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scire facias expire, and proceedings for revival be thereafter instituted and limitation be not pleaded, then judgment of revivor avoids the statute of limitation, and the statute begins to run against the new or revived judgment only from the date thereof.1 Therefore, it is held that if suit be brought in a different State on the revived judgment, then for defendant to avail himself of the plea of limitation as resting on the statute of the forum, the length of time required as a bar by that statute must have run between the day of the rendition of the judgment of revival and the day of the commencement of the suit. If, on the other hand, the law of the State where suit is brought allows the pleading of the statute of the State where the judgment was rendered as a bar to the action when the time limited therein has fully run, then, although that time may have run as to the original judg ment, yet when the judgment sued on has been so revived, then as to the revived judgment the statute of the State where rendered only runs from the revival thereof, and to avail defendant of that statute the full time required in that State must have run between the time of judgment of revival and commencement of the suit thereon.3

Action on Bastardy. Judgment of another State. It is held, in Indiana, that an action of debt will lie on the judgment of an Ohio court in a case of bastardy, adjudging the defendant therein to pay a sum certain in installments, and in default of payment. giving execution for the support of the defendant's illegitimate child. The ruling thus is predicated on the fact of the Ohio and Indiana statutes on the subject being alike, this being shown by pleading and proving the statute of Ohio. This ruling was on demurrer. In the same case the action was defeated, however, on the ground of a failure to show in the declaration any right of the plaintiff to receive the money sued for as guardian or otherwise.5

Jurisdiction, Inquiry into. But although inquiry may be made into the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment sued on in an action on a judgment of a court of another State,

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where nothing appears either way in the record as to service on or jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, yet this cannot be done in such action on a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, the record of which, duly authenticated, shows service upon the defendant. 1

Judgments of Justices of the Peace. In some of the United States such judgments have all the force and effect of judgments of courts of record. They are not open to collateral attack and are considered as absolute verity.2 Suits upon them, in those States, are, therefore, governed by the same rule as applies to foreign judgments of courts of record. As a general thing, however, justice judgments are not so considered. Being rendered by courts of only local and very limited and prescribed jurisdiction, having no clerk nor seal, they are not governed by the act of Congress which provides for the authentication of judicial records and proceedings. Their effect, therefore, in other States, would seem to be the same as that accorded judgments rendered by foreign countries. They must be shown to have been rendered by courts having jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, to have been authorized by the laws of the State where rendered. The judgment itself must be proved as a fact like a foreign judgment.3

II. ACTIONS ON DECREES OF OTHER STATES.

Same as on Judgments at Law. Decrees of courts of chancery for the payment of money made with full jurisdiction of the parties are of the same dignity and binding force as judgments at law; and actions and suits thereon may be maintained accordingly. Hence an action at law lies in the United States circuit court on a decree for money made by a State court, where the

1 Wescott v. Brown, 13 Ind. 83; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gilm. 197; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McL. 473; Roberts v. Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512; Newcomb v. Peck, 17 Vt. 302; Westervelt o. Lewis, 2 McL. 511; Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481; Freeman on Judgments, § 560 et seq., where this subject will be found discussed and many cases thereon cited.

Farr v. Ladd, 37 Vt. 158; Billings v. Russell, 23 Penn. St. 191; Fox . Hoyt, 12 Conn. 497; Turner v. Ireland, 11 Humph. 447; Stevens v. Mangum, 27 Miss. 481.

Carpenter v. Pike, 30 Vt. 81; Kean v. Rice, 12 S. & R. 203; Danforth v. Thompson, 34 Iowa, 243; Greenleaf on Evidence, § 513.

amount in controversy and the citizenship of the parties thereto are such as to ordinarily confer jurisdiction on the United States circuit court. It follows, as a legal conclusion therefrom, that wherever a judgment at law is conclusive as a record as a cause of action, a decree in chancery is of equal validity for that purpose, and, therefore, actions are maintainable in one State on decrees in chancery of another State, authenticated as by the act of Congress is required.2

Whatever doubts may have formerly existed upon this subject the modern rulings of the courts, both State and National, have set at rest, and in so doing have but conformed to prevailing English doctrines on the subject.3 In the case here cited the Supreme Court of the United States, DANIEL, J., say: "We lay it down, therefore, as the general rule, that in every instance in which an action of debt can be maintained, upon a judgment at law, for a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the like action can be maintained upon a decree in equity which is for an ascertained and specific amount, and nothing more; and that the record of the proceedings in the one case must be ranked with and responded to as of the same dignity and binding obligation. with the record in the other."4 So, that a bill in equity will lie to enforce a decree for money, of the same court or different court, has ever been recognized as a correct principle in courts of equity. Therefore, not only an action at law will lie in one State, as we have seen, upon a money decree of a court of another State, but it follows that a bill in equity will lie in the court of a State or United States upon a decree of a court, either Federal or State, rendered in another State, provided the citizenship of the parties to the bill (if in the Federal court) be such and the amount in controversy be such as in these respects to confer jurisdiction upon the court."

