lien on arriving in such latter State for whatever sum of money may be due them, and the same will there be enforced, if applied for, on arrival of such rafts at the destined port in such State for which they started. Nor will it alter the case as to the right of the lien, that the owner of the raft contracts with another person to make the run at his own expense to the destined point; the laborers are none the less entitled thereto, if there is no agreement with them to the contrary.

XII. CONTRACTS OF AFFREIGHTMENT.

Contracts for inter-State affreightment, valid in the State where made, are valid elsewhere if not in contravention of the law of such other place or places,3 and when made by a consignor of goods delivered for carriage, are binding on the consignee of another State the same as if made by himself.4

Existing rights of shippers, attached to freight consigned for inter-State carriage, are not prejudiced by the property being carried into another State. 5

A bill of lading and contract of shipment made in one State for the shipment and transportation of property to a point in another State, and on the faith of which advances are made in the State where the transaction occurs, is a contract governed by the laws of the State where made, if between citizens of such State. The person thus making the advances on the bill of lading becomes the legal owner of the property-not absolutelybut as security for the reimbursement of his advances. The obligation to reimburse the advances is in legal effect, and in the

'Hanson v. Hiles, 34 Iowa, 350. Ibid.

3 Robinson v. Merchants' Dispatch, 45 Iowa, 470; Marine Bank of Chicago v. Wright, 48 N. Y. 1.

Robinson v. Merchants' Dispatch, 45 Iowa, 470; Marine Bank of Chicago . Wright, 48 N. Y. 1.

'Story's Conf. of Laws, SS 401, 402, 402 a; Marine Bank of Chicago v. Wright, 48 N. Y. 1.

First Nat. Bank of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283; First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati e. Kelly, 57 N. Y. 34.

First Nat. Bank of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283; First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Kelly, 57 N. Y. 34; Bank of Rochester v Jones, 4 N. Y. 497; Bailey v. Hudson R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 70; Dows v. Greene, 24 N. Y. 638; Lick barron v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, and Hare & Wallace's Notes to Smith's Leading Cases, vol. 1, 7th ed. pp. 1147, 1227; Marine Bank of Chicago v. Wright, 48 N. Y. 1; Cayuga County Nat. Bank v. Daniels, 47 N. Y. 631.

absence of any other understanding, an obligation to make such reimbursement at the same place where the advancement is made.

Bills Drawn on Consignee. This, too, although bills are drawn on the consignee in favor of the person making the advances, and for the purpose of reimbursing the same. The effect intended is repayment there by means of such bills, and the law of the place governs the transaction. 1 When the reimbursement is completed, the ownership then is in the person thus secured, no longer for his own security, but in trust for the consignee or real owner of the property.2

Affreightment Contracts by Foreign Corporations. Contracts of affreightment or carriage made in one State by a railroad corporation of another State, and to be performed in the latter State, are governed, as to performance, by the laws of the latter State,3 and the fact that a part of the carriage is across an intermediate State boundary river, over which both States possess the right of navigation and used by their respective inhabitants, does not alter the case in law. 4

XIII. WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS.

The transfer, by delivery and endorsement of warehouse receipts, in one State, for goods stored in a warehouse of a different State in the ordinary course of commerce, is a transfer of the goods, as actual delivery is impracticable, and will, where the transaction is a bona fide one, hold over process of attachment against the person making the transfer, although such change of ownership and transfer be unknown to both the warehouseman and the plaintiff in attachment. The force thereof is like the transfer of a ship at sea-delivery is impracticable. Such transactions are a necessity of internal trade and result from the usages thereof, 5

1 First Nat. Bank of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283, 292; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 635, 644; Lanussee v. Barker, 3 Wheat. 101; Grant v. Healey, 3 Sumn. 523.

2 First Nat. Bank of Toledo v. Shaw, 61 N. Y. 283, 292, 294; Allen v. Will.

iams, 12 Pick. 297; City Bank v. Rome, W. & O. R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 136.

Brown v. Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co., 83 Penn. St. 316.

4 Ibid.

Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384.

XIV. STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

Inter-State Consignments. In cases involving the right of stoppage in transitu of inter-State consignments of property to be carried by common carriers out of one State into or through another, or into or through still another State or States, the personal right of the consignor to thus stop and reclaim the property is not prejudiced by its passing out of one State, into or through another State or States, but follows the property wherever it goes until delivery to the consignee, and may be enforced in every such other State into which the goods are carried.1 This right will override the claim of intervening purchases made of the consignee, as also levies against him during the transit, to the same extent as it would in the State wherein the consignment is made. But the prevailing idea that the carrier is bound to deliver up the goods on mere claim of the consignor to have the same, and at any and every place at which the goods may arrive, or which they may in their transit pass, or else subject himself, on refusal, to an action for conversion of the same, is altogether erroneous. While there is no want of authority to show that the consignor is entitled, under proper circumstances, to reclaim the goods, and to have possession thereof, yet we have been unable to find any decision imposing upon the carrier the duty of personally knowing the consignor, so as to be truly advised of his identity, or charging the carrier with knowledge of the facts on which the right of stoppage in transitu rests in each particular case, or compelling the carrier to become judge, jury and administrator of the law in each particular case, and as a sequence thereto to deliver up the property to whoever shall assume to have such rights and shall give notice thereof and demand the property, on peril of the carrier being deemed to have converted the goods to his own use in case of refusal, or, of what is still worse, of being chargeable in damages worth the value thereof to the consignee, in case of such delivery to a wrong claimant, or even to the right person, but when no real cause for stoppage in transitu exists.

