respect, for the matter is matter of right, appertaining to the obligation of the contract, and not of remedy in reference to the manner, merely, of enforcing it. But in cases of promissory notes made payable in a State other than where made, the rule of damages in case of a breach, it would seem, would be that of the place of performance.3 In cases of tort, the rule of damages is always enforced under the measure of the lex fori, as will be seen hereafter.

VII. CONTRACTS MADE WITH A VIEW TO VIOLATION OF LAW OF ANOTHER STATE.

Void Contracts. Contracts entered into in one State, with a view to, or in contemplation of, the violation of the laws of another State, or with intent to enable a party to violate the same, are not enforceable in the courts of the latter, although legal in the State, or by the laws thereof, where made.4

Knowledge Alone not Sufficient. There Must be Illegal Intent. A mere knowledge, of a party to a contract, that the other party thereto intends to use an article contracted for by selling the same in another State, in violation of the laws thereof, will not in itself avoid the contract, or prevent a recovery thereon in such

1 Huff v. Hutchinson, 14 How. 586. Jaffray v. Dennis, 2 Wash. C. C.

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253; Consequa v. Willings, Pet. C. C. 225; Willings v. Consequa, Ibid. 302.

3 Story's Conf. of Laws, $ 304 b, 307 a.; Foote's Private International Law, 351 et seq.; Field on Damages, §

214; Scofield v. Day, 20 John. 102; Archer v. Dunn, 2 W. & S. 327.

4 Davis v. Bronson, 6 Iowa, 410, 433; Armstrong . Toler, 11 Wheat. 258; Bliss . Brainard, 41 N. H. 256; Phinney v. Baldwin, 16 Ill. 108; Commonwealth v. Aves, 18 Pick. 193.

other State; there must be some sort of mutuality in the evil or wrong intent, or some purpose of aiding therein.1

Purchase Made in One State by Order from Another State. A purchase made by order from one State, of a person in another State, there sending or forwarding the article bought, to the buyer, is regarded in law as a transaction in the State where the vendor resided, or from wherein he forwards the article, and depends for validity upon the law thereof.2

Contracts of Common Carriers. The contracts of a common carrier to carry property from a point in one State to a point in another, over a route lying partly in each of said States, is governed as to its validity and interpretation by the law of the place where the contract is made and the property to be carried is received. Thus, where a railroad company undertook to carry property from Clinton, in Iowa, to Chicago, in Illinois, over its road between those places, and stipulated for a restriction from the ordinary liability of common carrier, in contravention of a statute law of Iowa inhibiting such restriction, it was held that the contract, being partly performable in each State, was to be governed as to validity by the laws of Iowa, and that, by reason of such illegal restriction, it was void; and that, therefore, the ordinary liability attached to the carrier.4 So, as in Talbott v. The Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Company, above cited, where a contract of transportation was made in Connecticut, for the carriage of property there received to Des Moines, Iowa, in which contract there was a stipulation in favor of the carrier, against loss by fire, and under which contract the property was received and transported as far as Chicago, in Illinois, and was there destroyed by fire, without fault of the carrier, and the laws both of Connecticut and Illinois tolerated such exemption in carriers' contracts, it was held that the carrier was exempt from liability, although the laws of Iowa, where the action was tried,

'Johnson v. Gregory's Exrs., 4 Met. (Ky.) 363; McIntyre v. Parks, 3 Met. (Mass.) 207; Boothby v. Plaisted, 51 N. H. 436; Tegler v. Shipman, 33 Iowa, 194; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253.

2 Holman v. Johnson, Cowper, 341; Sortwell v. Hughes, 1 Curtis, 244; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253; Tegler v. Ship

man, 33 Iowa, 194; Boothby v. Plaisted, 51 N. H. 436.

3 McDaniel v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 412; Talbott v. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co., 41 Iowa, 247.

4 McDaniel v. Chi. & N. W. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 412.

and the property was to have been delivered by the carrier, prohibits such contracts and renders the same invalid; such prohibition and invalidity under the Iowa law has no extra-territorial force to invalidate a contract made elsewhere, in case of loss sustained in a State where such exemption was allowed by law.1

VIII. STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

2

The Statute of Frauds is of the lex loci contractus, and therefore, if a contract made in one State be sued on or brought in question in the courts of another State, a party relying on the Statute of Frauds must rely upon the statute of the State where the contract was made, and must plead and prove the same, with averments and proof also, if not otherwise admitted by the pleadings, of the place of the alleged making of the contract. And when proven, the statute is not enforced, strictly speaking, as a law, but as entering into, and forming a part of, the contract. If the contract is not subject to the Statute of Frauds where made, but by the statute of the State where performable, the contract is void, yet it will be held valid, and will be construed by the lew loci contractus.4

IX. COMMERCIAL PAPER AND ENDORSEMENTS.

Law of Place of Payments Governs. Notes and other commercial paper, for payment of money, made in one State and payable in another, are payable, and carry a liability to payment, according to the law of the place where payable."

Law of Place of Endorsement Governs; Fixes the Liability of the Endorser. But an endorsement thereof is governed by the

Talbott v. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co., 41 Iowa, 247.

Denny v. Williams, 5 Allen, 1; Forward v. Harris, 30 Barb. 338; Low 2. Andrews, 1 Story, 38; Allshouse v. Ramsay, 6 Whart. 331; Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 1 Otto, 406; Robb v. Halsey, 11 Sm. & M. 140.

3 Forward v. Harris, 30 Barb. 338. Scudder v. Union Nat. Bank, 1 Otto, 406; Forward v. Harris, 30 Barb.

338; Carrigan v. Brent, 1 McLean, 167.

5 Hunt v. Standart, 15 Ind. 33; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65; Freese . Brownell, 35 N. J. 285; Edwards on Bills, 178; Daniels on Neg. Instru ments, § 879 et seq. So the number of days of grace allowed is governed by the law of the place where the note is payable. Story's Conf. of Laws, § 361.

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