The case here cited originated in the District court of the United States for the northern district of Iowa, upon a decree of the Circuit court of Grayson county, in the State of Kentucky, by certain of the heirs and distributees of John Golds

1 Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195, 203; Evans v. Tatem, 9 S. & R. 252; Warren . McCarthy, 25 Ill. 95. 2 Cases above cited.

Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65. 4 Ibid.

5 Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. 253, 262.

• Ibid.

bury, deceased, for an accounting for the proceeds of said Goldsbury's estate. A decree was made in favor of the complainants in a court of Kentucky, and upon that decree the suit was brought in the United States District court (then exercising circuit court jurisdiction) for the district of Iowa. The court decreed in favor of complainants and the case went thence to the Supreme Court of the United States, which affirmed the decree. It being objected, in said cause, that a bill in equity would lie upon a decree, the court said, DANIEL, J.: "Among the original and undoubted powers of a court of equity is that of entertaining a bill filed for enforcing and carrying into effect a decree of the same or of a different court, as the exigencies of the case or the interests of the parties may require."1

Decrees, as well as judgments of a final character, of courts of the United States and of courts of the several States, where jurisdiction has fully attached, are binding and conclusive upon parties and privies until satisfied, superseded, set aside or reversed, in all other courts, State and Federal, wherein they come in question in a legitimate course of inquiry, properly verified or authenticated.2

III. ACTIONS IN STATE AND UNITED STATES COURTS ON

JUDGMENT OF Either.

An action will lie in a State court upon a judgment of a United States court; and so, in a United States court, on a judgment of a State court, the parties being of the proper qualification as to jurisdiction, and the matter in controversy being of the required amount to authorize jurisdiction;3 and in such actions nothing adjudicated in the rendition of the judgment can be readjudicated. If jurisdiction of the person of defendant is attached, the correctness of the recovery is not open to question when the judg ment is sued on, for these State and United States courts are not foreign to each other, although their localities or forums be in different States.4

118 How. 262.

227.

Kittredge v. Emerson, 15 N. H.

3 Thomson v. Lee Co., 22 Iowa, 206; Niblet v. Scott, 4 La. Ann. 245;

Barney v. Patterson, 6 Harr. & J. 182;
Reed v. Ross, 1 Bald. 38; St. Albans c.
Bush, 4 Vt. 58.

4 Thomson v. Lee Co., 22 Iowa, 206.

IV. ACTION ON CONDITIONAL AND INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENTS.

On Conditional Judgment. An interlocutory or conditional judgment will not sustain an action in another State, as where its validity for enforcement by execution depend upon something subsequently to be done; as where a judgment is rendered against a surety in an appeal, under a statute providing therefor, and which statute required that to render such surety liable for the judgment, execution must go against the principal within thirty days, or within a given time, then such statutory regulation not being enforcible in another State, no regard can therein be had to the same, so as to carry out its provisions; and to render a judgment as at common law would be to give to the judgment greater force than it is entitled to where originally rendered; therefore, no judgment can be entered thereon in another State, either statutory or at common law.1

Judgment on Penal Bonds - Continued. A judgment upon a penal bond for the amount of the penalty, with leave to have execution for a sum named as then due, and the principal judgment to stand as security for other installments of the same debt, as they severally, from time to time, became due, so as then to resume the proceedings and take order of execution therefor, will not maintain or support an action of debt in another State, when from the record it appears that the first and only installment ascertained and adjudicated as due, by the court rendering the judg ment, has been paid. The main judgment is but a security; the action is not terminated as to the subsequently occurring liabilities or installments, and the court of a different State cannot take up the proceeding where left off by scire facias or otherwise. The real judgment in such a proceeding is for the amount then found to be due, and for nothing more; and that being satisfied, the bond in all other forums, except of the State where such judgment is rendered, is not merged in the proceeding, but remains as it was before. In delivering the opinion in this case, and after reviewing the whole subject with great ability, and in

1 Kellam v. Toms, 38 Wis. 592. This case was decided on demurrer of defendant, and the proceedings being

very irregular and imperfect, leave was given plaintiff to amend.

Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 569; Pierce v. Reed, 2 N. H. 359.

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