1 Story's Conf. of Laws, §§ 401, 402, 402 a; Inglis v. Usherwood, 1 East. 515; Redfield on Carriers, § 238 et seq.;

Desty's Shipping and Admiralty, SS 228, 229.

2

Story's Conf. of Laws, § 402.

On the contrary, this right is to be enforced as other rights are enforced; that is, through the courts and officers of the law. The carrier is but a stakeholder between the consignor and consignee, and is not bound to know the consignor personally; is not bound to know whether the goods were consigned or not on a purchase and sale thereof, or if so, whether or not the purchase money was paid or an indebtedness was incurred therefor; or, if the latter was the case, is not bound to know whether the debtor was then or since has proved insolvent, or whether the goods were obtained by fraud, or the facts as to any cause which in law is ground for stoppage in transitu.

Remedy by Replevin. The remedy of the consignor, if he has rights in such respect, is by process of replevin against the carrier to obtain possession of the goods, and the only effect of notice to the carrier is to prevent the latter from delivery of the same to the consignee until reasonable time is elapsed for the consignor to assert his rights. And we hold further, that in such case, although the carrier be made defendant, yet if he act in good faith, and do no more than to avoid committing himself, he will not even be liable for costs. In such actions, however, the carrier should notify the consignee thereof, if not already made a party, and disclaiming other interest than as carrier, move to substitute the consignee as defendant in his stead, that, as the real parties in interest they may interplead.

Bill of Interpleader. But the safer way for the carrier, in cases of doubtful right of the respective claimants to have delivery of the goods, and which must often if not always be the result of inter-State shipment over long lines of carriage, whenever conflicting claims arise as growing out of the right of stoppage in transitu, is to place the goods in the hands of a reliable bailee, and file against the claimants and parties in interest a bill of interpleader, to settle the rights of the parties in that respect, and thereby protect the carrier from the hardship of deciding to whom the right of delivery belongs.3 Chancellor KENT, in recognition of the injustice of a rule that would impose upon

Houston on Stoppage in Transitu,

51; Abbott on Shipping, 511 et seq. The notice places the goods quasi in custodia legis. Abbott on Shipping,

Abbott on Shipping, 511 et seq.

83 Kent, 215, 216; Jordan v. James, 5 Ham. 88, 107.

the carrier, in disputed cases of stoppage in transitu, the necessity of deciding, at his own risk, to whom the right of delivery belongs, says that the carrier ought not to be put to such peril, or to the uncertainty of indemnity, but "should know to whom of right he can deliver the goods," and that it "is safer for the master to deposit the goods with some bailee until the rights of the claimants are settled, as they can always be, upon a bill of interpleader in chancery, to be filed by the master."

XV. INVIOLABILITY OF CONTRACTS.

2

No State can pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. All such State laws are simply void. But what amounts to impairing the obligation of a contract, within the meaning and intent of the constitutional provision above referred to, has been the subject of much discussion, and the earnest consideration of our national courts, in whom alone, under the Constitution, the decision rests. The decisions are uniform, however, that the invalidity of a State law does not depend upon the degree or extent to which it modifies or changes the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract, or impairs, in any manner, a contract; but a State law is void that does it at all.

Such, too, is the case, whether it be by mere statutory enactment, or by a provision or clause of a State constitution; for it is not merely the legislatures of the States, but the States themselves, that are thus inhibited by the national Constitution.4

13 Kent, *215, *216. 2 Ibid.

Article 1, § 10, Const. of U. S.; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cr. 87; Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cr. 272; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cr. 43; McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143; Thompson v. Holton, 6 McL. 386; New Jersey . Wilson, 7 Cr. 164; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10; Corning v. McCullough, 1 N. Y. (47, 49; Conant

. Van Schaick, 24 Barb. 87; The

Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51; Green . Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Society for Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464; Cooley on Const. Limitations, 4th ed. 333 et seq.; Pomeroy on the Constitution, 3d ed. 349– 413; Story on the Constitution, S 1374-1400; Sedwick on the Construction of the Constitution, 603 et seq.; Smith on Statutory Construction, 382 et seq.

Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; New Jersey . Wilson, 7 Cr. 164; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Terrett r. Taylor, 9 Cr. 43; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.